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Introduction
0.1. The Concept of Secularism
Broadly speaking, secularism is a movement of thought, which aims
to improve the temporal welfare of the people on rational and ethical
grounds independently of religious considerations. The liberal
ambiance of the nineteenth century Western Europe1 favoured the
emergence of this movement. In the course of time, this concept
has been assimilated into many systems of philosophical thought
and socio-political movements and assumed different value
connotations.2 Hence, it may be difficult to give an adequate
conceptual definition to secularism. Dictionaries and encyclopaedias
have, nevertheless, attempted to provide us with certain conventional
definitions. Among them, the Webster’s Third International
Dictionary defines it as a “system of social ethics based upon a
doctrine that ethical standards and conduct should be determined
exclusively with reference to the present life and social well being
without reference to religion.”3
Similarly, the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics terms it
1 For an historical view on the impact of liberalism in the socio-political, economic
and cultural world of the nineteenth century Europe see Guido de Ruggiero,
The History of European Liberalism, trans. R.G.Collingwood, Fifth print
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1967); Christopher H. Dawson, Progress and Religion:
An Historical Enquiry (London, Sheed & Ward, 1938), pp. 206-211;Francis M.
Tyrrell, Man Believer and Unbeliever (New York, Alba House, 1973), pp. 86-
108; Jean Bauberot, “The Two Thresholds of Laicization”, in Rajeev Bhargava,
ed., Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999),
pp. 93-136.
2 Edwin Ewart Aubrey, Secularism a Myth: An Examination of the Current Attack
on Secularism (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1954); Vernon Pratt, Religion
and Secularisation (London, Macmillan, 1970).
3 Webster’s Third International Dictionary, (Massachusetts, Springfield, 1966)
vol. 2, p. 2053.
“as a movement, intentionally ethical, negatively religious, with
political and philosophical antecedents.”4 It was George J. Holyoke
(1817-1906), the English social reformer, who coined the word
“secularism”5 for the socio-political movement that he initiated in
the mid-nineteenth century. The aim of his movement was to improve
the welfare of the working class, to free them from all forms of
tyranny, whether of religion or of socio-political institutions, and to
propagate the values of rational thought, and the autonomy of the
secular order.6
The philosophy of utilitarianism7 had a great influence on
secularism in the early phase of its development. Scholars claim
that Jeremy Bentham’s book, Theory of Legislation,8 had a special
influence on the development of secular movement that was
launched by George J. Holyoke. According to Bentham’s theory,
the moral basis of politics and law should be determined from the
point of view of human welfare to attain the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. As a movement of thought, Secularism was
but a conscious articulation of the values and urges of the western
European society that prevailed during the nineteenth century. These
were the products of the Enlightenment,9 which propagated the
autonomy of reason and natural sciences, and Liberalism,10 which
stressed on the rights of the individual person. As a philosophical
thought, secularism stands for the non-recognition of the
4 E.S. Waterhouse, “Secularism”, in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed., J.
Hastings (Edinburgh, T & T. Clark / New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1981),
vol. 11, p. 347.
5 Crf. G. H. Taylor, A Chronology of British Secularism (London, National
Secular Society, 1957), p. 4.
6 Ibid., p. 5.
7 For a study of the development of the Utilitarian philosophy of Jermy Bentham
and its impact on society see Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism,
trans. M. Morris (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1966), pp.35-150.
8 Ibid., pp. 404-407.
9 Ibid., p. 281 f.
10 Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, op.cit; pp. 93- 346;
George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, third edition revised & enlarged
(London / Toronto / Sydney, George G. Harrap & Co., 1957), pp. 620-626.
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supernatural. It advocates rational thought and scientific temper.
From the ethical point of view, it calls for a practical morality of
tolerance in the civil society based on the rational and social nature
of the human person.11 Certainly, this is not the type of secularism
that we come across in the Constitution of India. This calls us to
search for the emergence of the Indian form of secularism in the
context of the development of political secularism as evolved in the
Western political history.
0.2. The Concept of Political Secularism
It is generally accepted among scholars that secularism, as a political
ideology for the governance of the State, advocates separation of
the State from religion.12 Depending on the nature of separation,
there are different forms of secular States. It is called political
secularism because the separation of the State from religion is
intended for the creation of a secure political order where the citizens
may organise their daily life13 free from religious conflicts; or when
such conflicts arise, these could be resolved amicably. Its aim is
different from religion, which deals with ultimate ideals of life
towards a higher time or a higher order of things with an
eschatological ring. These are beyond the aim and the competence
of a secular State.
The origin point of the political secularism was the wars of
religion that ravaged the Western Christendom in the aftermath of
the Reformation and the growth of denominational Churches, and
the eventual creation of the nation-states. In this conflict ridden
situation, the need arose to search in battle fatigue for a political
order so that people of different confessional persuasions might
coexist in peace and organise their ordinary life in a decent way,
free from religious wrangling and violence.14 This meant, in practice,
to separate the State from religion in some form so that the public
domain had to be regulated by some constitutional norms, which
were independent of confessional allegiance. These norms must
be capable of ensuring a sense of tolerance and public order in the
society. For this political objective, rules of peace, even with heretics,
and obedience to legitimate authority in the public sphere had to be
formed beyond revocation in the name of one or other version of
religious orthodoxy.15
The present day concept of political secularism, as we have it
in the liberal democratic tradition, emerged from these basic
principles. However, the significance of political secularism cannot
be properly gauged when viewed exclusively in the milieu of
Western Christian denominational conflicts. Whenever and
wherever interreligious or intrareligious conflicts and violence
become uncontrollable and unbearable, something similar to political
secularism arises intending to protect the citizens from a persistent
clash of ultimate ideals and religiously motivated denominational or
community interests.
The contemporary approach to political secularism depends
upon the mode of interpretation given to the nature of separation
involved between the State and religion in the public sphere. Prof.
Rajeev Bhargava suggests that essentially, there are two kinds of
approaches. The first kind identifies separation with total exclusion
of religion from the public domain.16 Accordingly, it has been
suggested that the secular State upholds no religion, pursues no
religious goals. Religiously defined-goods have no place in the
catalogue of ends the State promotes. Implicit in this approach is
the belief that religion is irrelevant to public life. Religion, where it
really counts in people’s lives and commitments, essentially exists
in the private sphere. This seems to be one of the widely accepted
views in the Western world about the separation of the State from
the Church.17 In its extreme form, the first kind of secular political
11 H. Srikanth, “Secularism versus Pseudo-Secularism: An Indian Debate”, in
Rudolf C. Heredia & Edward Mathias, eds., Secularism and Liberation (New
Delhi, Indian Social Institute, 1995), p. 91. See also Thomas Paine, The Age of
Reason, reprint (New Delhi, Indian Atheist Publishers, 1983).
12 Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?” in Secularism and Its Critics,
op.cit., p. 488.
13 Daily life means ordinary life as distinct from a life spent in the pursuit of some
ultimate ideals towards higher time or eternity. Ibid., pp. 490-491.
14 Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism”, ibid., p.32.
15 Ibid., p. 33.
16 Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?”,  Ibid., p.  493.
17 Ibid., p. 35.
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approach identifies separation with extrusion of religion from the
public square and the State tends to become hostile towards religion.
The typical example of this kind is the Constitution of the former
Soviet Union, which recognized the freedom to antireligious
propaganda but not religious propaganda.18
The second kind of approach does not demand total exclusion
of religion but identifies separation as setting boundaries or as
maintaining distance between the State from religion in the public
domain. This form of approach sees separation in terms of
“principled distance.”19 Accordingly, the second kind of approach
holds the view that it is possible for the co-existence of religion and
the State in the public sphere. Religion and State constitute two
distinct spheres in the society with their own respective areas of
jurisdiction to care for the religious and secular needs of the people.
Each is valuable in its own right. They respect each other as well
as their own limits. Therefore, the State maintains a principled
distance from religion in the public domain.
In the governance of the State, the idea of principled distance
operates either through a policy of neutrality towards religions or
through a policy of equidistant from religions. Positively speaking,
both maintain a reasonable approach towards religion. The purpose
of the neutrality policy is to avoid the State interference in the
religious affairs. Similarly, the State keeps equidistant from religions
so that it may not be partial to any particular religion.20
The Constitution of the United States of America is considered
to be a typical example of State’s neutrality towards religion. Prior
to the adoption of the Constitution, most of the States had State
Churches. When the Constitution was adopted in 1787, the United
States became a secular State in the sense that no religious test
was needed to hold a public office.21 Later in 1791, the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declared that the Congress
was to follow a policy of neutrality in religious matters, which is
construed as not to interfere with matters of religion.22 The First
Amendment to U.S. Constitution dealt with two distinct matters in
relation to religion. They are referred to as the “non-establishment
clause” and “the free exercise clause”. The non-establishment
clause prohibits the State from establishing or preferring any religion.
The free exercise clause prohibits the State from interfering in
religious matters.
There are some States, depending upon their historical
antecedents, recognise a particular religion as State religion.
However, in the political affairs of the State, they follow the policy
of separation in terms of equidistant from all religions and prohibit
religious intrusion into the political affairs of the State. In other
words, the State is not partisan to any religion in its political function
and in the distribution of the political goods to citizens. The most
characteristic example is the United Kingdom where the Anglican
Church is the established Church with the King / Queen as its
head.23 Nevertheless, the State gives full freedom to all religions
and equal liberty of conscience and worship to all citizens. Countries
like Ireland24 and Cambodia25 are of this category. In these States,
18 “In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR
is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious
worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.”
Article 124 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(1936).
19 Rajeev Bhargava, op.cit., p. 493.
20 Ibid., p. 494.
21 Article VI, 3, of the Constitution of the United States reads: “[N]o religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the
United States.”
22 First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1791) reads:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”
23 A. B.  Keith, Constitutional Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1939), pp. 406-
407. On account of the established Church in England, Prof. Ernest Barker
remarked that it was not a secular state. See Ernest Barker, Principles of Social
and Political Theory, reprint (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 77.
24 Article 44, 1(2) of the Constitution of Ireland (1937) recognizes the special
position of the “Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of
Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.” Nevertheless, no special
privilege is granted to it before the law because article 44, 2(2) declares: “The
State guarantees not to endow any religion.”
25 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1947) declares that “Buddhism
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separation is taken to mean setting boundaries between the State
and religion and their co-existence in the public sphere.
Political secularism also found its expression in the Constitution
of India. As a political concept, it stands for the separation of the
State from religion, equal protection of all religions and active
opposition to communalism.26 Indian secularism is a combination
of two streams of thought, the Western and the Indian.27 The
Western concept has been contextualised in accordance with India’s
culture of religious pluralism. In this process of synthesis, the content
of the Western political secularism has been identified and
interpreted as a political approach of religious tolerance for peaceful
co-existence in the political community. This is not new to India,
since it is known for religious tolerance. Consequently, the
foundation of the theory of Indian secularism has been widely
interpreted in the country as equal regard for all religions (Sarva-
dharma-sambhava),28 and opposition to communalism. Communal
conflicts are endemic in many parts of India.29
Evidently, as implied in the Constitution of India, secularism
refers not to the exclusion or marginalisation of religion from the
public sphere, but to a political and social order, wherein no one
religion in its respective claim is preferred to the others. In a positive
sense, it means that all religions are entitled, in their specific identities,
to equal protection of the State. Precisely, this approach calls for
the separation of the State from religion to make this polity to
function so that the political goods of all communities are protected
by the State. This happens only when the State in India is non-
partisan, which requires in the logic of its functioning separation of
the State from religion.
However, unlike the American concept of political secularism,30
the Indian concept is not based on a theory of strict “wall of
separation”31 between the State and religion. Freedom of religion
is guaranteed to all,32 but the State in India is not debarred from
providing religious assistance, provided it is on reasonable grounds
and on non-sectarian basis.33 Moreover, the State in India is
is the State religion” but article 8 guarantees to all “liberty of conscience and
worship.”
26 The terms ‘communal’ or ‘communalism’ generally denote in the Indian usage
a process of exclusive mobilization of a particular religious community on
powerful religious symbols for non-spiritual benefits such as social, economic
and political in a manner which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of other
communities or of the nation as a whole. Communalism usually provokes
violence against other communities, religious or non-religious, which are
presumed as obstacles in achieving the objectives of the communal group. For
an extensive study see Bipen Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New
Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1989).
27 Theodore De Bary, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition (New York / London,
Columbia University Press, 1958), vol. II, p. 150 f; K.M. Panikkar, Foundations
of New India (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp. 75-90; A.K. Saran,
“Secular-Sacred Confrontation: A Historical Analysis”, in Religion and Society,
vol. VIII, no. 3 (September 1971), pp.9-35; Satish Chandra, “ The Indian
National Movement and Concept of Secularism”, in B. Chakrabarty, ed.,
Secularism and Indian Polity (New Delhi, Segment Book Distributors, 1990),
pp. 69-71.
28 Gandhiji popularised it among the people.  See “Gandhiji and Secularism”, in
Bipan Chandra, op.cit., pp. 115-118. For the Constituent Assembly debates on
secularism see CAD, vol. VII, pp. 612-882. For scholars` views see
S. Radhakrishnan, “Forward”, in Abid S. Hussain, The National Culture of
India (Bombay, Jaico Publishing House, 1956), pp. vii-viii; P. B. Gajendragadkar,
The Constitution of India: Its Philosophy and Basic Postulates, reprint (Nairobi,
Oxford University College, 1972), pp. 40-41; Sarla Jhingran, Secularism in
India (New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 1995), pp. 142-143. For extensive
critiques of the use of the concept of secularism in the Indian polity see Ved
Prakash Luthera, The Concept of Secularism and India (Calcutta, Oxford
University Press, 1964); V.K. Sinha, ed., Secularism in India (Bombay, Lalwani,
1968); T.N. Madan, “Secularism in Its place”, in Secularism and Its Critics,
op.cit., pp. 297-320; Ashis Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery
of Religious Tolerance”, ibid., pp. 321-334; H. Srikanth, “Secularism and Pseudo-
Secularism”, op.cit., pp. 76-99.
29 It has been reported that from 1947 to 1980, over 5000 cases of communal riots
have been recorded. See A. R. Desai, “Caste and Communal Violence in Post-
Partition Indian Union”, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-
Independent India (Bombay, Sangam Books, 1984), pp. 10-41.
30 For a comparative study of the concept of political secularism in India and
United States of America see Wilfred M. McClay, “Two Concepts of
Secularism”, in Span (January-Feb., 2001), pp. 7-27.
31 Alvin W. Johnson & F.H. Yost, Separation of the Church and State in the United
States (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948), p. 12.
32 Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
33 Articles 27 of the Constitution of India.
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empowered with extensive powers to intervene in matters related
to religious practices.34 Therefore, the concept of separation as
provided in the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution has
been taken to mean as the State keeping a “principled distance”
from all religions. In other words, the State in India maintains a
reasonable approach towards religion. The State’s intervention or
non-intervention depends upon the nature of religious practices.
The State intervenes when their practices are in contravention of
the politically defined goods of the people, as individuals and as
communities, in their respective community identities, to organize
their ordinary lives in a manner worthy of human dignity. The
defining idea of Indian State’s principled distance seems to be based
on a humanistic secular approach towards State and religion in
order to secure a dignified life for all its citizens. This leads us to
see the reasons for the need of this research study in the context
of Indian secularism as enshrined in the Constitution of India as
well as the pastoral responsibility of the Indian Church to safeguard
human dignity in the civil society as implied in the teaching of the
Church on human dignity, especially as given in the documents of
the Second Vatican Council, the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et
Spes and the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae.
0.3. The Context of the Study, Research Question and
        Research Objectives
0.3.1. The Centrality of Secularism
Secularism is central to the conception of modern India as a nation-
state. The Indian national movement for independence, which was
one of the greatest mass movements in the world history – especially
from the year 1880 onwards when the Indian National Congress
(INC) spearheaded it, was a secular national movement.35 The
strength of the secular content of the Indian national movement
became obvious when, despite the partition of the country into India
and Pakistan and the Hindu-Muslim religious hatred and bloodshed
of 1946-47, free India succeeded in making secularism a basic
pillar of its Constitution.36 The framers of the Constitution of India
articulated the avowed aim of the Indian people and intended the
State to be secular.37 The Constitution of free India came to force
on 26 January 1950.
The term “secular” was added in the Preamble of the
Constitution in 1976 by the Forty-second Amendment of the
Constitution38 with the view to emphasise the secular character of
the Constitution as enunciated by the framers of the Construction.
Its purpose was to assure to the citizens that the nation remained
committed to the principles of the secular State. Srimati Indira
Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, has concisely stressed this when
she spoke for the reasons to add the concept “secular” in the
Preamble of the Constitution. She said inter alia:
The founding fathers of our Constitution and of our country
had intended Indian society to be secular and socialist. They
have guided our laws all these years. All we are doing now
is to incorporate them in the Constitution itself for they rightly
deserve to be mentioned there. The specific mention of this
fact in the Preamble will provide the frame of reference to
the people, to the government, to the judiciary and to the
world.39
The Constitution of India does not provide us with explicit and
precise explanation that the State in India is secular. However,
when we read through the debates that took place in the Constituent
Assembly at the time of framing the Constitution and when we
study the Preamble of the Constitution and the relevant provisions
of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to free exercise of
religion40 and the ruling of the Courts on the subject,41 we are on
34 Articles 17, 25, 26 and 38 of the Constitution of India. P. B. Gajendragadkar,
op.cit., pp. 13-22; K.M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads (Bombay,
Asia Publishing House, 1955), pp. 40-47.
35  Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., p. 44.
36  Ibid., p. 14.
37  See CAD, vol. VII, pp. 818-882.
38  Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s.2.
39  Crf. R.L. Chaudhari, The Concept of Secularism in Indian Constitution (New
Delhi, Concept Publishing House, 1987), p. 113.
40  See especially articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution of India.
41  The judicial ruling on the secular character of the Constitution came as early as
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reasonable grounds to say that secularism is a basic principle in
making India as a nation-state.
It is generally presupposed in the Western liberal democratic
political tradition that a secular State is expected to have three
basic characteristics. They are religious freedom, citizenship
unrelated to religious affiliation and separation – not always
complete, of the State from religion as two autonomous institutions
co-existing in the society.42 The secular character of the Indian
Constitution seems to satisfy these basics.43 However, the content
of the various secular provisions of the Constitution indicates its
indigenous character. It has been adapted to India’s unique character,
its propensity to respect diversity in religious pursuits and cultural
expressions44 and to see dignity in diversity.
One of the defining traits of India of all ages is its culture of
unity in diversity. It is the co-existence and integration of different
religious, cultural, racial and regional strands but respecting their
diversity and not resorting to homogeneity. Multiculturalism is integral
to Indian way of life. The constitutional term for this is “composite
culture.”45 It is the duty of every Indian citizen to value and preserve
it in the civil society.46 At the time of national struggle for
independence, Maulana Azad, a towering Muslim leader, has
succinctly articulated this unique character of the Indian society.
He pointed it out in his presidential address given to the plenary
session of the Indian National Congress held in 1940. He said, “It
was India’s historic destiny that its soil should become the destination
of many different caravans of races, cultures and religions. Even
before the dawn of history’s morning, they started their trek into
India and the process has continued since.”47 Recently this has
been recalled by Mr. K.R. Narayanan, the late President of India,
in his Republic Day address delivered to the nation in 1999. He
said:
The unity of our nation is not based on any monolithic idea,
but on our age-old tradition of tolerance, which is at once a
pragmatic concept of living together, and a philosophic
concept of finding truth and goodness in every religion. Long
ago, Mahatma Gandhi put it very simply: “I do not expect
the India of my dream to develop one religion, i.e., to be
wholly Hindu or wholly Christian or wholly Mussalman, but
I want it to be wholly tolerant with its religions working side
by side with one another.”48
India as a multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-
linguistic civilization constitutes what we call the nation-state. The
founders of modern India saw that secularism was a relevant political
answer to India’s diversity, especially religious diversity, which is
also known as the culture of pluralism.49  They saw that the value
of human dignity is embedded in a culture that esteems diversity.
They knew well that the culture of pluralism, especially religious
pluralism, has a symbiotic affinity with Indian ethos, which should
not be legislated away but should be incorporated into the
Constitution. Thus the framers of the Constitution ensured it by
making secularism one of the constitutive premises of the basic
structure of the Indian Constitution. They made it clear that respect
for diversity in the political community is an affirmation of human
dignity.50 Consequently, Constitution recognises the inalienable worth
1954.See Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 296.
Similarly, in the historic case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR
1973 SC 1461), the full bench of the Supreme Court inscribed secularism as an
essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. This ruling
was reiterated in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR 1976 SC 1260).
42  Donald E. Smith, India as a Secular State (New Jersey, Princeton University
Press, 1963 / Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1963),
pp.3-8.
43  Ibid., pp. 497-499.
44  Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp.46-47.
45  Article 51-A (f), Constitution of India.
46  Ibid.
47 Quoted in Sonia Gandhi, “Conflict and coexistence in our age” in Seminar, no.
521 (January 2003), 38-42, at 39.
48  Quoted in P.D. Mathew, Hinduism, Hindutva and Secularism (New Delhi,
Indian Social Institute, 1999), p. 138.
49  Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp. 84-85.
50 The value of human dignity is constitutive of the constitutional vision of India,
as it has been explicitly referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution. See the
Preamble of the Constitution of India.
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and dignity of every person as a moral subject to seek the truth and
to organize one’s way of life in consonance with one’s conviction
of conscience. This takes us to brief on the secular provisions of
the Constitution of India and their specific contents.
0.3.2. The Secular Provisions Affirm Pluralism
Articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution of India contain the secular
provisions. They serve as instruments to order a civil society
wherein people are free from coercion to seek the truth and organize
their lives as responsible subject of the society according to the
convictions of their conscience. In this regard, articles 25 and 26
guarantee individual and corporate freedom of religion. This is
generally secured in most of the constitutions under liberal
democratic polity. In positive terms, these articles affirm that the
individual and corporate freedom of religion in a free society is to
be a fundamental human right and thereby this right is to be
protected by juridical guarantee as a civil right. In negative terms,
these articles also imply that coercion in matters religious is to be
rejected as an offence against the inalienable worth and dignity of
human person as moral subject.
However, the entitlement to free exercise of religion as provided
under articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution is subject to
many qualifications and restrictions51 with the objective of giving
protection of human dignity. First of all it is subject to public order,
morality and health. Secondly, it is subject to the fundamental rights,
which are enjoyed by all in the political community as guaranteed
in Part III of the Indian Constitution. The free exercise of religion
is guaranteed under the conditions of these humanistic objectives
of the secular State since they are essential values needed in the
society for people to lead an ordinary life with dignity. Thirdly, all
persons are equally entitled to religious freedom. The doctrine of
egalitarian anthropology adopted in articles 14 to 18 is inbuilt in
article 25.  Fourthly, this freedom applies to individuals and to
corporate bodies. One need not be a member of a religious
association or denomination or any section thereof for the
entitlement to religious freedom. This has been aptly nuanced by
placing the right to freedom of conscience prior to the right to
profession, practice and propagation of religion.52 These articles
protect diversity of beliefs and ways of life and their peaceful co-
existence in a pluralistic society, which ensures to people security
to lead a life worthy of human dignity.
According to article 27, the Constitution incorporates yet another
dimension to the Indian conception of secularism. This article
specifically prohibits the State from levying tax the proceeds of
which are specifically appropriated for the maintenance or promotion
of any particular religion or religious denomination. This provision
equally implies that the State in India shall neither establish a religion
of its own nor confer any special patronage upon any particular
religion, but the State is not anti-religious.53 The prohibition against
discrimination implied in these articles also means that whatever
aid or encouragement the State may give, it should ensure the benefit
of all religions.54
Article 28 deals with an individual’s freedom from attending
religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational
institutions. This article provides that no religious instruction shall
be imparted in any educational institution wholly maintained out of
State funds.55 However, this does not apply to an educational
institution administered by the State but has been established under
an endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall
be imparted in such an institution.56 This article further stipulates
that no person attending any educational institution recognised by
51  “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practice and propagate religion”. Article 25 (1), Constitution
of India. This formula is repeated also in article 26, which secures corporate
freedom of religion.
52  P.K. Tripathi, “Secularism: Constitutional provision and judicial review”, in
G.S.Sharma, ed., Secularism: Its implications for law and life in India (Bombay,
N.M.Tripathi, 1966), pp. 165-194.
53  P.B. Gajendragadkar, op.cit., pp. 39-43.
54  Article 30 (2), Constitution of India.
55  Article 28 (1), Constitution of India.
56  Article 28 (2), Constitution of India.
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the State or receiving State aid shall be required to take part in any
religious instruction that may be imparted there or to attend any
religious worship that may be conducted there, unless such a person
or, if such person is a minor, his / her guardian has given consent to
it.57
Article 28 also lays down a specific distinction between
educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds and
those recognized by the State or receiving State aid. The imparting
of religious instruction is wholly prohibited in the former, but no
prohibition is attached to the latter from imparting religious
instruction or conducting religious worship. This article reiterates a
distinction between the sacred and the secular spheres, their co-
existence in the society, and the dignity of the persons as moral
subject by protecting them from coercion either by the State or any
power in deciding their way of life in the civil society.
Similarly, articles 29 and 30 empower the minority communities
based on language, culture or religion to conserve their respective
community identities. These articles are the pointers that the
Constitution is committed to conserve the rich heritage of India’s
composite civilisation in order to provide space in the civil society
for people to organise their lives in a manner fitting to their inalienable
worth and dignity as moral subject of the political community.
0.3.3. Secular Constitution on Trail
During the past two decades, the growth of religious
fundamentalism and communalism instrumentalised religion to
create violence in the society. It has become a matter of great
concern in the country. This was particularly true with a Hindu
communal nationalist ideology of a fascist type, known as the
Hindutva ideology.58  This militant organisation was formed in the
early phase of the twentieth century. In the recent years, it has
been on the rise over the Indian political landscape. The proponents
of this ideology have relentlessly sought to communalise Indian
nationalism by denouncing the secular provisions of the Indian
Constitution as pseudo-secularism59 intended to appease the non-
Hindus, namely the minority religious communities like Muslims
and Christians.
Prof. Upendra Baxi points out that these communal forces have
managed to attract political mobilisation of the masses by fanning
up the Hindu communal sentiments based on the following three
political propositions: “That Hindu Indians are treated badly by a
State professing ‘secularism’; that true ‘secularism’ consists in
affording a strong protection, or at any rate affirmation, of Hindu
Indians; and that only such protection or affirmation will, in turn,
ensure respect for the autonomy of other religions.”60 In other
words, non-Hindus can be part of Indian nation provided they abide
by the objectives of the Hindutva weltanschauung.
The Hindutva militants have committed atrocities against the
minorities, especially the Muslims and Christians. Religious
personnel were the victims of their attacks. Places of worship have
been demolished and desecrated.61 These acts of communal
violence and ideological onslaught have been grievous blows to
all principles of secularism, democracy and civilised nationhood
as enshrined in the nation’s Constitution. They have falsified the
culture of pluralism,62 which underpins India’s national unity, as
well as the characteristic mark of its history and civilisation.63
57  Article 28 (3), Constitution of India.
58 A large amount of writings, books and articles are available. We only mention
for information a few recent publications: Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu
Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to 1990‘s (New Delhi, Penguin
Books, 1999); P.S. Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism, from
Periphery to Centre (New Delhi, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1999);
Hansen T. Blom, The Saffron Wave, Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in
Modern India (New Delhi, 1999); P. Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism:
Hindus and Muslims in India (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996);
M. Juergensmeyer, Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (New
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1993).
59  H. Srikanth, op.cit., pp. 79-99.
60 Upendra Baxi, “The ‘Struggle’ for the Redefinition of Secularism in India: Some
Preliminary Reflections”, in Secularism and Liberation, op.cit., pp.53-78, at
56.
61 Frontline, vol.9, No. 26 (Jan. 1, 1993), pp. 22-23, 111- 117.
62  Abid S. Husain, op.cit., pp. 1-56.
63 K.N. Panikkar, “Outsider as Enemy: Politics of Rewriting History in India”, in
Indian Church History Review, XXXVI, No. 2 (December 2002), pp. 73-89.
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These acts of religious fanaticism and ideological assault have put
under high risk the viability of the secular, democratic constitutional
edifice of the nation. These acts of communal hatred have
traumatised the nation, especially the minority religious
communities, the Constitution and also Hinduism because its
greatness “lies essentially in its diversity and catholicity which
enabled it to embrace even atheism.”64
0.3.4. The Indian Church amid the Nation’s Secular Concern
Political parties and people’s organisations committed to India’s
composite culture and its secular democratic future have come
together on secular nationalist terrain to oppose the communal
menace of the Hindutva ideology and to ensure a polity appropriate
to the secular democratic objectives of the nation’s Constitution.
Christians in India, especially the Catholic Church in India, have
expressed their solidarity with the majority of the country’s citizens,
who are committed to the constitutional values and objectives of
secularism. In this context, the Catholic Church in India has taken
a historic decision to develop an appropriate pastoral response to
the political problem of national magnitude and expressed the Indian
Church’s desire to create a common forum of dialogue and
collaboration with the civil society in support of the secular
Constitution of India.65
With this emerging trend in the background, the Biennial General
Body meeting of the Catholic Bishops‘ Conference of India (CBCI)
held in the year 1994 in New Delhi had its deliberations on the
theme “The Christian Contribution to foster secularism in the country
in the changed circumstances.”66 At the end of the Conference,
the Bishops issued a “CBCI Message on Secularism.”67 This was
addressed to all people of good will, especially to the Catholics of
India, exhorting them to uphold and promote true secular values.
The Preface of the booklet published by the Conference states:
[The booklet] will go in a big way to help our personnel and
institutions to reflect over this fundamental and basic feature
of our nation so that we can take a positive step to promote
it.
Secularism or secularisation process enables people to liberate
themselves from oppressive traditions, beliefs and practices
breaking down feudalism, traditional values, culture of caste
discrimination and inferior status of women. This process of
secularisation involves socio-economic, political, constitutional
and religious implications.68
The Bishops‘ Conference in its message on secularism states:
In India today, poised as we are on the brink of revolutionary
economic, social and cultural changes, the forces of religious
bigotry and intolerance have unfortunately reared their ugly
heads. Some types of religious fundamentalism seek to gain
legitimacy in the guise of nationalism…This unfortunate
movement is exclusivist and intolerant. It seeks to divide the
polity on religious grounds and openly calls upon non-
conforming religious minorities to either conform or to get
out. Fortunately this religious bigotry is not representative of
the vast majority of India’s citizens, who remain tolerant,
respectful of religious diversities, and take pride in India’s
pluralistic society.
The Catholic Bishops of India, meeting in New Delhi on the
occasion of the 23rd Biennial Conference of the CBCI…have
prayerfully and carefully pondered over the situation prevailing
in India at this time. We strongly affirm our support for the
secular values enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which
are not merely tolerant of religious, cultural and linguistic
diversities, but which respect all these differences and which
unambiguously promote equality before law for all citizens
and the pursuit of social justice and the well being of all…
We are aware that secularism is integral to the basic structure
of the Indian Constitution and of Indian society…
64  Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., p.85.
65  JPAD, Secularism in Indian Context (New Delhi, CBCI Centre, 1994).
66  Ibid., p. vii.
67  Ibid., pp. 79-82. 68  Ibid., p.vii.
INTRODUCTION 17 18 HUMAN DIGNITY…
We strongly recommend that all citizens and Christians in
particular, actively participate in the political, social, cultural
and economic life of the nation to promote basic human
values and to make the political, social and cultural systems
supportive of the just aspirations of the people, specially of
the poor and the marginalized.69
Commenting on the pastoral role of the Church in promoting
and conserving the secular values of the Indian Constitution, the
Bishops say:
In this context, the primary role of the Church will be to
infuse the right spirit of secularism at different levels in society
through means available in our pastoral ministry. Catechesis
is one of the important means by which, the true spirit and
value of secularism can be infused. Secondly, information
about other religions, and the right attitude towards the values
of those religions is another means in our catechesis. Pastoral
letters should articulate this authentic character of secular
education…
Through its various Educational, Health and Social Service
Organizations, the Church in India should find creative means
of promoting true secular values…
We should not take our secular polity for granted, but should
work actively to preserve and promote it. Eternal vigilance
is the price of freedom.70
Similarly, the Indian Theological Association (ITA), in its annual
conference held in the year 2000 at Bangalore, studied the
phenomenon and ideology of Hindutva.71 In its concluding
statement, the Association stresses that it is a dangerous ideology
that falsifies Indian history and communalises Hinduism and Indian
polity.72 The Indian theologians highlight further that “the age-old
civilization of India is pluralistic and India has been continuously
sustained and nurtured by the diversity of its peoples, races, cultures,
religions, traditions, and languages … [which] cannot be
sacrificed”.73
In this context, describing the mission of the Church in the civil
society the Indian theologians stress inter alia:
India is a multi-religious and pluri-cultural country. Such
diversity is its divinely bestowed blessing and grace. The
Church’s mission in this context calls for it to be a truly
dialogical community…to foster dialogue with other religions,
ideologies and movements cherishing, safeguarding,
promoting and assimilating the wealth of truth and grace to
be found in them.
The dialogical mission of the Church also implies that it
becomes an agent of reconciliation and peace among various
groups. Even when it becomes itself a victim of communal
violence, it has to carefully avoid retreating into a paralysing
fear psychosis of indulging in aggressive and often counter-
productive postures of self-defence. Rather, it has to keep
in mind its vocation to be the “light of the world” and “salt of
the earth” and strive to enter increasingly into the mainstream
of the nation’s life by infusing into it the ever-new face of
Christ’s love. It has to join hands with the majority of the
country’s citizens who are, by and large, persons of good
will and peace loving. We have to create a common forum
of dialogue and liberative action through which mutual
misunderstanding, hatred, discord and discrimination could
be opposed, and we could together build up a nation with
justice, peace and harmony.74
Religious communalism of the Hindutva has become a threat
to the secular character and framework of the State and society in
India. It has spread its tentacles in the civil society and also69  Ibid., pp. 80-81.
70  Ibid., pp. 81-82.
71  J. Mattam, & P. Arockiadoss, eds., Hindutva: An Indian Christian Response
(Bangalore, Dharmaram Publications, 2002).
72  Ibid., p. 322.
73  Ibid., p. 315.
74  Ibid., pp.320-321.
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succeeded in gaining access to centres of political power.75 The
Indian Church76 has come forward in solidarity with the civil society
and shares its anxiety and hope. It has taken the initiative, though
in a moderate way, to enter into dialogue and collaboration with the
civil society to offer its services to strengthen the secular democratic
institutions of the country in order to protect the just aspirations of
all, beginning with the least in the society, the poor and the
marginalized. The Church has taken this step as part of its social
ministry to civil society arising from its pastoral responsibility, and
willing to offer the “means available in [its] pastoral ministry”,77
such as catechesis, pastoral letters, educational, health and social
service organizations to impart and inculcate among people the
true spirit of secularism as enshrined in the Constitution of India.78
These are laudable plans of a religious community, which is an
insignificant minority community in the vast political community of
India.
0.3.5. Centrality of Human Dignity
The context of our study, which we described above, posits the
central research question and the answer provides the matter for
our research project. This has to do with the question: what
constitutes the ultimate reason for the Indian Church to support the
Indian form of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution? In
responding to this question, we need to pay attention to the following
principles. The ultimate reason must be grounded in a manner that
it must be embodied in the secular provisions of the Constitution of
India and, at the same time, it must also resonate with Christian
faith perspective. This is needed because the Church’s support for
the political philosophy of the Indian form of secularism is not
something added to or something apart from its ecclesial ministry,
but part of its social ministry to the civil society arising from its
ecclesial ministry.79
This is based on the faith perspective of the Church. The Church
is the community of Jesus‘ disciples who are called together by his
word and animated by his Spirit to continue his mission in all nations
and among all peoples of the world.80 The Church’s ecclesial mission
is none other than the mission of Jesus himself in the service of
God’s Kingdom inaugurated by him.81 The Church carries on this
mission in the civil society, as the Second Vatican Council states,
“most of all by her healing and elevating impact on the dignity
of the person, by the way in which she strengthens the seams of
human society…the Church believes she can contribute greatly
toward making the family of man and its history more human.”82
Therefore, it is part of Church’s ecclesial ministry to civil society to
defend the transcendent dignity of the human person created in
God’s image.83
Hence, our answer to the research question is that respect for
human dignity constitutes the ultimate reason for the Indian Church
to support the Indian form of secularism as enshrined in the secular
provisions of the Constitution of India. It is also the basis for the
Church to engage into dialogue and collaboration with all peoples
of diverse persuasions in the civil society and with civil movements
75  K.N. Panikkar, “Introduction: Defining the Nation as Hindu”, in K.N. Panikkar,
ed., The Concerned Indian’s Guide to Communalism (New Delhi, Viking
Publishing House, 1999), p. xi.
76  The phrase “Indian Church” generally means the ‘Catholic Church in India’ but
not in an exclusive sense. The phrase came in usage among Catholic theologians
in India since the late 1970s, when interest in inculturation became an important
movement in the Catholic Church in India. See D.S. Amalorpavadass, ed., The
Indian Church in the Struggle for a Just Society (Bangalore, NBCLC, 1981),
pp. 17-18, 40 ff; Paul Puthanangady, ed., Yesu Krist Jayanti 2000: Towards A
New Society (Bangalore, St. Paul’s Press, 2001), p. 92.
77  JPAD, Secularism in Indian Context, op.cit., p. 81.
78  Ibid.
79  Crf. GS, articles 40-42, 76; DH, articles 1, 13; SRS, nn.41-42. It is appropriate
here to cite the comment of Vatican II on the role of the Church in the political
community in our contemporary times. The Council says, “The role and
competence of the Church being what it is, she must in no way be confused
with the political community, nor bound to any political system. For she is at
once a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person.” (GS,
article 76, para 2).
80  LG, article 1; GS, article 40; AG, articles 1-2.
81  AG, articles 4-5; GS, article 40; DH, article 13.
82  GS, article 40, para 5. Italics are ours.
83  Ibid., articles 19, 76. See also AG 12.
INTRODUCTION 21 22 HUMAN DIGNITY…
for the purpose of promoting values and institutions protective of
human dignity. Respect for human dignity is central to political
philosophy of the Indian form of secularism and to Christian theology
of human person, society and State because both accord high priority
to prevent violation of human dignity.
How do we know it? We know it from the secular previsions
of the Constitution of India84 and allied articles85 of the Constitution,
which respect diversity in the civil society. To respect diversity,
especially religious diversity, is to provide with a polity that prevents
the evil of violating the inalienable worth and dignity of the human
persons as free and responsible subject to seek after the truth and
accordingly to organise their lives in the civil society. Similarly,
according to Christian theology, since all persons are created in
God’s image and redeemed by Christ for blessed communion with
God, they are endowed with capacity to seek after the truth and
order their lives in responsible freedom.86 Therefore, all are
endowed with inviolable dignity and inalienable rights. Society and
State must respect these values because people created in God’s
image are the subject of these institutions.87
Our answer to the research question is also the basis for the
title of the thesis “Human Dignity in Indian Secularism and in
Christianity” which is sub-titled as “Christianity in Dialogue with
Indian Secularism.”88 Hence, in accordance with the context of
our research project, which we have explained above, and the title
of the thesis, we articulate the following as the primary objectives
of our research: Firstly, it is to present a systematic study of the
centrality of the concept of human dignity in the Indian secularism
as seen in the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution and in
the Christian theology of the human person, the political order, and
religious freedom. Secondly, it is to identify in them the defining
principles of value commonality and, therefore, to propose human
dignity as a significant basis for dialogue and collaboration between
the Indian Church and the political community to promote the
philosophy of humanistic secular ethos of the Constitution.
It is to be noted, as shown above, that the modern concept of
political secularism is European in origin. It is based on the principles
of civil liberties, egalitarian social order, human dignity, rule of law,
the institution of the constitutional State – a State based on the
principle of the separation of powers – and the modern affirmation
of the secularity of the temporal order, which is to be construed as
the recognition of the legitimate autonomy of the secular institutions,
their proper laws and values. These principles and institutions were
the eventual results, which arose from the collapse of the unitarian
order of the medieval Western Christendom that could no longer
withstand the forces of modern pluralistic Europe.89
These political values and institutions are also embedded in the
Indian secularism as provided in the secular provisions of the
Constitution of India.90 They have been adopted from the Western
liberal democratic tradition, but attained indigenous value significance
when adapted to the Indian cultural ambience to secure the
pluralistic nature of the Indian society under a constitutional State.
All this becomes part of our investigation in order to provide with
material needed for theological reflection on the concept of human
84  Articles 25-30, Constitution of India.
85  See the Fundamental Rights as given in Part III of the Constitution of India,
especially articles 14-19.
86  GS, articles 12, 15-17, 19, 22; DH, articles 2-4; Catechism of the Catholic
Church (Bangalore, TPI, 1994), pp. 327-332.
87  GS, article 73; DH, articles 2-8.
88  We make a point of clarification in the use of the term ‘Christianity’ as given in
the title of the thesis. By Christianity we specifically mean in the title of the
thesis the Catholic Church in India. Hence, human dignity in Christianity means
the concept of human dignity as propounded in the teaching of the Catholic
Church. Similarly, by the sub-title “Christianity in Dialogue with Indian
Secularism”, we mean specifically the initiative taken by the Catholic Church in
India to dialogue with Indian Secularism.
89  For a perceptive analysis of this phenomenon see Georg Essen, “Ethical
Monotheism and Human Freedom: Theological Convergences with the Pluralism
of the Modern Age” in Norbert Hintersteiner, ed., Naming and Thinking God
in Europe Today: Theology in Global Dialogue (Amsterdam/New York, Rodopi,
2005), pp. 265-284.
90  In this particular instance it applies to article 25 of the Constitution of India,
which deals with the free exercise of religion. See D.D. Basu, Commentary on
the Constitution of India (Calcutta, S.C. Sarkar & Sons, 1962), vol. II, p. 144;
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dignity as emerging from the Indian Constitution and from the
Christian tradition.
While dealing with the Christian tradition, we pay special
attention to the documents of the Second Vatican Council, the
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium
et Spes; and the Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis
Humanae. In these two conciliar documents, the Catholic Church
brings out an updated version of theological anthropology in a
systematic form dealing with human person, society and state – all
centred on human dignity and sourced by the biblical vision of the
human person as imago Dei. This takes us to give an overview of
the chapters.
0.4. An Overview of Chapters
This thesis consists of six chapters in two parts. Part one has
chapters one to three and part two has chapters four to six. First of
all, it is to be noted that the principles of Indian secularism have
been shaped by insights assimilated from many traditions. The
principle of equal respect and regard for all religions is founded on
India’s age-old ethos of religious pluralism.91 The principle of social
and religious reforms for human welfare and regard for human
dignity has been the constitutional affirmation of the humanistic
legacy of Indian Renaissance.92 The principles of democratic polity,
fundamental rights, egalitarian social order and separation between
State and religion have been drawn from the experience of Western
liberal political tradition, especially from the constitutional principles
of the United States of America.93
Hence, chapter one titled as “Secular State in the Western
Tradition,” presents a study of the development of this political
institution in the Western Tradition. Our inquiry begins with the
Church in the Roman Empire and culminates with the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America,
which established, for the first time in the political history, religious
freedom as a legal institution in the juridical order of the constitutional
State. In this chapter, we have also added a few cases appeared
before the U.S. Supreme Court. These cases had been appealed
on the ground that certain policies of the Board of Education in that
country seemed to have violated the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. We have taken these cases to study the judicial
application of the First Amendment, which claimed to have
established a strict principle of separation between the State and
religion in that country.
Similarly, chapter two titled as “The Indigenous Foundations
for Indian Secularism” presents a study of the Indian political history.
We present a historical survey beginning from ancient history to
the time of making of the Constitution of modern India as a nation-
state. We pay special attention to some important political
developments and ideas that shaped the culture of religious diversity
and tolerance, and the history of Indian national movement for the
independence of the country. We also highlight the emergence of
different kinds of nationalism, such as religious nationalism,
communal nationalism and secular nationalism, which arose in the
country, when the political struggle began for swaraj
(independence) from the foreign yoke. We highlight the importance
of the secular nationalism, which, under the leadership of Gandhiji,
the Father of the nation, became the national mass movement for
the creation of a modern secular democratic State in India.
We also present the opinions of the framers of the Constitution
on secularism as voiced during the debates on the subject in the
Constituent Assembly and the opinion of the scholars. We follow
this process of investigation to obtain, from a historical perspective,
a clear idea of the development of the Indian form of secularism
enshrined in the Constitution of India, even though the secular
C.H. Alexandrowicz, “The Secular State in India and in the United States,” in
Journal of the Indian Law, vol.2 (1960), p. 273.
91 Sarla Jhingran, Secularism in India, op.cit., p. 143; S. Radhakrishnan, “Forward”,
in Abid S. Hussain, The National Culture of India, op.cit., p. 5.
92 R.C. Majumdar, gen.ed., The History and the Culture of the Indian people, vol.
X, pp. 86-159, 256-310. Theodore de Bary, gen.ed., Sources of Indian Tradition,
vol. II, pp. 41-42 ff.
93 B.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, op.cit., vol. II, p. 144;
V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, 6th edition, revised & enlarged
(Luck now, Eastern Book Company, 1984) pp. 13-45; K.M. Panikkar,
Foundations of New India, op.cit., pp. 75-86; Theodore de Bary, The Sources of
Indian Tradition, vol. II, pp. 132-135, 148-149, 151-152.
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provisions of the Indian Constitution are, for the most part, adopted
from the political principles of the Western countries.
 The results of our research in this part points out three facts:
(1) Secularism as a political doctrine developed both in the Western
political history and in India in a religiously plural society to manage
religious conflicts, to protect people from religious persecution,
religious violence and occasional communal conflicts and to affirm
religious freedom a civil right. (2) It was instrumental to create the
institution of constitutional State based on civil liberties and
egalitarian social order and rule of law. These are essential political
values and institutions to protect human dignity. (3) India’s age-old
culture of religious pluralism, its composite civilisational ethos and
the absence of religion-state conflict in the annals of its political
history were instrumental to integrate the Western liberal democratic
values and institutions with its ancient civilisational heritage.
Secularism adopted by the framers of the Constitution of India
means positively religious pluralism, which is to be taken to mean,
in a broader perspective, as respect for diversity in the political
community and negatively it means a non-communal State.
Chapter three deals with the secular provisions of the Indian
Constitution and allied articles as interpreted by the Indian judiciary.
Most of our study in this chapter revolves around articles 25 and
26 of the Constitution, which guarantee individual and corporate
freedom of religion. These provisions point out that the framers of
the Constitution intended a form of secular polity that respects all
religions with equal regard and acknowledges the place of religion
in the society. However, the right to free exercise of religion is
subject to a constitutional framework of egalitarian social order,
imbued by the principles of welfare State, public order, morality
and health. These are expected to promote substantive values for
the enhancement of human dignity in the civil society. Hence, the
State in India has wide powers to regulate religious freedom in
defence of human dignity.
Moreover, when cases are appealed against certain State
regulations allegedly violating the right to religious freedom, the
Courts in India have the responsibility of giving judicial definition to
“religion” and “matters of religion” protected under the secular
provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, the contribution of the
Indian judiciary is very important for us to understand the
underpinning political philosophy of the Indian form of secularism.
For this purpose, we investigate some historic cases that appeared
before the Supreme Court of India claiming for protection under
the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.
Hence, chapter three deals with the judicial definitions of
“religion” and “matters of religion”, constitutional laws related to
the “Free Exercise of Religion and State Restrictions”, “State
Assistance to Religion”, and some important laws related to “Welfare
State and Religion”.
In the light of our research findings, we define the Indian
secularism as Humanistic Secularism and enumerate its salient
features. We define it as humanistic because its idea of “principled
distance” from religion is basically conditioned by certain humanistic
values in defence of the inalienable worth and dignity of the human
person as a moral subject in one’s self-identity and the community
of persons in their distinct community identities in the pluralistic
society. Human dignity is inclusive of the social nature of the person.
We conclude the first part of our reflection by pointing out that
the leitmotif of the philosophy of humanistic secularism of the Indian
Constitution is to secure a dignified life for all its citizens and to
promote values and institutions for the advancement of human
dignity in the pluralistic Indian society. This is the solemn resolve of
the people of India, their hope and longing for constituting India a
Secular Democratic Sovereign Republic.94 In the context of Indian
political community, it is a significant source for our theologising on
human dignity in the light of theological anthropology as developed
in the Christian tradition. This would be our task in part two of our
research study.
Part two presents an extensive theological study of the Christian
concept of human dignity beginning with the biblical sources and
94  See the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
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its systematic development in the documents of Vatican II. The
aim of this part of study is to interpret the philosophy of the humanistic
secularism of the Indian Constitution, which is centred on human
dignity, in the light of theological anthropology, which is also centred
on human dignity. In the light of these studies, this part of research
concludes that human dignity can be a significant basis for dialogue
and cooperation between the Indian Church and the civil society to
advance the cause of humanistic secular ethos of the country as
intended by the Constitution of India.
In pursuance of our research objective, chapter four studies
the development of theological anthropology based on imago Dei
doctrine. In particular, this chapter pays attention to the biblical
sources, the contributions of the classical theology and the social
encyclicals of the Popes. The aim of this chapter is to see, in a
historical perspective, the development of the concept of human
dignity in Christian thought, especially in theological anthropology,
and its eventual importance for the Christian approach to temporal
order, namely society, State and human rights, etc., as expounded
in the contemporary encyclicals of the Popes.
Chapter five explores – in the background of the progressive
theological development of the concept of human dignity as shown
in chapter four, the theology of human dignity as developed in the
documents of the Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes and
it application to religious freedom and constitutional State as given
in Dignitatis Humanae. These documents are studied in the
context of the Church’s opening towards the world in terms of
triple dialogue. In particular, as required to our research objectives,
the chapter studies the systematic development of the theology of
human dignity in Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae in
the context of the Church’ opening towards the political community
and its readiness to enter into dialogue and collaboration with people
of all persuasions in the civil society to secure human dignity.
Chapter six concludes our research project. Firstly, the chapter
collates the salient features of the philosophy of humanistic
secularism of the Indian Constitution. Similarly, it brings together
the most important features of the Church’s teaching on
constitutional State based on human dignity. Secondly, it points out
a common anthropological approach underlying in the philosophy
of Indian secularism and in the theological anthropology of the
Christian thought. We call it as “relational anthropology” whose
ethics is “interhuman concerns”. It is an ethics that cares for others.
It is the same ethics of the Kingdom values of Jesus. Therefore,
the chapter relates the humanistic values of the Indian secularism
with the Kingdom values and points out that God’s Word and Spirit
are not absent in the political aspirations of the people of India as a
nation-state. Accordingly, the chapter concludes by proposing that
human dignity can be a strong basis for dialogue and collaboration
between the Indian Church and the civil society in defence of
substantive values and institutions, which protect human dignity in
the civil society.
0.5. Methodology
Our research consists of a systematic theological study of the
concept of Human Dignity in Indian Secularism and in Christianity.
This research project requires a theological methodology, which is
inductive in its approach of doing theology.95 The inductive method
starts from historical facts and experiences and leads to faith-insight
or revealed truth for interpretation.96 In this process of doing
theology, both the historical elements and the deposit of faith
(depositum fidei) constitute as the sources of theological
knowledge (loci theologici).97 Theologising proper takes place in
the second stage. We have arranged the structure of our research
work accordingly. Part one of the thesis constitutes the first stage
95  One may also notice this method being followed by the Second Vatican Council
in its document, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
Gaudium et Spes, as this document is addressed to all people with the hope of
building up a world order on the principles of inalienable worth and dignity of
human person. See Charles Moeller, “History of the Constitution”, in Herbert
Vorgrimler, ed., Commentary on the Document of Vatican II, (New York, Herder
and Herder, 1969), vol. V, pp. 1 ff.
96  Yves Congar, “Theology’s Task After Vatican II”, in L.K. Shook, ed., Theology
of Renewal (New York, Herder and Herder, 1968), vol. I, p. 57.
97  Ibid., pp. 47- 65.  Karl Rahner, “Theological Reflections on the Problem of
Secularization”, in Theological Investigations (New York, Herder and Herder,
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and part two forms the second stage, namely the theological
reflection on human dignity in the light of insights drawn from
Christian faith. For part one, we gather materials from political
(Western and Indian) and ecclesiastical history, and from
commentaries on constitutional law and judicial decisions of the
Indian judiciary as well as from few cases appeared before the
United States‘ Supreme Court.
Chapters one and two basically deal with political and
ecclesiastical history for which we follow the method of content
analysis and contextual interpretation of the historical information.
Chapter three studies specifically the secular provisions of the
Constitution of India. For this we follow the method of case study
of the Court rulings on relevant cases as used in the study of
constitutional law. Part two consists of theological reflection. We
follow the method of systematic theological approach. To maintain
the thematic continuation of the research from one chapter to the
other, each chapter ends with a conclusion.
The topic of this research project is something new. We haven’t
come across its treatment either under theological or secular
disciplines, though several research works and doctoral dissertations
and plenty of articles have been published on Indian secularism.
However, some of the previous works are helpful for our research.
John Courtney Murray’s98 theory of religious freedom and
constitutional State has helped us to explore the significance of
some underpinning principles of the liberal democracy to Christian
understanding of human person, society and State because in the
Christian thought these are centred on the value of human dignity,
but ultimately theocentric as they are founded on the theology of
creation and redemption. Rajeev Bhargava’s99 theory of classifying
the Indian secularism as “contextual secularism” and his theory of
“principled distance” give us clarity in our attempt to identify the
centrality of human dignity in the Indian secularism. For our
theological work on human dignity, the doctoral dissertations of
A. O. Erhueh100 and Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson101 on the concept of
image of God have been resourceful.  And for the rest, ideas taken
from various sources are duly acknowledged at appropriate places.
1973), vol. 10, pp. 318-348; Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Church and Mankind”,
in Concilium, vol. I, no. 1 (1965), pp. 34-50. See also “Loci Theologici,” and
“Deposit of Faith,” in Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Concise Theological
Dictionary, ed., C. Ernst, trans., R. Strachan, 3rd print (New York, Herder and
Herder / London, Burns & Oates, 1968), pp. 123-124, 264-265. Jared Wicks,
“Loci Theologici,” in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, eds., Rene Latourelle
& Rino Fisichella (New York, St. Paul’s, 1994), pp. 605-607.
98 John C Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, Woodstock Papers, no.7
(Westminster, The Newman Press, 1965).
99 Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism For?” in Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism
and Its Critics (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 486-550.
100 A.O. Erhueh, Vatican II: Image of God in Man (Roma, Urbaniana University
Press, 1987).
101 Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson, The Image of God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century of
Old Testament Research, trans., L. Svendsen, revised by M.S. Cheney,
Coniectanea Biblica, Old Testament Series 26 (Almqvist & Wiksell International,
1988).
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PART ONE
The Concept of Secular State in
the Western and Indian Traditions
1. Introduction
Part one studies the concept of secularism enshrined in the secular
provisions of the Constitution of India. In accordance with the
research objectives of this thesis, the aim of the research in part
one is to identify the particular form of Indian secularism and its
philosophy centred on human dignity in the governance of the State.
This part of the research takes into account that the concept of
political secularism developed over a period of several centuries of
Western political experience. It has become a constitutive concept
of the liberal democratic political tradition that originated from
Western Europe and the United States of America.
The concept of political secularism reached the shores of the
Indian soil in the second half of the nineteenth century at the time
of Indian national movement for independence. Right from the
beginning, the political application of secularism in the functioning
of the State in India has been indigenised to India’s need.
Accordingly, it came to mean in the Indian polity the separation of
the State from religion, equal regard for all religions (Sarva-dharma-
samabhava) and active opposition to communalism.  This form of
secularism stood opposed to communal nationalism, and united
people of diverse faith affiliations to engage in the national struggle
for political freedom. It was a basic constituent of the freedom
movement’s political vision of the independent India and finally got
incorporated into the Constitution as one of the pillars of India as a
nation-state.
The indigenous character of the Indian secularism is known by
the manner in which the idea of separation between the State and
religion is approached. The manner in which religious freedom is
guaranteed in the Indian Constitution shows that the State in India
keeps a “principled distance from religion”. In other words, the
Indian secularism raises the radical question: separation for what?
The principled distance that the State in India keeps from religion
gives the answer. It is to promote humanistic values, such as liberty,
social justice, egalitarian social order, and religious harmony, etc.,
in the pluralistic society so as to secure human dignity for all. These
are solemnly enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
Hence, in keeping with the research aim of part one, chapter
one presents an investigation into the development of the concept
of secular State in the Western political history and the eventual
creation of the particular form of secularism as given in the
Constitution of the United States of America. The American model
of secularism seemed to have had a decisive influence in the
formulation of the fundamental rights that pertain to the free
exercise of religion as given in the Indian Constitution. In this context,
our purpose in chapter one is to identify the value significance of
the particular form of political secularism as given in the United
States Constitution in relation to Indian Constitution which is studied
in the following chapter.
In chapter two, we make an extensive enquiry into the Indian
political history to identify the indigenous factors that influenced
the formation of the political philosophy of secularism as thought
out by the framers of the Constitution. Besides giving due attention
to India’s ancient and medieval political history, we pay special
attention to the history of the Indian freedom movement, the
emergence of the Indian secular nationalism and the debates that
took place in the Constituent Assembly. These had a decisive role
to play in the formation of the concept of secular state, especially
when religious violence and hatred prevailed at the dawn of
country’s independence.
In chapter three, we examine and discuss the value significance
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of the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution, which
regulate the principle of religion-state separation. We also analyse
and study the relevant constitutional provisions dealing with religion
and welfare State as well as the egalitarian order of the civil society.
We conclude that these provisions of the Indian Constitution do not
intend to create a State, which marginalizes religion, or a State
neutral to religion. On the contrary, they imply that the State in
India respects all religions with equal regard, acknowledges their
due importance in people’s lives and guarantees their free exercise
but under the frame-work of an egalitarian social order informed
by the principles of the welfare state which is consistent with the
progressive enhancement of human dignity. Hence, chapter three
deals with the contribution of the Indian judiciary.
CHAPTER ONE
Secular State in the Western Tradition
1.1. Introduction
Several political exigencies, which took place for many centuries,
were instrumental for the creation of the concept of secular state
in the Western world. Its historical antecedents are traceable in
the history of Christianity in the Roman Empire. This concept, which
developed into a definite political institution in the early nineteenth
century, has been instrumental for the creation of the liberal
democratic tradition in the Western Europe and in the United States
of America. It has become the contemporary political order in many
countries of the world.
The modern India as a nation-state is founded on liberal
democratic polity. While framing the fundamental rights as well as
the secular policy, the framers of the Indian Constitution have relied
upon the principles laid down in the Constitution of the United States
of America, including the one related to religious liberty as provided
in articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution. Moreover, in the
early phase of the Indian judiciary the Indian judges have been
guided by the jurisprudence of the American judiciary in dealing
with matters related to religious freedom.1
Hence, in this chapter we present a broad review of the Western
political history to point out the most significant events and ideas,
which have shaped the institution of the secular state in the West.
We also pay special attention to United States Constitution. We
have also incorporated in our study some historic cases dealing
1 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp.100-101.
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with the principle of religion-state separation, which appeared
before the United States Supreme Court. Our objective is to highlight
that the political philosophy of religion-state separation as enshrined
in the Constitution of the United States does not amount to hostility
towards religion, but does imply a juridical understanding of co-
existence of the two institutions to take care of the secular and
religious needs of the citizens in a manner which secures human
dignity in the cultural climate of that country.
1.1.1. The State Cult in the Roman Empire
The Roman Republic, which was centred on the Senate and based
on the citizen-class of Italy and the provincial municipalities, was
founded on the cult of state-deity just as the Greek city-states grew
around some local deities.2 Arend T. Van Leeuwen observed that
it was a weakness of the Roman Republic to have this sacral linkage
since it meant that the existence of the Republic was legitimised by
a theocratic ideology.3 Augustus Caesar revived the state-cult. He
championed the cause of the Roman Republic, but introduced the
political ideology of Hellenistic orientalism.4 Thus, he combined in
himself the function of the Prince of the Senate with the sacerdotal
office of Pontifex Maximus, the supreme priest of the state-
religion.5
The oriental cult of theocratic ideology became well ingrained
into the Roman republican polity by the third century A.D., when
the imperial cult of Sol Invictus (the invincible Sun deity) was
firmly established and the status of Summus Deus (Supreme Deity)
was accorded to the Sun among the Roman syncretic pantheon.
With this process, the emperor was apotheosised, as he was believed
to be the earthly manifestation of the presiding Sun deity of the
Empire. Consequently, oriental forms of emperor worship and
imperial absolutism were adopted.6 The citizens had to pay religious
veneration to the emperor and their refusal amounted to high
treason.7
Christopher Dawson in his study, The Making of Europe8,
concluded that the Roman Empire at the time of Diocletian and
Constantine the Great was a semi-oriental State having more in
common with the Persian imperial cult than with the Roman
Republic.9 There was no place in this form of political system to
make distinction between citizen’s allegiances to the State from
that of religion. On the contrary, the State was believed to be
omnipotent and all-inclusive “society-state”10 which claimed to
represent the embodiment of cosmic totality under one single
omnipotent authority, the deified emperor.11
1.1.2. The Church in the Roman Empire
The rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire as an autonomous
religious institution entitled to serve the spiritual concerns of the
people, created a new political consciousness regarding a twofold
loyalty the citizen owed to religion and to the State. This was
unknown in the ancient world. One of the renowned political
historians, George H. Sabine, remarked that seen from a historical
perspective, it was not only “the most revolutionary event in the
history of Western Europe, in respect to both politics and to political
philosophy”12 but also a significant factor for the development of2 Ernest Barker, op.cit., P. 11.
3 Arend T. Van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, trans., H.H.
Hoskins (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), p. 273.
4 Arend T. Van Leeuwen claimed that Hellenistic orientatlism was a form of
theocratic ideology adopted by the Roman Emperors. It was a syncretism
between the Hellenic republicanism and the theocratic autocracy of the ancient
Near Eastern civilizations. These civilizations conceived the State as an
embodiment of cosmic totality centred on the king who represented in his
person the reigning deity of the nation / empire. The theocratic ideology in these
ancient civilizations took concrete form in terms of autocratic absolutism. For a
detailed study see ibid., pp. 145-208.
5 Ibid., p. 273.
6 Ibid., pp. 204-205, 272.
7 Hubert Jedin & John Dolen, eds., Handbook of Church History, trans. Nselm
Biggs (Freiburg, Herder and Herder / London, Burns & Oates, 1965),vol.I, p.89.
8 Christopher H. Dawson, The Making of Europe (London, Sheed and Ward,
1932).
9 Ibid., pp. 10-34.
10 Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (Boston, The Beacon
 Press, 1953), p. 119.
11 Arend T. Van Leeuwen, op.cit., p. 165.
12 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 162.
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the modern constitutional right to “liberty”13 as we have it under
the liberal democratic political system.
The duty to respect the legally constituted authority of the State
was an undoubted Christian virtue, which Christians believed, was
intended by God and, therefore, deeply embedded in Christian ethics.
Christ himself taught it when the Pharisees along with members of
the Roman ruling class, the Herodians, attempted to entrap him
into a controversy against paying tribute to Caesar. It was at that
time Christ uttered to them the memorable words of wisdom:
“Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to
God the things that are God’s.”14 St. Paul in his letter to the Romans
explained further the meaning of the Christian attitude to governing
authorities in general and in particular the Christian obligation to
the legally constituted authority of the State:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities.
For there is no authority except from God, and those that
exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists
the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those
who resist will incur judgment. For rulers not a terror to
good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of him
who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive
his approval, for he is God’s servant for your good. But if
you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not beat the sward in
vain; he is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the
wrongdoer. Therefore one must be subject, not only to avoid
God’s wrath but also for the sake of conscience. For the
same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are
ministers of God; attending to this very thing. Pay all of them
their dues, taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom
revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honour to
whom honour is due.15
Similarly, the Fathers of the Church, even in the midst of state-
led persecution against Christians, were emphatic on Christian
loyalty to the State. They advised them to hold civil and military
offices and exhorted them to pray for the well being of the emperor
and for the good of the empire. St. Clement of Alexandria, for
instance, remained loyal to the civil duties of the State and affirmed
Christian obligation to pay taxes, to render military service when
needed and to recognize the Roman law. He also claimed that if
the State persecuted the Church, the hand of Providence was to
be worshipped. Origen, another great theologian of the ancient
Church, attempted to work out a political theology on the basis of
Rom 13: 1-7, and argued that the Imperium Romanum derived its
power from God.
St. Clement of Alexandria, moreover, believed that the Roman
Empire exercised a providential mission to maintain unity and peace
in the world to facilitate the proclamation of the Gospel of Christ.
So, he affirmed that ultimately the empire was in the service of the
faith. Similarly, Tertullian, who defended the freedom of Christian
conscience in the face of anti-Christian empire, was profoundly
convinced that the emperor’s power derived from God. He taught,
moreover, that the God of the Christians was also the God of the
emperor. So, he exhorted the Christians to pray for the well being
of the emperor and for the continuance of the empire.16 Their faith,
nevertheless, bound them to “a twofold duty… unknown to the
ethics of the pagan antiquity”.17 They were not only duty bound to
Caesar on matters that were Caesar’s but also to God on matters
that were God’s. If the two came into conflict, their conscience
bound them that their duty to God took precedence over duty to
Caesar.18
The Christian faith, therefore, contained a value that was
incompatible with the Roman virtue of unlimited loyalty to the State.
It meant in Ernest Barker’s phrase “the sundering of the sphere of
society from the sphere of the state”.19 For the citizens who followed
13 Ibid., p. 166.
14 Mt 22:21. See also Mk 12:17; Lk 20:25.
15 Rom 13:1-7. See also 1 Pet 2:13-17; 1 Tim 2:1-4.
16 Hubert Jerdin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit. vol.1, pp.316-
 317.
17 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 164.
18 Crf. Acts 5:29.
19 Ernest Barker, op.cit., p. 7.
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the traditional religions of the empire, the highest duty to the
State meant the highest duties of morality and religion. Its overt
expression was the cult of emperor worship, who was believed to
be the deified supreme civil authority, in whom were united the
spiritual and temporal powers. On the contrary, for the Christians
the religious duties were a supreme obligation owed directly to
God.20 Consistent with their faith, the Christian conscience could
not submit to a deified emperor “to be the court of last resort”21 to
decide their spiritual destiny, their eternal salvation. Hence, until
the Edict of Milan,22 which granted liberty of worship to all religions,
widespread martyrdom23 was the price Christians paid for the
freedom of conscience for which they clamoured.
For this reason, the Church in the Roman Empire advocated an
institutional separation between religion and the State. This new
proposal of the Church in the ancient world order arose from the
Christian vision of the human person. Based on the Biblical
revelation, Christians believed right from the beginning that human
persons were embodied spirits endowed with spiritual and temporal
natures and their corresponding needs and destinies. As embodied
spirits, human persons were created in God’s image and destined
for life eternal, which is not however, divorced from one’s concrete
temporal life.24
Grounded on the twofold essential nature of human persons,
the Church claimed that society was likewise maintained by twofold
orders and powers, the spiritual and temporal, to care for this twofold
essential needs and destinies of the people. It follows that under
this theological perspective, citizens owed a twofold duty, one to
religion and the other to the State.25 The religious duty came under
the spiritual order in loyalty to the demands of one’s conscience
and the duty to the State came under temporal order in loyalty to
the demands of legal enforcement required in the civil society. Both
duties were qualitatively distinct and generally independent of each
other as one was concerned with eternal life and the other with life
temporal.
The separation, which the Church advocated between religion
and the political order, meant neither hostility nor competition
between the two, but rather implied to establish the jurisdiction
proper to each institution, to respect their autonomy in that sphere
of human life which belongs to the competence of each institution
and to acknowledge their mutual support so as to ensure religious
liberty of the citizens. As George H. Sabine suggests, the Church
believed that both institutions were “divinely appointed agencies
for the government of human life in this world and the world
hereafter”.26 Hence, the distinction between the spiritual and
temporal orders is decisive to understand the Church’s claim for its
spiritual freedom and the manner of co-existence it sought to
maintain with the State.
Utmost vigilance and moral courage were, therefore, needed
on the part of the Church and the State to preserve the sanctity of
20 George H.  Sabine, op.cit., p. 166.
21 Ibid., p. 165.
22 Emperors Constantine Augustus and Licinius Augustus enacted
 the Edict of Milan in the year A.D. 313. The content of the Edict
 reads:
“Freedom of religion cannot be restricted, and in matters pertaining
to the divine, each man should be allowed to obey the dictates of his conscience…
We desire that anyone wishing to practise the Christian religion should be able
to do so without the slightest fear of being harassed because of it. The Christians
have full liberty to practise their religion.
However, what is accorded to the Christians is accorded to everyone else too.
Each man has the right to choose and practise the cult that he prefers, without
his honour or the convictions being attacked. Thus there will be peace in our
time”.
As quoted in Hubert Jerdin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 317.
 23 The persecutions that took place during the reign of Septimius Severus, Decius,
Valerian and Gallienus were in particular of religious nature against Jews and
Christians who refused to comply with Emperor Cult. For detail see Hubert
Jerdin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol.I,  pp.217-228.
24 For the patristic theology of Human person see William A. Jurgens, selected &
trans. The Faith of the Early Fathers, reproduced by license (Bangalore,
Theological Publication of India, 1984), vol. 1, nn. 500-522; vol. 2, nn. 500-512;
vol. 3, nn. 500-525.
 24 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 166.
 25 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 166.
26 Ibid., p. 166.
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the line of jurisdiction drawn between the spiritual and temporal
orders.27 It was a plain fact that often the line was breached for
spiritual advantage or for political benefit and, as a result, jeopardized
the citizen’s liberty for which the Church waged the moral war.
The first of these ruptures took place in the fourth century itself
when the Church resorted to the secular arm of the empire to
restore its doctrinal orthodoxy against the onslaught of heresies.28
In the year A.D. 381, emperor Theodosius I (379-395), for instance,
accorded imperial status to the orthodox Christian faith,29 whereas
non-Christian religions were not tolerated to grow. This was the
imperial policy thereafter pursued by successive Christian emperors.
But several Church representatives saw the dangers involved in
such a close alliance between the two.30
Christianity had, therefore, not only stepped into the shoes of
the ancient Roman imperial religion but also attempts were made
to rationalise a Christian version of the State-cult especially in the
Eastern Roman Empire.31 Thus the trend was set for State
intervention in the ecclesiastical affairs, which was known as
Caesaropapism.32 It was, nevertheless, to defend the autonomy of
the Church in matters religious and, therefore, to safeguard freedom
of conscience that the Church resolved to stop the growing menace
of Caesaropapism and to re-define the kind of co-existence that
ought to be maintained between the Church and the State.
Athanasius, the bishop of Alexandria, led the first of the
resistance against the interference of the State in matters
ecclesiastical, when emperor Constantius II (A.D.337-360) claimed
for himself the title “Episcopus episcoporum” and, thereupon,
appointed bishops and imposed Arianism33 as the faith of the empire.
Led by Athanasius, the Catholic bishops of the Western Roman
Empire anathematised Arianism34 in the Synod of Sardica in the
year A.D.343, condemned the emperor’s interference in matters
divine and defended the irrevocable independence and freedom of
the Church in matters ecclesiastical.35 The Synod dispatched a
letter admonishing the emperor “not to confuse the Roman
government with the order of the Church, nor to impose Arian
heresy into the Church of God”.36
Hosius, the bishop of Cordova spearheaded the second instance
of resistance against imperial interference in the matters of faith
when emperor Constantius once again attempted to impose
Arianism in the Church.37 In a letter of protest addressed to the
27 Ibid., p. 167.
28 The Council of Nicaea (June 16 - August 25, 325) was the first Ecumenical
Council of the entire Church. Emperor Constantine the Great convened it. He
treated it as the Council of the Empire. Its theological purpose was to affirm the
orthodox doctrine of Christ and the Holy Spirit against Arian heterodoxy. At
the Council the emperor’s influence was decisive to defeat Arianism. The
Council’s decision became the official orthodox Christian doctrine to be
professed in the Empire. See Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition:
From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (A.D.451), revised edition, trans., J.
Bowden (London & Oxford, Mowbray, 1975), pp. 249-264; 78-79.
29 Hubert Jerdin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 68-
 69, 89.
30 Ibid., p. 90.
31 Eusebius, the bishop of Caesarea, expounded the Christian vision of the state
cult. He was a theologian, historian and an influential political person in the
Eastern Roman Empire at the time of Constantine the Great. In his work,
Historia Ecclesiastica and Vita Constantini, Eusebius described Constantine
the Great as an expected figure of certain biblical predictions. He eulogized him
as a co-fulfiller of Christ’s saving mission and, therefore, credited him with the
resemblance (mimesis) of Christ, the Logos of the Father. Hence, the Emperor’s
function was treated with priestly and royal prerogatives. The Bishop projected
the Emperor as the image (eikon) of an ideal ruler. Thus Eusebius was the
forerunner of Byzantine Emperor cult, which came to be known as
Caesaropapism. For detail see Aloys Grillmeier, op.cit., pp. 252-262; Van
Leeuwen, op.cit., pp. 276-286.
32 Hubert Jerdin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol.. 1, pp. 429-430.
33 Arianism is a heretical doctrine about Christ expounded by Arius, a distinguished
Alexandrian priest. Arianism claimed that Jesus Christ was neither true God
nor true man because Christ neither shared divine nature nor human nature. He
was not the mediator between God and humankind because humanity and
divinity were not united in his person. Christ was only a composite intermediary
being between God and humankind in the hierarchical order of being. See Aloys
Grillmeier, op.cit., pp. 219-248.
34 For a detailed discussion on the controversy see Trevor Gervase Jalland, The
History of Papacy: An Historical Study (London, SPCK / New York, Morehouse-
Gorham Co., 1949), pp. 218-226.
35 Arend T. Van Leeuwen, op.cit, p. 277.
36 Ibid., p. 277.
37 Trevor Gervase Jalland, op.cit., pp.228-231.
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emperor, the bishop, citing the saying of Christ, “Render
therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the
things that are God’s”, stated, “therefore we are not entitled to
govern on earth, and you, Emperor, are not entitled to sacrifice. I
write to you out of care for your salvation”.38
The Western Church of the fourth century found the greatest
champion of the Church’s freedom in St. Ambrose, the bishop of
Milan. The conflicts that he encountered in defence of the autonomy
of the Church against the position of emperors Valentinian II (383-
392) and Theodosius I (379-395) were of historic importance. The
bishop asserted that in matters spiritual the Church has jurisdiction
over all Christians, the emperor included. In A.D.395 the bishop
refusing to set aside a Church building for the empress to listen to
the preaching of the Arian doctrine, asserted, “To the emperor
belongs the palaces, to the priests the churches”.39 The bishop
declared further, “the Emperor’s place is inside, not above the
Church… in matters of faith the Bishops used to judge the Emperors
not the Emperors the Bishops”.40
In the Eastern Roman Empire the Cappadocian Fathers led the
movement against the religious policy of the emperor Valens
(A.D.365-378) when he interfered with the freedom of the Church.
St. Basil, the bishop of Caesarea, held the view that obedience to
the law of the State is a duty when laws promote welfare of the
society. But when the State jurisdiction oversteps its competence
and opposes the divine law and, therefore, infringes on religious
freedom, it must be resisted.41
The political thought that emerged from these pastoral conflicts
that arose in the political arena and the theological reflection of the
Fathers on the nature of relation between the Church and the State
received official approval of the Church at the end of the fifth
century in the writings of Pope Gelasius I (492-496). In his letter
written in A.D. 489 to emperor Zeno (474-491), on matters
regarding the legitimate place and the duty of a Christian Emperor
in a Christian State, Gelasius I stated inter alia:
It is his (sc. The Emperor’s) business to learn what is the
content of religion, not to teach it. He has received the
privileges of his power on civil affairs from God, and so he
should be thankful for benefits received, and not claim
anything contrary to God’s order. It is God’s purpose that
bishops should be responsible for the administration of the
Church, not the secular powers; the latter, if they are
Christian, according to his will ought to be subject to the
Church and to the bishops.42
Five years later in another letter written to emperor Anastasius
I (491-518), Pope Gelasius I described the distinct features of the
spiritual and temporal powers and their mutual relation, which was
known as the ‘doctrine of the two powers’. The pope wrote:
There are in fact two, Emperor Augustus, by whom this
world is originally …governed: the consecrated authority of
bishops (auctoritas sacrata pontificum) and the royal power
(regalis potestas). Of these, the responsibility of the bishops
is more weighty, since even for the rulers of men they will
have to give account at the judgment seat of God. For you
know, most gracious son, that, though in your office you
preside over the human race, yet you bow your head in
devout humility before those who govern the things of God
and await from them the means of your salvation; you realize
that in the use and fitting administration of the heavenly
sacraments you ought to submit to Christian order, not to be
its master … for if within the limits of the order of civil
government Christian bishops appreciate that sovereignty
38 Arend T. Van Leeuwen, op.cit., p. 277.
39 Ibid., p. 277.
40 Ibid., p. 278. In his letters written to Emperors Gratian, Theodosius I and
Valentinian II, St. Ambrose pursued a relentless logic in championing the rights
of God and the Church, using Scripture to illustrate the truth of God’s sovereignty
in matters human and divine. See Roy Joseph Deferrari et ali., eds., The Fathers
Of The Church. St. Ambrose, new trans. M.M. Beyenka, reprint (Washington,
D.C. The Catholic University of America, 1967), vol. 26, pp.3-66.
41 Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen, Handbook of Church History, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 85, f. 42 Trevor Gervase Jalland, op.cit., p. 326.
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has been conferred on you by the disposition of heaven, and
themselves obey your laws, so as to prevent their seeming
to resist a judgment supreme in human affairs, how greatly
it befits you in your turn eagerly to give obedience to those
to whom have been assigned the privileges of the sacred
mysteries.43
The Gelasian doctrine holds that the society is divinely ordained
to be governed by two authorities, the spiritual and temporal. The
priest (sacerdotium) holds the spiritual authority and the king
(imperium) exercises the temporal authority.44 Both authorities are
believed to be subject to law. The spiritual authority is to be exercised
in accord with the divine law and the temporal authority in accord
with the natural law to fulfil their necessary functions in the
government of the State so as to respond to the twofold needs of
the people.45
Under Christian dispensation, no person can possess both
jurisdictions. The twofold jurisdictions ought to remain distinct and
inviolate, but mutually to respect and support the rights God has
ordained to each realm for the good of the people. Among the two,
the spiritual jurisdiction is superior in dignity as it deals with the
eternal destiny of the people in accord with one’s conviction of
conscience.46
For almost a thousand years, the canonists relied on Gelasian
doctrine to settle recurrent claim for supremacy that arose between
the Church and the State. This was particularly the situation in the
Middle Ages. Thus the Gelasian doctrine asserted the individual’s
right to spiritual autonomy and freedom over which the temporal
jurisdiction has no competence. The doctrine, therefore, set the
term for the development of the concept of “individual privacy and
liberty”47 as we have it in the modern political system.
1.1.3. The Medieval Church-State Controversy
The Middle Ages were known for the remoulding of Europe out of
the chaos that befell from the breakdown of the Western Roman
Empire. The Church was the sole institution equipped with a high
organizational potential, which emerged from the collapse of the
Roman Empire, carrying with it the cultural and spiritual heritage
of the classical age. The Church committed itself in the task of
reshaping the socio-cultural, political and spiritual fabric of the young
European feudal States. Feudalism began to settle itself as a more
definite form of socio-political system from which were to arise,
eventually, the institution of the nation-state and the constitutional
principles that were carried forward from the Middle Ages into
modern Europe.48
The medieval European world, which was re-constructed by
the Church, was conceived as a universal Christian society, the
collective body of the Christian society-state (Christendom). For
unlike in the past, the Church was believed to be more than a
voluntary body of believers but treated as co-extensive with the
expanse of the empire itself. Under theocracy, this society-state
had two heads, the Pope and the emperor. They represented two
principles of authority, the spiritual and the temporal in the society.
They were considered as forming two governments each with its
own hierarchy, laws and jurisdictions, both ruling the universal
Christian society.49 Among them the secular power was expected
to be at the service of divine truth.50 It is no surprise that this form
of governance occasioned for frequent interference and heightened
controversy between the spiritual and temporal powers, not in
defence of the freedom proper to each order but for the claim of
supremacy over the Christendom.
Thus in the Carolingian age, the State consistently interfered in
matters ecclesiastical while the Church to a great extent controlled
the affairs of the State. It was Pope Leo III who in the year 80043 Ibid., pp. 326-327.
44 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 199.
45 Ibid., p. 199.
46 Ibid., p. 174.
47 Ibid., p. 175.
48 George H. Sabine, op.cit., pp. 198-199, ff.
49 Ibid., p. 199.
50 Ibid., p. 201.
SECULAR STATE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 47 48 HUMAN DIGNITY…
A.D. re-established the Holy Roman Empire once again in the
West by crowning Charlemagne emperor of the universal Christian
world.51 But to reject the subordination of imperium to sacerdotium,
Charlemagne crowned his son, Louis Pious, emperor.52 The claim
for ecclesiastical supremacy over secular order became so strong
that at the end of the ninth century the papalists modified the doctrine
of two powers of Gelasius I (492-496). They argued that all authority
was originally vested in the Church. Retaining the spiritual authority,
the Church handed over the temporal authority to the State. On the
contrary, the imperialists claimed that God directly gave both powers
to the Church and the State respectively.53
The lay Investiture controversy,54 which rocked the Western
Christendom in the eleventh century over the choice of bishops by
the secular authorities, was another manifestation of the prevailing
Church-State interference and control in the Middle Ages. The
controversy precipitated in the armed struggle emperor Henry IV
had with Pope Gregory VII. The later advocated in his document,
dictatus Papae,55 the supremacy of the papal authority on the
ground that the spiritual order was superior to temporal order. The
document stressed that the Pope had the power to depose unworthy
Christian rulers.
The Concordat of Warms, which was signed in the year 112256
during the reign of Pope Calixtus II and emperor Henry V, settled
the Investiture controversy. The terms of the settlement distinguished
in the appointment of the bishops the spiritual elements and
authority that belonged to the Church alone from the temporal office
attached to it. The Concordat excluded the interference of
the State in ecclesiastical matters and acknowledged the
supremacy of the spiritual order.57
In fact, the Concordat of Warms was only an armistice. This
was particularly true in the thirteenth century when the powerful
Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II, who was very much under
the influence of Islamic civilization, revived once again
Charlemagne’s supremacy controversy. He pronounced himself to
be the priest-king, under the call of God and having an authority
derived directly from God, not mediated by the Pope.58
Frederick II claimed that as Vicarious Christi, the emperor
was not only above all kings, but also above the Pope himself.
Frederick II stressed further that it was his messianic mission to
restore the divine order in the Christendom and to revive the
universal dominion of Augustus as lord and saviour of the world.
His dream, however, ended in the complete collapse of his empire,
just as half a century later the spiritual superiority of a similar kind
on the Pope’s part led to a most wretched disaster. In the long run,
Caesaropapism and Papocaesarism turned out to be not merely
incompatible, but even mutually destructive.59
Consequently, at the end of the thirteenth century, the
controversy over spiritual supremacy shot up once again but in
another form, when Pope Boniface VIII clashed with King Philip
the Fair of France. This time the Pope was not challenged by the
emperor but by a national king on the appointment of a bishop
against the wishes of the king. In defence of the episcopal
appointment, in his Bull, “Ausculta Fili”, Boniface VIII mentioned
“the unconditional superiority of the papal power over every secular
power”.60 Against the papal claim, Philip called for a session of the
State-General to defend himself and to declare the Pope a criminal.
This incident marked decisive victory of the State’s supremacy
over ecclesiastical authority on political matters at a time when the
concept of nation-state and national monarchy were gaining
51 Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 3, pp. 93-94.
52 Ibid., p. 101.
53 Sidny Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall, Church and state Through the Centuries: A
Collection of Historic Documents with Commentaries, (Westminster, Newman
Press, 1954), p. 11.
54 Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 3, pp. 393-397.
55 Trevor Gervase Jalland,  op.cit., pp. 397-398.
56 Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 3, p. 400.
57 Ibid., p. 401.
58 A.T. van Leeuwen, op.cit., p. 286.
59 Ibid., p 287.
60 H.Jerdin & J. Dolen, op.cit, vol. 4, p. 276.
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currency in Europe. The aggrieved Pope in retaliation published
the Bull, Unam Sanctam,61 which reiterated the medieval
hierarchical order and hierocracy of the Western Christendom. Once
again, Unam Sanctam revived the unitarian concept of the society-
state in which religion and society were treated as fused together
into one monolithic organization under the supreme power of the
Pope.
The claims of the papacy for supremacy over temporal order
as advocated by Boniface VIII were excessive and not in accord
with the doctrine of the two powers developed from the time of
pope Gelasius I (492-496). These were opposed by the sovereign
State monarchies that sprang up in the following centuries. One of
the thinkers who challenged on the legitimacy of hierocracy and
contributed to the idea of secular State in the fourteenth century
was Marsilius of Padua.62 He defended the independence of the
secular society as good and necessary in itself apart from sanction
by the Church. The fourteenth century secular thinker, Marcilius
of Padua, emphasised that in secular matters the Church was subject
to civil jurisdiction.
In his work, Defensor Pacis (1324), Marsilius of Padua
distinguished between divine and human laws. Divine law is enforced
only by the rewards and punishments, which God renders in the
next life. Hence, no temporal compulsion can be used to enforce
religious tenets. He declared, “The rights of citizens are independent
of the faith they profess; and no man may be punished for his
religion.”63 These are, in fact, the two principles fundamental to
the modern concept of secular State. The political thought of the
Defensor Pacis was too radical to exert an immediate influence in
the medieval Christendom, but indirectly it had a great and far-
reaching effect.64 At any rate, the hierocracy of medieval
Christendom could no longer withstand the economic, political,
intellectual and religious forces led loose by the modern age. Among
them, the Protestant Reformation singularly stands out for our study,
which scattered the monolithic faith of Western Christendom and
accelerated the pace of modern spirit of awaking in the Western
society.
1.1.4. The Reformation: Religious Diversity and Secularisation
The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century was
primarily a religious revolt to reform the Western Christendom.
The secularisations of the State and religious tolerance were not
even the remote concerns of the Reformers. Apart from
transforming the centre of authority from the Pope to the Bible as
interpreted by each Reformer, no new notion of religious liberty
was expounded by them. Commenting on the prevailing mentality,
George H. Sabine wrote:
The belief was general on the side on the churchmen that
pure doctrine ought to be maintained by public authority, and
on the side of statesmen that unity of religion was an
indispensable condition of public order. Where the government
of the Roman Church was broken the maintenance of the
faith became a charge on the civil authorities, because no
one else could do it. In effect, the decision as to what is pure
doctrine passed largely to secular rulers. When this was
honestly attempted, government became charged with the
impossible task of deciding what religious truth is, and when
it was not honestly done, politicians were given an infinity of
troubled water to fish in.65
Martin Luther, who propagated freedom of conscience, opposed
it when he entered into political alliance with German princes and
advocated the duty of passive obedience to civil authority: He wrote:
It is no wise proper for anyone who would be a Christian to
set himself up against his government, whether it acts justly
or unjustly.
There are no better works than to obey and serve all those
61 Ibid., p. 277.
62 For an analysis of the of the political thought of Marsilius of Padua, see George
H. Sabine,  op.cit., pp. 250-264.
63 Leo Pfeffer, op.cit., p. 18.
64 Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 363. 65 George H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 305.
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who are set over us as superiors. For this reason, also,
disobedience is a greater sin than murder, unchastity, theft,
and dishonesty, and all that these may include.66
Moreover, he relied on the secular arm of the Protestant princes
to crush Catholicism. His disruption of the universal order of the
Western Church, the suppression of its monastic institutions and
ecclesiastical corporations, and the abrogation of the Canon Law,
removed the strongest checks upon the State that had prevailed in
the Middle Ages.
In like manner, John Calvin set no limit upon the power of the
State. He believed as emphatically in the duty of passive obedience
to civil authority as Martin Luther. In its initial form, Calvinism not
only condemned resistance to civil government but it lacked a
political theory disposed towards liberalism, constitutionalism or
reprehensive principles. Where Calvinism had free choice, it
developed characteristically into a theocracy, a kind of oligarchy
maintained by an alliance of the clergy and the gentry from which
the mass of the people was excluded. This was the nature of Calvin’s
own government in Geneva and of Puritan government in
Massachusetts.67
In this respect, John Calvin’s theory of the Church was more in
the spirit of extreme medieval ecclesiasticism of the Western
Christendom than that held by nationalist Catholics. According to
him the first duty of the State was to maintain the pure worship of
God and to uproot idolatry, sacrilege, blasphemy, and heresy.68 The
emphasis in his enumeration of the objectives for which the power
of the State existed is surprising to read in what he wrote in his
Institute:
It is the purpose of the temporal rule, so long as we live
among men, to foster and support the external worship of
God, to defend pure doctrine and the standing of the Church,
to conform our lives to human society, to mould our conduct
to civil justice, to harmonize us with each other, and to
preserve the common peace and tranquillity.69
The immediate consequence of the Reformation in connection
with the creation of secular state was, however, the
denominationalization of the Western Christendom into Catholic
and Protestant, out of which emerged several independent
confessional princely States based on ecclesiastical territories. As
opposed to the medieval arrangement, according to which the
bishops had been civil as well as ecclesiastical princes, the lay
princes now became civil princes of the territorial Churches or
national Churches. Each of them had its own centres of learning
with theological faculties and jurisprudence, which offered
authoritative interpretation of the Bible and of the Canon Law.70
Describing the nature of the Western society during the early
Reformation period Hedrick W. van Loon wrote:
There had been one universal spiritual and intellectual prison-
house. The Protestant rebellion had ruined the old building,
and out of the available material it had constructed a gaol of
its own. After 1517 there are, therefore two dungeons, one
reserved for the Catholics, the other for the Protestants.71
Arend T. van Leeuwen describes that this was the prevailing
situation at the time when the princes kept a close watch on the
Church and society lest their subjects deviate from the confessional
faith of their respective States.72
The Protestants assumed, as did the Catholics, that religion
was a binding force for civic cohesion. They could neither think of
a body politic apart from homogeneous religious society, nor could
they rationalise citizenship independent of religious affiliation.
Heinrich A. Rommen points out that Catholics and Protestants
carried on medieval Christendom but in territorial forms.73 Seen
66 Crf. Ibid., p.310.
67  Ibid., p. 311.
68  Ibid., pp.316-317.
69 Crf. Ibid., p. 312.
70 Arend T. van Leeuwen, op.cit., p. 302.
71 Hedrick Willem van Loon, The Liberation of Mankind (London,
 G.G. Harrap, 1954), p. 149.
72 Arend T. van Leeuwen, op.cit., p. 303.
73 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought (London,
 Herder and Herder, 1950), p. 566.
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retrospectively, the confessional faith reproduced once again,
at the beginning of the modern age, the pre-Christian Greco-Roman
polis and civitas in Christian garb. Church historians Hubert Jedin
and John Dolen were correct in reminding us that the peace of
Augsburg (1555),74 which compromised the Catholic and Lutheran
claims in the German States, translated the medieval Catholic and
Protestant political thoughts into concrete political policy. For the
territorialism of the peace of Augsburg was solely based on the
policy of cujus regio ejus et religio, and accordingly religious
minorities were compelled to immigrate to States professing their
respective faiths.75
As a matter of fact, neither the Augsburg peace nor the division
of Christendom into two confessions could last for long. As Hubert
Jedin and John Dolen76 remind us, the spirit of Reformation, in the
course of time, created multiple fractures in the medieval edifice
of the Corpus Christianum Romanum. This produced multiplicity
of denominational Churches, each professing their own conflicting
faith claims. These were often mutually antagonistic in their faith
and Church-order. Therefore, under the aegis of denominational
claim, pluralism of denominational faith became a matter of political
fact to be reckoned with in the Western European polity.
Many States had, moreover, sizable religious minorities. So, the
States could no longer be a Catholic or Protestant only, nor could
they legitimate any single confessional faith as the religion of the
realm by marginalizing others. This could have caused not only
civil war but also fratricide, which would have endangered social
harmony and civic amity. Herbert Raab, who wrote on the history
of Attempt at Church Reunion in the seventeenth century
observed:
Tolerance became the political motto of state in the
denominationally mixed territories and in the flourishing
mercantilist thinking. The idea of the authority of the state
began to surmount denominational limits and prejudices.77
Under these circumstances, mutual toleration of faith arose as
a matter of historical expression of religious liberty. Commenting
on the slow process of secularisation of the medieval State in
Europe, George H. Sabine wrote:
In most parts of northern Europe it [Protestantism] produced
relatively strong religious minorities, bodies too numerous to
be coerced without endangering public order and quite as
determined as the party in power to gain for its own faith the
benefits of legal establishment. Every such body was, for
obvious reasons, a political source of disorder, and every
religious difference was, at the same time, a political issue.
Only slowly and under the compulsion of circumstances that
permitted no other solution did a policy of religious toleration
emerge, as it was discovered that a common political loyalty
was possible to people of different religions.78
Some ideas towards secular State also arose from the dissident
sects of the Reformed Churches, known as the free-Churches.
These were the Congregationalists, Baptists and Quakers of
England, etc. Some of them propagated the belief that the Church
was a spiritual association of believers grouped in autonomous
Congregations. They believed that a body of Christians could form
a Congregation, which would be a true Church. It could ordain its
clergy, and set up a reformed mode of worship, without authorization
either by civil magistrates or ecclesiastical authority. In principle,
therefore, the Church was seen as a voluntary association of like-
minded believers.
This sort of ecclesiastical perspective enabled the free-
Churches to renounce the support of the civil authorities either in
reforming themselves or propagating their practices to others. These
Ecclesial Communities argued that, as spiritual associations, the
Church for its existence neither required the coercive power of the
State nor its hierarchical authority. Ecclesial activities were carried
74 H. Jedin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 5, pp.295-300.
75 Ibid., 297.
76 Ibid., p. 632.
77 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 510.
78 George H. Sabine,  op.cit., p. 306.
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on in these sects by democratic process.79 A petition submitted
by a Baptist in 1614 to King James I of England points out:
Kings and magistrates are to rule temporal affairs by the
swords of their temporal kingdoms, and bishop and ministers
are to rule spiritual affairs by the word and spirit of God, the
sword of Christ’s spiritual kingdom, and not to intermeddle
one with another’s authority, office, and function.80
This statement of the Baptist clearly emphasized that the nature
and function of the Church and the State were different and,
therefore, the distinction between the two powers were to be
respected. Anson P. Stokes who did an extensive research on the
free-Church movements in the United States of America points
out that this sort of Ecclesial Communities eventually flourished in
that country as being freed from European mainland.81
Critical thinking of various philosophers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries also made significant contribution for the cause
of religious liberty and Church-state separation. George H. Sabine
highlights that the empiricism of John Locke, Francis Bacon and
David Hume, the rationalism of Rane Descartes and Immanuel
Kant and the utilitarianism of Jermy Bentham, Thomas Paine and
John Stuart Mill provided liberal intellectual frameworks for the
process of secularisation of European society. These philosophers
affirmed, against medieval dogmatism, the importance of empirical
knowledge in establishing truth and defended the right to freedom
of inquiry and autonomy of individual’s reason and conscience.82
Suffice for us to indicate here the contribution of John Locke,
the first among the advocates of religious toleration. Speaking on
religious toleration needed in the Church of Christ he wrote:
I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark
of the true Church. If the gospel and the apostles may be
credited, no man can be a Christian without charity and
without that faith which works, not by force, but by love.
Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if those
that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from
their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it
was much more easy for him to do it with armies of heavenly
legions than for any son of the Church, how potent so ever,
with all his dragoons.
The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of
religion is so agreeable to the gospel of Jesus Christ, and to
the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for
men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and
advantage of it in so clear a light.83
Stressing the need for the separation of religion from the State
to settle the problem of national Churches, John Locke argued that
the separation of the Church from State was a requirement inherent
in their distinct natures and the different functions they had in the
society. So, in his Letter concerning Toleration he continued to
state:
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly
the business of civil government from that of religion and to
settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the
other…on the one side, a concernment for the interest of
men’s souls, and, on the other side, a care of the
commonwealth. The commonwealth… to be society of men
constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing
their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health
and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things,
such s money, lands, house, furniture, and the like. It is the
duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of
equal laws, to secure into all people in general and to every
one of subjects in particular the just possession of these things79 Ibid., pp. 378-379.
80 As quoted in Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the United States
(Harper & Brothers, New York, 1950), vol. 1, p.113.
81 Ibid ., pp. 114-127.
82 George H. Sabine, op.cit., pp. 387-404; 503-627.
83 John Locke, “A Letter concerning Toleration,” in Great Books of the Western
World, ed., Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica,
1952), vol. 35, pp.1-2.
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belonging to this life.
[T]he care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate,
any more than to other men… Nor can any such power be
vested in the magistrate by consent of the people, because
no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as
blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether prince or
subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall
embrace.
[T]he care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate,
because his power consists only in outward force; but true
and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the
mind…Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments,
nothing of that nature can have any efficacy as to make
men change the inward judgment that they have framed of
things.84
John Locke’s “An Essay Concerning The True Original Extent
And End Of Civil Government”85 which became the Bible of modern
liberal democracy laid great stress on the equality of all people,
individual’s inalienable right to life, health, liberty and property upon
which a legitimate government would not dare to encroach.86 Hence
separation between the Church and the State came to be interpreted
in terms of a broader understanding of the natural rights of people
and the nature of society and State.
Hubert Jedin and John Dolen stressed also on the important
contribution made by the advance of natural sciences for the
creation of secular State. For these disciplines of thought grew
with no affiliation to ecclesiastical dogmatism, but based themselves
on empirical observation and mathematical computation that set
the rubrics for the legitimation of secular sciences and paved the
way for secularisation of thought and for the creation of secular
polity.87 Analysing the impact of the natural sciences on the process
of secularisation of seventeenth century Europe, historian Arnold
Toynbee wrote that science replaced religion as “the paramount
interest and pursuit of the leading spirits in the Western society”.88
All these factors had a cumulative effect to sunder the Church-
State hegemony of medieval Christendom. But for the most
significant events, which led to the establishment of the secular
State, we must now pay our attention to the American experiment.
1.1.5. The Separation of the Church from the State
It was left to the political wisdom of the people of America, first
among other nations, to commit themselves to a State, which was
constitutionally secular and separate from religion. Various
indigenous factors were instrumental to arrive at this solution. The
Pilgrim Fathers, who inherited the European traditions, transplanted
the European model of a close union between the Church and State
in most colonies of America. This model brought a twofold pattern
in the political scenario of the New World: (1) a close union between
a denominational Church and a State within a colony which provided
limited tolerance or no tolerance to dissenters and (2) denominational
diversity from one colony to another.89 Eventually American society
became religiously plural90 as believers of almost all denominational
Churches and sects were found scattered throughout all States.
Christopher H. Dawson suggested that religious leaders such
as Roger Williams and William Penn, who founded the colonies of
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania respectively, followed a radically
secular view of the State. They advocated the separation between
the Church and State and practiced it as a matter of political policy
in their colonies.91 Moreover, many Reformed Churches, especially
the Baptists and Presbyterians, propagated the principle of
separation as an article of faith. Evarts B. Greene adds that Deists
and Unitarians from their respective faith point of view opposed
84 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
85 Ibid., pp. 25-79.
86 Ibid., pp. 25-28.
87 H. Jedin & J. Dolen, Church History, op.cit., vol. 5, pp.639-643.
88 Arnold Toynbee, An Historian’s Approach to religion, (New York, Oxford
University Press, 1956), p. 184.
89 Donald E. Smith,  op.cit., p. 15.
90 John C. Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflection on the American
Proposition, (New York, Image Books, Doubleday, 1964), pp. 26-29.
91 Christopher H. Dawson, Religion and Culture (London, Sheed and Ward, 1948),
p. 204.
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the spiritual tyranny of those Churches that promoted their
respective orthodoxies with the aid of the coercive arm of the State.
The political philosophy of John Locke and the Enlightenment from
France had due impact on the American society.92
All these factors together influenced to reduce the dogmatism
and fanaticism of religious groups, and contributed to create the
American environment for a liberal democratic polity at the time
when the newly independent States confederated to establish the
United States of America under Federal Government.93 John
Courtney Murray commented that in the emerging political climate
of the American nationalism, the public consensus stressed, “civil
unity and religious integrity”94 under a Federal Constitution in such
a manner that the former did not hinder the various religious
communities in the American society in the maintenance of their
distinct religious identities. This inevitably implied in the American
milieu separation of religion from the State.
The principle of separation won popular acceptance by 1786
when political agitation for separation was successfully carried out
by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Madison in his Memorial
argued out his position on separation and stated:
Religion is wholly exempt from the cognisance of Civil
society… whose authority is necessarily subordinate to the
individual’s allegiance to the Universal Sovereign…Since
religion is exempt from the authority of the society at large,
still less can it be subject to that of the Legislature Body
whose jurisdiction is both derivative and limited…Since religion
is not within the cognisance of Civil Government…its legal
establishment cannot be necessary to Civil Government.95
It is surprising to note that Madison’s Memorial echoed the
Gelasian theory. The Memorial stressed the separation between
the spiritual and temporal realms with their respective authorities
and loyalties in that the temporal authority was placed subordinate
to citizen’s spiritual loyalty. Madison’s injunction, nevertheless, was
that since religion was not within the previews of civil jurisdiction,
its legal establishment was not required to form the civil government.
1.1.5.1. The U.S.  Supreme Court on the “Establishment
    Clause”
The secular provision of the U.S. Constitution implies that the framers
of the Constitution wanted to establish a wall of separation between
the Church and the State. The Constitution, which was ratified and
adopted in 1787, contained no reference to religious affiliation.
Consequently, the United States of America became a secular State
in the sense that no religious test was required to hold public office.96
The First Amendment made the secular intent of this provision
explicit in the Constitution that declared non-interference of State
in the matters of religion. The Amendment states, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof…”97 The non-interference provision was
extended to all the States by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1868, which provided
that no State was to deprive any person of life, liberty or property
“without due process of law”.98
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains two
92 Evarts B. Greene, Religion and State: The Making and Testing of an American
Tradition, (New York, New York University Press, 1941), pp. 48-51.As quoted
in Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 16.
93 For an exhaustive study of these and other factors instrumental in creating a
secular atmosphere needed for liberal democratic polity in America see Anson
P. Stokes, Church and State in the united States, (New York, Harper & Brothers,
1950), pp. 65-357.
94 John C. Murray, We Hold These Truths, op.cit., p. 55.
95 As quoted in Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom, op.cit., pp.99-100.
96 “No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under the united States”. Article VI, 3, Constitution of the United States
of America (1787)
97 First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America (1797).
98 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law”.
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1898).
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religious. The Constitution forbids the State from making any law
and taking any executive action that involves the interlocking of
the functions of the State with the institutional functions of any
religion.
The Supreme Court of the United States in number of instances
has given statements on the various constitutional and institutional
meaning of the principle of separation between religion and the
State as intended in the establishment clause and free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. While issuing its verdict the Supreme
Court frequently enjoined the mind of the framers of the
Constitution, relaying often on the statements of James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson. Suffice here for our work to refer to some
of the illustrious judicial decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to
understand the political philosophy of secular State as enshrined in
the U.S Constitutions.103
1.1.5.1.1. Transportation Facility to Parochial School
In Everson v. Board of Education, the constitutionality of a statute
of the Board of Education that provided State transport facility to
parochial school children was challenged before the U.S. Supreme
Court. Following are the facts of the case. The transportation of
children to public schools was initially the responsibility of their
parents. This, however, caused difficulties to children living in distant
places. So, the New Jersey State statute authorized the local board
99 It is also referred to as “non-establishment clause”. See P.C. Jain, Religion and
Law, op.cit., p. 7.
100 As quoted in Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and freedom, op.cit., p. 119.
101 Crf. J.C. Jain, op.cit., p.8.
102 As quoted in Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and
 Freedom, op.cit., p. 224.
essential principles, which constitute the typical secular
character of the United States of America. They are the
“establishment clause” and “free exercise clause”.99 The former
forbids the State from establishing or preferring any religion and
the latter prohibits the State from interfering in the individual and
corporate freedom of religion. The principle of religion-state
separation and religious freedom are concisely linked up in this
provision.
President James Madison explained, for instance, that the First
Amendment meant a “separation between religion and
Government” and that “religion is a private affair”.100 Similarly, in
1802 President Thomas Jefferson interpreted the meaning of the
First Amendment to the Danbury Baptist Association in the following
words:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
American people which declared that their Legislature should
‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof’, thus building a wall of
separation between Church and State.101
In another letter written to a Presbyterian clergyman in 1808
he re-affirmed his position on the First Amendment and said:
I consider the Government of the United States has been
interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with
religious institutions, their doctrines, disciplines, or
exercises…Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious
discipline, has been delegated to the General Government.102
These statements of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
mean that under the system of religion-state separation as given in
the U.S. Constitution, the State has no power to deal with matters
103 Some of the important cases are as follows: Arch R. Everson v. Board of
Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1 (1947). This case will henceforth
be referred to as Everson v. Board of Education. People of the State of Illinois ex
rel. Vashti McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No.71 Champaign
County, Illinois, 333 US 203 (1948). This case will henceforth be referred to as
McCollum v. Board of Education. Tessim Zorach v. Andrew G. Clauson, 343
US 306 (1952). This case will henceforth be referred to as Zorach v.
Clauson.John Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, 344 US 94 (1952). This case will henceforth be
referred to as Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.  Steven J. Engel v. William J.
Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962). This case will henceforth be referred to as Engel v.
Vitale. School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Edward Lewis
Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963). This case will henceforth be referred to as
Abington School District v. Edward Lewis. Among these, we would study for
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of education to provide free transport facility to children if they
were living at remote places from their schools. This facility applied
to all children except those attending schools run for profit. Acting
under this statute, the School Board of Ewing Township passed a
resolution providing for the transportation of children from township
to the public and Catholic Schools at Trenton, a nearby township.
The township did not provide its own buses, but allowed re-
imbursement of the cost of public conveyance to the parents of
children attending public and Catholic schools at Trenton. Mr. Arch
R. Everson, a district tax-payer filed a case against the Ewing
Board of Education on the ground that the Board had reimbursed
parents when their children used transport facility to study in a
denominational school. The action of the Board, he alleged, violated
the First Amendment and amounted to an establishment of religion.
The case ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court for hearing.104
By a 5 to 4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the statute on the ground that the law was intended to protect
children and, therefore, the provisions of the said statute came under
public welfare measure.105 On this occasion, the Court and the
dissenting judges, however, dealt in detail on the meaning of the
separation between the Church and the State as implied in the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Black
delivering the majority opinion of the Court said that the separation
between the Church and the State implied:
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws, which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another… No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practise religion.
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or group and vice versa…New Jersey cannot consistently
with the “establishment of religion” clause of the First
Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an
institution that teaches the tenets and faith of any church…
State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them.106
Commenting on the public purpose involved in the Everson v.
Board of Education case, Mr. Justice Black was of the opinion
that the Courts should be very cautious when judging the public
purpose which the legislature had in view. The free transportation
granted to the New Jersey Statute was for the welfare of the
children regardless of their religion.107 He admitted, however, that
a State statute “Cannot consistently with the establishment of
religion clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds
to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of
any church.”108  Nevertheless, he hastened to add that a law:
[C]annot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their
own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-
believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislature.109
Mr. Justice Black maintained that a Court couldn’t prohibit the
State from extending its general benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief. Speaking for the majority opinion of
the Court he concluded, “measured by these standards”,110 that
the New Jersey Statute in providing tax-paid transport facility to
school children who also included the parochial school children,
was not prohibited by the establishment clause of the First
Amendment.
our purpose Everson v. Board of Education; McCollum v. Board of Education;
Zorach v. Clauson; and Engel v. Vitale.
104 Arch R. Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1
(1947)
105 Ibid., at 1-3.
106 Ibid. at 15, 16, 18.
107 Ibid., at 18.
108 Ibid., at 16.
109 Ibid., at 17.
110 Ibid., at 17
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Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge gave their
dissenting opinions separately. Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that
the majority opinion was for “complete and uncompromising
separation of church and state”, but its conclusions gave “support
to their commingling in educational matters”.111 Taking his views
further he said that the principle of separation was intended to
achieve a dual end, which was “to keep the state’s hands out of
religion” and also “to keep religion’s hands off the state”.112
Moreover, he pointed out, “If the state may aid these religious
schools, it may therefore regulate them”113 which would be against,
he cautioned, the very essence of the principle of separation as
implied in the First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissent concurred with Jackson, J.,
and opined that both the New Jersey Statute and the school Board
resolution were obnoxious. He stressed that the Constitution erected
a “wall of separation.” Further, he reminded the Court that the
decision in the textbook case114 made the first breach in the wall,
and the instant case115 would be a second breach. The purpose of
separation, he stressed, was to separate completely the sphere of
religious activity and civil authority. The prohibition implied in the
First Amendment “broadly forbids state support, financial or other,
of religion in any guise”.116 He emphasized that the intent of the
principle of separation of the State from the Church as referred to
in the First Amendment was not to secure equality of treatment to
all religions but to sever all connection between the two. Mr. Justice
Rutledge asserted in conclusion, “It is one of principle, to keep
separate the separate spheres as the First Amendment drew
them”.117
1.1.5.1.2. Release Time Programme for Religious Instructions
In McCollum v. Board of Education the constitutionality of a
system of “release time programme” that was drawn by the school
authorities to teach religion in public school premises was challenged
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The case history of McCollum v.
Board of Education is as follows.118  In 1940 the Jews, Roman
Catholics and some Protestant sects of Champaign County, Illinois,
formed a voluntary association called the Champaign Council on
Religious Education. The Council obtained permission from the
Board of Education to have classes on religious instructions for
public school children during the regular hours on one day of the
week. The children who received parents’ consent were “released”
(30 minutes release to lower grade and 45 minutes for higher grade)
from their secular study. During this time, religious instructions were
given to them in the school premises. The children whose parents
did not consent to it were not released and they had to attend regular
classes. Mrs. Vashti McCollum, the mother of Terry McCollum, a
ten-year-old student, registered her objection to this arrangement
to impart religious instructions on the ground that she was an atheist.
She, therefore, challenged the constitutional validity of the “release
time programme” before the U.S. Supreme Court in the year 1948.
This was the first case of this sort that appeared before the Supreme
Court.
By a majority of 8 to 1 decision the Court declared that the
system infringed upon the establishment clause of the First
111 Ibid., at 19.
112 Ibid., at 26.
113 Ibid., at 27.
114 Emmet Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 US 370 (1930).
Following is the matter of the case. Several states in America have provided aid
out of tax-money for the supply of secular textbooks to parochial schools.
Different state courts have issued conflicting verdicts on this matter. In Smith v.
Donahue, 67 ALR 1196 (1922), the Court of Appellate Division in the New
York State, rejected the presumed constitutional validity of the book aid to
denominational schools on the ground that it was against the establishment
clause. On the other hand, in a similar case, Silas P Borden v. Louisianan State
Board of Education, 67 ALR 1189 (1929 La) the Supreme Court of the Louisiana
State upheld the book aid practice on the basis of child benefit measure. Finally
the issue came up before the U.S. Supreme Court in the (1930). In this case the
Federal Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the boo aid to
school children. The Court concluded that so long as it was given to all children
of the state without discrimination it was an aid for the promotion of education
and, therefore, the common interest of the state was safeguarded.
115 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947).
116 Ibid., at 33.
117 Ibid., at 63.
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Amendment and the Court once again re-affirmed the meaning
of Church-State separation as rendered earlier in Everson v. Board
of Education. Mr. Justice Black who presented the majority opinion
of the Court in the instant case said:
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular educations
are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition
that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all
question utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First
Amendment as we interpreted it in Everson v. Board of
Education.119
Mr. Justice Frankfurter who concurred with the majority opinion
observed that though there were about 250 sects and denominations
in the country, under the Champaign system of “release time
programme” only a few of them were entitled to instruct in religious
matters which, he considered, amounted to a discrimination among
the sects. He further emphasized that even if the system did not
incur discrimination, the establishment clause prohibited all aid to
religion. He added, “Separation is a requirement to abstain from
fusing functions of Government and religious sects, not merely to
treat them all equally… Separation means separation, not something
less.”120
Mr. Justice Jackson, who also concurred with the majority
opinion of the Court, took a view that is significant. He said that
although religion could not be eliminated altogether from education,
yet the “Champaign system” must be held unconstitutional. But he
indicated in his observation that one need to have a religion friendly
approach in secular education on the ground that it would not seem
practical to teach the arts like music or architecture if we were to
forbid the students to any religious influence.
Mr. Justice Jackson further reminded the Court  “music without
sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without
the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from
a secular point of view.”121 Therefore, he concluded that one can
hardly respect a system of education that would leave the student
wholly ignorant of the current of religious thought that moves the
world society for a part in which he [the student] is being
prepared.”122
The question of separation between Church-State was once
again raised in the U.S. Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson
case. The history of this case is as follows. The facts of this case
were almost same as in the McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 US 203 (1948). The Zorach v. Clauson case also arose out of
a “release time programme” arrangement to impart religious
education. This was arranged between the public schools and some
religious organization in New York City. To this effect, the State
Commissioner of Education and the New York Board of Education
framed regulations. Under these regulations, religious instructions
might be given at the released time outside the school premises to
students with parents’ consent. This arrangement involved only a
time adjustment between the public schools and the religious centres.
On the contrary, in McCollum v. Board of Education case the
religious teacher came to the school, used public school classrooms
or premises.
However, one of the petitioners, Mr. Tessim Zorach, a member
of the Episcopal Church, whose son studied in one of the New
York city schools, framed a case on the ground that according to
the decision given to McCollum v. Board of Education case, all
forms of release time programme for religious purpose were per
se contrary to the First Amendment. In the year 1952, this case
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.123
By a majority of 6 to 3, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional validity of the system in the present case. Mr. Justice
118 People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Vashti McCollum v. Board of Education of
School District No. 71 Champaign County, Illinois, 333 US 203 (1948).
119 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203, at 209, 210.
120 Ibid., at 227, 231.
121 Ibid ., at 235.
122 Ibid., at 236.
123 Tessim Zorach v. Andrew G. Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952)
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Douglas, who gave the majority judgment, distinguished certain
features of the McCollum v. Board of Education case from the
present case under judicial consideration. He commented that in
the former case the tax-paid amenities of the public schools were
used to teach religion, while in the present case, he indicated, “no
religious exercise…. is brought to the class rooms of the public
schools.”124 He further added:
Here as we have said, the public schools do no more than
accommodate their schedules to the programme of outside
religious instruction. We follow the McCollum case. But
we cannot expand it to cover the present release time
programme unless separation of the Church and State means
that public institutions can make no adjustments of their
schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the people.
We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of
hostility to religion.125
Therefore, Mr. Douglas, J., concluded, that the New York
system did no more than to accommodate the public school schedules
to public interest. Hence, it did not infringe upon the establishment
clause of the First Amendment. Moreover, he stressed that
separation did not amount to hostility to religion.
Messrs. Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ, voiced their dissent.
Mr. Justice Black who delivered the majority judgment in the
McCollum case126 said that there was hardly any difference in the
McCollum case and the instant case. He re-asserted that the
principle laid in the McCollum case and claimed that in a compulsory
public school system, the students were not to be released for
religious instruction. Hence, he came to the conclusion that the
New York system was a clear violation of the establishment clause.
He stated:
In considering whether a state has entered this forbidden
field the question is not whether it has entered too far but
whether it has entered at all. New York is manipulating its
compulsory education laws to help religious sects get pupils.
This is not separation but combination of Church and
State…State help to religion injects political and party
prejudices into a holy field. It too often substitutes force for
prayer, hate for love, and persecution for persuasion.
Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft
euphemism of “co-operation” to steal into the sacred area
of religious choice.127
Mr. Justice Black’s contention was that the time-slot allotted to
religious instruction involved a manipulation of the compulsory
education laws to help religious sects to get children for religious
instruction. It amounted to using the coercive power of the State
covertly for religious purpose, which has been forbidden by the
First Amendment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter who gave the dissenting opinion was
critical of the majority judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas.
He indicated that in the instant case, the formalized religious
instruction was substituted for secular school activity and those
who did not attend the religious instruction were kept inside the
school. This amounted to an aid to religion, which was proscribed
by the establishment clause.128 He wished that in future the Supreme
Court might change its views as the majority opinion in the present
case129 had not disapproved of the judgment given in the McCollum
case,130 and would hold that all released time programme infringed
on the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
1.1.5.1.3. Prayer at Public Schools
The Principle of Church-State separation as contained in the
establishment clause of the First Amendment to U.S. Constitution
was raised once again in another case in connection with reading
prayer in public schools. Following is the matter of the case.
In the United States the controversy over holding prayers, Bible
reading and other forms of religious activities in the public schools124 Ibid., at 311.
125 Ibid., at 315.
126 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203 (1948)
127 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US 306, at 318-320.
128 Ibid., at 20
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occurred on account of strained relationship between the
Catholics and Protestants. The question of the constitutional validity
of reciting prayers in public schools arose in precise terms before
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1962 in Steven J. Engel v. William J.
Vitale. In this case, the controversy was on a non-denominational
prayer that was composed by the Board of Education of Union
Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, which
was to be read in all public schools without comment at the opening
of each day.
The parents of some students of a public school filed a suit in
the Court of Appeals of New York on the ground that the
aforementioned prayer reading was contrary to their religious faith
and doctrine. But the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the
power of the Board of Education to use the prayer so long as the
directive of the Board of Education did not compel any student to
participate in the prayer against the consent of his or her parents.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the contention of the
aggrieved parents.131
By a majority decision the U.S. Supreme Court held invalid the
prayer directive given by the Board of Education on the ground
that the establishment clause forbade the Government for
composing prayers, which were to be read officially in public
schools. Mr. Justice Black who spoke for the majority judgment in
the present case concluded, “[T]he establishment clause of the
First Amendment must at least mean that in this country it is no
part of the business of Government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
programme carried on by Government.”132
Subsequent to the judicial decision on reciting prayers in public
schools, cases were registered before the U.S. Supreme Court to
clarify on the constitutional propriety of Bible reading in public
schools. One such important case was the School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Edward Lewis Schempp.133
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterated the position taken in
the prayer case134 and ruled that even Bible reading in the public
schools was an infringement on the establishment clause. The Court
pointed out that on the one hand the establishment clause prohibited
the State to recognise or give official support to the tenants of any
religion, and on the other hand, the free exercise clause guaranteed
the right of every person to freely choose his own way according
to his belief. The State should remain neutral.
To deal with cases of similar kind, the U.S. Supreme Court laid
down a rule, known as the “neutrality test”. Interference by the
State is to be tested by the purpose or the effect of the action of
the State. It means that if the State’s action advanced or put a
check on religion, it might be found unconstitutional. The Court
said:
[W]hat is the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?
If ether is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution… [T]here must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.135
In Abington School District v. Edward Lewis case certain
concessions granted by the State showed the religious character
of the Bible reading regulation. The rule permitted the alternative
use of any version of the Bible. Various versions like the King
James, the Catholic Donay and the revised Standard Versions of
the Bible as also the Jewish Holy Scriptures were used. The fact
that an amendment was made in the rules permitting non-attendance
also showed the religious character of the Bible reading. The Court
remarked, “[T]he State’s recognition of the pervading religious
character of the ceremony is evident from the Catholic Donay
version as well as the recent amendment permitting non-attendance
129 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952).
130 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 US 203 (1948).
131 Engle v.Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
132 Ibid., at 425.
133 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Edward Lewis Schempp,
374 US 203 (1963).
134 Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
135 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Edward Lewis Schempp,
374 US 203, 222 (1963).
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at the exercises.”136
It was due to this religious character that special arrangements
were made in schools by persons of various denominations. The
Court pointed out that though “the Bible is worthy of study for its
literary and historic qualities” and that “one’s education is not
complete without a study of comparative religion or history of religion
and its relationship to the advancement of civilization”,137 the instant
case regarding the reading of verses from the Bible did not fulfil
that purpose. The matters associated with the Bible readings
challenged in this case were actually of the nature of religious
exercises and as such violated the First Amendment.
The cases that we have studied so far enable us to conclude
that the First Amendment to U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the
State to give aid for the educational welfare of students even if
such welfare measure helps denominational schools, provided that
the aid is non-discriminatory. This had been settled when the cases
on ‘text book aid’138 and ‘transport facility’139 to schoolchildren
came before the U.S. Supreme Court. In the Zorach v. Clauson
case140 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ‘release time
programme’ for children to attend religious instruction outside the
school premises did not infringe upon the ‘establishment clause’,
but the State only adjusted its programme to accommodate to
respond to the need of the public good. The Court stressed,
moreover, that the principle of separation between the Church and
the State did not amount to hostility to religion.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held invalid to
hold a non-denominational and simple prayer service in a public
school even though the students were not compelled to attend it.141
Similarly, the Court decided with majority judgment that a simple
Bible reading service even without comments violated the First
Amendment on the ground that the Bible reading service was a
religious service, and therefore, infringed upon the “establishment
clause”.142 Finally the U.S. Supreme Court commented that the
intension of the First Amendment to the Constitution was to keep
the State neutral in matters religious so as to guarantee to people
religious freedom.
1.1.6. Separation Not Absolute
It has often been considered whether the doctrine of wall of
separation between the Church and the State has been fully
observed in the American political system. The answer generally
given by constitution experts is in the negative because the U.S.
Government recognises many religious observances. Anson P.
Stokes reminds us that appointment of Chaplains for the two houses
of Congress, legislative bodies and for the army and navy are not
compatible with ‘establishment clause’.143 The opening prayer of
each day’s session in the U.S. Supreme Court,144 the U.S.
President’s invocation for divine blessing while taking the oath of
office,145 the U.S National Anthem,146 and the pledge of Allegiance
to the Flag that reads, “One Nation under God indivisible, with
136 Ibid., at 224.
137 Ibid., at 225.
138 Emmet Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 US 370 (1930).
139 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947).
140 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952).
141 Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
142 Abington School District v. Edward Lewis, 374 US 203 (1963).
143 Anson Phelps Stokes, vol. III, op.cit., p. 134.
144 The prayer ends with the words, “God save the United States and the Honorable
Court”; quoted in Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421, at 446 (1962). Mr. Justice
Stewart referred to it in his dissent in this case.
145 In Engle v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962), Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent
pointed out how many U.S. Presidents at the time of taking oath of office
invoked God’s blessing and protection. President John F. Kennedy, for instance,
invoked divine blessing as follows: “The rights of man come not from the
generosity of the state but from the hand of God…With a good conscience our
only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to
lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here
on earth God’s work must be our own.” Quoted in ibid., at 449.
146 One stanza of “The Star-spangled Banner” which was made the National
Anthem reads:
‘‘Blest with victory and peace, may the Heav’n rescued land,
Praise the Pow’r that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto “In God is our Trust’’ ’’.
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liberty and justice for all”,147 the U.S. coin inscription, “In God We
Trust”,148 the Sunday holiday as Lord’s Day,149 and other State
holidays on Christmas, Thanksgiving Day, New Year Day and Good
Friday, etc., contain deep-seated Christian religious sentiments.
Moreover, among religious attitudes the U.S. judicial decisions
seem to support values that are in consonant with the “established
Christian standards of civilization”.150 Besides, it is known that the
major religious sects in America maintain organisations to influence
political decisions to achieve their ends. The “Anti-Saloon League”
of the Baptists established in 1895, “The Federal Council of the
Churches of Christ in America” founded in 1908 by the American
Protestants, the “Friends Committee on National Legislation”
organised in 1943 by the Quakers, the “National Catholic Welfare
Conference” of the Roman Catholic Church, which is the most
powerful among them all, and the “Central Conference of American
Rabbis” of the American Jews are some of the political wings of
the religious communities. Leo Pfeffer commented that American
politicians acknowledge the influence these religious organisations
have over American polity and pay serious thought to these religious
forces.151
1.1.7. Conclusion: Separation for Co-existence
We sum up that in the Western political history the concept of
secular State evolved out of many different historical situations
and ideological compulsions. The concept arose, for the first time,
in the Roman Empire with the arrival of Christianity. As an
autonomous institution in matters spiritual, the Church claimed for
itself freedom to care for the spiritual need of the citizens in a State
where, under emperor cult, no distinction was ever made between
citizen’s allegiance to the State from that of religion. Whereas, the
Church differentiated the citizen’s loyalty on two levels, one to
Caesar and the other to God. Consequently, the Church delineated
the secular from the sacred order. The Church, therefore, called
for an institutional separation between State and religion to ensure
civil and religious liberty in the society. Pope Gelasius I in the 5th
century developed it into a doctrine, which came to be known as
the Gelasian Doctrine of Two Powers.
The Popes of the Middle Ages, however, reversed the Gelasian
doctrine and held a doctrine of spiritual supremacy as defined, in
the course of time, by Pope Boniface VIII. This doctrine once
again legitimised hierocracy by subordinating the secular to the
spiritual order as prevailed in the pre-Christian Roman Empire.
Hence, in the medieval Christendom religion and State were fused
together into a unitarian and monolithic society-state under the
spiritual power, the Pope. This unholy alliance between the two
orders that reigned supreme in the Middle Ages was nevertheless,
scattered by the forces of confessional pluralism led loose by the
Protestant Reformation.
The idea of a common secular political loyalty that surmounted
denominational limits and prejudices became a historical necessity
to stop confessional wars, and to assure civil and religious liberty to
citizens, to provide social amity and economic growth in the
European States. Hence, once again at the beginning of modern
age, the separation of the spiritual and temporal orders, and their
legitimate autonomy were re-asserted. This time it was propagated
not by Church-personnel, but by liberal thinkers of various
persuasions. Thus, the concept of secular State re-emerged carrying
with it a broader value orientation with the objective of giving
protection to fundamental human rights.
The political philosophy of secular State received constitutional
definition for the time first in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which declared, “Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
147 As quoted in P.C. Jain, Law and Religion: A Comparative Study of the Freedom
of Religion in India and the United States (Allahabad, Mohan Printers, 1974),
p.10.
148 As quoted in Anson Phelps Stokes, op.cit., p. 560-561.
149 Abraham Burstein, Laws Concerning Religion in the United States (New York,
Oceania Publications, 1950), p. 35.
150 Anson P. Stokes, vol. 3, op.cit., pp. 560-565.
151 Leo Pfeffer, op.cit., pp. 202-206.
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exercise thereof”.152 As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the First Amendment prohibited the State to aid one religion, aid all
religions or prefer one religion to another and, therefore, set a “wall
of separation”153 between the State and religion. The United States
model has been considered as the classic example of a secular
State.154 It seems to us that even in the American model, the
principle of separation as implied in the First Amendment is not
absolute because the U.S. Government policy has integrated number
of religious practices. In many instances, the Supreme Court has
conceded that certain areas of co-operation between the State and
religion in the matters of public welfare does not violate the
establishment clause.155
The U.S. Supreme Court, moreover, stressed that separation
does not mean hostility to religion. Hence, the “wall of separation”
between the State and religion amounts to an understanding of
mutual non-interference in matters proper to each order and their
co-existence in the society to provide a social order conditioned by
the historical antecedents and the political need of that country. It
is submitted that the manner of separation as given in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is conditioned, certainly for
good reasons, by the painful memory of many centuries of conflict
that prevailed between the Church and the State in the Western
Christendom. This was a defining factor that shaped the political
history of Western civilization.
152 See First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1797).
153 Arch R. Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 US 1
(1947), at 1-3.
154 M.S. Bates, op.cit., p. 312.
155 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US1 (1947)., Emmet Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board of Education, 281 US 370 (1930)
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CHAPTER TWO
The Indigenous Foundations for
Indian Secularism
1.2. Introduction
The Constitution of India establishes a Secular State and has
enjoined upon Indian democracy the task of creating an egalitarian
social order where social, political and economic justice will prevail
and secular values will govern the relationship of all the citizens
with the State. But the Constitution does not provide a ‘non-
establishment clause’ as of the First amendment to the U. S.
Constitution. The secular provisions of the Indian Constitution do
not intend to create a rigid wall of separation between the State in
India and religion.
Let us illustrate this positive approach of Indian secularism
towards religion by way of referring to certain provisions of the
Constitution. Clause (5) of article 16 excludes offices in connection
with the affairs of any religious institution from the operation of
clauses (1) and (2) of the same article.1 Article 27 implies that the
State may tax for religious purposes provided the proceeds of which
are benefited by all without discrimination.2 Clause (2) of article 28
permits the State to manage educational institutions established
under an endowment or trust where religious instructions may be
required to impart. Likewise, clause (3) of the article 28 provides
the right to impart religious instructions or to conduct religious
worship in educational institutions recognised by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds on the condition that attendance to
such activities is not compulsory.3
It is evident, as stressed by P.B. Gajendragadkar, one of the
former Chief Justices of India, that the philosophy of Indian
secularism is not hostile to religion but recognises the relevance
and validity of religion in people’s life and, therefore, it “seeks to
establish a rational synthesis between the legitimate functions of
religion and the legitimate and expanding functions of the State.”4
The emphasis of the Indian form of secularism as enshrined in the
Indian Constitution is not on the rejection of religion in people’s life,
but rather on offering a significant basis founded on reason for
national solidarity through an emphasis on mutual recognition and
equal regard for all religions in the civil society.
1 “(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State.”
“ (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, decent, place of
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in
respect of, any employment of office under the State.”
“(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides
that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or
denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall
be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular
denomination.” Article 16 (1), (2) and (5) of the Constitution of India.
2 “No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are
specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination”. Article 27 of
the Constitution of India.
3 “(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution
wholly maintained out of State funds”.
“(2) Nothing in this clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is
administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or
trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such
institution”.
“(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious
instructions that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious
worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached
thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given
his consent thereto”.
Article 28 (1), (2) and (3), of the Constitution of India.
4  P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and the Constitution of India (Bombay,
Bombay University Press, 1971), p. 52.
FOUNDATIONS FOR INDIAN SECULARISM 81
National luminaries and scholars are of the opinion that this
positive approach of secularism towards religion as given in the
Constitution has evolved from the influence of Indian heritage and,
therefore, it articulates the national ethos.5 Hence, in this chapter
an attempt is made to investigate, through the long history of India,
the indigenous values and institutions that are favourable for the
kind of secular vision of the State as we have it in the Constitution
of India.
1.2.1. The State in Ancient India
In his general survey and estimate of the ancient Indian polity and
its achievements, Professor J.J. Anjaria concluded that ancient India
had plural forms of polity. He observed:
Several types of states like republics, oligarchies, diarchies
and monarchies were prevailing in India in ancient times,
but eventually monarchy became the order of the day. This
phenomenon was not peculiar to ancient India; it repeated
itself in ancient Europe also where we find the republics in
Greece and Italy being gradually supplanted by monarchies
and empires.6
A.L. Basham and A.S. Altekar suggest that the State, during
the Vedic period (cir. 1500-500 B.C.),7 was small in size, hardly
more extensive than a modern district.8 The Vedic king was merely
president of the Council of Elders. His powers were limited and he
enjoyed no divine status.9 J.J. Anjaria points out that as centuries
passed on, the State became territorially expanded and along with
it the king’s powers also increased. For centuries, however, popular
assemblies called samiti effectively controlled the royal powers.
The establishment of the empire-state, which began with the
Mauryan period (cir. 325-185 B.C.) and continued in the Gupta
and post-Gupta period (cir.300-1200 A.D.), produced highly
advanced organic concept of State and created bureaucratic political
system centred on the king assisted by a Council of ministers.10
All round welfare of the people was regarded as the chief aim
of the State.11 Among them the promotion of dharma was given
foremost importance. In the legal literature dharma means sacred
law or the divinely ordained norm of conduct varying according to
caste and age (varnasramadharma).12 As promoter of dharma,
the king was called dharmaraja.13 Promotion of dharma included
to foster values of piety, morality, to protect religion and to render
material assistance to establish religious institutions irrespective of
sects and denominations. It also meant to build hospitals and
charitable institutions.14 In his research work, The Concept of
Secularism in Indian Constitution, Professor R.L. Chaudhari
points out that in promoting dharma the ancient Indian polity was
not only tolerant towards all religions but also impartially patronised
all faiths as evidenced through the long political history of ancient
India.15 This political legacy provided one of the bases for the growth
of modern secular State in India.
5 S. Radhakrishnan, East and West: Some Reflections (London, George Allen and
Unwin, 1955), p. 40; C. Rajagopalachari, “ The Place of Religion in Future
India”, in Message of India (New Delhi, The Publications Division, Government
of India Press, 1959), vol. 1, p. 63.For the opinion of the framers of the
Constitution see CAD, vol. 7.
6  J.J. Anjaria, The Nature and Grounds of Political Obligation in the Hindu State
(Calcutta, Longmans, Green and Company, 1935), p. 231. Scholars such as
professors A.S. Altekar, A.L. Basham and R.C.Majumdar also share this
observation. See A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India: From
Earliest Times to c. 1200 A.D, 3rd edition, revised and enlarged (Delhi, Motilal
Banarsidas, 1958), 377-378; A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India: A
Survey of the history and culture of the Indian sub-continent before the coming
of the Muslims, third revised edition (London, Sedgwick & Jackson, 1967),
pp.97-98.
7 A.L. Basham, op.cit., p. xxi.
8  J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., p. 231.
9 A.L. Basham, op.cit., pp. 88-89;
10 J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., pp. 235-238; This is also concurred by other scholars. See
A.S. Altekar, op.cit., pp. 339-350; A.L. Basham, op.cit., pp. 99-137.
11 A.S. Altekar, op.cit., p. 48.
12 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
13 The royal title “dharmaraja” primarily belonged to Yama, the god of death and
the departed. Since the time of Emperor Asoka, it was analogically ascribed to
good kings on the ground that both Yama and good kings uphold dharma (the
sacred law) by punishing the wicked and rewarding the just. For detail see A.L.
Basham, op.cit., pp. 144, 238, 313.
14 J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., pp. 29-30;
15 R.L. Chaudhari, The Concept of Secularism in Indian Constitution (New Delhi,
Uppal Publishing House, 1987), pp. 49-51.
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The promotion of artha (economic welfare) was procured by
encouraging trade, industry and agriculture and by developing
national resources etc. The State was to promote Kama (individual
and social enjoyment) by ensuring peace and order so that each
individual in particular and society as a whole could enjoy life
unthreatened. The promotion of Kama also included the State’s
support to encourage the growth of fine arts, sculpture and
architecture in order to develop aesthetic culture. The State in
ancient India was thus to promote values and institutions for the all
round welfare of the people.16 In their study about the scope of the
State’s activity, Professors Beni Prasad and R.C. Majumdar had
made the following assessment:
There was never an a priori limit set to the activity of the
State. The State was integrated into the vast institutional
apparatus for the realization of the spiritual life, and could
not, therefore, be restricted to merely police functions, or
the administration of justice. Hindu government could not be
merely negative. It had to adopt a positive attitude towards
all the main concerns of life - religion, ethics, family,
economics, culture, etc. We find accordingly that the Hindu
State touched the whole of life.
This is the reason why the duty of the State is frequently
summed up as protection. The State protects the religion,
the morality, the customs and the tradition, which have been
derived from the gods or evolved by society. It is totalitarian
in the sense that it embraces the whole of life. But it is not
totalitarian in the sense of dominating all other associations
and enacting statutes for wholesale regimentation. The State
holds the ring for the interplay of social forces, intellectual
influences, and economic enterprises and, above all, the
spiritual tradition.17
It is acknowledged that well organised Mauryan and Gupta
empires discharged most of these functions. Prof. J.J. Anjaria
comments that the State was able to exercise such vast powers
because the concept of individual liberty in the body politic was not
well developed.18 Professor A. L. Basham, on the other hand, opined
that even though the State had vast areas of jurisdiction, it did not
directly interfere with individual liberty because the function of the
State was only to harmonise and co-ordinate diverse interests of
the people in the society in consultation with guilds such as the
Panchayats, Brahmana ands Sravana samiti (assemblies) which
enjoyed people’s confidence.19
1.2.1.1. The State and Theocracy
Until the modern age, almost all nations of the world had theocratic
States. Under theocracy the spiritual and temporal powers are
vested either in one person or in an institution. According to this
conception, either the head of the religion becomes the head of the
State as was the case with the early Caliphs in Islamic political
history,20 or the head of the State wields spiritual authority as was
the custom in the ancient Egyptian and Greco-Roman emperor
cult,21 and also in Anglicanism and the British Monarchy since
Henry VIII,22 or even the head of the State could be merely be an
agent of a particular religion as practiced in the medieval Western
Christendom.
The ancient Indian polity, on the other hand, maintained a
distinction between the authority of the priest and the king. The
priest stood for spiritual authority only, just as the king held secular
authority of the State. A.S. Altekar acknowledged that the role of
the royal chaplain (purohita) and the Brahmins (the priestly caste)
in general were greatest during the Brahminic period when there
was widespread faith in the Vedic rituals. The priestly class tried to
extend its power over the king and through him over the State.
16 J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., p. 244; A.S. Altekar, op.cit., p. 48.
17 R. C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 2 p. 308.
18 J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., p. 245.
19 A.L. Basham, op.cit., pp. 88,96.
20 Gustavo E. Van Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation
(Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1961), pp. 155-156.
21 See supra Section 1.2.1, “ State Cult in the Roman Empire “.
22 See “ The Act of Supremacy of November 3, 1534”, in Hubert Jedin & J. Dolen,
op.cit., Church History, vol. 5., pp. 329-331.
84 HUMAN DIGNITY… FOUNDATIONS FOR INDIAN SECULARISM 85
This is evident from a number of passages from literature
coming from the Vedic period eulogizing the superiority of the priests
and their importance for the welfare of the State and king.23 Scholars
are of the opinion that such priestly claims were generally
exaggerations and wishes rather than practiced really.24 We also
come across contrary views claiming the superiority of the king in
matters of secular realm. Brahminic literature points out, for
instance, that the king at his sweet will can lord over the Brahmins,
and that the king can expel the Brahmins from office, and that the
ruling class (Kshatriya) is the one who enjoys the highest status in
the society.25
We would conclude that in ancient India the institution of
priesthood was treated with honour and reverential decorum. The
spiritual function of the priest was treated with respect as an integral
part of the society. However, the king was not an instrument in the
hands of the priests. There was a definite distinction between the
sacerdotal function of the priest and imperial function of the king.
This was well sustained by social order that was enforced by none
other than the caste system.26 By the fourth century B.C., as the
impact of Vedic cult and ritualism were considerably reduced or
fell into disgrace owing to the influence of Upanishads, Jain and
Buddhist spiritualities, priestly influence over political order also
declined accordingly.
The available evidence indicates that there was neither the
practice of theocracy nor instances of usurpation of political power
by the priestly class in the political history of ancient India. U.N.
Ghoshal suggested that the struggle between the regnum and
sacerdotium which prevailed over ancient and medieval European
political history was rather absent in India. The priestly class in
India, moreover, never developed into a well-organised hierarchical
institution so as to stake its claim to control kings and emperors.27
Nevertheless, as U.N. Ghoshal also points out, it is important to
note that the spiritual and temporal powers in India neither
functioned dependently nor independently of each other, but rather
maintained an interdependent functional relationship for the integral
welfare of the people.28
1.2.1.2. The State and Religious Liberty
From ancient time onwards India is known as a land of many
religions and philosophies, languages and cultures, races and castes.
All who came from outside to settle down in India were allowed to
develop their culture, religion and philosophy, and thus to maintained
their personality. It is generally claimed that the reason for this
unity in diversity in the Indian life and culture is due to the remarkable
spirit of tolerance rooted in the Vedantic insight that truth is one but
it is perceived differently by different learned persons (Ekam Sat
vipra bahudha vadanti).29 The recognition that truth cannot be
comprehended entirely by human intelligence, and that only its
different facets are perceived and described even by seers,
inevitably leads to a spirit of intellectual humility, pluralism and a
sense of tolerance.
Commenting on the spirit of tolerance that has permeated the
Hindu thought, Max Weber had this to say:
It is an undoubted fact in India, religious and political thinkers
were able to enjoy perfect, nearly absolute freedom for a
long period. The freedom of thought in ancient India was so
considerable as to find no parallel in the West before the
most recent age.30
From the metaphysical axiom that truth is many-sided and that
different views contain different aspects of truth, which no one
could fully comprehend, Hinduism recognises many ways of spiritual
liberation. Hinduism, therefore, does not claim the monopoly of
spiritual wisdom nor does it require being frightened of other religious23 Crf. A.S. Altekar, op.cit., p. 52.
24  Ibid., pp. 194-195.
25 Ibid., p. 54.
26 J.J. Anjaria, op.cit., p. 238.
27 U.N. Ghoshal, op.cit., p. 7.
28 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
29 Rg Veda I. 164.46. As quoted in Sarla Jhingran, op.cit.,  p.163.
30 Quoted in Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 61-62.
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traditions. The entire history of Hinduism is, moreover, a history
of constructive assimilation of different cultures, faiths and people.
Commenting on the spirit of Hindu universalism Monier Williams
wrote:
It must be borne in mind that Hinduism is far more than a
mere form of theism resting on Brahmanism. It presents for
our investigation a complex categories of creeds and
doctrines which in its gradual accumulation may be compared
to the gathering together to the mighty volume of the Ganges,
swollen by a continual influx of tributary rivers and rivulets,
spreading itself over an ever-increasing area of country, and
finally resolving itself into an intricate Delta of tortuous
streams and jungly marshes…The Hindu religion is a
reflection of the composite character of the Hindus, who
are not one people but many. It is based on the idea of
universal receptivity. It has ever aimed at accommodating
itself to circumstances, and has carried on the process of
adaptation more then three thousands years. It has first borne
with and then, so to speak, swallowed, digested and
assimilated something from all creeds.31
So much is the breath and comprehensive nature of Hindu
religion that it is not so easy to define it in the narrow confines of a
definition that is generally ascribed to a particular religion. The
Supreme Court of India has pointed out this aspect of Hindu world-
view when it had to deal with the nature of Hindu religion in Shastri
Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhunardas Vaishya.32 Chief Justice
Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkar, who delivered the majority opinion of the
Court in the instant case, later in his work, Secularism and the
Constitution of India, explained his conception of Hinduism:
Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does
not claim any one prophet; it does not worship any one God;
it does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does not believe in
any one philosophic concept; it does not follow any one set
of religious rites or performances; in fact, it does not appear
to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any religion or
creed. It may broadly be subscribed as a way of life and
nothing more.33
The Hindu catholicity permits the believer to choose the God
of one’s choice from among the numerous gods and pursue the
path of salvation which satisfies one’s spiritual longing.34
The political implication of the above-mentioned Hindu theology
is that the State in ancient India never sought to impose a particular
conception of God as the deity of the State or a particular creed as
imperial creed upon the people. Various schools of thought holding
doctrines of theism, atheism, agnosticism and materialism as well
as various Hindu religious sects along with Jainism, Buddhism,
Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Islam were not only
allowed to settle down, but also were permitted to propagate their
tenets, build their places of worship and establish their way of life.
Dr. Donald E. Smith who made a seminal research on the secular
nature of modern India remarked that Muslims, for instance, lived
peacefully for three hundred years before Islam came as a military
force in the eleventh century A. D.35 The struggle for religious
freedom that continued in Europe and America for many centuries
had no trace in the political history of ancient India. Religious liberty,
which was an important aspect of the ancient Indian polity, indicates
an indigenous political value foundational to the modern concept of
secular State.
31 Monier Williams, Religious Thought and Life in India (1883), p. 57. As quoted
in Shastri Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhunardas Vaishya, AIR 1966 SC 119,
at 1128-1129.
32 AIR 1966 SC 119. In this case the Supreme Court of India was appealed to
consider whether the provisions of the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship
Entry Authorisation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956) applied to the temple of the
Swaminarayan sect. The sect under consideration claimed that it did not form
part of the Hindu public and, therefore, as such its temples did not come under
the category of Hindu temple in so far as the Hindu temple category is referred
to in the above said Act. In giving verdict to the instant case (AIR 1966 SC
1119), the Supreme Court of India studied at length the broad features of Hindu
religion as described by scholars from India and abroad.
33 P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and the Constitution of India, op.cit., p. 34.
34 Ibid., pp. 39-41.
35 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 27.
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1.2.2. The Indo-Islamic Political Pragmatism in Medieval
 India
The society founded by the Prophet Mohammed in Medina in the
seventh century A.D., was a commonwealth of religio-political
community in which no separation existed between religious
obligation and civil duty. While commenting on Islamic polity Guenter
Lewy, who did an extensive study on the influence of religion to
usher in revolutionary changes in the society, states that God and
his revealed word were the supreme authority in the early Islamic
society. This sort of political order is called either “theocracy or
nomocracy.”36
The Prophet Mohammed represented the unity of spiritual (din)
and temporal (dawla) authority by reason of his mission as the
Apostle of God. Consequently, he was theologically legitimised to
be the vice-regent of God on earth. The primary purpose of the
State was to ensure peace in the society and to protect the new
faith, Islam.37 After the death of the Prophet, the Caliphs38 carried
on theocracy in Islamic polity. However, from the ninth century
onwards, the Ulama39 reduced the spiritual authority of the Caliph
to minimum and by thirteenth century, the Sultans40 enjoyed
complete control over their respective States in religious and secular
affairs. This left the Caliph as a mere figurehead for ceremonial
decorum.41
In this prevailing Islamic political climate, the Muslims were
not particular to re-establish the classic Islamic theocracy. They
were satisfied to see that the government formally recognised the
sharia and allowed them to obey the Holy Law.42 Islamic scholars
like al-Ghazali, a scholar of great repute in the twelfth century,
acknowledged the incapacity of the Caliphate to reinforce
theocracy and, therefore, advocated the position that the State was
based on secular or military power. Looking at the changes that
were taking place in the political administrative set-up of the Islamic
States al-Ghazali wrote:
The concessions made by us are not spontaneous, but
necessity makes lawful what is forbidden. We know that it
is not allowed to feed on a dead animal; still, it would be
worse to die of hunger. Of those who contend that the Caliph
is dead forever and irreplaceable, we would like to ask: what
is to be preferred, anarchy and the stoppage of social life for
the lack of properly constituted authority, or acknowledgement
of the existing order, whatever it be? Of these two
alternatives, the jurist cannot but choose the latter.43
This historical background to Islamic polity points out that during
the Indo-Islamic rule - the Delhi Sultanate (1211-1504 A. D.) and
the Mughal Empire (1526-1757A.D.) - the classic Islamic theocracy
was obsolete. Hence, the medieval Indo-Islamic scholars proposed
a modified version of Islamic rule in India, according to which they
accorded the divine ordination to the Delhi Sultanate and conferred
36 Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York, Oxford University press,
1974), p. 43.
37 Ibid., p. 47.
38 The Arabic word ‘khalifah’, written also as ‘Caliph’ in English (vicegerent,
deputy, or successor) is one of the titles - others include ‘imam’ (leader,
particularly of prayer) and ‘amir al-muminin’ (commander of the faithful) -
given to those who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as real or nominal rulers
of the Islamic world. The Office of the Caliph was validated by a covenant with
the Islamic community on the ground that he would protect the ‘sharia’ (the
Holy Law) and abide by it. If he violated the terms of the covenant, the people
were absolved of their allegiance and were free to elect another Caliph. See
Glenn E. Perry, “Caliph” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic
World, ed., John L. Esposito (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), vol.
1., pp. 239-243.
39 The Arabic word “’ulama’” is the plural of ‘alim’, literally means “men of
knowledge”. The ulama are the doctors of Islamic theology and law. By 9th
century they claimed an exclusive right to interpret the Islamic tradition. See
Iftikhar Zaman, “Sunni ulama” in Ibid., vol.4, pp. 258-260.
40 The Arabic word sultan denotes an Islamic ruler. In the Qur’an it refers to
divinely vouchsafed authority or a divine mandate. In the later Islamic history,
the sultans are the military leaders who during the vast territorial expansion of
Islam appropriated to themselves independent political and also often religious
authority of the Islamic States. See Vincent J. Cornell, “Sultan” in Ibid., pp.
135-136.
41 Guenter Lewy, op.cit., p. 47.
42 Theodore De Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 464.
43 Quoted in Guenter Lewy, op.cit., p. 48.
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on it the right of Caliphate over its own dominion.44
1.2.2.1. The Delhi Sultanate
The Delhi Sultanate did not have a legal link with any Caliphate,
the supreme religio-political head of the classic Islamic society.45
Dr. Abid S. Husain, a well known Islamic scholar in India, asserted
that in the Delhi Sultanate to follow or not to follow the sharia
depended on the sweet will of the Sultan both in his personal life
and in the administration of the State.46 In matters of economic
policy and in personal law, shariat was not strictly imposed on
non-Muslims.
Dr. V. P. Varma, a scholar of Medieval Islamic rule in India,
has pointed out that the Delhi Sultanate was not an Islamic State
because the Sultans only substituted non-Muslim rulers but did not
fundamentally change the traditional functions of the Hindu State
and the customs of the land.47 The only change was that the non-
Muslims under the Sultanate had to pay the required taxes in
recognition of the sultan’s suzerainty, on account of which the non-
Muslims obtained the rights to protection, and guarantees for the
maintenance of their religious rights and rituals, the observations of
their social customs and personal law.48
Commenting on the religious tolerance of the Delhi Sultanate,
Ziauddin Barani, an Islamic fundamentalist and the most important
historian of Delhi Sultanate, complained:
The Muslim king will not be able to establish the honour of
theism (tauhid) and the supremacy of Islam unless he strives
with all his courage to overthrow infidelity and to strengthen
its leaders (imams) who in India are the Brahmans… on the
other hand if the Muslim king… is merely content to take
the poll-tax (jizya) and tribute (kharaj) from the Hindu and
preserves both infidels and infidelity… what difference will
there be in this respect between the kings of Islam and the
Rais [king] of the infidels? For the Rais of the infidels also
exact the poll-tax (jizya) and the tribute (kharaj) from the
Hindu… in fact, they collect a hundred times more taxes.49
Ziauddin Barni’s complaint indicates that the government under
the Delhi Sultanate was not much different from that of the Hindu
States. Dr. Abid S. Husain has also asserted that except for a few
changes in civil and criminal laws, the Sultans generally followed
the policy of religious freedom as practiced in the Hindu States.50
1.2.2.2. The Mughal Empire
The Mughal political system was known for its autocratic absolutism
and centralism, which were sustained by the concept of the divine
right of the emperor.51 In the administration of the State, however,
the Mughal emperors followed to some extent the separation of
the State from religion in the sense that the government offices
were not the monopoly of the Muslims but, on the other hand, the
Hindus formed a significant part of the State administration.52
Moreover, the emperors until the time of Aurangzeb underplayed
the political role of the Muslim clergy. Akbar, for instance, by relaying
on the support of Hindu Rajputs (a Hindu warrior class) reduced
the Muslim clerical militancy in the affairs of the State.53 While
describing the secular nature of the Mughal Empire Dr. V. P. Varma
asserted:
The Mughal state in India was not the sacerdotal orthodox
Islamic state and during the Mughal period the real authority
resided in the omnipotent will of the rulers rather than in the
texts and enumerations of the shariat, although theoretically,
the rulers were expected to promulgate the injunctions,
44 Theodore De Bary, op.cit., vol.1, pp.465,470.
45 V. P. Varma, Ancient and Medieval Indian Political Thought (Agra, Education
Publishers, 1986), p. 216.
46 Abid S. Husain, The National Culture of India, reprint (Delhi, National Book
trust, 1985), p. 75.
47  V. P. Varma, op.cit., pp. 221-225.
48  Ibid., p. 222.
49 As quoted in Ibid., p. 220.
50 Abid S. Husain, op.cit., p. 77.
51 V. P. Varma, op.cit., p. 239.
52 A.S. Husain, op.cit., p. 89.
53 de Bary, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 437.
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maxims and precepts of the shariat.54
The religious policy of the Mughal emperors varied from the
tolerance of Akbar to the fanaticism of Aurangzeb and Shah Jahan.55
Among them, Akbar was the most liberal minded who intended to
establish a secular State in the sense of a non-communal state. His
eclectic creed, Din-i-Ilahi (Divine Faith)56 and a number of his
letters written to Shah Abbas Safavi of Persia testify that he was
sincere in his effort. An extract of his letter written to Shah Abbas
Safavi reads:
The various religious communities are Divine treasures
entrusted to us by God. We must love them as such. It should
be our firm faith that every religion is blessed by Him, and
our earnest endeavour to enjoy the bliss of the ever-green
garden of universal toleration. The eternal king showers his
favours on all men without distinction. Kings who are
shadows of God should never give up this principle.57
In pursuance of his non-communal policy, Akbar followed a
policy of non-discrimination in the administration of the State, as
caste and creed did not come in the way of government
appointments. In the matters of religion, he pursued a policy to
support all sects. In education Akbar would be the first ruler to
establish public schools with common non-sectarian syllabus open
to all that were designed to create an intellectually and emotionally
bonding community atmosphere for national integration and
communal harmony.58 Akbar’s State policy clearly recognised
respect for individual liberty and equality of all citizens before the
law. These are, in fact, the foundational principles for the creation
of the modern secular State.
Akbar’s contribution to the age-old religious toleration of Indian
heritage is really impressive. Dr. Sri Ram Sharma, after pointing
out Christian fratricide on account of denominationalism and
sectarianism in the sixteenth century Europe, asserted how Akbar’s
non-communal State policies brought peace and concord among
people of different religions. He wrote:
In the modern age, he [Akbar] was the first and almost the
greatest experimenter in the field of religious toleration if
the scope of his toleration, the races to which it was applied,
and the contemporary conditions be taken into account.59
Akbar’s empire came much closer to the modern concept of
the secular State than the Hindu State that was religiously tolerant
but could not establish a common citizenship based on equality before
the law on account of the societal polarization due to caste rigidity.
Certainly, Akbar’s experiment is an indigenous historical antecedent
to the modern secular India. It was on this basis, probably, that
Professor Humayun Kabir referred to Akbar’s experiment as
“perhaps the first conscious attempt to formulate the conception of
a secular state.”60
1.2.3. The British Rule in India
The British paramountcy in India was established through the English
East India Company. This was created according to the Charter
given by Queen Elizabeth on December 31, 1600. The Charter
authorised the Company for a monopoly of trade with the East
under the managerial authority of a Governor. The Company was
also vested with power to make reasonable laws, which were not
contrary to English laws and customs, and the power to punish
those who violated them.61
By the Charter of 1726, the Government-in-Council of the three54 V. P. Varma, op.cit., p. 226.
55 For a detailed documentation of the religious policy of the Mughal Empire see
R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 5, pp. 633-678.
56 For an analysis of the pluralistic attitude of Din-I-Llahi  towards religions see,
ibid., pp. 138-139
57 An extract of Emperor Akbar’s letter written to Shah Abbas Safavi of Persia on
religious tolerance. As quoted in Abid S. Husain, op.cit.,  p. 86
58 Ibid., p. 89.
59 Sri Ram Sharma, The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors (Calcutta,
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 60.
60 Humayun Kabir, The Indian Heritage (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1955),
p.21.
61 A. B.  Keith, A Constitutional History of India 1600-1935, reprint (Allahabad,
Central Book Dept., 1961), pp. 1, and 4-5.
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Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay were given similar
powers to make civil and criminal laws that were not repugnant to
English law. They were not to have the force of law unless approved
by the Court of Directors of the English East India Company.62
The battle of Buxer in 1765, and the prevailing political climate in
India led the East India Company to claim for territorial sovereignty
which created, in the course of time, socio-economic, political and
religious discontent precipitating into the great revolt of 1857-58.63
Soon after the revolt, by the Government of India Act, 1858, the
Government of East India Company was transferred to the British
Crown who acted through a Secretary of State for India. The
Secretary of State of India was answerable to the British Parliament
in the matters of moral and martial progress of India.64
The Crown directly appointed the Governor General of India
and Governors of the three Presidencies. It re-assured the policy
of religious freedom and non-annexation of Indian States, provided
means of representation of Indian views and, at the same time,
reorganised the army and police forces to make further uprising
impossible.65 The British rule ended on 15th August 1947 by the
Indian Independence Act, 1947,66 which provided absolute political
freedom for the establishment of two independent Dominions of
India and Pakistan, each with full authority to make its own
Constitution from the appointed day, August 15, 1947.
1.2.3.1. The Religious Policy of the British in India
The British rulers in India did not follow a uniform policy on religion.
Dr. Donald E. Smith, in his study on the religious policy of the
British Raj, has delineated three complex types of British interest
in India. They are the British as colonial trader, the British as Indian
ruler and the British as professing Christianity. Accordingly, their
religious policy also varied from neutrality to interference.67
The religious policy of the British trader government in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was one of non-interference
in the religious matters of the country in order to secure its
commercial interest; and, as a result, to maintain the good will of
loyal subjects in India.68 This is seen clearly in the order issued by
the East India Company in Bombay in 1662. The order stated,
“There shall be no compulsory conversion, no interference with
native habits and no cow killing in Hindu quarters.”69
Missionaries were required to obtain a license from the Board
of Directors of the East India Company, but the Company was not
enthusiastic to grant it. A noted missionary, William Cary was, for
instance, denied a license to carry out mission work in the British
India. Cary who is known in the Protestant circles as the Father of
modern missions could find shelter at Serampore in Bengal, which
was a Danish territory at that time.
The Board of Directors of the East India Company permitted
merely few chaplains to look after the spiritual requirements of the
Company’s European employees. It has been pointed out that one
chaplain was sent to India between 1760 and 1800.70 Already in
1793 attempts were made in British Parliament under the leadership
of William Wilberforce to grant legal approval for direct missionary
work in India for “the religious and moral improvement”71 of
Indians. However, the Parliament rejected the request on
Company’s representation. On the contrary, the British Parliament
claimed that the Hindus had “as good a system of faith and morals
as most people and it would be madness to attempt their
conversion”.72
The religious neutrality of the British East India Company was
neither based on the principle of religious tolerance nor on the
principle of separation between the Church and the State. On the
contrary, as A.C. Lyall, a British official remarked, it was a policy
62 Ibid., p. 18.
63 R. C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 9,  pp.406 and 603.
64 A.B. Keith, op.cit., 165, 170, 267-270.
65 Ibid., pp. 166 -167, 188 -190.
66 V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp. 9-10.
67 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 65.
68 W.H. Moreland and A.C. Chatterjee, A Short History of India (London, Longmans
Green and Company, 1957), p. 341.
69 Crf. Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 66.
70 Ibid., p. 195.
71 Ibid.,  p.68.
96 HUMAN DIGNITY… FOUNDATIONS FOR INDIAN SECULARISM 97
of expediency for commercial interest. He opined that toleration,
meaning complete non-interference with the religions of the natives,
was of such plain and profitable expediency with the East India
Company in its earlier days, that not to have practiced it would
have been outright insanity in an association whose object was to
do business with Indians. The business pretence of the Company’s
neutrality was betrayed by its own policy of debarring Indian
Christians from appointment to various judicial and military posts in
order to impress on the Hindus and Muslims that the Company did
not favour Christians.73
The reception of missionaries by the Company officials in India
differed according to the interest shown by the Presidencies and
Governors. In Bengal, the Company officials were not very happy
to receive them. In Madras, on the other hand, the Company wanted
missionaries not only for spiritual purpose but much more to acquaint
the British officials with Indian languages and customs of the
people.74 Lord William Bentinck, during his tenure as the Governor
of Madras, encouraged missionaries for evangelical work. However,
the Vellore Mutiny in 1806, which was attributed as a reaction to
conversion work, put an end to direct encouragement to conversion
work.75 On the other hand, Lord Minto, when he assumed the office
of the Governor General in 1807, knew well that any official
affiliation to Christianity would endanger the British interest in India
and, therefore, resorted to a strict policy of control over
missionaries.76
In the meantime, pressure was mounting in England to lend
free entrance to missionaries in India for propagation of Christianity.
Hence, the Charter Act of 1813 included the legal right of
missionaries to enter British India under a new system of licensing.
According to this Act the Company’s Board of Control was made
the final authority in granting permits to missionaries proceeding to
India. The Act also made provisions for an Anglican Bishop of
Calcutta [Kolkata] and thee Archdeacons.77 Certainly, neutrality
was not perfect!
As ruler of India, the British government respected the rights,
privileges and immunities enjoyed by religious institutions under
former Hindu and Muslim rulers.78 The British government also
patronized and administered the Hindu and Muslim religious
institutions. Donald E. Smith records that this practice began as
early as 1796 in Madras Presidency at the time when the British
officials took responsibility to maintain and administer the Hindu
temples by allotting required financial assistance and assigning
proper functionaries to perform religious duties.79
Regulations to look after the temples and mosques and other
pious and beneficial institutions were passed in Bengal and Madras
in 1810 and 1817 respectively. These measures empowered the
Government to ensure that endowments were used according to
the interest and will of the donor. The British officials carefully
observed their roles in Hindu and Muslim festivals and paraded
troops and artillery to make such occasions solemn because State
participation was customary among Indian rulers.80
Indians appreciated these actions and attitudes of the British.
But the Christian fundamentalists both in India and England reacted
adversely either due to their ignorance of Indian customs or as a
matter of dogmatic intolerance towards other religions. In response
to this mounting pressure, the Court of Directors of the East India
Company issued a dispatch in 1833 asking the British officials in
India to withdraw their interference with native religions.81
72 Ibid.
73 Crf. Ibid., P. 69.
74 Ibid, p. 195.
75 Ibid., p. 195.
76 Ibid., p. 196.
77 A.B. Keith, op.cit., p. 160.
78 For example, the Muslim rulers of Mysore, Hyder Ali (1769-1782) and Tipu
Sultan (1782-1799) saw to it that the religious institutions were maintained
well. Similarly, Muhammed Ali Walajah (1752-1794), the Nawab of Arcot in
the Karnatic region saw to it that the Hindu religious institutions were looked
after well in his territory. In the Hindu Kingdom of Mysore under the reign of
Wodyar Family, religious institutions of various sects and denominations were
cared for. See Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 72-74.
79 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 74.
80 Ibid., p. 75.
81 Ibid., p. 76.
98 HUMAN DIGNITY… FOUNDATIONS FOR INDIAN SECULARISM 99
By 1841, the British officials stopped participating in the religious
activities of Hindus and Muslims but guaranteed to the continuance
of grants and allowances allotted for religious and charitable
purposes by the former Hindu and Muslim rulers. Indians
reproached the British that the withdrawal violated one of the
immemorial duties of rulers.82 The principle of neutrality and equality
before the law, which the British intended to maintain as a matter
of State policy, was asserted in the Royal proclamation of 1858,
when Queen Victoria assumed the government of the country in
her hands. The proclamation affirmed inter alia:
We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian
territories by the same obligations of the duty which binds us
to all our other subjects.
We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be
any-wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason
of their religious faith or observances, but all shall alike enjoy
the equal and impartial protection of the law, and we do
strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority
under us that they abstain from all interference with the
religious belief or worship for any of our subjects on pain of
our highest displeasure.83
By 1863 the British government handed over the temple
properties to government appointed trustees or committees.
Accordingly, the imperial legislature representing the Indian opinion
passed the Charitable and Religious Trustees Act in 1920.84
The third role of the British in India was that of a Christian
government. The East India Company from 1644 onwards sent
few Anglican chaplains to minister to the religious needs of the
British merchants and soldiers. The Charter of 1698 had included
provision for the maintenance of ministers and schoolmasters in
the Company’s factories but no missionary intent was attached. In
1813, with the renewal of the Company’s Charter, provision was
made for an Anglican bishop of Calcutta and three Archdeacons.
The see of the Anglican bishop of Calcutta included India, Ceylon
and Australia. In 1833 the British Parliament created thee Anglican
dioceses of Madras and Bombay and designated the bishop of
Calcutta metropolitan of the entire Indian territory.85
During this period the building of Anglican churches increased.
The Presidency governments met half of the cost of construction
and the churches remained the property of the government. The
British government also appointed and financed chaplains of other
denominations to minister to the British and Anglo-Indian civilians
of those persuasions. The Presbyterian ministers were appointed
in 1813. In 1840, first grant was made to build a Roman Catholic
Church in Madras Presidency and thereafter the Roman Catholic
bishops and missionaries began to receive allowances.86 By the
first half of the twentieth century the British government had to
limit considerably the cost maintaining ecclesiastical services in
India.87 The government’s connection with the ecclesiastical affairs
in India came in for sharp criticism on the ground that in the course
of time the State, Christian religion and missionary society were
apparently linked up.
Though the British government did not directly approve of the
missionary efforts of the clergymen appointed by the State, yet
from the first half of the nineteenth century onwards many of them
were directly involved in evangelical work. For example, bishop
Heber, the second bishop of the Anglican see of Calcutta put the
evangelisation of India in the forefront of the Church’s duty.88
Eminent persons from many religions voiced reactions to this
abnormal position of the British government. Raja Ram Mohan
Roy, the Father of Indian Renaissance, also voiced his objection.
In a letter that he wrote to the British government in the year 1821
Raja Ram Mohan Roy registered his protest to the manner of
missionary-behaviour under European protection, which were
82 Ibid., p. 76.
83 J.C. Powell-Price, A History of India (London, Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1955), p. 560.
84 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 78.
85 Ibid., p. 79.
87 A.B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India, op.cit., p. 414.
88 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 79.
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repugnant to Indian sensibilities. He stated:
[D]uring the last twenty years, a body of Englishmen who
are called missionaries, have been publicly endeavouring, in
several ways, to convert Hindoos and Mussulmans of this
country into Christianity. The first way is that of publishing
and distributing among the natives various books… reviling
both religions, and abusing and ridiculing the gods and saints
of the former. The second way is that of standing in front of
the doors of the natives or in the public roads to preach the
excellency of their won religion and the debasedness of that
of others. The third way is that if any natives of low origin
became Christians from the desire of gain or from any other
motives, these gentlemen employ and maintain them as a
necessary encouragement to others to follow their example.
It is true that the apostles of Jesus Christ used to preach the
superiority of the Christian religion to the natives of different
countries. But must recollect that they were not of the rulers
of those countries where they preached…In Bengal, where
the English are the sole rulers, and where the mere name of
Englishman is sufficient to frighten people, an encroachment
upon the rights of her poor timid and humble inhabitants and
upon their religion, cannot be viewed in the eyes of God or
the public as a justifiable act. For wise and good men always
feel disinclined to hurt those that are of much less strength
than themselves, and if such weak creatures be dependent
on them and subject to their authority, they can never attempt,
even in thought, to mortify their feeling.89
Similarly, bishop Henry Whitehead, one of the Anglican bishops
in India, who observed the problem involved in the appointment of
the bishop by the State, wrote in 1924:
It is true that they (bishops) are appointed and paid by the
state to minister to the Christian servants of the government,
but at the same time, by virtue of their position as bishops
they are the heads of the church of which the government
servants form only a small minority; and as every Christian
church, so far as it is faithful to its commission, is bound to
be a missionary body, the bishops cannot do their duty as
bishops of the church of Christ unless they take an active
interest and an active part in the missionary work of the
dioceses over which they rule.90
The need to de-link the Anglican Church from the State
establishment was also voiced by Church leaders in order to have
the freedom for mission work. Accordingly, the Indian Church Act,
1927, permitted the legal separation of the Church of England in
India from the English Church. This Act was supplemented by the
Indian Church measure (1927) passed by the British Parliament,
which formally effected the separation.91
Subsequently, all Christian denominations in India were put on
an equal footing but the financial assistance given by the government
continued. With the attainment of Independence, the Indian
Ecclesiastical Establishment of the British government was abolished
on March 31, 1948, and the Churches maintained by the government
were handed over to the proper denominational authorities.92 These
measures of the British government were the direct response to
the political ideology of secular nationalism that was definitely
emerging during the national struggle for India’s independence
(swaraj) from the British rule.
1.2.4. The Emergence of Indian Nationalism
The emergence of nationalism in India was a very slow process.
The alien rule was essentially responsible for the awakening of
nationalism. Therefore, nationalist movements were a challenge to
and revolt against the British rule.93 In the first half of the nineteenth
century there were number of revolts. They were, however, local
in character, meant to re-establish the supremacy of the local rulers
against the British Raj and they had little nationalist significance.
After the mutiny and the revolt of 1857, Indians lost their trust in
89 R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 15-16.
90  As quoted in Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 81.
91  A. B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India, op.cit., pp. 413-414.
92  Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 82.
93  R.C. Majumdar, History, vol. 10, pp. 465-498.
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the providential rule of the British,94 and they realised the need to
start a national struggle for independence. As a result, the growth
of nationalist movements increased.95 The different trends that
emerged under Indian National movement could be grouped as
religious, secular and communal nationalism.
1.2.4.1. Religious Nationalism
The beginning of religious nationalism could be traced to the Wahhabi
movement that began under the influence of Shaik Muhammed-
ibn-Abdul Wahhab of Najd. In the first half of the nineteenth century,
the Wahhabi movement was, probably, the only political revolt which
had a certain broader national base.96
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Muslims had
the Deoband movement centred on the Deoband Seminary founded
by Maulana Muhammed Qasim.  According to Dr. Abid S. Husain,
the Deoband movement propagated Shah Wali Ullah’s ideas of
social revolution, religious reform and political struggle against the
British Raj and westernisation.97 Similarly, when the awakening of
nationalism arose among the Hindus, it was based on some religious
ideal. In Maharastra, it was the Hindu rule of Shivaji became the
motivating political force for the freedom struggle.98 Similarly,
Professor R.C. Majumdar holds the view that the inspiration of
Bankim Chandra Chatterji in particular and the Bengal movement
in general that took place at this phase of national struggle had a
Hindu religious flavour.99 As these movements had their inspiration
from religion, though not communal in objective, Dr. Abid S. Husain
categorises these national movements as religious nationalism.100
of nationalism arising “purely as a political movement.”101 People
who had Western liberal education steered it in the emerging Indian
political scenario. The Indian liberals who were inspired by the
Western political liberalism, held in their political ideology an abiding
faith in the values of human dignity, equality and liberty. They
followed a policy of social tolerance, dissociation of religion from
politics, secular approach to social and political issues and believed
in the people’s capacity to progress.102 K.M. Panikkar was of the
opinion that John Stuart Mill’s tracts on liberty and representative
government and Edmund Burke’s principles of prescriptive
constitution, parliamentary representation and political parties
provided the basics needed for the liberal political ideology in
India.103
The Indian liberals, therefore, saw the possibility of a national
movement for political freedom and the establishment of a
democratic State from a secular and humanistic point of view. It is
this national movement that we call “secular nationalism.”104 Its
foundational principles were liberal and secular in value orientation
as these are based on reason and not attached to religious
legitimation. Dr. M.M. Thomas points out that the Indian liberals
who were the founding members of the Indian National Congress
(INC), projected secular nationalism as an expression of “the spirit
of fraternity”105 and treated patriotism as “social feeling”106 of all
people who lived in the territory of the Indian subcontinent.
Secular nationalists believed that such a national solidarity would
help Indians to transcend the isolation resulting from the joint-family
system and the caste system as well as the divisive tendencies
1.2.4.2. Secular Nationalism
In the second half of the nineteenth century, we find another kind
94 R.C.Majumdar, History, vol. 9, pp. 467-558.
95 Ibid., pp. 663-665.
96 Ibid., pp. 883-900.
97 A.S. Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, op.cit., pp. 42-43.
98 A.K. Saran, op.cit., p.3.
99 R.C. Majumdar, History, vol. 10, p. 44.
100 Abid S. Husain, The destiny of Indian Muslims, op.cit., p. 44.
101 Ibid., p. 44.
102 K.M. Panikkar, In Defence of Liberalism (Bombay, Asia Publishing House,
1962), pp. 1,19; B.D. Shukla, A History of Indian Liberal Party (Allahabad,
The Indian Press, 1960), pp. 52-53; Theodore De Bary, The Sources of Indian
Tradition, vol. 2, pp. 41, 132-135, 148-149, 151-152.
103 K.M. Panikkar, Foundations of New India, op.cit., pp.75-86.
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105 M.M. Thomas, The Secular Ideologies of India and the Secular Meaning of
Christ (Madras, C L S, 1976), and p.8.
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arising from regional, linguistic and religious sentiments.107 They
believed that a nation could survive only when all sections of the
people shared, as Jawaharlal Nehru asserted, “a sense of common
national consciousness…of belonging together and of together facing
the rest of mankind”108 irrespective of their regional, ethnic, linguistic
and religious considerations.
With this in view, the secular nationalists advocated the territorial
concept of the nation-state in that all the inhabitants of India as a
people were included on the basis of dignity of all people as human
nature demands. Therefore, equality of status and opportunity
irrespective of religious or other identity became central values in
their concept of nationalism. Political stalwarts of this sort of
nationalism formed the Servants of Indian Society as a secular
fraternity to foster and serve this emerging sense of a secular national
community among the people of India.109 Hence, the political
ideology of secular nationalism differentiated national identity and
secular interests from one’s religious identity.
Liberals from all walks of life such as Mahadev Govind
Ranade,110 Surendranath Banerjea,111 G. Subramania Aiyar,112
Pherozeshah M. Mehta,113 Gopal Krishna Gokhale,114
Abdul Rasul,115 Dadabhai Naoroji,116 Badruddin Tyabji,117 and
Kashinath T. Telang118 were some of the luminaries who
propounded the political values of secular nationalism under the
banner of Indian National Congress.119
Professor Bipen Chandra, an eminent historian of modern India,
who had done decades of research on the various aspects of the
Indian national movement, highlights that the creation of a secular
State had been an important concern of the Indian national
movement for freedom. His observation sums the nation’s political
consciousness:
A very important part of the vision of the movement from
the very beginning was secularism. It is very interesting that
the national movement, especially from 1880s onwards when
the Indian National Congress was founded, never took up a
religious issue nor did it ever criticize the British for being
Christians. Not once was it said that the British rule should
go because the rulers are Christians - a very minority religion
in India. Nor was a religious critique made of colonialism or
of British rule. From the very beginning the notion that religion
should be separated from the state was accepted. This was
the vision unanimously accepted since the days of Dadabhai
Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale to
the very end, even when our country was forced to accept
partition. The movement never accepted communalism. And
that is why though the country was partitioned, because we
could not rout communalism - it was communalism, which
was successful in partitioning our country - still we managed
to create a secular constitution. Secularism was a basic pillar
of the national movement.120
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1.2.4.3. Communal Nationalism
At the beginning of the twentieth century, nationalism in India,
nevertheless, took an unhealthy turn towards Hindu and Muslim
communalism. Communalism in its extreme form is a modern
phenomenon peculiar to India. It denotes a narrow group mentality
of exclusive loyalty to one’s religious community often causing
antagonism towards people of other religious communities and even
willing to sacrifice national interest for the advancement of the
interest of one’s own religious community.121 In his systematic study
of the growth of communalism in modern India, Dr. Bipan Chandra
Says:
Communalism is the belief that because a group of people
follow a particular religion they have, as a result, common
social, political and economic interests. It is a belief that in
India, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs form different
and distinct communities which are independently and
separately structured and consolidated.122
According to Bipan Chandra, communalists identify secular
interests exclusively with the interests of their respective religious
communities. The pursuance of these secular interests in a manner
benefiting only to a particular religious community becomes
detrimental to the interests of the larger national community and
creates communal tension.123
Asghar Ali Engineer who has also done an extensive research
on the phenomenon of communalism in India, shares the view of
Bipan Chandra. In his attempt to identify the reasons for the growth
of communalism in India, A.A. Engineer points out, “Secular
demands, either socio-economic or political in nature, voiced by a
religious community by virtue of its belonging to a particular religion
constitute the core of communalism.”124 Engineer is of the opinion
that in India religion is not the root cause of communal conflicts.
Religion is only used as a powerful emotive instrument in the hands
of the elites of various religious communities for the purpose of
achieving secular ends. Communalism in India is very much a socio-
economic phenomenon rather than a religious issue.125
The Muslim communal nationalism arose at the time when the
All India Muslim League, which was a political body, was founded
in the year 1906. It was an elite Muslim organisation. The League’s
objective was to protect the separate communal national identity
of the entire Muslim community in India and to seek legal safeguards
until the goal of separate Islamic State was achieved.126 Hence, in
l909 the League obtained separate electorates for Muslims. Muslim
seats were reserved in both central and provincial councils for which
only Muslims could vote. The system of separate electorates
encouraged communal sentiments of various religious communities
in the Indian subcontinent.127
The factors that influenced the Muslims to justify their cause
were many. The blending of Hinduism with nationalism by some
Hindu extremists in the Indian National Congress,128 the anti-Muslim
reactions of the Hindus over the partition of Bengal in 1905,129 the
Hindu-Muslim riots,130 the Hindu revivalism spearheaded by a
religious body known as the Arya Samaj and the Hindi-Urdu
controversy in North India131 were some of the causes that created
an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among Muslims. These issues
121 For an extensive study of communalism and communal politics in India see B.
Chakrabarty, ed., Secularism and Indian Polity (New Delhi, Segment Book
Distributors, 1990); Bipen Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New
Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1989); Asghar Ali Engineer & M. Shakir, eds.,
Communalism in India (New Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1985); Asghar Ali
Engineer, Communalism and Communal Violence in India (New Delhi, Ajanta
Publications, 1989).
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123 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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led them to isolate themselves from the mainstream secular
national movement headed by the Indian National Congress.
R.C. Majumdar and K.M. Panikkar point out that parallel to
the growth of Muslim communal nationalism, the Hindu communal
nationalism also arose to safeguard Hinduism, and the interests of
those who belonged to Hindu religion and to counter-balance the
communal ideology of the Muslim League.132
In the year 1922, a militant Hindu organization known as the
Hindu Mahasabha was formed to spearhead the Hindu communal
nationalism. It was an elite Hindu political organization. Vir Savarkar,
the President of the Hindu Mahasabha from 1937 to 1942
propounded the ideology of Hindu politics known as Hindutva
(Hindu nationalism), which was modelled on Fascism and Nazism.
This is something that the founder fathers of Hindutva openly admit
in their writings.
Commenting on V.D. Savarkar, the founding father of the
concept of Hindutva, Christophe Jaffrelot has the following to say:
More instrumental than anyone else in bringing about this
qualitative leap was another Maharashtrian Brahmin, Vinayak
Damodar Savarkar, the former head of the terrorist group
and a future President of the Hindu Mahasabha (1937-42).
His ‘Hindutva: who is a Hindu?’ published at Nagpur in
1923, is a basic text for nationalist “Hinduness” (the generally
accepted translation of “Hindutva”). This work perfectly
illustrates the mechanism of Hindu nationalist identity -
building through the stigmatisation and emulation of
“threatening others”. Savarkar wrote the book in 1922, while
in prison in Ratnagiri…
Nevertheless Savarkar discovered nationalism in his study
of the “threatening others” and especially his study of
nationalist movements in Europe. When he was a young
revolutionary in Maharastra he was inclined to model himself
on Mazzini, while the secret society, Abhinav Bharat
(Modern India), which he founded in 1904, was probably
intended to resemble Mazzini’s Young Italy organization.
After settling down in England in 1906 he read Mazzini’s
political writings, and his autobiography, which he translated
in Marathi and sent to India for publication. In his introduction
to this study, he linked Garibaldi to Shivaji and Mazzini to
Shivaji’s guru, Ramdas…The technique of matching
European models of action can also be seen in Hindutva
where Savarkar declares: “I read the life of Mazzini and I
exclaim ‘How patriotic they are!’ I read the life of a
Madhvacharya (founder of Vaishnavite sect) and exclaim
‘How patriotic we are!” Such sentiments suggest that
Savarkar learnt what nationalism was from western
experiments and then tried to apply this imported concept to
his own country, a process that relied on a new construction
of tradition.133
While trying to ascribe the defining characteristics of a Hindu,
Savarkar identified race, religion and nationality as a single unit.
He wrote, “A Hindu means a person who regards this land of
Bharat varsha, from the Indus to the seas as his Fatherland as well
as his Holy Land, that is, the cradle land of his religion.”134 His
definition of Hindutva or Hinduness further clarifies the ideology
of Hindu communal nationalism:
Hindutva embraces all departments of thought and activity
of the whole being of our Hindu race. Hindutva refers to a
people united by a common country, blood, history, religion,
culture and language. The Hindus are vastly more than a
religious community, they are a nation.135
The idea of “Two Nation” theory136 was the logical consequence
132 K.M. Panikkar, Foundations of New India, op.cit., p. 57; S. Radhakrishnan,
Religion and Society (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 242; R.C.
Majumdar, History, vol. 11, p. 419.
133 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics,
1925 to 1990’s (New Delhi, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd, 1999), pp. 25-26.
134 V. D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who Is A Hindu (Poona, V.G. Ketkar, 1942), p. 4.
135 Ibid., p. 4.
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of the Hindutva ideology. For, Savarkar wrote, “India cannot
be assumed today to be under Unitarian and homogeneous nation,
but on the contrary, there are two nations in the main, the Hindus
and Muslim.137
The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) is another Hindu
fundamentalist and militant organization founded by Dr. Keshav
Hedgewar in 1925. Just as the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS
propagated the ideology of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation-state)
modelled after Italian fascism. While Commenting on the fascistic
character of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak, Christophe Jaffrelot
made this observation:
The fascistic dimension of the RSS is suggested by its
paramilitary style. In 1926, Hedgewar introduced a uniform
- consisting of khaki shorts, khaki (later white) shirts and
black forage capes - which has already been partly adopted
by the Corps of volunteers which he set up at the 1920
session of Congress at Nagpur. The shakhas also observed
strict discipline symbolized by the detailed code of regulations
for the daily assembly and dismissal of the company of
swayamsevaks and by their behaviour when saluting the
flag: the ‘volunteers’ stood to attention, with the right hand
held at chest level, palm downwards, head bowed; they were
arrayed in ranks in order of age. On some occasions, such
as the festivals of Dasahara, they marched in step through
the streets holding their lathis to demonstrate the strength
of the movement. These elements suggest that the RSS
should be regarded as ‘an Indian version of fascism’…The
RSS had already assumed its final form by the time of the
first contacts between the Hindu nationalists and the
European fascists and neither Hedgewar nor Golwalkar
developed a theory of the state and the race, a crucial element
in fascism and Nazism.138
The first contacts between the Hindu nationalists and the
European fascists took place in the 1930s…In the late 1930s, both
Hindu Outlook and Mahratta praised Franco, Mussolini and Hitler.
Moreover, in late 1938, the volkischer Beobachter, the mouthpiece
of the German National Socialist Party, took an interest in
Savarkar’s activities. The views expressed by RSS leaders about
European fascist movements during this period resemble those of
the Hindu Sabhaites in some respects but with the crucial difference
that whereas the Hindu Mahasabha as a political party, was
interested in the role of the state, the RSS was more concerned
about the socio-political aspects of building the Hindu Rashtra.
Its supreme ideologue, M.S Golwalkar, asserted that Hindus
were one nation from which non-Hindus were automatically
excluded. The latter were expected either to adopt Hindu dharma
and culture, or accept to be second-class citizens. His ideology
was very significant in popularising the “Two nation” theory and
the Hindu communal nationalism. In respect to the status of
minorities he wrote:
The non-Hindu people of Hindustan must either adopt the
Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold
in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those
evolved from the political thought of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and his Aligarh
Movement. Syed Ahmad propounded the idea that the Hindus and Muslims
formed two separate political entities with separate outlook and conflicting
interests. He, therefore, consistently opposed the formation of INC and its
claim to represent the entire people of India irrespective of religious
consideration. Syed seemed to mean that the two communities are not only
entirely separate but also that they cannot co-exist in one nation. For detail see:
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India (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996); A.T. Embree, Utopias in Conflict:
Religion and Nationalism in Modern India (Delhi, Oxford University Press,
1992); M. Juergensmeyer, Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State
(Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1993); W.K. Anderson and S.D. Damle, The
brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sang and Hindu
Revivalism ( New Delhi, Vistaar, 1987).
137 V. D. Svarkar, Hindu Rashtra Drshan: A Collection of the presidential speeches
delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha platform (Bombay, V.G. Khare, 1949), p.
26. 138 Ibid., pp. 50-52.
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of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., they must
not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness
toward this land and its age long traditions but must also
cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion instead -
in a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may in the
country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming
nothing …not even citizen’s rights.139
Similarly, M. A. Jinnah’s concept of the “Two nation” theory,
which he expounded during the latter part of the freedom struggle,
was also significant in his effort to popularise Muslim communal
nationalism, which resulted in the partition of the sub-continent. In
his presidential address to the all India Muslim League session held
in 1940, M.A. Jinnah advocated for the cause of Islamic nationalism.
He declared:
Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of
the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders.
The Hindus and Muslims have different religions … They
belong to different religious philosophies, social customs and
literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together;
and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which
are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. It is
quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration
from different heroes and different episodes. Very often the
hero of one is a foe of the other … to yoke together two
such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority,
another as majority, must lead to growing discontent and
final destruction of any fabric that may be built up for the
government of such a state. Mussalmans are not a minority
…Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of
the nation. And they must have their homeland, their territory,
and their state.140
Despite the communal hostility to each other, the Hindu
Mahasabha and the Muslim League had agreed on one point that
India could not be regarded one nation because of its religious and
ethnic heterogeneity. V.D. Savarkar asserted time and again that
Hindus and Muslims were “Two Nations”.141 In the same way,
M.A. Jinnah held that it was a dream that the two communities
could ever form a common nationality, which would lead only to
disaster.142 The idea of nationalism propounded by the Hindu
Mahasabha, the RSS and the Muslim League was communal
nationalism because the concept of nation-state in their thinking
was identified with religio-ethnic boundaries.
1.2.4.4. The Growth of Secular Nationalism
The Indian liberals who committed themselves to the principles of
secular nationalism carried forward the spirit of renascent India
and its humanistic values in the political arena with multiple interests.
Their objectives were to free India from foreign rule and to establish
swaraj (self-rule) and to build India as a modern nation-state under
socialist, secular democratic principles, wherein the values of human
dignity and solidarity among various sections of the people would
be fostered for national integration and social amity.143
These liberal stalwarts were the founding members of the Indian
National Congress (INC), which was founded in 1885 under the
leadership of a retired British civil servant, Allen Hume. The growth
of Indian nationalism as a non-communal political movement for
national struggle to attain Independence was led by the INC. Right
from its inception, the Congress represented the national aspirations
of the people of all caste, creed and language and its membership
was open to all.
This secular approach that was adopted by the INC was,
certainly, rooted in the Indian ethos of pluralism. It was, nevertheless,
expanded and enriched by the inspiration that the liberals received
139 M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood, 4th Edition (Nagpur, Bharat
Prakasham, 1947), pp. 55-56.
140 As quoted in A. Kashyap, Communalism and Constitution (New Delhi, Lancer
Books, 1988), p. 112. For a recent study on this issue by the Indian Theological
Association, see Yvon Ambrose, “Hundutva’s Real Agenda and Strategies” in
Hindutva, An Indian Christian Response, eds., J.Mattam & P. Arockiadoss,
op.cit., pp. 11-102.
141 V. D. Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, op.cit., p. 26.
142 De Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 283-286.
143 Bipan Chandra, Essays,  op.cit., pp. 13-117.
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from the humanistic values of liberty, equality and fraternity as
evolved in the Western liberal political tradition. They were
convinced that such open-ended humanistic values and national
vision alone would unite people for a national struggle to attain
swaraj in a land known for diversity of religions, races, castes,
languages and cultures.144
Professor Bipan Chandra has made the following observation
about the vision of swaraj and its legacy for free India:
Free India has been largely guided by the vision of Swaraj
that generations of freedom fighters had. The Indian national
movement was one of the greatest mass movements in world
history. Moreover, especially after 1919, it was consciously
built around the basic notion that the common people had to
play an active role in their own liberation. They were to be
the subjects and not the object of history…
The Indian national movement was fully committed to a policy
based on representative democracy and the full range of
civil liberties…What is of equal importance, the values of
democracy and civil liberty were extensively promoted among
the middle classes by the intelligentsia and then, after 1919,
among the common people in the urban and rural areas by
the grass-roots level nationalist political workers…
Secularism - defined as separation of religion from politics
and the state, equal regard for all religions, absence of
discrimination among citizens on grounds of religion and
active opposition to communalism - was another basic
constituent of the freedom movement’s view of independent
India…(T)he strength of the secular content of the Indian
national movement became obvious when, despite the
partition and the communal orgy of 1946-47, independent
India succeeded in making secularism a basic pillar of its
Constitution as also its state and society.145
Right from the beginning, every effort was made to keep the
Indian National Congress on a solid non-communal footing. The
resolution of the Second Congress Meeting held in 1886 made it
clear that religious consideration was irrelevant to membership in
the nationalist movement headed by the Congress. The resolution
stated:
The Congress is a community of temporal interests and not
of spiritual convictions that qualify men to represent each
other in the discussion of political questions; we hold their
general interests in this country being identical, Hindus,
Christians, Muslims, and Parsis may fitly as members of
their respective communities represent each other in the
discussion of public secular affairs.146
The leaders of the Indian national movement held the view that,
though certain elements of cohesion and even sense of nationhood
were found in India’s past history, India was not yet a structured
nation. Hence, from the beginning, the secular national movement
stressed on the importance of promoting the “process of nation-in-
the-making.” The leaders of the movement under the banner of INC
assumed that it was only by affirming and appreciating the immense
cultural, linguistic, religious, regional and geographical diversities that
India could become a structured secular nation-state.147
Influenced by the nineteenth century European concept of
nationalism, that any people who constituted a nation were thereby
entitled to self-government, the Congress committed itself to the
task of inculcating the spirit of non-communal nationalism. The
Indian National Congress asserted that India is one country despite
the existence of hundreds of separate States on the sub-continent
and that Indians constitute one nation despite all racial, religious,
cultural and linguistic diversity. The leaders of the Congress,
therefore, stressed that the pluralistic nature of the Indian society
would not be an obstacle to establish a secular democratic State.148
144 R. C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 10 (1965), pp. 524-538.
145 Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit. , pp. 13-14.
146 Report and Proceedings of the Second Indian National Congress, 1886. As
quoted in Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 88.
147 Bipen Chandra, Essays On Indian Nationalism, op.cit., p.15.
148 Ibid., p. 45; also Theodore de Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, vol. 2, pp.
150-152.
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The example of Italian nationalists, Garibaldi and Mazzini,
provided much of the early inspiration to Indian nationalists. Similar
to the aims of Young Italy, the INC had two objectives (1) to end
the British Raj, and (2) by isolating the communal forces, unite
India under one secular nationalistic flag.149 In 1932 Maulana Syed
Husain Ahemed Madani, a prominent Muslim leader gave a
theoretical framework for non-communal nationalism: that “nations
are formed from countries.”150 Therefore, people of different ethno-
linguistic and religious communities in India belonged to one Indian
nation.
The British opposed the idea on the presumption that the people
of a multi-linguistic and multi-caste society could ever be regarded
a nation. R.C. Majumdar reminds us that it was also an idea equally
shared by the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and the Muslim League
and also by the Communist Party of India at that time.151 Prominent
Congress leaders refuted these assumptions.  Jawaharlal Nehru,
for example, posited the question that if ethno-religious criteria were
to be the deciding factor for nationality there would be innumerable
nations in India. He asserted that ultimately nationality consisted in
the consciousness of unity of the people. Replying to Jinnah’s “two
nation” theory he wrote:
Mr. Jinnah’s demand was based on a new theory he had
recently proposed - that India consisted of two nations, Hindu
and Muslim. Why only two, I do not know, for if nationality
was based on religion, then there were many nations in India.
Of two brothers one may be a Hindu, another a Muslim;
they would belong to two different nations. They were nations
which had no boundaries; they overlapped. A Bengali
Moslem and a Bengali Hindu living together, speaking the
same language, and having much the same traditions and
customs, belonged to different nations. …It seemed a
reversion to some medieval theory … Possibly the essential
characteristic of national consciousness is a sense of
belonging together and of together facing the rest of mankind
…It may even be said that India developed in the past as a
multinational state and gradually acquired a national
consciousness… Today the most powerful states are multi-
national, but at the same time developing a national
consciousness, like the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R.152
The nationalists advocated the proposition that all who lived in
the territorial unit of India, and acknowledged it their homeland,
belonged to the one Indian nation. From the Muslim point of view,
Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, one of the prominent leaders of the
Indian National Congress, gave the theoretical justification to the
territorial and secular nationalism in which Hindus and Muslims
formed one nation. Azad referred to the seventh century “covenant”
that took place between the Muslims and the Jews of Medina through
which they were declared “one people” in defence against the
hostile Quraish tribes. Azad rendered the Arabic phrase “one
people” into “one nation”153 and interpreted the covenant as a
historical precedent for the formation of a common Indian nationality
of the Muslims and the Hindus.
In the context of growing menace of communal nationalism
created by the Hindu-Muslim hostility, the Congress reiterated its
position that the nationalist struggle was not for the creation of a
Hindu Raj, but for a united secular and free Indian State, which
would ensure equal rights and obligations to all citizens irrespective
of their religious affiliation.154 To this effect, the objective Resolution
adopted by the Congress in its Karachi session in 1931 said, “The
state shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions.”155  Hence,
149 R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 10, p. 458.
150 Crf. Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 139-140.
151 See for a detailed study in R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 11, chapters
15, 21, 30.
152 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, op.cit., pp. 415-416.
153 Quoted in Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p.144. On the basis of this historical
covenant of the seventh century, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind interpreted that the
Muslims and non-Muslims of India have entered into a covenant to establish a
secular state. The covenant, they claimed, has been embodied in the Constitution
of India. See W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, op.cit., pp.284-285.
154 Jawaharlal. Nehru, The Discovery of India, op.cit.,   pp. 416-418.
155 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India (New York, John Day Company, 1948),
p. 406.
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during the freedom struggle, nationalism signified the freedom
movement of the people of India who fought not only against the
British Raj but also against all separatist-political forces built on
ethnic and religious loyalties, which were known as communalism.
In like manner, in the post-independent India the antithesis of
communalism has been secularism that professed to give equal
regard for all religions in the political community.
This has been the political attitude held by most nationalist
leaders from Gandhiji to Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad. They
acknowledged the fact of plurality of religious communities and
gave importance and the need to cultivate the culture of peaceful
co-existence in one nation-state.156 So, the political philosophy of
Indian secularism evolved in the context of a political attempt to
unite together heterogeneous communities of peoples divided on
religious backgrounds into a modern nation-state. This required on
the part of the State a total rejection of communalism and affirmation
of a constitutional policy to separate politics and other secular
institutions from religious sanction.157
Commenting on the evolution of the secular nationalism in India,
Dr. Donald E. Smith points out, “The main current of Indian
nationalism assured the separation of religion and politics, there
was no conflict between India’s religious pluralism and the goal of
independence with political unity.”158 As a result, secularism was
conceived by Nationalist leaders to work out a political philosophy
founded on liberal democratic values that acknowledged the national
fact of religious pluralism, and guaranteed equal regard for all
regions (Sarva Dharma Samabhava) and committed for a welfare
State, which was not altogether new to the political ethos of India.
Dr. Satish Chandra who has done studies on the various aspects of
Indian national movement says that secularism was projected as a
political policy at the time of nationalist movement for swaraj to
meet two challenges: first to neutralize the challenges of
communalism and to strengthen the forces of national integration.
Secondly to provide a non-religious foundation for nationalist
aspiration, which all Indians irrespective of their religious affiliations
would share.159
Thus, we may conclude that secularism as a political philosophy
arose in the modern Indian polity not on account of religion-state
conflict nor religious wars as it had been in the west, but “as an
attempt to unify the followers of different religious faiths for national
solidarity in their struggle against foreign rule by making secularism
the premise of a united free India.”160 As Sarla Jhingran in her
recent study points out that equal regard for all religions (Sarva
Dharma Samabhava) became “pivotal to Indian conception of
secularism”.161 This positive emphasis of Indian secularism towards
religion and its dynamic character towards human welfare would
become clear to us when we look into the debates on the concept
of “secularism” that took place while framing the Constitution, and
later in the Indian Parliament. This would be the matter for our
study in the section that follows.
1.2.5. The Making of a Secular Constitution
After the independence of India on August 15, 1947, the Drafting
Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly on August
29, 1947. It was charged with the duty of preparing a Constitution
in accordance with the decisions of the Constituent Assembly. The
Government of India Act of 1935 supplied a large part of the basic
framework to work out the new Constitution. However, important
principles and constitutional provisions were adopted mostly from
the constitutional systems of Great Britain and United States. Part
III of the Indian Constitution which deals with fundamental rights,
including the provisions dealing with the Indian form of secularism
as given in articles 25 to 28 have been adopted mostly form the
secular provisions of the of United States Constitution.
156 B.R. Nanda, Gandhi: Pan Islamism and Nationalism (Bombay, Oxford
University Press, 1989), p. 283.
157 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, op.cit., p. 362.
158 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 141.
159 Satish Chandra, “The Indian National Movement and Concept of Secularism”,
in B. Chakrabarty, ed., Secularism and Indian Polity (New Delhi, Segment
Book Distributors, 1990), p. 69.
160 Ibid., p. 70.
161 Sarla Jhingran, op.cit., p. 143.
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However, at the time of drafting of the Constitution and during
the debates which took place in the Constituent Assembly, the
members of the Constituent Assembly refused to add the terms
“secular” or “secularism” either in the Preamble of the Constitution
or in the articles dealing with the secular provisions of the
Constitution. At that time these terms had a compelling sense of
atheistic connotation, especially as it was in usage in the Western
countries. Therefore, the Constituent Assembly omitted their usage
in the Constitution. This calls for explanation. We provide it in the
following sections.
1.2.5.1. The Omission of the term ‘Secular’ In the Constitution
On December l3, l946, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru moved the Objectives
Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, which was passed on
January 22, l947. The Objectives Resolution gave expression to
the ideals and aspirations of the people of India. Its principles were
to guide the Constituent Assembly in its deliberations in making the
Constitution. The principles embodied in the Objectives Resolution
were incorporated into the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
Some of the provisions of the Objectives Resolution read:
(l) This Constituent Assembly declares in its firm and solemn
resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign
Republic and draw up for her future governance a
Constitution…
(4) Wherein all power and authority of the sovereign
Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of
Government, are derived from the people; and
(5) Wherein shall be guaranteed and secured to all the people
of India, justice, social, economic and political; equality of
status, of opportunity, and before the law; freedom of thought,
expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and
action, subject to law and public morality; and
(6) Wherein adequate safeguards shall be provided for
minorities, backward and tribal areas, and depressed and
other backward classes; and
(7) Whereby shall be maintained the integrity of the territory
of the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea and air
according to justice and the law of civilized nations, and
(8) This ancient land attains its rightful and honoured place
in the world and makes its full and willing contribution to the
promotion of world peace and the welfare of the mankind.162
It is surprising to note that the Objectives Resolution did not
mention the terms ‘secular state’ or ‘secularism’ even though clause
(5) of the Resolution was definitely secular in character. The terms
did not occur in the long speech Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru delivered at
the time of moving the Resolution in the Constituent Assembly.163
They were also not referred to by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, in his speech given at the
time of introducing the Draft Constitution in which he highlighted
the salient features of the Draft.164 The terms, moreover, did not
find a place in any part of the Constitution. The omission of the
words ‘secular’ and ‘secularism’ are not accidental, but deliberate.
The reasons for the omission would become clear when we access
the debate on secularism, which took place in the Constituent
Assembly.
1.2.5.2. The Constituent Assembly Debates on Secularism
The meaning of the concept of secular State and secularism and
their inclusion in the Constitution were debated in the Constituent
Assembly. Professor K.T. Shah, for instance, attempted twice to
insert the concept ‘secular’ in the Constitution. On both occasions
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar opposed Shah’s proposals.
Professor K.T. Shah’s first attempt was put forward in the
form of an amendment to add the words “Secular, Federal and
Socialist” to clause (1) of Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, so
that the amended article would have read, “India shall be a Secular,
162 CAD, vol. 1, p. 59.
163 Ibid., p. 62 f.
164 CAD, vol. 7, pp. 31-44.
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Federal, Socialist Union of States.”165 He opined that the
insertion of the term ‘secular’ would be a counter-check to the
prevailing communal and sectarian tendencies, which might gravely
tarnish the state’s egalitarian approach to all its citizens.166 Professor
Shah’s second attempt was presented in the form of a proposal for
a new article that read, “The State in India being Secular shall
have no concern with any religion, creed or profession or faith,
shall observe an attitude of absolute neutrality in all matters relating
to the religion of any class of its citizens or other persons in the
Union.”167 He, nevertheless, hastened to explain that by absolute
neutrality he did not mean “the utter ignorance or neglect”168 of
religious institutions of the people by the State.
While professor K.T. Shah’s proposals were rejected, the
framers of the Constitution, on the other hand, took care to
emphasize the secular character of the Constitution. For example,
when the Constituent Assembly was finally considering the Draft
Preamble of the Constitution, Professor H. V. Kamath proposed
an amendment for prefixing to the Preamble the words “In the
name of God”. His proposal was strongly opposed on the ground
that the invocation of God was inconsistent with the freedom of
faith guaranteed by the Constitution as it was referred to in the
Preamble itself.169
In fact, the term, ‘God’ is not found anywhere in the Constitution
except other than the reference given in Schedule III.170 This
Schedule has the provision for the forms of taking oaths or
affirmations and provides an option to the person who is called
upon to take the oath or give the affirmation either to do so in the
name of God or to affirm solemnly. It means that the framers of
the Constitution opted for a secular State, but refrained from the
inclusion of the terms ‘secular state’ or ‘secularism’ in the
Constitution.
Scholars give various interpretations for the omission. According
to Ayyub Abu Syeed, the reason for the omission of the term
‘secular’ was that it was not found in “ancient Scriptures”, and
then went on to explain that the framers of the Constitution
associated this term “with a spirit of antagonism towards everything
that is signified by religion”.171 Dr. Ved Prakash Luthera, in his
well-argued doctoral thesis, The Concept of Secular State and
India, emphatically brought out his view that India was not a secular
State. He observed that the framers of the Constitution did not
include the term in any part of the Constitution because they did
not intend India a “secular state” as this term was generally
understood in the Western political tradition.172 Similarly, Dr. Donald
E. Smith, a staunch exponent of the secular character of the
Constitution of India, opined that, in its rigid sense, the inclusion of
the word ‘secular’ in the relevant provisions of the Constitution
would have contradicted the tenor of Article 25 which, while
guaranteeing freedom of religion, equally permits extensive State
intervention in matters connected with religion in the interest of
social reform.
The observation of Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkar, the former Chief
Justice of India, seems to resonate with the mind of the makers of
the Constitution. He commented:
The omission of the word ‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ is not
accidental, but was deliberate. It seems to me that the
Constitution-makers were apprehensive that if the words
‘secular’ and ‘secularism’ were used in suitable places in
the Constitution, they might unnecessarily introduce, by
implication, the anti-religious overtones associated with the
doctrine of secularism as it had developed in Christian
countries …making religion almost irrelevant… That is why
165 Ibid., p. 399.
166 Ibid., p. 400.
167 Ibid., pp. 815-816.
168 Ibid., p. 816.
169 Ibid., vol. 10, pp. 432-442.
170 The Third Schedule, which contains the Forms of Oaths of affirmations which
one may “ swear in the name of God” or “solemnly affirm as provided in
articles 75 (4), 99, 124(6), 148(2), 164(3), 188 and 219 of the Constitution of
India.
171 A.A. Syeed, Socialism, Democracy and Secularism (New Delhi, National
Book Trust of India, 1965), p. 48.
172 V. P. Luthera, op.cit., pp. 62-63.
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the Constitution makers deliberately avoided the use of the
word ‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ in the relevant provisions of
the Constitution.173
These opinions of the scholars could be further corroborated
by the observation of the various views expressed on the subject
by the members of the Constituent Assembly. The overwhelming
opinion that arose during the debate on the subject was for secular
State. There was, however, a small minority who voiced their claim
in favour of a Hindu State on the ground that after the partition of
the country and after Pakistan turning into an Islamic State, opting
for secular State had no meaning and, therefore, India must be a
Hindu State. Lokenath Misra, for example emphasized:
If you accept religion, you must accept Hinduism as it is
practiced by an overwhelming majority of the people of
India… Our ‘secular state’ is a slippery phrase, a device to
by-pass the ancient culture of the land…Do we really believe
that religion can be divorced from life; or it is our belief that
in the midst of many religions we cannot decide one to
accept? If religion is beyond the ken of our state, let us clearly
say so and delete all reference to rights relating to religion.174
Shri Chudri Ranbir Singh voiced his opinion that a secular State
is non-denominational and non-sectarian State. He said:
Our aim today is to set up a secular state - non-denominational
state. I cannot, therefore, see any reason why seats should
be reserved for minorities or sectarian groups…our object
of establishing a secular state in this country would remain
merely an unrealized dream if we decide to provide
safeguards on grounds of religion.175
Hussian Imam suggested that the secular State is a non-religious
State. He clarified what is meant by a non-religious State: “Secular
state does not mean that it is anti-religious…but non-religious and
as such, there is a world of difference between irreligious and non-
religious.”176 Similarly, Prof. H.V. Kamath claimed that a Secular
state should not identify itself with any particular religion. He
suggested: “When I say that a State should not identity itself with
any particular religion, I do not mean to say that a State should be
anti-religious or irreligious.”177 Shri Lakshmikanda Maitra
emphasised religious non-discrimination as the essential criterion
of a secular State. He pointed out:
By secular state, as I understand it, is meant that the state is
not going to make any discrimination whatsoever on the
ground of religion or community against any person professing
any particular religious faith. In other words in the affairs of
the state the professing of any particular religion will not be
taken into consideration at all. This I consider to be the
essence of a secular state.178
Sri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi commented that religion is not
incompatible with the concept of secular State and then he added
“To say some religious people should not do propaganda or
propagate their views is to show intolerance on our part”.179
Similarly, Sri K.M. Munshi also concurred with the opinion of Sri
L.K. Bharathi in regard to propagation of one’s faith in a secular
State.180 Sri Mohd. Ismail Sahib and Sri Tajamul Husain highlighted
that imparting religious education either in State institutions or in
any educational institutions partly maintained out of State funds
would not be in contravention to the tenet of the secular State.181
These opinions and views on secularism and the secular State,
which were expressed in the Constituent Assembly, were also
shared by some political luminaries of the time. Expressing his views
on the nature on the secular State in India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad,
the first President of India said in a press report:
There are some who think that because we are a secular
173 P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and the Constitution of India, op.cit., p. 52.
174 CAD, vol. 7, pp. 822-824.
175 Ibid., p. 289.
176 Ibid., 546.
177 Ibid., 825.
178 Ibid., p. 831.
179 Ibid., p. 834.
180 Ibid., p. 837.
181 Ibid., pp. 866-867, 871.
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state, we do not believe in religion or spiritual values. Far
from being so, it really means that in this country all are free
to profess or preach the faith of their liking and that we wish
well of all religions and want them to develop on their own
way without let or hindrance.182
Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who
has been acclaimed as the architect of modern India said:
I am convinced that the measure of India’s progress will be
the measure of our giving full effect to what has been called
a secular state. That, of course, does not mean a people
lacking morals or religion. It means that while religion is
completely free, the state, including in its wide fold various
religions and cultures, gives protection and opportunities to
all and thus brings about an atmosphere of tolerance and co-
operation.183
He explained further what he meant by a secular State: “A
secular state is one in which every group, every individual, has the
full freedom to function according to his own way, either culturally
or in matters of religion.”184
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee
of the Constitution and later became the Minister of Law in the
Union Government of India, explained the nature of the secular
State as provided in the Constitution when the Hindu Code Bill
was introduced in the Parliament. He said:
It is very good to say that we have proposed in our
Constitution a secular state. I have no idea whether any
members, when they use the words “secular state” really
mean what the Constitution is intended to mean. It does not
mean that we can abolish religion. It does not mean that we
shall not take into consideration the religious sentiments of
people. All that a secular state means is that this Parliament
shall not be competent to impose any particular religion upon
the rest of the people. That is the only limitation that the
Constitution recognizes.185
Similarly, commenting on the nature of secularism as provided
in the Constitution of India Dr. S. Radhakrishnan said:
It may appear somewhat strange that our Government should
be secular one while our culture is rooted in spiritual values.
Secularism here does not mean irreligion or atheism or even
stress on material comforts. It proclaims that it lays stress
on the universality of spiritual values which may be attained
by a variety of ways.186
Sri Abdul Kalam Azad explained,  “The essence of a secular
and democratic state is freedom of opportunity for the individual
without regard to race, religion, caste or community.”187 For Dr.
Zakir Hussain a secular republic is one that is universal in its
approach and provides opportunity to all for their integral
development according to their choice. He commented:
A secular republic will have a Hindu University and a Muslim
University as central Universities because only a secular
republic has the large-heartedness, the tolerance and the
vision to have them both… a secular republic, is not an anti-
religious republic. It is only a tolerant republic, a large-hearted
and impartial republic, denominationally unconnected with
any exclusive creed, anxious to develop and stimulate the
growth of all healthy elements in our national life.188
These observations bring home in obvious terms that the framers
of the Constitution intended the State in India secular. They meant
that the principles of the secular State as given in the relevant
provisions of the Constitution would not be contrary to Indian ethos.
Secularism envisaged by the framers of the Constitution recognises
the validity of religion in people’s lives; accords equal respect and
protection to all religions.
182  V. P. Luthera, op.cit., p. 159.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid, p. 160.
186 S. Radhakrishnan, “Forward”,  op.cit., p. v.
187 As quoted in V.P. Luthera, op.cit., p. 160.
188 Ibid, p. 165.
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It is on account of these specific characteristics reposed in the
concept of secularism by the Constituent Assembly that the terms,
‘secular state’ and ‘secularism’ were deliberately omitted from
the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It was due to the fact
that, in their Western usage, these terms conventionally conveyed
negative connotation towards religion. They also implied a polity
built on the sterile and static notion of a rigid wall of separation
between religion and State, especially as used in the Constitution
of the United States of America.189
1.2.5.3. The Inclusion of the term ‘Secular’ in the Preamble
The secular nature of the State in India is obvious from the aims
and objectives of the Constitution as spelt out in the preamble.
However, as we have seen, to avoid possible anti-religious impression
that the term ‘secular’ might connote, it was omitted from the
Preamble and other parts of the Constitution. The test of the original
Preamble reads:
We THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to
constitute India into a SOVEREIGN, DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and opportunity;
and to promote among them all
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and
The unity of the nation;
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth
day of
November 1949, Do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND
GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.
When the Revised Draft Constitution was submitted to the
Constituent Assembly for final consideration, no modification was
suggested in the text of the Preamble except the replacement of
the date of enactment of the Constitution from “This-of-day, May
1948 A.D.” to “this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949”190
The Constitution (Forty-Second) Act of 1976, which was passed
by the Parliament in November 1976, added for the first time the
term “secular” in the Preamble. The Amended Preamble reads:
WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved
to
Constitute India into a [SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST
SECULAR
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] and to secure to all its
citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY OF thought, expression, belief, faith and Worship;
EQUALITY of status and opportunity; and to promote
among them all
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and
[Unity and integrity of the Nation];
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth
day of
November 1949, DO HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND
GIVE TO
OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.191
The Forty-Second Amendment was the most comprehensive
and most controversial amendment made in the Constitution. The
statement of objectives and reasons given in the Bill for the Forty-
Second Amendment Act 1976 indicated that the said amendment
was required inter alia “to spell out expressly the high ideals of
Socialism and Secularism.”192 When the Bill was moved for
189 P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and Indian Constitution, op.cit.,   p. 52.
190 Draft Constitution of India (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1948), p.
2.
191 By the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution made in 1976, for the
words [SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC], the words [SOVEREIGN
SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] were substituted; and
for the words [Unity of the Nation], the words [Unity and Integrity of the
Nation] were substituted. See Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,
1976, s. 2.
192 D. Paras, Indian Constitutional Amendment From First to Forty-Fourth (New
Delhi, Oxford University Press / I.B.H. Publishing Company, 1980), p. 219.
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discussion in both Houses of the Parliament, the members
questioned the Parliament’s power to amend the Preamble of the
Constitution. However, no one was opposed to the inclusion of the
term “Secular” in the Preamble.
Sri P.G. Mavalankar, for instance, argued that the Preamble
could not be amended. He said, ”if you put the words today
‘socialist’ and ‘secular’ in the Preamble, I am afraid…some people
might say remove the word ‘democracy’. Already, the substance
has gone, the word may go next time.”193 Srimati Indira Gandhi,
the then Prime Minister, spoke for the reasons to amend the
Preamble. She emphasized:
The founding fathers of our constitution and of our country
had intended Indian society to be secular and socialist. They
have guided our laws all these years. All we are doing now
is to incorporate them in the Constitution itself for they rightly
deserve to be mentioned there. The specific mention of this
fact in the Preamble will provide the frame of reference to
the people, to the Government, to the judiciary and to the
world.194
Sri. C. M. Stephen stated that after twenty-five years of
experiment, the Constitution would have to reflect the thought of
the nation. Concurring with the reasons for amendment put forward
by Srimati Indira Gandhi, he said:
It [The Constitution] has to set a course for the nation to
follow. It has to renew its oath to what it is meant for. It is
with that purpose that the Preamble is amended… Jana
Sangh is going about with a sectarian point of view and with
a divisive philosophy. Therefore, it is necessary that the
Preamble reminds the nation that the nation has committed
to secularism and there can be no going away from
secularism.195
The members of the Rajya Sabha also consented to incorporate
the term ‘secular’ in the Preamble. Sri. B. Rachaih pointed out
that “the inclusion of the words ‘secular’ and ‘Socialist’ in the
Preamble of the Constitution reflect the urges and aspirations of
the people towards the direction in which the country wants to
proceed.”196
1.2.5.4. The Opinion of the Scholars
The inclusion of the term ‘Secular’ in the Preamble by the Forty-
Second Amendment Act of 1976 became a matter for debate among
constitution experts, political scientists and judges. Professor S.V.
Kogekar opined that the inclusion of the term ‘secular’ in the
Preamble is “only a recognition”197 of the secular nature of the
Indian State as enunciated in the various relevant provisions of the
Constitution. Sri H. Swaroop commented that the inclusion of the
term, Socialism, Secularism and Integrity, in the Preamble “are three
jewels, which make the nation’s most important manifesto a real
document of a socio-economic revolution.”198
Justice R.A. Jahagirdar199 and Justice Robert D. Baird200 were
of the opinion that the addition of the term, secular, in the Preamble
is superfluous because it does not add anything new to the secular
nature of the State in India as already provided in the relevant
provisions of the Constitution. Dr. D.D. Basu, another expert of
the Indian Constitution, commented that a clarification to the meaning
of the secular provisions of the Constitution would have been much
more beneficial than adding technical word, ‘secular’, in the
preamble.201
193 Crf.  R.L. Chaudhari, The Concept of Secularism in Indian Constitution (New
Delhi, Concept Publishing House, 1987), p. 112.
194 Ibid., p. 115.
195 Ibid., p. 116.
196 ibid., p. 118.
197 S.V. Kogekar, Revision of the Constitution: R.R. Kale Memorial Lectures (Poona,
Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1976), p. 13.
198 H. Swaroop, “New Jewels in the Constitution’s Preamble”, in Secular
Democracy, vol. X, No. 1&2 (January 1977), p. 28.
199 R .A. Jahagirdar, “Secularism under the Indian Constitution”, in The Secularist,
vol. II, No. 66 (November-December 1980), p. 145.
200 Robert D. Baird, Religion in modern India (New Delhi, Manohar Publications,
1981), p. 391.
201 D. D. Basu, Constitutional Law of India, third edition (New Delhi, Prentice-
Hall of India, 1983), p.3.
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1.2.6. Conclusion: The Legacy of the Indian Heritage
In concluding this chapter, we sum up the indigenous Indian values
and institutions, which influenced in the shaping of the modern
secular political thought in India. First of all in the traditional Indian
polity a distinction was maintained between the spiritual and temporal
powers represented by the priest and king in the society.
Secondly, the long tradition of religious tolerance is integral to
Indian way of life.202 It is grounded in the metaphysical understanding
of the multifaceted nature of truth rather than motivated by
considerations of political expediency.203 It has helped to grow
diverse creeds and cultures amicably in the society and enabled
the State to accord equal respect and protection to all faiths. The
culture of religious pluralism has been part of Indian ethos, which
is a constitutive value for the creation of a secular State. Implicit in
this tradition is the basis for a common citizenship irrespective of
religious affiliation.204 It is submitted, however, except in the attempt
that emperor Akbar made to evolve a common citizenship throughout
his empire, this idea was not found in the traditional Indian polity.205
Thirdly, the British policy of religious neutrality did not amount
to a complete severance of State aid to religious welfare. The
significant contributions of the British rule in India were the
introduction of liberal education, egalitarian system of law, the
initiatives of the State for social reform and rational system of
political administration, which had ushered in the process of
secularisation in education, law, culture and society. These were
absent in the traditional Indian polity, but were important factors to
further the process towards the creation of a secular democratic
State.
Fourthly, the Indian National Congress that led the freedom
movement defined its aims and objectives in terms of secular political
principles. Except for a brief period marred by Hindu extremism,
the Congress remained faithful to the objectives of establishing a
non-communal welfare State. It is acknowledged that the Congress
received much of its political inspiration from the liberal democratic
tradition of the West and the humanistic movement of Indian
Renaissance of the 19th century. Its secular political philosophy
was, nevertheless, influenced by the culture of religious pluralism,
which is a significant value to the Indian way of life.
The Indian National Congress represented, therefore, the secular
national aspiration of the people of India on the basis of which it led
a twofold national struggle, one to end the British rule and the other
to repudiate the forces of communal nationalism. On the basis of
secular political ideology, the Congress won political freedom and
was able to achieve national integration of the diverse religious
communities for the establishment of India as a Secular Democratic
Sovereign State. As a political concept, secularism stands for the
separation of the State from religion, equal protection of all religions
and active opposition to communalism.
The philosophy of Indian secularism is to be seen, therefore, in
terms of a unique synthesis between the Western institution of liberal
democracy with an ancient civilizational heritage of the country
that has got an innate capacity to respect and live in amity with
plurality of faith communities as well as to absorb and integrate
modernity with tradition.206
Thus, unlike Europe, secularism as a political ideology for the
governance of the State evolved in India not out of religion-state
conflict but to stop communal conflicts and to unite the multicultural
and multireligious plural communities as a national community in
human solidarity to fight against colonialism and communal
nationalism. However, in both societies – Western and Indian
societies – religious conflicts and violence have been the defining
factors for the emergence of secular State.
202 S. Radhakrishnan, “Forward”, op.cit., p. v-vi; Speeches of Maulana Azad,
1947-1955 (New Delhi, Publications Division, Government of India, 1956),
pp. 20-21.
203 S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought (London, Oxford
University Press, 1940), p. 316.
204 See above, chapter 2, Section 1.2.1.2, “The Sate and Religious Liberty”, p. 87.
205 Ibid. 206 Abid S. Husain, The National Culture of India, op.cit., pp. 54-59.
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Nevertheless, in the case of Indian secularism, the emphasis
was not on marginalization of religion from society, but on the
accommodation of religion in a way, which would not hamper sharing
the benefits of secular national life by all citizens. This was the
view held by most of the members of the Constituent Assembly at
the time of framing of the Constitution. It involves a process of
adjustment on the part of the State and religion for the common
good of the citizens, that is to say, the good of all and each individual
citizen. In chapter three, we study the constitutional and institutional
details of this philosophy affecting the individuals and communities.
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CHAPTER THREE
Human Dignity Central
to the Philosophy of Indian Secularism
1.3. Introduction
In Western political history the concept of secular State and granting
of religious freedom developed out of many different historical
situations and philosophical impulses. In particular, they have been
shaped by the process of secularisations of the State and sundering
of the medieval fusion between the Church and the State. In
practice, this separation hasn’t been always complete as seen earlier
in chapter one. The question, however, may be raised whether the
separation between religion and the State in the absolute sense can
ever be maintained in this age of ours, when political decisions
affect every aspect of human life, especially moral and religious
issues, which people hold important in their lives.
In this chapter we study the secular provisions of the Indian
Constitution that regulate the manner of separation between religion
and the State in the Indian polity. These provisions do not intend to
create a State that marginalizes religion from society, or to follow a
policy of strict neutrality towards religion. As we have seen in
chapter two, India’s historical antecedents, and the context in which
secularism evolved as a political concept as well as its historical
exigency do not warrant for such policies. The framers of the Indian
Constitution envisaged a model of secular political system that
protects all religions with equal regard (Sarva Dharma
Samabhava) but under the framework of an egalitarian social order,
informed by the principles of welfare State consistent with the
progressive enhancement of human dignity.1
The State’s approach towards religion embedded in these
constitutional provisions is one that maintains a ‘principled distance’
from religion. This, however, does not prohibit the State to intervene
when practice of religion contravenes public order, morality, health,
egalitarian social order and objectives of the welfare State intended
for integrated development of the individuals and communities. State
intervention or non-intervention in the practice of religion depends
upon which of the two better promotes substantive values like
religious liberty, egalitarian social order, social justice and religious
harmony which are constitutive of a life worthy of human dignity
for all.
In this context, the Courts in India have taken upon themselves
the task of giving judicial definition to ‘religion’ protected under the
secular provisions of the country’s Constitution. They also have
the burden of doing the sensitive job of differentiating ‘matters of
religion’ protected under the same provisions from matters of secular
interest added or associated with religious practices, which may be
liable to the action of the State when needed to maintain common
good and to promote social welfare and reform.
Hence, in this chapter our study is directed towards the
contribution of the Indian judiciary by way of judgements issued by
the Courts on several cases associated with religion allegedly
affected by State intervention. The contributions of the Courts are
very useful for us to understand the fundamental principle underlying
the political philosophy of Indian secularism. Most of the cases
selected for our study appeared before the Supreme Court of India
in the 1950s and 1960s. These are of historic importance, because
those were the important times in the history of the young nation in
setting up the road map for public life regulated by secular laws
governing people’s every day life.
Articles 25 to 30 and 325 of the Constitution contain the secular
provisions. The central provisions are given in articles 25 and 26,
which deal with individual and corporate freedom of religion. Most
1 P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., 13-14, 40-41.
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of our research would revolve around these two articles. We
study these articles and other allied articles by going through the
judicial decisions on important cases appeared before the Supreme
Court of India. We also substantiate our study by researching through
the documents of the Constituent Assembly Debates, the
commentaries of the Constitution, and opinion of the scholars. We
limit our material for investigation only to those provisions dealing
with the free exercise of religion and state restriction, state’s
assistance to religion, and religion and the welfare state. These are
directly connected with a set of substantive values that protect
equal dignity for all.
1.3.1. The Need to Define Religion
The Constitution of India guarantees the protection of certain
fundamental rights. They are given in articles 12 to 35, which form
Part III of the Constitution. Among them articles 25 and 26 are the
two central articles guaranteeing religious freedom. Article 25 reads:
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the
other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled
to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practice and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any
existing law or prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political
or other secular activity which may be associated with
religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing
open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to
all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation I. - The
wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be
included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II. - In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference
to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to
persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and
the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed
accordingly.
Article 26 reads:
Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right –
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and
charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property;
and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
The religious freedom of the individual person guaranteed by
the Constitution of India is given in clause (1) of article 25 that
reads:
Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practice and propagate religion.
In precise terms, the Constitution makes it clear that the rights
provided in clause (1) of article 25 are subject to public order, morality
and health and to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution
that lays down the fundamental rights. Clause (2) of article 25 is a
saving clause for the State so that the religious rights guaranteed
under clause (1) are further subject to any existing law or a law
which the State deems it fit to pass that (a) regulates or lays
restriction on any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practices, or, (b)
provides for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus.2
Similarly Article 26 is the main article that provides the corporate
freedom of religion governing the relation between the State and
the freedom of religious bodies in their internal affairs. It states:2 V. D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India,  op.cit., pp. 232-241.
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Subject to public order, morality and health every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and
charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property;
and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
Clause (b) of article 26 guarantees to every religious
denomination or any section thereof the right to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion and clause (d) gives them the right to
administer their property (institutions) in accordance with laws
passed by the State. It is obvious from the language of the clauses
(b) and (d) of article 26 that there is an essential difference between
the right of a denomination to manage its religious affairs and its
right to manage its property.
This means that a religious denomination’s right to manage its
religious affairs is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
No legislation can violate it except for health, morality and public
order. But the right to administer property associated with religion
can be exercised only “in accordance with law”. In other words,
the State can regulate the administration of religious property by
way of validly enacted laws. Hence, in the exercise of individual
and corporate freedom of religion as guaranteed in articles 25 and
26 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to understand the
judicial definition of ‘religion’ as given in article 25(1) and ‘matters
of religion’ as provided in article 26(b). To define religion for judicial
purposes has been an onerous job for the judiciary both in the
Western countries and in India.
1.3.1.1. The Western Judicial Attempts to Define Religion
In many liberal democratic countries the tensions arising between
the right to practice religion and the State’s right to regulate it have
created the need to approach the Courts for judicial definition of
religion. The Courts in different countries have acknowledged that
it is not easy to give an adequate definition to religion acceptable to
all. For instance, in a case that appeared before the Australian
High Court,3 Chief Justice Latham of the Australian High Court
observed, “It would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise a
definition of religion which would satisfy the adherents of all the
many and various religion which exists, or have existed, in the
world…What is religion to one is superstition to another.”4
In fact, as early as 1890 need arose in the United States of
America to give judicial definition to religion in the case of Samuel
D. Davis v. H.G. Beason.5 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court
maintained the definition of religion as it is generally held in the
monotheistic religious tradition. The Court observed, “religion has
reference to one’s views of his relations to his creator and to the
obligation they impose of reverence for his being and character,
and obedience to his will.”6
In another case7 of similar kind, which appeared before the
United States Supreme Court in 1965, the Court gave a liberal
interpretation to what amounts to religion. In this case, Mr. Daniel
A. Seeger, a conscientious objector from military service registered
his contention that his religion consisted in “belief in and devotion
to goodness and virtue for their own sakes”8, which did not include
faith in a Supreme Being. He referred to Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza
to substantiate his position that his was an ethical belief in intellectual
and moral integrity without having belief in a divine person like the
God of the monotheistic religion.
Another conscientious objector, Mr. Jacobson, claimed that he
believed in “Goodness” as the “Ultimate Cause” of the Universe”
and that his religion amounted to faith in the “sum and essence of
3 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witness v. The Commonwealth 67 CLR 116
(1943).
4 Ibid. at 123.
5 Crf.  P.C. Jain, op.cit.,  pp. 103-105.
6 Ibid., p. 105.
7 United States v. Daniel Andrew Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965).
8 Ibid., at 166.
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one’s basic attitude to the fundamental problems of human
existence.”9 Mr. Peter, a third registrant of the case, said that his
belief in moral value objected him to destroy human life; and he
claimed that this belief for him was “superior to his obligation to the
state”.10
Mr. Justice Clark who spoke for the Court in the instant case
acknowledged the difficulty involved in giving a precise definition
to religion agreeable to all. He then referred to several definitions
of religion given by theologians and philosophers and pointed out
that though all of them held diverse views as to the precise meaning
of religion, there was something common in their approach to
religion that it was “paramount”11 in the life of the believers. The
learned Judge then concluded that all the three plaintiffs of the
case had the right to exemption from military service since their
beliefs were the sincere expressions of their moral and religious
experiences that were “paramount in their lives.”12
Mr. Justice Douglas while concurring with the opinion of the
Court pointed out that there were many Buddhists living in different
parts of the United States. They did not believe in “God” or the
“Supreme Being” in the sense in which other Americans believed.
He concluded that it was necessary that an extensive interpretation
should be given to what amounted to religious belief so that any
person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which in
one’s life filled the same place as a belief in God, was to be granted
exemption.13
1.3.1.2. The Indian Judicial Attempt to Define Religion
In India the need to define religion was raised for the first time by
B.R. Ambedkar when the matter pertaining to personal law and its
relation to religion came for discussion in the Constituent Assembly.
He pointed out:
The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that
they cover every aspect of life from birth to death. There is
nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be
saved I am sure about it that in social matters we will come
to a standstill…There is nothing extraordinary in saying that
we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion
in such a manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs
and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which
are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of
laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating
to succession should be governed by religion…I personally
do not understand why religion should be given this vast
expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and to
prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field.14
In the opinion of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, what constitutes a
‘religion’ or ‘matters of religion’ is to be ascertained by limiting to
religious beliefs and ceremonials, which are held as essentially
religious in a particular religion, which is under judicial review.
The Indian Constitution has no explicit definition of ‘religion’ or
‘matters of religion’. Under the directive of article 32 of the
Constitution, which provides the right to constitutional remedies, it
is left to the Supreme Court to decide on the judicial meaning of
such terms. In the early 1950s in a number of cases the Courts in
India had been faced with the problem of defining ‘religion’ as
given in article 25 (1) and ‘matters of religion’ as provided in article
26 (b). We shall now proceed to examine some of those specific
cases, which were appealed before the Supreme Court of India
for judicial classification.
We study five cases of historical importance where need arose
to give judicial definition to “religion” and “matter of religion.” These
are (1) Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, AIR
1954 SC 282 (hereafter it will be referred to as the Sri Lakshmindra
case); (2) Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR
14 CAD, vol. 7, p. 781.
9 Ibid., at 168.
10 Ibid., at 169.
11 Ibid., at 184.
12 Ibid., at 184.
13 Ibid., at 192-193.
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1954 SC 388 (hereafter it will be referred to as the Ratilal
case); (3) Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR
1958 SC 731 (hereafter it will be referred to as the Quareshi case);
(4) Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961
SC 1402 (hereafter it will be referred to as the Durgah Committee
case); and (5) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 (hereafter it will be referred as the
Tilkayat case).
1.3.1.2.1. Sri Lakshmindra Case
The Sri Lakshmindra case15 arose out of the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 195116 passed by the
Madras legislature in 1951. The object of the Act, as stated in its
preamble, was to amend and consolidate the law relating to the
administration and governance of Hindu religious and charitable
institutions and endowments in the State of Madras. The Act
contained sections dealing with the powers of the State with regard
to the general administration of the Hindu religious institutions, their
finances and certain other miscellaneous subjects.
Section 20 of the Act dealt with matters pertaining to the
administration of Hindu religious endowments that were to be placed
under the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner.
The Commissioner was authorized to pass orders, which he deemed
necessary, for the proper administration of these religious
endowments. He was to ensure that the income from these
endowments was spent for the purposes for which they were
founded. Section 21 of the Act gave the Commissioner, the Deputy
and Assistant Commissioners, and such other officials as might be
authorised, the power to enter the premises of any religious institution
or any other place of worship for the purpose of exercising any
power conferred, or discharging any duty imposed by or under the
Act, provided that the concerned officer exercising such power
was a Hindu.
Section 23 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments Act of 1951 provided that the trustee of a religious
institution was to obey all lawful order issued under the Act by the
Government, the Commissioner and other such officials. Section
56 stated that the Commissioner was empowered to ask the trustee
to appoint a manager for the administration of the secular affairs
of the institution and in default of such an appointment he could
make the appointment himself. The rest of the sections dealt with
the financial aspects of the religious bodies.
On constitutional grounds, the validity of the Act was challenged
by Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar, the mathadhipati of Sirur
math17 who assumed also the office of mathadhipati of Udipi math
at a time when it was under financial crisis. The Hindu Religious
Endowment Board stepped in at this point to assist the Udipi math
in getting out of its financial problems. Apparently the
Mathadhipati, Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar, consented to the
intervention as he signed over power of attorney to the manager
appointed by the Board. But it seemed that the manager wanted
his own way in all affairs of the math. This caused the mathadhipati
to retract his power of attorney and to ignore the efforts of the
Board, which filed a case against the mathadhipati. The
mathadhipati appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that
the Board, whose powers were alleged to be unconstitutional, had
violated his constitutional guarantees under articles 25 and 26 of
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court found the case in favour of the math. While
giving the judgement, it seems that the Court has taken a thoughtful
approach to the meaning of  “religion.” Besides the Supreme Court
seemed to have given an indigenous meaning to what includes into
the category of “secular activities” associated with religion. This
ruling of the Supreme Court has been considered as one of the
most important decisions in Indian jurisprudence with regard to the
15 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
16 Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19
of 1951).
17 A “Matt” (also spelt as math) is defined by the court as an institution for the
promotion of the Hindu religion, presided over by the head of that institution
known as mathadhipati whose duty is to engage himself in imparting religious
instructions or rendering spiritual service. See V.P. Luthera, op.cit.,  p. 129.
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definition of religion.18 Mr. Justice Mukerjea who spoke for the
unanimous decision of the Court pointed out that the resolution of
the dispute hinged on the clarification of what ‘matters of religion’
are. He said:
The word “religion” has not been defined in the Constitution
and it is a term which in hardly susceptible of any rigid
definition. In an American case (vide Davis v. Benson, 133
U.S. 333 at 342), it has been said “that the term ‘religion’
has reference to one’s views of his relation to his Creator
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being
and character and of obedience to His will. It is often
confounded with cultus of form or worship of a particular
sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.” We do not think
that the above definition can be regarded as either precise
or adequate. Articles 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based
for the most part upon article 44(2) of the Constitution of
Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of
“religion” as given above could have been in the minds of
our Constitution-makers when they framed the Constitution.
Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or
communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well
known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism, which
do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A
religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or
doctrines that are regarded by those who profess that religion
as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be
correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or
belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical
rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals
and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which
are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and
observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.19
This passage, which has been frequently quoted by judges and
jurists, broadened the protection guaranteed in the Constitution ‘to
practice religion’ as given in article 25 (1). Commenting on clauses
(b) and (d) of article 26, the Supreme Court held in the instant
case:
Under art. 26 (b), therefore, a religious denomination or
organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of
deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside
authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision
in such matters.
Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection
with these religious observances would be a matter of
administration of property belonging to the religious
denomination and can be controlled by secular authorities in
accordance with any law laid down by a competent
Legislature; for it could not be the injunction of any religion
to destroy the institution and its endowments by incurring
wasteful expenditure on rites and ceremonies. It should be
noticed, however, that under Art.26 (d), it is the fundamental
right of a religious denomination or its representative to
administer its properties in accordance with law; and the
law, therefore, must leave the right of administration to the
religious denomination itself, subject to such restrictions and
regulations as it might choose to impose.
A law which takes away the right of administration from the
hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in
any other authority would amount to a violation of the right
guaranteed under cl. (d) of Art.26.20
1.3.1.2.2. Ratilal Case
In the Ratilal case,21 the Supreme Court was once again appealed
to decide on the judicial application of ‘religion’ and ‘matters of
20 Ibid., at 292.
21 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
18 Richard W. Lariviere, “The Indian Supreme Court and The Freedom of Religion”,
in Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, vol. IX, no.2 (1975), p.
176.
19 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290.
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religion’ as implied in the right to exercise of religion protected
under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The case arose out of
the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950,22 passed by the Bombay State
Legislature. Similar to the Madras Act of 1951,23 the object of the
Bombay Act as stated in its preamble was to regulate and to make
better provision for the administration of public religious and
charitable trusts in the State of Bombay.
Section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, declared
that it was obligatory upon the trustee of every public trust to which
the Act applied, to make an application for the registration of the
trust. Like section 21 of the Madras Act of 1951, section 37 of the
Bombay Act also authorized the Charity Commissioner and his
subordinate officers to enter and inspect any property belonging to
a public trust. Section 44 of the Act provided that the Charity
Commissioner might be appointed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction or by the author of the trust to act as a sole trustee of a
public trust. Section 74 gave powers to the Court to appoint a new
trustee or trustees and the Court, after making inquiries, could
appoint the Charity Commissioner or any other person as a trustee
to fill up vacancies.
The Manager of a Jain public temple and Trustees of Parsi
Panchayat Funds and Properties in Bombay challenged before the
Bombay High Court24 the constitutional validity of the Bombay
Public Trust Act of 1950. It was done on the ground that the
provisions of the Bombay Act of 1950 contravened freedom to
practice religion as guaranteed in article 25 (1) and freedom to
manage matters of religion as protected by article 26 (b) of the
Constitution.
The Bombay High Court denied the petition in the light of sub-
clause (c) and (d) of article 26 of the Constitution, which provides
the State with authority to enact the legislation as given in the
Bombay Act.25 Therefore, the Bombay High Court resolved the
case in favour of the State on the basis of the definition that the
Court gave to religion in the instant case. This definition reduced
religion to spiritual and moral aspects only and eliminated secular
activities, like the property ownership and expenditure associated
with religious practices, from the protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. The Chief Justice, Mr. M.C. Chagla who delivered
the judgment of the Bombay High Court said:
“Religion” as used in arts. 25 and 26 must be construed in its
strict and etymological sense. Religion is that which binds a
man with his Creator, but Mr. Sommaya on behalf of his
client (Panachand) says that as far as Jains are concerned
they do not believe in a Creator and that distinction would
not apply to the Jains. But even where you have a religion
which does not believe in a Creator, every religion must
believe in a conscience and it must believe in ethical and
moral precepts. Therefore whatever binds a man to his own
conscience and whatever moral and ethical principles regulate
the lives of men that alone can constitute religion as
understood in the Constitution. A religion may have many
secular activities, it may have secular aspects, but these
secular activities and aspects do not constitute religion as
understood by the Constitution. There are religions which
bring under their own cloak every human activity. There is
nothing which a man can do, whether in the way of clothes
or food or drink, which is not considered a religious activity.
But it would be absurd to suggest that a Constitution for a
secular State ever intended that every human and mundane
activity was to be protected under the guise of religion, and
it is therefore in interpreting religion in that strict sense that
we must approach arts. 25 and 26.26
The petitioners of the present case appealed to Supreme Court.
22 Bombay Public trust Act, 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950).
23 Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act
19 of 1951).
24 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1953 ILR, Bombay 1187.
25 Bombay Public trust Act 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950).
26 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1953 ILR, Bombay, 1187, at
1193.
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On hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court refused to comply
with the narrow definition of religion delivered by the Bombay High
Court but reiterated its definition of religion given earlier in the Sri
Lakshmindra case.27 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Mukerjea
in his judgment once again repeated:
What sub-cl. (a) of cl. (2) of Article 25 contemplates is not
State regulation of the religious practices as such which are
really of an economic, commercial or political character
though they are associated with religious practices.
…The language of the two cls. (b) and (d) of Art.26 would
at once bring out the difference between the two. In regard
to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management
given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right
which no legislation can take away. On the other hand, as
regards administration of property which a religious
denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has
undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in
accordance with law…A law, which takes away the right
of administration altogether from the religious denomination
and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount
to violation of the right which is guaranteed by Art.26 (d) of
the Constitution…
A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs
and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that
religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being, but it
would not be correct to say as seems to have been suggested
by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court,
that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious
faith and religious beliefs. A religion is not merely an opinion,
doctrine … Religious practices or performances of acts in
pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion
as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of
the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that certain rites and
ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a
particular manner, it cannot be said that these are secular
activities partaking of commercial or economic character
simply because they involve expenditure of money or
employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities.
No outside authority has any right to say that these are not
essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular
authority of the state to restrict or prohibit them in any manner
they like under the guise of administering the trust estate.28
In the Sri Lakshmindra and the Ratilal cases, the Supreme Court
of India has given a liberal approach to the meaning of religion
which includes not only faith, belief, doctrines, code of ethical rules
but also rituals, ceremonies and observances done in pursuance of
religious belief, which are regarded conducive to spiritual well being.
It is surprising, however, that in two subsequent cases, Quareshi
and Durgah Committee, the Supreme Court had given a guarded
interpretation when it had to decide on ‘matters of religion’ as
referred to in article 26 (b).
1.3.1.2.3. Quareshi Case
The Quareshi case29 is about prohibiting the slaughter of cows. It
has got long constitutional history. The Constitution of India has
certain Directives to the States that they expect to keep in view in
the conduct of their policies. These Directives are listed in Part IV
of the Constitution under the heading ‘Directive Principles of State
Policy’. The Directive Principles are different from the rest of the
articles of the Constitution in the sense that they are non-justifiable
because they don’t have a legal force to bind them. That is, if the
State acts in a way contrary to the Directives laid down in Part IV
of the Constitution, its action cannot be challenged in the Court.30
It is held that the Directive principles are, nevertheless,
important. Their importance consists, as commented by M.C.
Setalvad, a former Attorney-General of India, in that ”they appear
27 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
28 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, at 391-392.
29 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
30 V. D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp. 298-309.
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to be like an instrument of instructions, or general
recommendations addressed to all the authorities in the Union
reminding them of the basic principles of the new social and
economic order, which the Constitution aims at building.”31 Hence,
article 48 of the Constitution of India is one of the Directive
Principles. The objectives of this article are for the development of
agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines as
well as for the preservation and improvement of the breeds of
cattle, and prohibition of the slaughter of cows and calves and other
milch and draught cattle. Article 48 reads:
The state shall endeavour to organize agriculture and animal
husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in
particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds,
and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other
milch and draught cattle.
It may be appropriate here to point out that the directive for the
prohibition of cow-slaughter as referred to in article 48, was made
mainly out of respect for the religious sentiments of the majority
community, the Hindus. As it is well known in India, cow has great
religious significance for them. This article did not find a place in
the Draft Constitution but was incorporated during the debates in
the Constituent Assembly. Most of the members of the minority
communities, the non-Hindus, who were in the Constituent
Assembly, seemed to have consented to the Hindu religious
sentiments associated with the provision against cow-slaughter.32
However, some held that the Hindu sentiments predominated in
the Constitution.33
As follow-up to these Directives, some State Governments34
have enacted legislation banning the slaughter of cows. Shortly
after these enactments, three cases were petitioned before the
Supreme Court challenging their constitutional validity.35 The
petitioners were Muslims, mostly of the Quareshi community, who
were traditionally engaged in the butcher’s trade. The first among
the three was the Quareshi case that challenged the legislations of
the all three States, namely Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya
Pradesh on the ground that they violated the constitutional right of
the petitioners to carry out their trade.36
The petitioners also contended that these legislations infringed
on their right to practice religion because Islam enjoined on every
Muslim to sacrifice one goat on the Bakr-Id day (the festival of
sacrifice) or seven persons together may even sacrifice one cow.
They claimed that cow sacrifice was customary among Indian
Muslims on Bakr-Id day and the practice was “certainly sanctioned
by their religion.”37 Therefore, cow sacrifice was part of their
practice and profession of religion protected by article 25 of the
Constitution.38 The Bihar Act placed a total ban on slaughter of all
types of animals of the species of bovine cattle while the Uttar
Pradesh Act did not protect the slaughter of buffaloes and the
Madhya Pradesh Act allowed such slaughter under a certificate
issued by certain authorities as mentioned in the Act.
In dealing with this case, the Supreme Court traced the history
of cow slaughter in India and indicated that in the past many Muslim
kings prohibited cow slaughter even on the Bakr-Id day.39 Chief
31 Crf. Ibid., p. 301.
32 CAD, vol. 7, pp. 577-578.
33 Austin Granville, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1966) p. 82.
34 The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animal Act, 1956 (Bihar Act 2 of
1956); Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (U.P. Act 1 of
1956); Central Province and Bihar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 (C.P & Bihar
Act 52 of 1949) as amended by Madhya Pradesh Acts 32 of 1951 and 10 of
1956. et.c.
35 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Abdul Hakim
Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 448 and Mohammad Faruk v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 93.
36 “All citizens shall have the right…
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
“Nothing in sub-clause (g)…shall affect the operation of any existing law in so
far it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by the said sub-clause…”
Clauses (1) g and (6) of article 19, The Constitution of India.
37 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, at 740.
38 Ibid., at 740.
39 The Supreme Court noted that the Moghul emperor Babar not only prohibited
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Justice Mr. Das who delivered the judgement of the Court
stressed that the Islamic law gives option to sacrifice a camel instead
of a cow or even permits to give gifts of charity as a substitute for
animal sacrifice on the Bakr-Id day. Chief Justice Mr. Das argued
further, as claimed by the State, that many Muslims do not sacrifice
a cow on the Bakr-Id day. He, moreover, pointed out that three
members of the Gosamvardhan (cow protection) Enquiry
Committee appointed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh were
Muslims.  All the three concurred with the unanimous
recommendation of the Committee for total ban on cow slaughter.40
Mr. Das, C.J., who issued the judgment of the Court in the
Quareshi case, stated that the Islamic law sanctioned cow sacrifice
on the Bakr-Id day but did not enjoin it as an obligatory overt act in
the practice and profession of Islamic faith and therefore, cow
sacrifice was not essential. He said:
We have, however, no material on the record before us which
will enable us to say, in the face of the foregoing facts, that
the sacrifice of a cow on that day is an obligatory overt act
for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea.41
In examining this case, the Court acknowledged that Islam
sanctioned cow sacrifice. Nevertheless, Mr. Chief Justice Das
ascertained that it was not “an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman
to exhibit his religious belief”42 because Islamic law provides
alternatives. The Supreme Court noted that instead of a cow,
Muslims could sacrifice a camel or do acts of charity on the day of
Bakr-Id.
The petitioners of the instant case pleaded that the impugned
laws, if enforced, would affect adversely their trade and, therefore,
violated the constitutional protection guaranteed under article 19
(1) (g). The Court ruled that the laws only regulated and restricted
these occupations, but did not deprive the petitioners of their right
to practice them because butchers could still slaughter certain
classes of bulls, bullocks, buffaloes, as well as sheep and goats.43
It seems that the Supreme Court’s ruling on this case (Quareshi
case) had taken into consideration the Hindu religious sentiments
attached to the legislation of banning cow slaughter as one of the
reasonable elements. Certainly, the Court was equally concerned
with communal riots often arising on account of cow slaughter.
The honourable judges of the Quareshi case acknowledged, “While
we agree that the constitutional question before us cannot be decided
on grounds of mere sentiment, however passionate it may be, we,
nevertheless, think that it has to be taken into consideration, though
only as one of many elements, in arriving at a judicial decision as to
the reasonableness of the restrictions”44
1.3.1.2.4. Durgah Committee Case
In the Durgah Committee case,45 appeal was made once again to
decide on “the matters of religion” which is protected under clause
(b) of article 26. The history of the present case is as follows:  In
1955, the Parliament had passed the Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act46
to administer the Durgah and the endowment of the Durgah
Khawaja Moinuddin Chisti at Ajmer. This Durgah, which is a
Muslim pilgrim centre built at the tomb of Khawaja Moinuddin
Saheb who is a Chisti saint, has been visited by both Muslim and
Hindu pilgrims.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act of 955,
provided for the appointment of a Durgah Committee by the Central
Government to administer and manage the Durgah endowment.
cow slaughter but had also directed his son Humayun to follow that example.
Similarly emperors Akbar, Jehangir, and Ahmad Shah prohibited cow slaughter.
Nawab Hyder Ali of Mysore made cow slaughter an offence punishable with
cutting off the hands of the offenders. Ibid., at 740.
40 Ibid., at 740.
41 Ibid., at 740.
42 Ibid., at 740.
43 Ibid., at 745.
44 Ibid., at 745. For a detailed discussion on legislation banning cow slaughter and
its impact on the secular society, see V.P. Luthera, op.cit., pp. 134-145; Donald
E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 483-489; C.P. Jain, op.cit., pp. 282-294; CAD, vol. 7, pp.
568-581.
45 Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402.
46 Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955 (Act 36 of 1955).
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According to the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the Act, the
members of the committee nominated by the Government were to
be Hanafi Muslims. Section 15 of the Act laid down the instruction
that the Committee should follow the Muslim rules and tenets of
the Chisti saint in performing and conducting the established rites
and ceremonies at the tomb of the Chisti saint.
The Khadims (the traditional custodians of the tomb) challenged
the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it infringed upon
their rights guaranteed in article 26(b), (c) and (d). Their challenge
succeeded in the High Court of Rajasthan.47 In issuing the judgment,
the Rajasthan High Court observed that the provisions for the
appointment of the Committee members were ultra vires to the
extend that the appointment of the Committee members avoided
members of the Chisti order who have the faith in the religious
practices and rituals associated with the Chisti saint shrine. Other
provisions of the Act affecting the privileges and duties of the
functionaries of the shrine were also declared violative of articles
19 and 25 of the Constitution.
On appeal,48 the Supreme Court found that the provisions of
the said Act were not violative of the Constitutional rights guaranteed
to religious communities. The Court observed that the Act regulated
only the secular practices associated with religion, which were not
essential or integral part of religion. Mr. Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
who delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court said:
Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of
place incidentally to strike a note of caution and observe
that in order that the practices in question should be treated
as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion
as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely
secular practices which are not an essential or an integral
part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form
and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices
within the meaning of article 26. Similarly even practices
though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious
beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential
accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices found to
constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their
claim for the protection under Article 26 may have to be
carefully scrutinized; in other words, the protection must be
confined to such religious practices as are an essential and
an integral part of it and no other.49
In delivering the judgment of the instant case, Mr. P. B.
Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court, stressed that ‘matters
of religion’ protected under article 26 (b) are those acts which are
treated as essential and integral part by the religion. He cautioned
that otherwise things that are not of religious concern can be brought
under its ambit in such a way that religion can be used or manipulated
to legitimate superstitious beliefs and practices which may harm
instead of enabling human well being. This is the reason for the
learned judge to strike a note of caution to differentiate ‘matters of
religion,’ whose protection is guaranteed by the Constitution of India,
from secular activities attached to religious practices.
1.3.1.2.5. Tilkayat Case
When cases have been brought before the Courts in India on
contentious issues regarding ‘matters of religion’ as referred to in
clause (b) of article 26 of the Constitution, judges have relayed on
literary sources as well as traditional usages and practices of the
religion which was under scrutiny to ascertain its essential aspects
as claimed by the petitioners or the contending parties. In this regard,
it is informative for our purpose to study the Tilkayat case,50 which
throws more light on the Indian judicial position on ‘matters of
religion’ as given in articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
The Tilkayat case arose out of the Nathdwara Temple Act of
Rajasthan51 enacted for the management of the Nathdwara temple
through a Board. Section 16 of the Act provided that subject to the
47 Syed Hussain Ali v. The Durgah Committee, AIR 1959 Raj 177.
48 Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402, at 1417.
49 Ibid., at 1415.
50 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638.
51 Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959).
HUMAN DIGNITY CENTRAL TO INDIAN SECULARISM 157 158 HUMAN DIGNITY…
provisions of the Act and of the rules made there under, the
Board was to manage the properties and “affairs of the temple”52
and arrange for the conduct of daily worship and ceremonies and
of festivals in the temple “according to the customs and usages of
the denomination”53 to which the temple belonged.
The custodians of the Nathdwara temple challenged the
Nathdwara Temple Act of Rajasthan (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959)
before the Rajasthan High Court. The plaintiffs petitioned that
section 16 of the Act violated the rights of the denomination to
administer its property as protected by clause (d) of article 26 of
the Constitution as well as infringed the denomination’s right to
manage its own affairs in “matters of religion” guaranteed by clause
(b) of the same article.54
The Rajasthan High Court decided the case in favour of the
plaintiffs. The High Court held that the expression “affairs of the
temple” as referred to in section 16 of the impugned Act was too
wide and could include religious affairs of the temple as guaranteed
in article 26 (b) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Rajasthan High
Court concluded that the impugned Act violated the constitutional
protection given to religious denomination to manage its own affairs
in matters of religion.55
On appeal56 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Rajasthan High Court and held that the expression “affairs of the
temple” covered only the secular affairs of the temple and,
therefore, could not be objected by law. The Supreme Court then
pointed out two kinds of duties, which had been entrusted to the
Board of managers: firstly, the Board had to manage the properties
and secular affairs of the temple. Secondly the Board had to arrange
for the religious worships, ceremonies and festivals in the temple in
accordance with the customs and usages of the denomination to
which the temple belonged.57
Commenting on the customs and usages associated with
religious practices, which were claimed as integral part of a
particular religious denomination, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar who
delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in this case made the
observation:
In deciding the question as to whether a given religious
practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test
always would be whether it is regarded as such by the
community following the religion or not. This formula may in
some cases present difficulties in its operation. Take the case
of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given
proceeding, one section of the community claims that while
performing certain rites white dress is an integral part of the
religion itself, whereas another section contends that yellow
dress and not the white dress is the essential part of the
religion, how is the court going to decide the question? Similar
disputes may arise in regard to food. In cases where evidence
is produced in respect of rival contentions as to the competing
religious practices the court may not be able to resolve the
dispute by a blind application of the formula that the
community decides which practice is an integral part of its
religion, because the community may speak with more than
one voice and the formula would, therefore, break down.
This question will always have to be decided by the court
and in doing so, the court may have to enquire whether the
practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether
it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the
religion, and the finding of the court on such an issue will
always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to
the conscience of the community and the tenets of its
religion.58
57 Ibid., at 1662.
58 Ibid., at 1660-1661.
52 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638, at
1653.
53 Ibid., at 1655.
54 Tilkayat Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 Raj 196.
55 Ibid., at 213.
56 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638.
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1.3.1.2.6. A Principled Approach towards Religion:
The preceding cases point out that the Supreme Court of India has
held a principled approach towards religion when appealed for
judicial definition of ‘religion’ and ‘matters of religion’ protected
under articles 25 (1) and 26 (b) of the Constitution. As a general
rule, it has maintained a liberal definition of religion - as assumed in
most of the liberal democratic States - covering in its ambit belief,
doctrines and moral codes, rituals and observances, ceremonies
and modes of worship.59 However, in some cases, the Supreme
Court did not hesitate to pass a strict definition of ‘matters of religion’
as protected under clause (b) of article 26 of the Constitution limiting
them only to those essentials and obligatory overt acts necessary
to express one’s faith.60 These are the instances where the Court
found that certain acts of rituals though sanctioned by a particular
religion, if allowed to perform would violate, on reasonable grounds,
social solidarity and even cause harm to life.61
In the context of a religiously plural society like India, where
conflicting value systems often compete with each other, the
principled approach of the Supreme Court on religious matters is to
promote religious freedom that secures human dignity. Therefore,
the Court may apply a liberal or a conservative approach towards
religion depending on which of the two better promotes religious
liberty consistent with a set of values that protect the sanctity of
human life and provide a life-affirming space for all to live in dignity.
Hence, the Indian judiciary tells in unambiguous language that
the Constitution recognises the importance of religion in people’s
life, and that it holds religious liberty as a fundamental value of the
Indian political community but not at the cost of certain substantive
principles which are necessary in the society for all to lead a life
worthy of human dignity.
Religion thrives in India and it remains an integral aspect of
Indian ethos. Its popular practices are multifarious and often
unrestrained as shown by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar during the debates
in the Constituent Assembly.62 In this context, the principled
approach founded on reason as held by the Indian Supreme Court
regarding religion is an important requirement to keep religions to
be authentic in their practices. Such an interpretation of religion
would remind believers to shed away non-religious and, at times,
even unreligious accretions added to religious practices. It would
enlighten the followers of various faith traditions not to thwart the
legitimate activities of the State to further the cause of human dignity.
1.3.2. The Free Exercise of Religion
The individual person’s religious freedom as guaranteed by the
Constitution of India is provided in clause (1) of article 25. Some
say63 that this part of the article seemed to have been based on the
clause (1) of article 2 of the Constitution of Eire (1937).64 Others
say65 that the tenor of article 25 resonates with the Karachi resolution
on the fundamental right adopted by the Indian National Congress
in 1931 that declared, ”Every citizen shall enjoy freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess and practice his religion,
subject to public order and morality.”66 Dr. D.D. Basu67 commented
59 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290.
60 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, at 739;
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638, at
1660-1661.
61 It is particularly true in the case of cow sacrifice on Bakr-Id day and hurting the
religious sentiments of the Hindus. Ibid. at 745. See also the debate on the
subject, which took place in the Constituent Assembly: CAD, vol. 7, and
pp.568-581.
62 CAD, vol. 7, p. 781.
63 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290.
64 Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India reads: “Subject to public order,
morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice
and propagate religion”.
Article 2 (1) of the Irish Constitution (1937) reads: “Freedom of conscience
and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and
morality, guaranteed to every citizen”.
65 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 102.
66 Sadiq Ali, ed., Congress and the problem of Minorities (Allahabad, Law Journal
press, 1947), pp. 119, 129.
67 D. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, vol.2 (Calcutta, S.C.
Sarkar & Sons, 1962), p. 144.
HUMAN DIGNITY CENTRAL TO INDIAN SECULARISM 161 162 HUMAN DIGNITY…
that all the rights pertaining to religion provided in article 25 of the
Indian Constitution appear to be included in the expression ‘exercise’
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The religious freedom guaranteed under article 25 is not limited
to the citizens of India only but also applies to “all persons” as spelt
out in clause (1) of the said article. Question was raised in the
Ratilal case68 whether the aliens and in particular, the foreign
Christian missionaries who were exclusively engaged in propagating
their religion, were also protected under clause (1) of articles 25 of
the Indian Constitution. Mr. Justice Mukerjea who spoke for the
Court said, “Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to every person
and not merely to the citizens of India, the freedom of conscience
and the right freely to profess, practice and to propagate religion”.69
Hence in the next section, we shall discuss the different aspects of
the religious freedom protected under article 25 (1).
1.3.2.1. Freedom of Conscience
The Courts have defined freedom of conscience as the freedom of
a person to entertain any belief or doctrine concerning matters,
which are regarded by him or her to be conducive to his or her
spiritual well being.70 The wording of article 25 of the Indian
Constitution, however, seems to suggest that the individual’s right
to hold such belief is subject to public order, morality and health
and to the other provisions of part III of the Constitution.
Under the terms of article 25, it may be asked whether the
State may claim any power over an individual’s freedom of
conscience. Dr. Donald E. Smith argued that the State could have
no power over an individual’s freedom of conscience, and, therefore,
the wording of article 25 which apparently implied State’s restriction
was due to inaccurate drafting.71 It seems, nevertheless, the
restrictions to which freedom of conscience may be submitted as
implied in article 25 of the Constitution of India, are not resulting
from such inaccuracy in drafting; rather the said article did not
intent to protect freedom of conscience on religious scruples when
it stands opposed to protect public welfare, because the protection
guaranteed to religious freedom is at the same time subject not
only to public order, morality and health but also to the other
provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Hence, in its operation, article 25 is subject to clause (2) of
article 23 that is one of the articles in Part III of the Constitution.
Let us look at this provision as given in article 23. This article states:
(1) Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar
forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention
of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance
with law.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing
compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such
service the State shall not make any discrimination on
grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
Clause (1) of article 23 protects individual persons against any
form of forced labour or exploitation. It is designed to protect the
dignity of the individuals not only against such actions of forced
labour of any sort but also against perpetration of such actions by
other private citizens. This clause has two declarations. The first is
that traffic in human beings; beggar and other similar forms of forced
labour are prohibited. The second is that any contravention of the
first provision shall be an offence punishable according to law.72
Clause (2) of article 23 is an enabling provision for the State,
which makes exception in favour of the State to impose compulsory
service for public purposes provided that in imposing such services
the State does not make any discrimination on grounds only of
religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
It may be noted that conscription for military service neither
amounts to traffic in human beings nor beggar nor other similar
forms of forced labour violating a person’s dignity. Consequently, it
68 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
69 Ibid., at 391.
70 V. D. Mahajan., op.cit., pp. 233-234.
71 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 103-104. 72 V. D. Mahajan, op.cit., p. 230.
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is not affected by the prohibition clause of article 23 (1).
Conscription for military service is, nevertheless, a form of
compulsory service imposed by the State for the security of the
citizens’ life and property. Hence, it follows that on occasion, when
the State deems it necessary to impose compulsory military service
or other services for the protection of the people, article 25 does
not protect exceptions to persons on account of religious scruples.
It may be also recalled that when the question of conscription
for military service was discussed at great length in the Constituent
Assembly,73 no one raised the question of granting exception from
such services to conscientious objectors on religious grounds, though
difference of opinion arose as to whether a conscription clause
should be provided or not.74 So far no case against conscription for
military service has been brought before the Courts in India.
However, in a case regarding State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar
Singh,75 which appeared before the Supreme Court of India, the
Court had the occasion to give judicial definition to the term “public
purposes” as used in the Constitution. In this case, the appellant
challenged the constitutional validity of compulsory acquisition of
private property with due compensation by the State for “public
purposes” on the ground that its objective was not for public
purposes. The Court held in its interpretation that whatever furthers
the general interests of the community as opposed to the particular
interests of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose.76
Similarly, in the case of Somavanti v. State of Punjab,77 The
Supreme Court was called upon to define the application of “public
purpose.” Once again the Court in its definition of public purpose
said, “Broadly speaking, the expression public purpose would,
however, include a purpose in which the general interests of the
community, as opposed to the particular interests of the individuals,
is directly and vitally concerned.”78
When article 25 is read with article 23, the intent of the
Constitution is that the State stands to provide its citizens security
of life and property and to promote human welfare with the object
in view for the development of people’s life befitting to a life of
dignity for all. This cannot be disturbed by religious belief. Hence,
the types of religious practices or beliefs or even ideologies
protected under article 25 are the ones, which support some of
these fundamental humanistic objectives of the Constitution.
1.3.2.2. Profession of Religion
The constitutional right to profess religion means a right to exhibit
one’s religion in such overt acts as teaching, practicing and observing
religious precepts and ideals in which there is no explicit intention
of propagation involved. Taking out religious processions, worship
in public places, putting on specific garments include within the
ambit of profession of religion.79 The Constitution of India, for
example, provides the wearing and carrying of kirpans80 as part
of the profession of Sikh religion. The phrase ‘profess a religion’
as given in article 25 means according to the Supreme Court “to
enter publicly into a religious state.”81
73 CAD, vol. 7, pp. 803-813.
74 Hansa Mehta and Amrit Kaur, who in their dissent to the inclusion of the
conscription, said:
“(W)e recorded our vote against compulsory service in any form…We look
upon compulsion as against all tenets of democracy and would point to the
danger for giving to the State powers of compulsion in any sphere of life”. B.
Shiva Rao, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 178.
Alladi Krishnaswami who in support of the conscription clause registered his
opinion:
“[W]ar may be forced upon India much against her will and in sheer self-
defence she might have to raise an army appropriate to the occasion…The
State exists for all and for any particular class of citizens wedded to any
particular creed or persuasion.” Ibid., p. 180. B. R. Ambedkar added:
“Ban on compulsory military service by a nation living in the midst of hostile
nations …is nothing but wilful self-immolation which is contrary to wisdom
and morally quite heinous.” Ibid., p. 183.
75 AIR 1952 SC 252
76 Crf. V. D. Mahajan, op.cit., p. 231.
77 AIR 1963 SC 151.
78 Crf. V.D. Mahajan, op.cit., p. 251.
79 P.C. Jain, op.cit., p. 177.
80 “The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the
profession of the Sikh religion”. Article 25 (b), Explanation - I, The Constitution
of India. Kirpan is a sword, one of the five emblems, which an orthodox Sikh
must wear.
81 Punjab Rao v. D.P. Meshram, AIR 1965 SC 1179, at 1184.
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In the Quareshi case82 the appellants contended that sacrificing
a cow on Bakr-Id day amounted to profession and practice of Islam,
which is protected by article 25 of the Constitution. Tracing the
history of the custom of offering sacrifice of a cow on the Bakr-Id
day, the Supreme Court ruled, “ We have, however, no material on
the record before us, which will enable us to say… that the sacrifice
of a cow on that day is an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to
exhibit his religious belief and idea.“83
The right to take out religious processions and to have religious
gatherings in the public places fall under the right to profess religion
as guaranteed in article 25 (1). The exercise of this right is, however,
subject to public order and morality. The police authorities, for
instance, have been empowered to regulate such overt acts of
religious profession. Section 30 (1) of the police Act84 authorizes
the police to regulate assemblies and processions and to prescribe
the routes and timings for such purposes. Under section 144 of the
Code of Criminal procedure,85 a magistrate can ban processions
and meetings altogether where there is an apprehension of breach
of peace. Such orders are done during the times of communal
tension that is endemic in some parts of the country.
On some occasions of communal and public disturbances, the
prohibitive orders can also include banning of the use of loudspeaker
and such electronic devices employed in religious profession and
practice. For instance, the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta
prohibited the use of loudspeakers for prayer in Mosques located
in some residential areas in the city. On challenge, his ban order
was held constitutional.86 The right to profess one’s religion
includes also the right to use all lawful means required for such
acts provided they don’t destroy public peace and order. The
protection given under article 25 (1), however, does not divest the
citizens from their duty to co-operate with the State to maintain
public order so that people may live their ordinary life in dignity.
1.3.2.3. Practice of Religion
The freedom to practice religion is protected under article 25 (1) of
the Indian Constitution. In the year 1952, the first case of this sort
seeking protection under this constitutional right as guaranteed in
clause (1) of article 25 appeared before the High Court of Bombay.87
The case arose out of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu
Bigamous Marriage Act,88 passed by the State of Bombay. The
Act prevented bigamy among Hindus alone who resided in that
State while the Muslim community that practiced polygamy was
left out of the operation of the said Act. Therefore, Sri Narasu
Appa Mali appealed before the High Court of Bombay, because the
Act infringed the plaintiff’s religious freedom. The aggrieved plaintiff
alleged that by enacting the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous
Marriage Act of 1946, the State of Bombay discriminated between
Hindus and Muslims residing in that State on the basis of religious
practice and, therefore, pleaded that the enactment was void.
The Court upheld the impugned Act constitutionally valid.
Mr. M.C. Chagla, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court,
who gave the judgment of the Court in this case, indicated that the
freedom to practice religion as provided under article 25(1) was
not absolute, in the sense that if religious practices contravened to
public order or to a policy of social welfare, then the said practices
could not claim State protection. He also opined, “a sharp distinction
must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious
practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief.”89
Subsequent to the Narasu Appa Mali case,90 many cases came
before the Supreme Court of India for constitutional protection to
“religion” and “matters of religion” as guaranteed in articles 25 (1)
and 26 (b) respectively against certain state statutes.91 In these
cases, the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the question
82 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
83 Ibid., at 740.
84 Police Act, 1861 (Act 5 of 1861).
85 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898).
86 Masud Alam v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1956 Cal. 9.
87 State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84.
88 Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriage Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 25
of 1946) (as amended by Bombay Act 38 of 1948).
89 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84, at 86.
90 Ibid.
91 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
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of “freedom of practice of religion” protected under article 25
(1).
First among them was the Sri Lakshmindra case.92 The matter
under dispute in the instant case was on the rights of the head of a
religious institution in the management of the affairs of religious
denominations in “matters of religion” given under article 26 (b) of
the Constitution. In giving its judgment, the Supreme Court studied
in great detail freedom of religious practice as protected under
article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution in comparison with similar
cases brought before the Courts in the United States of America
and Australia. The Supreme Court of India observed that the
“practice of religion” as given in article 25 (1) and “matters of
religion” as given in article 26 (b) of the Indian Constitution have
the same scope.
Mr. Justice Mukerjea who spoke for the unanimous opinion of
the Supreme Court said, “The guarantee under our Constitution
not only protects the freedom of religious opinion but it protects
also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by
the use of the expression ‘practice of religion’ in Art.25.“93 He
further observed that the freedom of religion in article 25 included
not only the “freedom to entertain such religious belief, as may be
approved of by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit his
belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper.”94
In some of the latter cases of this sort, the Supreme Court’s
ruling seemed to have been rather strict regarding the practice of
religion protected under article 25 (1) of the Constitution. For
instance, Mr. Justice Mukerjea who once again delivered the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the Ratilal case95 said:
Thus, subject to the restrictions which this Article imposes,
every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution
not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be
approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his
belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or
sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious
views for the edification of others.96
So, we notice that the space granted for the protection of religious
practice is getting restricted. In Sri Lakshmindra case97 the court
decided that a person had his \ her religious freedom protected in
those overt acts of his \ her belief which he \ she thought proper;
and it was not required that such overt acts should be enjoined or
sanctioned by one’s religion. On the contrary, in the Ratilal case98
the court held that such overt actions must be enjoined or sanctioned
by one’s religion.
In the Quareshi case99 the Supreme Court further held that the
religious practice under question should not only be “enjoined or
sanctioned”100 by one’s religion but it must also be “an obligatory
overt act”101 of the concerned religion to exhibit its tenet. As seen
earlier, in this case the appellants pleaded for the sacrifice of a
cow on Bakr-Id day.102 After going through the Islamic custom of
animal sacrifice on Bakr-Id day and the tradition maintained by
Muslim rulers in India, the Supreme Court observed that cow
sacrifice was sanctioned by Islam but it was not an obligatory overt
act to express Islamic faith and, therefore, it would not be protected
under practice of religion as given in clause (1) of article 25.
In the Durgah Committee case103 the Court further restrictedTirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; Ratilal Panachand Gandhiv. State of Bombay, Air 1954 SC 388;; Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of
Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR
1961 SC 1402; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
1963 SC 1638; et.c.
92 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
93 Ibid., at 290.
94 Ibid., at 289.
95 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
96 Ibid., at 391.
97 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 289.
98 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, at 391.
99 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
100 Ibid., at 739.
101 Ibid., at 740.
102 See above section 1.3.1.2.3: “The Quareshi Case”, pp. 142-146.
103 Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402.
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the criterion adduced to the practice of religion, which might
claim State protection. In giving the judgment of the Court Dr.
J u s t i c e
P. B. Gajendragadkar observed:
[I]n order that the practices in question should be treated as
a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion
as its essential and integral part; otherwise purely secular
practices which are not an essential or an integral part of
religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may
make a claim for being treated as religious practices within
the meaning of Art.26. Similarly even practices though
religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs
and unessential accretions to religion itself.104
According to the criterion set by the Supreme Court an act is a
religious practice, which deserves protection under clause (1) of
article 25 of the Constitution of India, in so far as it is held by a
particular religion as essential and integral part of its tenet. This
criterion was proposed by the Court with the objective of saving
true religious practices from non-religious accretions and even
superstitions. By 1963, the Courts in India have followed this
approach in dealing with matters related to the practice of religion,
which is protected under right to religious freedom. The test is that
a particular religious community must regard it as something
essential of its religious tenet. In the case of counter claims by
competing individuals or groups on this matter, the court is the proper
forum to resolve it. This was brought out in the Tilkayat case.105
The approach pursued by the Courts in India towards matters
pertaining to the practice of religion has come under severe criticism
from Constitution experts. Dr. P.C. Jain has suggested106 that in
the matter of doubtful religious practices, the Courts in India should
accept the contention of a believer who claims before the Court
that certain practice has religious significance to the plaintiff instead
of restoring to judicial prove into plaintiff’s claim so as to see
whether it is an essential and an integral part of a religion, and in
some other instances to ascertain whether it is an obligatory overt
act of a religious tenet.
Similarly, it has been observed by Dr. B.P. Parameshwara Rao
that in the matters of intra-denominational disputes, the courts should
recognise the faith-claims of a rival group because it is difficult and
at times even impossible to prove religious beliefs held by people.107
Dr. V.P. Luthera expressed his opinion that a secular State has no
authority to interfere with or to regulate matters internal to
religion.108
1.3.2.4. Freedom to Propagate Religion
Unlike the Constitutions of many countries, article 25 of the Indian
Constitution specifically provides the right to propagate religion.109
However, the original draft of this article did not mention it explicitly
that reads:
All citizens are equally entitled to freedom of conscience
and to the right freely to profess and practice religion in a
manner compatible with public order, morality or health:
“Provided that the economic, financial or political activities
associated with religious worship shall not be deemed to be
included in the right to profess or practice religion.110
The insistence from the Christian minority seemed to have
largely contributed to the specific inclusion of this right. The joint
Committee of the Catholic Union of India and the All India Council
of Indian Christians passed a resolution in October 1945, which
stated, “In the future Constitution of India, the free profession,
104 Ibid., at 1415.
105 Tilkayat Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638, at
1660-1661.
106 P. C. Jain, op.cit., p. 212.
107 B. P. Parameshwara Rao, “Matters of Religion”, in Journal of Indian Law
Institute, vol. 5 (1963), pp. 509 ff.
108 V. P. Luthera, op.cit., p. 113 f.  See also R.W. Lariviere, “The Indian Supreme
Court and the Freedom of Religion”, in Journal of Constitutional and
Parliamentary Studies, vol. IX, no.2 (1975), p. 186.
109 M.V. Pylee, India’s Constitution (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962), p.
113.
110 Shiva B. Rao, op.cit., vol. II, p. 76.
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practice and propagation of religion should be guaranteed, and
the change of religion should not involve any civil or political
disability.”111
Clause (13) of the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights
submitted to the Constituent Assembly in April 1947 included the
right to propagate.112 Nevertheless, clause (17) of the Report stated,
“conversion from one religion to another brought about by coercion
or undue influence shall not be recognized by law”.113 When clause
(17) was debated on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, Mr.
K.M. Munshi who composed the text, proposed a new amendment
to the clause during the debate which read, “Any conversion from
one religion to another of any person brought by fraud, coercion or
undue influence or of a minor under the age of eighteen shall not
be recognized by law.’’114
The Christian members of the Assembly opposed Mr. K.M.
Munshi’s amendment proposal, because they voiced that it would
nullify in large measure the freedom of religion guaranteed under
clause (13). Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Constituent
Assembly, also strongly opposed Mr. K.M. Munshi’s amendment
proposal. The reluctance shown by some members of the Constituent
Assembly for the inclusion of the clause on the right to propagate
religion was conditioned by their fear that this right would help
Christian missionaries to convert Hindus and others to Christianity.115
Some other Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly,
however, emphasised India’s spiritual heritage, which is inclusive
and open to all faiths. Therefore, they had no misgiving to include
the right to propagation under religious freedom. In his advocacy
for the inclusion of propagation clause under religious freedom,
Pundit Lakshmikanda Maitra, referred to the sayings of Swami
Vivekananda and said:
The great Swami Vivekananda used to say that India is
respected and revered all over the world because of her
rich spiritual heritage…If we are to educate the world, if we
are to remove the doubts and misconceptions and the colossal
ignorance that prevails in the world about India’s culture
and heritage, this right must be inherent, - the right to profess
and propagate her religious faith must be conceded.116
The Constitution when finally adopted, accepted only the positive
statements related to religious freedom as we have it in article 25
of the Constitution.
Article 25 provides to all persons the right to propagate religion
and article 26, which guarantees collective freedom of religion to
denominations, or any section thereof, does not explicitly refer to
the right for propagation. In the Sri Lakshmindra case,117 the
Supreme Court held that the heads of religious institutions had liberty
to propagate their respective religious tenets because institutions
acted only through human agencies.118 Similarly, in the Ratilal
case,119 the Court said that the right to propagate religion applied to
a person in one’s individual capacity as well as on behalf of an
institution.120
The right to propagate religion means the right to communicate
one’s religious tenets to others by way of preaching, teaching and
writing with the explicit intention of convincing others about the
goodness of one’s religion. As propagation implies convincing others
to one’s point of view, it may involve underestimating others’ religion.
This may produce religious ill feeling and may lead to violence,
which may place the maintenance of public order and safety at
111 N.C.C. Review, vol. 66 (1946), p. 3. The general Hindu attitude towards
Propagation and conversion to Christianity by missionaries has been a matter
of debate for a very long time. At times, it has created communal tension
between Christians and Hindu fundamentalists. For detail see Donald E. Smith,
op.cit., pp. 162-192.
112 CAD, vol. 7, p. 427.
113 Ibid., p. 428.
114 Ibid., p. 480.
115 Ibid., pp. 818, ff.
116 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 832.
117 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
118 Ibid., at 289.
119 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
120 Ibid., at 391.
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stake. Hence, the task of the State is to maintain a balance
between the right to propagate religion and the right of the public
for order and security of life. Article 25 of the Constitution, therefore,
grants freedom to propagate religion “subject to public order.”
If propagation is done in any form to outrage the religious
feelings of any section of the public, the same may be penalized.
Section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code,121 for example, punishes
deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings
of any class of persons. In the case of Ramji Lal Modi v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh,122 the petitioner who was the editor, printer
and publisher of Gaurakshak, a monthly journal devoted for the
protection of cows, published an article, which the Supreme Court
found deliberate and malicious in intent to outrage the religious
sentiments of the Muslims. Under section 295 A of the Indian Penal
Code he was fined and sentenced to imprisonment. Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, he challenged the constitutionality of the
said section under article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right to freedom of speech.
Rejecting the petitioner’s contention, the Supreme Court held
that clause (2) of article 19 of the constitution at the same time
empowered the State to impose reasonable restrictions “in the
interest of” and not only “maintenance of” public order and,
therefore, the intent of clause (2) of article 19 covered section 295
A of the Indian Penal Code.123 In its judgment in the instant case,
the Supreme Court emphasized:
[T]he expression “in the interest of” makes the ambit of the
protection very wide. A law may not have been designed to
directly maintain public order and yet it may have been
enacted in the interest of the public order … S.295-A does
not penalize any and every act of insult to… the religious
beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalizes only those acts
of insult…which are perpetrated with the deliberate and
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that
class…It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to
religion.124
These above observations enable us to conclude that the
religious freedom protected under article 25 of the Constitution
includes the right to propagate one’s religion by way of preaching,
teaching and writing with the explicit objective of convincing others
about the goodness of one’s religion that may lead to conversion.
However, incidents of competing claims of religions may cause
religious ill feeling and social unrest, which may jeopardize the life
of ordinary people to live in dignity. As the Supreme Court of India
ruled in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,125 if religious
propagation is done in any way with deliberate intention to outrage
the religious feeling of others, the same can be penalized within the
protection of clause (2) of article 19. Any act perpetrated with the
intention of outraging the religious feelings of the people is an attack
on their dignity in their self-identity because religious convictions
are deep-seated values constitutive of one’s self-identity. By
protecting the people against such religious outrage, the State honours
human dignity, which is one of the primary objectives of the secular
State, as referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
1.3.2.5. An Indigenous Approach to Religious Freedom
The foregoing case studies regarding the free exercise of religion
provide us the reason to conclude that the Constitution of India
guarantees religious freedom, which is indigenous to Indian religious
ethos and to its socio-cultural context so as to satisfy the multi-
religious tradition of the country. Article 25 of the Constitution
guarantees freedom of conscience. However, clause (2) of article
121 “Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intentions of outraging the religious
feelings of any class of citizens of India, by word either spoken or written, by
signs or by visible representations or otherwise insults or attempts to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine,
or with both”.
Section 295 A, the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961).
122 AIR 1957 SC 620.
123 Ibid., at 622.
124 Ibid., at 623.
125 AIR 1957 SC 620.
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23 does not oblige exemption to conscientious objectors on religious
scruples from compulsory service of the State when services of
this sort are necessary for public welfare and for the security of
the country.126
As interpreted by the Courts, article 25 (1) protects religious
practices that are essential or integral to a religion. Owing to the
delicate communal situation, which is endemic in some parts of the
country, these practices are, however, subject to overriding
regulatory process of the State under sub-clause (a) of clause (2)
of article 25 that saves any State statutes to regulate and restrict
secular transactions and activities associated with religious
practices.127 Although religious practices protected under the
provision of clause (1) of article 25 are free from State regulation
unless detrimental to public order, morality, health and the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution,
nevertheless these practices cannot be protected if they contravene
social welfare and reform measures initiated by the State as
provided under sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of the same article.128
This dialectical process of freedom and regulatory measures
amounting to the State’s non-intervention and intervention associated
with the practice of religion brings out clearly the fundamental
dynamics of the philosophy of Indian secularism as enshrined in
the secular provisions of the Constitution. It means that the
Constitution is committed to protect values that enhance the
flourishing of human life in dignity. Therefore, the free exercise of
religion cannot supersede these objectives of the nation reposed in
the Constitution.
1.3.3. The Exercise of Religion Subject to State Restriction
The Constitutions of the democratic States guarantee freedom of
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religious beliefs in overt
ways. But this freedom is to be ensured in a balanced manner so
as not to endanger the security and well being of the society, the
maintenance of which is the prerogative of the State for the proper
growth and progress of the people. Hence, Constitutions provide
also the power to regulate and even to restrict this freedom. The
manner and various reasons under which religious freedom comes
under State restriction in India will be discussed in the proceeding
sections.
1.3.3.1. Subject to Law
Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India guarantees the individual’s
right to freedom of religion.129 The exercise of this freedom,
however, is made explicitly subject to public order, morality, and
health and to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution,
which lay down the fundamental rights. Exercise of religion means
the performance of acts in pursuance of one’s religious tenet.
In India the limitations laid on the exercise of religious freedom is
really very emphatic. The Constitution of India does not presume
that beliefs that are religious deserve absolute protection. Clause (1)
of Article 25, therefore, begins with a number of safeguards. The
right to religious freedom may be exercised only under these conditions.
These are substantial conditions. Commenting on the provision
protecting religious freedom under article 25 of the Constitution, Shri
K. Santhanam remarked in the Constituent Assembly:
“Hitherto it was thought in this country that anything in the
name of religion must have the right to unrestricted practice
126 “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory
service for the public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not
make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race. Caste or class or any
of them.” Article 23 (2) of the Constitution of India.
127 “ Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any law –
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practice.” Article 25 (2) (a) of
the Constitution of India.
128 “ Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any law –
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all casts and sections of Hindus.”
Article 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution o India.
129 “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of
this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.”
Article 25 (1), Constitution of India.
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and propagation. But we are now in the new Constitution
restricting the right only to that right which is consistent with
public order, morality and health”.130
The Courts in India on various occasions interpreted the scope
of freedom guaranteed to religion that reflects the mind of the
framers of the Constitution. The Bombay High Court held in one
of the cases131 that article 25 provided to all persons the right to
freedom of religion. But the Court reiterated that this “right is not
an absolute or unlimited right. In the first place, it is subject to
public order, morality and health. In the second place, it is subject
to other provisions of Part III”.132
In another case,133 the Supreme Court of India ruled that
article 25 of the Constitution guaranteed to every person freedom
of religion. But the Court emphasised:
This is subject, in every case, to public order, health and
morality…Subject to the restrictions which this article
imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our
Constitution…to entertain such religious beliefs as may be
approved by his judgement or conscience.134
Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in interpreting the scope and
limitations laid on the free exercise of religion as provided in clause
(1) of article 25 held that this provision did not give, for example, a
Hindu student the right to perform the ceremonies of his religion in
the compound of a Christian college.135 Therefore, under article
25(1) of the Indian Constitution, every person is entitled to have
the right to free exercise of religion. But this right is at the same
time subject to State law in order to safeguard the security and
welfare of all in the society as well as the individual because
protection of human persons in their dignity is the concern of the
Constitution of India.
1.3.3.2. Subject to Public Order and Morality
In India the State has imposed extensive regulations on the exercise
of religion in the interest of public peace and order. There are three
reasons arising from the peculiar nature of religious practices in
the country that call for these measures. First of all both Hinduism
and Islam which have the largest number of followers in the country
lack centralised organisation and authority necessary to provide
for the orderly conduct of religious practices in the public space.
Secondly most religions in India place great importance to public
display of religious celebrations in the form of festivals and
processions spread over many days. Thirdly India being a multi-
religious country, various religious communities having diametrically
opposed belief systems and practices live side by side all over the
country. Hence, it is not possible to permit them all to exercise their
different religious beliefs to the fullest possible measure.136
Hence, the State has enacted statutory restrictions to prevent
breaches of peace and to protect people from possible violence
arising from religious excitements associated with practice of
religion in the public places. Thus Chapter XV of the Indian Penal
Code137 declares certain religious acts are offensive if they tend to
create breach of peace. It is surprising to note that the authors of
the Code who composed it in 1860 commented, “(T)here is perhaps
no country in which the government has so much to apprehend
from religious excitement among the people.”138
130 CAD, vol. 7, p. 834.
131 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84.
132 Ibid., at 87.
133 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
134 Ibid., at 391.
135 Sanjib Kumar v. St. Paul’s College, AIR 1957 Cal, 524. It may be noted that
the Indian judicial opinion on the limitations imposed on the right to free
exercise of religion is similar to the view held by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the “free exercise of religion guaranteed in the
First Amendment had to be to “subject to regulation for the protection of
society.” (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, at 304). As quoted in V.P.
Luthera, op.cit., p. 114.
136 For certain details of these celebrations and their consequences on law and
order see Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 220-221.
137 Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
138 As quoted in R. Rachoddas and D.K. Thakore, The Law of Crimes (Bombay,
Bombay Law Office, 1948), p. 671.
HUMAN DIGNITY CENTRAL TO INDIAN SECULARISM 179 180 HUMAN DIGNITY…
Sections 295 to 298 of the Indian penal Code139 are more
intended for keeping peace and protection of people against violence
than for the protection of religion as such. These sections deal with
cases where a person performs an act whereby the religious feelings
of any class of citizen are wounded. Section 295 A specially limits
the religious freedom of propagation by making it an offence to
outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens by acts
incompatible with a civilised way of behaviour. The said section
reads:
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intentions of outraging
the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by
word either spoken or written, by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise insults or attempts to insult the
religion or the religious belief of that class, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both.140
In the case of Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramaswamy,141 the
Madras High Court had to deal with a case of this sort. In this case
the respondent, Mr. P. Ramaswamy published certain articles with
malicious purpose of outraging the religious sentiments of the
Muslims. The author criticised various injunctions of the Quran.
He was critical of the punishment sanctioned by the Quran, such
as the stoning to death of persons who were found guilty of adultery
which, according to him, was inconsistent with the provisions for
divorce, remarriage and allowing a person to have as many as four
wives. He also questioned the punishment of cutting off hands for
theft as sanctioned by the Quran. The author concluded in his article
that these provisions of Quran indicated that Allah was a fool
and “a foolish and barbarous person like Allah has no place
in this world”.142 The Madras High Court found the respondent
of the instant case guilty of section 295 A. In giving its verdict,
the Court declared:
[T]he Courts have to be circumspect and pay due regard to
the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of
persons with different beliefs, irrespective of the
consideration whether or not they shared those belief or
whether those beliefs were rational or not in the opinion of
the Court.143
Under section 153 A of the Indian Penal Code,144 it has been
declared a crime to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language,
caste or community, enmity between different religious, racial or
language groups. This section holds an act as a criminal offence if
it is detrimental to the maintenance of harmony between different
religious groups or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. The same is
the object of section 34 of the Police Act145 that prohibits the
slaughter of cattle or indecent exposure of one’s person on any
road, thoroughfare or other public place. Consequently, although
the Islamic law sanctions cow sacrifice on Bakr-Id day,
nevertheless, not to outrage the religious sentiments of the vast
majority of the Hindus, the Supreme Court can provide alternative
or regulatory measures as ruled in the Quareshi case.146
In an Ananda Marg case,147 the Supreme Court held valid the
order issued by the Calcutta Police Commissioner under section
144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,148 which prohibited the
‘Thandava dance’149 in public places. The Court asserted that
carrying lethal weapons like daggers, and carrying human skulls
139 Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
140 Section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961).
141 AIR 1964 Mad. 258.
142 Ibid., at 258-259.
143 Ibid., at 259.
144 Section 153 A of the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961).
145 Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 (Act 5 of 1861).
146 Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, at 740. For
the details of the case see above section 4.4.2.
147 Acharya Jagadiswaranda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta, AIR
1984 SC 51. Ananda Marg is a Hindu religious sect.
148 Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1890 (Act 5 of 1890). Section
144 empowers certain magistrates to direct any person to abstain from any act
to prevent a disturbance of the public tranquillity, a riot or an affray.
149 Thandava dance is a religious cult performance practised by the Ananda Marg
sect. The use of lethal weapons and human skulls are part of the cult dance.
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posed danger to public order and morality and, therefore, the
Police Commissioner’s order to ban Thandava dance from the
public places was valid.
The Courts in India have been often faced with cases challenging
the constitutional propriety of banning processions in some religiously
sensitive areas. In a case that arose from the State of Orissa,150
the Supreme Court was appealed to settle a long-standing dispute
between a section of Hindus and Muslims in that State. The History
of the instant case was that the leaders of Hindus and Muslims of
some villages in Orissa entered into an agreement in 1931 about
the manner of taking religious processions. According this agreement,
the Hindus should not play music near a mosque in order to enable
the Muslims to hold their prayers in a calm atmosphere. In 1964
the Hindus filed a case before the Orissa High Court151 claiming
that they were not bound by the 1931 agreement and that they
were entitled to play music in religious and non-religious processions
on the high way. The Orissa High Court rejected the petitioners’
claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the
Orissa High Court and asserted that the restrictions on playing
music and beating drums by the Hindus near the mosque were not
justified.
As provided in article 25 (1) of the Indian Constitution, while
the State protects the individual’s right to free exercise of religion,
the State is also duty bound to safeguard public order and morality
because the State’s coercive power is for the purposes of
maintenance of law and order necessary to promote conditions
fitting for the development of the people that is worthy of human
dignity.
In this connection, one of the practices associated with religion,
which came under the purview of the State in India, was the system
of devadasi dedication. Many Hindu temples, particularly in South
India, had the tradition of dedicating young girls to the deities as
devadasis (literally, servants of God). The devadasis danced and
sang before the deities in the temples and in religious processions.
It was also a belief prevalent among some sections of the Hindus
that spiritual merit was gained by such dedication. The dedication
ceremony was done by the performance of a spiritual marriage of
the girl with the deity of the temple. Although religious in origin, in
time it degenerated to such an extent that most of the devadasis
became either temple prostitutes or took to prostitution.
As early as a century ago prominent members of the Hindu
community in South India condemned the practice of devadasi
dedication on account of immorality and promiscuity spread through
the system. They also made it known that the practice of devadasi
dedication was not an essential part of the worship in the temples.152
In 1924, the amended Section 372 of the Indian Penal Code153
declared that any person dedicating a girl for devadasi was liable
to punishment. With the enactment of Madras Devadasi (Prevention
of dedication) Act, 1947, the prohibition of the devadasi practice
in any form was legally enforced in South India.154
In addition, The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in women and
Girls Act155 declared prostitution illegal if it is practiced within 200
yards of any place of public worship. The Act also makes it an
offence to procure, induce or take women for prostitution.156 In
the case that came before the Supreme Court of India from the
State of Uttar Pradesh,157 the constitutional validity of the Act158
150 Shaikh Piru Bux v. Kalandi Pati, AIR 1970 SC 1885.
151 Shaikh Piru Bux v. Kalandi Pati, AIR 1964 Orissa 18.
152 P. Ramanatha Iyer and P.R. Naraya Iyer, The Madras Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowment Act, (Madras Law Journal press, Madras, 1953), p. 43.
153 “Whoever sells, lets to hire, or otherwise disposes of any person under the age
of eighteen years with intent that such person shall at any age be employed or
used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for
any unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person
will at any age be employed or used for any such purpose shall be punished”
Section 372 of the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1924 (Act 18 of
1924).
154 Section 3 (3) of the Madras Devadasi (Prevention of dedication) Act, 1947
(Madras Act 31 of 1947).
155 Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act 104 of
1956).
156 Sections 5 and 7 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls
Act, 1956 (Act 104 of 1956).
157 Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushaliya, AIR 1964 SC 416.
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was challenged on the ground that the terms of the Act amounted
to a restriction on the trade of prostitution. But the Court held valid
the restrictions involved in the said Act, because it was a reasonable
control in the interest of public morality to stem the evil of prostitution
practised in some localities. The above considered statutes and
Court observations indicate that whenever the State prohibits
immoral practices, religion must give way to such actions, because
under the secular provisions of the Constitution of India, the State
is vested with power to uphold good values, on reasonable grounds,
in the interest of common good.
1.3.3.3. Subject to Public Health
It is the duty of a welfare State to provide legal safeguards to
protect individual’s life and to maintain good health of the community.
However, this life-saving objective of the State may run counter to
certain religious beliefs and practices. According to the Penal Code
of India,159 suicide is a crime that applies to the person who attempts
it and those who support or assist to commit it. Similarly death by
starvation or by self-inflicted torture to attain spiritual ends is also
an offence under the same Code.160 The law, therefore, forbids
suicide even if the act is motivated by religious intention.
Consequently, the practice of sati,161 for instance, though a
part of Hindu religious belief and practised by some sections of
Hindus in some parts of India, was made a criminal offence by the
law. In a case on sati brought before the Rajasthan High Court,162
the Sessions Judge issued a lenient sentence of six months rigorous
imprisonment to all those who were found guilty of abetting sati on
the ground that the people of that particular locality where sati
was committed believed it to be their religious duty to induce the
act. But Chief Justice Mr. Wanchoo of the Rajasthan High Court,
who spoke for the Court in the instant case remarked:
“The reasons he (the Sessions Judge) has given for this
ridiculously lenient sentence are rather strange in the middle
of the 20th century. He is still not sure whether the people
are wrong or right in their adoration of Sati…He seems to
sympathise with the view of the people that it is their religious
duty to help a woman who wants to become a Sati.”163
The Rajasthan High Court, therefore, disapproved the term of
six months rigorous imprisonment as lenient and extended it to five
years of rigorous imprisonment so that people may realize the
criminality of sati abetment and that they might in no manner induce
or help a woman to commit sati.
Maintenance of good health of the public requires on the part
of the State to take measures to prevent infectious diseases.
Religious beliefs cannot contravene State regulation on this matter.
Sections 269 and 270 of the Indian Penal Code,164 for example,
empower the State to take punitive action against a person who is
likely to spread such infections unlawfully and negligently. Similarly,
the Epidemic Diseases Act165 provides rules for enacting special
measures to control epidemic diseases.
In a case filed in the Orissa High Court,166 the petitioner was
158 Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act 104 of
1956).
159 The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
160 Sections 306, 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
161 Sati was a religious practice associated with Hinduism. It was prevalent among
some sections of Hindus in Bengal and Rajasthan. Originally Sati meant a
chaste or virtuous woman. By some development it came to mean the practice
of the self-immolation of a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband for the
sanctification of her husband and his ancestors. Though it was highly praised
by the ancient Hindu lawgivers as a meritorious act, it was never made a
religious obligation. But its glorification and strong social pressure seemed to
have frequently brought to bear on widows to make this sacrifice. The Regulation
XII of the Bengal Code passed on December 4, 1829, prohibited Sati in Bengal.
By 1830 the same was passed in Madras and Bombay. See Edward Thompson,
Sutte: A Historical and Philosophical Inquiry into the Hindu Rite of Widow-
Burning (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1928); R.C. Majumdar, The History
and Culture of the Indian People, op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 268-275. Rajeswari Sunder
Rajan, “The Subject of Sati: Pain and Death in the Contemporary Discourse on
Sati” in Yale Journal of Criticism, no.3 (1990).
162 Tejsingh v. The State, AIR 1958 Raj 169 (DB).
163 Ibid., at 172. As quoted in P.C. Jain, op.cit., p. 267.
164 Sections 269, 270 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
165 Section 2 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (Act 3 of 1897).
166 J. Choudhury v. The State, AIR 1963 Orissa 216.
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convicted on the ground that he refused to get himself inoculated
against cholera in violation of a State measure under the Epidemic
Diseases Act. The petitioner pleaded that he had “conscientious
objection”167 against inoculation. He, moreover, contended that he
had taken homeopathic medicine against cholera attack. The Court
rejected his contention and ruled that since the petitioner could not
prove that taking homeopathic medicine was similar to inoculation
he could be convicted for his refusal to comply with the State order.
These afore seen judicial decisions and State statutes re-enforce
one thing in a significant way, namely that the free exercise of
religion cannot contravene the constitutional objectives to protect
institutions and values intended to promote human well being in
defence of human dignity.
1.3.3.4. Subject to Fundamental Rights
Clause (1) of article 25 of the Indian constitution declares that the
exercise of religious freedom is subject to other fundamental rights
guaranteed in part III of the Constitution.168 This requires a balancing
of rights in the area of religion with other rights. A constitutional
question to this effect arose for the first time in 1958 in the case of
Sri Venkatarama Devaru v. State of Mysore.169 The facts of this
case were as follows. The case arose out of the Madras Temple
Entry Authorization Act170 passed by the Madras Legislature in
1947 and amended in 1949. The Preamble to the Act declared that
the Act aimed at the removal of disabilities imposed by custom or
usage on certain classes of Hindus171 with regard to entry into the
Hindu temples in the Madras Province, which were otherwise open
to the general Hindu public. Section 3 of the Act authorized persons
belonging to certain ‘excluded classes’ to enter any Hindu temple
and offer worship in the same manner and to the same extent as
Hindus in general. A ‘temple’ was defined as ‘a place, which is
dedicated to or for the benefit of the Hindu community or any
section thereof as a place of public religious worship’.
The trustees of Sri Venkataramana Temple, apprehending the
application of the Act to their temple, sent a memorandum to the
Madras Government claiming that their temple was a ‘private
temple’, which exclusively belonged to a Hindu sect called the
Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. Consequently, their temples were
not within the scope of the Act. The Government of Madras
rejected the petitioners’ claim. Thereupon the petitioners filed a
suit before the Supreme Court under Article 26 (b) that guaranteed
to a religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs in
“matters of religion”. The petitioners pleaded that according to
scriptural authority, the caste of the prospective worshippers was
a relevant part of ‘matters of religion’ and, therefore, the
enforcement of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act172 to
throw open their denominational temple to general public was
violative of article 26 (b) of the Constitution. The petitioners also
pleaded that since article 25(1) was subject to other fundamental
rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, the provision given
in Article 25 (2) (b) was also subject to article 26 (b).
In delivering the judgment in the instant case the Supreme Court
held section 3 of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act intra
vires of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed, “the validity
of section 3 of the Madras Act V of 1947 does not depend on its
own force but on article 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution…and
therefore, the trustees can succeed only by establishing that article
167 Ibid., at 217.
168 “(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of
this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or
prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) Providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus”.
Article 25, the Constitution of India.
169 AIR 1958 SC 255.
170 Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947 (Madras Act 5 of 1947 as
amended by Act 13 of 1949).
171 This class of people were known as ‘the untouchables’ or Harijans or the
Dalits.
172 The Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, 1947 (Madras Act 5 of 1947 as
amended by Act 13 of 1949).
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25 (2) (b) itself is inoperative as against article 26 (b).173 The
court then commented that there were two provisions in the
Constitution, article 25 (2) (b) and article 26 (b). These were of
“equal authority, neither of them being subject to the other.”174
Consequently, the rule of harmonious construction had to be applied
when interpreting them. Mr. Justice Aiyar who delivered the
judgment of the Supreme Court said:
The limitation “subject to the other provisions of this part”
occurs only in cl. (1) of Article 25 and not in cl. (2). Clause
(1) declares the rights of all persons to freedom of conscience
and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate
religion. It is this right that is subject to the other provisions
in the Fundamental Rights Chapter. One of the provisions to
which the right declared in Art. 25 (1) is subject to Art.25
(2). A law, therefore, which falls within Art. 25 (2) (b) will
control the right conferred by Art. 25 (1), and the limitation
in Art. 25 (1) does not apply to that law.175
According to the judgement of the Court, clause (2) of article
25 supersedes clause (1) of the same article. Therefore, the
petitioners’ right to free exercise of religion is subject to the right
conferred to every Hindu to enter any Hindu temple of public
character. The provisions given in article 26 (b), the Supreme Court
observed, were to be read in the light of the limitations contained in
sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of article 25.
1.3.3.5. Religious Freedom in Consonance with Human
              Dignity
The preceding observations show us that the State in India has
wide powers to restrict religious freedom for the purposes of public
order, morality and health and to secure fundamental rights of the
people as guaranteed by the Constitution. Most of the religions
practised in India lack the centralised organization and authority
necessary to supervise the vast expanse of activities associated
with religion. This peculiar nature of religions in India has
necessitated the State to enact several statutory laws to regulate
religious freedom. Moreover, the strained relationship between some
religious communities in some parts of the country, flare up into
communal riots and even lead to bloodshed.176 All this creates life-
situations of insecurity to citizens if the State failed to arm itself
with necessary legal measures to regulate religious freedom.
It is also the duty of the State to provide opportunity for an
integrated development of the people by maintaining the moral
standards in accord with reason as demanded by human nature
and by ensuring proper physical health conditions necessary for
the people to organise their life in a way worthy of human dignity.
Therefore, constitutional measures to uphold these values and norms
are fully justified even though they may infringe on or even
supersede certain religious practices, beliefs and prejudices.
The framers of the Constitution envisaged a specific model of
secular State founded on the liberal democratic values as well as
India’s culture of religious pluralism. This secular model of the State
embedded in the Constitution contains a healthy dialectic between
faith and reason. Hence, in the prevailing religious context of the
country, the framers of the Constitution felt the need to enact
constitutional safeguards for the advancement of society and every
individual person based on the dignity of the human person as a
moral subject by placing the individual persons before and above
religious scruples and customs.
This constitutional framework has been explicitly brought out
in the manner in which the right to freedom of conscience is placed
prior to that of religious freedom per se as contained in clause (1)
173 Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, at 257.
174 Ibid., at 258.
175 Ibid., at 267.
176 A.G. Noorani, “Ordained Secularism: Outlawing the Purveyors of hatred” in
Frontline (August-14-27, 1993), pp. 14-17., S. Chandra, “Communal
Consciousness and Communal Violence, Post-Riot Surat” in Economic and
Political Weekly (September 4, 1993), pp. 1883-1887., G. Pandey, “In Defence
of the Fragment. Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India”, in Economic
and Political Weekly (Annual Number, March 1991), pp. 559-572., A.R. Desai,
“Caste and Communal Violence in Post-partition Indian Union,” op.cit., pp.
10-41.
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of article 25 of the Constitution, which declared, “[A]ll persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely
to profess, practice and propagate religion.” The constitutional
emphasis ingrained in article 25 (1) is that religion is placed at the
service of human person in his / her capacity for free, conscious
and responsible action to decide one’s own destiny. Every one is
free to choose a religion of one’s own choice or reject them all,
according to one’s free choice. Equally emphatic in clause (1) of
article 25 is the protection given to the right to religious freedom,
which explicitly means freedom to profess, practice and propagate
religion of one’s choice.177
However, just as any other fundamental right, religious freedom
is also not absolute. As Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar reiterates,178
fundamental rights are legally enforceable rights under a liberal
democratic political system because these rights govern the legal
bond that exists between the State and the citizens. Consequently,
the State’s supreme duty is to enforce them through constitutional
means. The purpose is to prevent people from committing the evil
of violating the dignity of the person as a moral subject just as the
State itself is interdicted by the Constitution from doing the same.
Hence, when religious practices come into conflict with other
fundamental rights protected under Part III of the Constitution,
preference must be given to the latter because religious practices
should be in harmony with certain substantive values that are
affirmative of human dignity. Therefore, the free exercise of religion
cannot contravene human welfare and progress, which are the
conditions necessary for people to grow in dignity.
1.3.4. The State’s Assistance to Religion
The activities of a welfare State are to be ordered in a manner
conducive to provide proper facilities for the integrated development
of its citizens including their religious needs. The secular provisions
of the Indian Constitution recognise the importance of religion in
people’s lives, though may not be applicable to all.179 If religion is
an important factor in the welfare of the people, it must be assisted
through constitutional means.
The peculiar nature of religions in India, moreover, calls for
various types of State support to religion. Unlike the ecclesiastical
institutions, most of the religions in India require administrative and
organisational systems capable of taking care of the enormous
amount of wealth and landed property they possess. These are
given to them from ancient time onwards by way of endowment
for religious, charitable and educational purposes in perpetuity. Under
these circumstances, the State in India has assumed great
responsibility for the proper administration of such religious
institutions within the constitutional rights to religious freedom
guaranteed to them.180
It has to be noted, at the same time, that India has neither State
religion nor it gives any constitutional recognition to Hinduism as
the religion of the majority of the citizens. There is also no
Ecclesiastical Department in the Union Government as existed
during the British Raj. Hence, we will examine the various kinds of
assistance the State in India provides to religion while being secular.
This would enable us to see another important dimension of the
political philosophy of Indian secularism, which stands committed
to integral humanism affirming the dignity of human persons in
their individual self-identities and their plural community identities.
1.3.4.1. Religion and Taxation
The financial requirements of a welfare State are met by way of
taxes. As a matter of justice, all who have the capacity to pay tax
share the tax burden. Tax exemption is not a right but a grace
granted by the State on certain reasonable grounds. It has been
customary from ancient time onwards both in the East and West to
assist religion by giving tax exemption to religious personnel,
177 Some of these observations have been made by Prof. Upendra Baxi, Former
Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi University in one of his recent articles, “The
‘Struggle’ for the Redefinition of Secularism in India: Some Preliminary
Reflections” in R. C. Heredia and E. Mathias, ed., Secularism and Liberation
(New Delhi, Indian Social Institute, 1995), pp. 54-78.
178 P. B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., p.24.
179 Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
180 See in particular article 26 of the Constitution of India.
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institutions and properties.181
During the time of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire,
Islam enjoyed tax exemption in India, while others were subject to
jizya, a poll tax, for recognition of their religions by the State.182
During the British rule in India, tax exemption was granted to all
religions. But right up to 1948 the Ecclesiastical Department of the
British government paid out of State revenue a large sum of money
for the maintenance of Anglican churches and clergymen.183
The Constitution of India empowers the legislature to pass laws
to levy taxes.184 The amount to be levied through taxation is left to
the discretion of the legislature. The Constitution of India, however,
doesn’t protect taxes when they contravene the equal protection
rights185 or any tax measure meant to meet the expense of any
particular religion or religious denomination.186
The Indian Constitution is, nevertheless, silent about the matter
of taxation on religion. This implies that the State in India is not
debarred from imposing taxes on religious institutions. On the
contrary, the State in India, by means of various statutes of the
Union Government,187 grants tax exemption to religious institutions
of a public character because tax exemption to religion is a form of
State assistance to religion in the public interest. It is part of the
State’s commitment for the all round development of its citizens
which is a significant affirmation of the inherent worth and dignity
of the human person.
1.3.4.2. Direct State Aid to Religion
The Constitution of India does not debar the State to levy taxes on
condition that the proceeds of which are defrayed without
discrimination to promote and maintain religion. Non-discriminatory
taxes for the benefit of all religions would be perfectly valid as
protected under article 27 of the Constitution. This article sates,
“No person shall be compelled to pay taxes the proceeds of which
are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the
promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious
denomination.”
The constitutional propriety of levying tax on religious activities
was, nevertheless, raised for the first time in the year 1954 when
the Lakshmindra case188 of historic importance was appealed to
the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court’s observations of
this case throw light on the interpretation of the content of article
27 of the Constitution within the secular objectives of the
Constitution.
The history of Lakshmindra case is to be seen in the context of
several statutes189 passed by many Indian Legislatures for the
181 The Book of Ezra in the Old Testament reads: “We also notify you that it shall
not be lawful to impose tribute, custom or toll upon any of the priests, the
Levites, the singers, the door keepers, the temple servants, or other servants of
this house of God” (Ezra 7:24) In the Roman Empire, Emperor Constantine the
Great provided tax exemption to ecclesiastical properties. This custom prevailed
for centuries in the West. Similarly, in ancient India tax exemption was granted
to Brahmins and temple properties. However, the tax relief measure to religion
in ancient India varied from region to region. See A.S. Altekar, The State and
Government in Ancient India, op.cit., pp. 264-269.
182 Abid S. Husain, The National Culture of India, op.cit., p 77.
183 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 128.
184 “No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law”. Article 265,
Constitution of India.
“Law” in article 265 of the Constitution of India means a statute law enacted by
an Act of legislature. See State of Kerala v. P.J. Joseph, AIR 1958 SC 269, at 300.
185 “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the law within the territory of India”. Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
186 “No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are
specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or
maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination”. Article 27,
Constitution of India.
187 The Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act 43 of 1961), Ss. 11 & 88. The Wealth Tax Act,
1957 (Act 27 of 1957), S. 5 (1) (i), The Gift Tax Act, 1958 (Act 18 of 1958), S.
5 (1) (v) & (vi).
188 Commissioner, Hindu religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
189 Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Act, 1966 (AP Act 17 of 1966)., Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 ( Bihar
Act 1 of 1951)., Bombay Public trust Act, 1950 ( Bombay Act 29 of 1950).,
Durga Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 (Act 36 of 1955)., Madras Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 ( Madras Act 19 of 1951)., Nathdwara
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creation of Boards of Managers to look after the proper
management and administration of religious institutions. The
expenses of these Boards have been met by a contribution collected
either in the form of tax or fee from the concerned institutions
themselves. Similarly, the Government of Madras, under the Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951, constituted the
Hindu Religious Endowments Board190 in order to work out a system
for the administration of the Shirur Mutt. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, the Head (Mathadhipati) of the Shirur
Mutt, appealed to the Supreme Court191 challenging many provisions
of the Act as well as the activities of the Board on the ground that
they infringed on several fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
One of the contentions of the appellant in this case was that
the contribution levied from their religious institutions was a tax
because the proceeds of the levy was not earmarked and kept
apart to meet the expenses of the Board but formed part of the
revenue of the State of Madras. Therefore, the plaintiff pleaded
that it violated article 27 of the Constitution. While examining the
case, the Supreme Court found that the contribution was in fact in
the nature of tax192 but held that it did not violate article 27. Regarding
the proscription involved under article 27 of the Constitution as
raised by plaintiff, the Court commented:
What is forbidden by the Article is the specific appropriation
of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the
promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or
religious denomination. The reason underlying this provision
is obvious. Ours being a secular state and there being
freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, both to
individuals and to groups it is against the policy of the
Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for the
promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or
religious denomination.193
Therefore, The Supreme Court indicated that the purpose of
the contribution was to see that religious trusts and institutions
wherever they existed were properly administered.194 This was a
secular administration of the religious institutions with the objective
of ensuring that the endowments bequeathed to religious institutions
were justly administered and their income was duly utilised for the
purposes to which they were established. This implies that it is
constitutionally valid to levy tax for religious purposes on condition
that the proceeds of which are used non-preferentially for the benefit
of the religious cause.
On the contrary, one may be surprised to note during the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, article 290-A was added195
to grant State contribution to Hindu temples and shrines in the States
of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Article 290-A reads:
A sum of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall be
charged on, and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the
State of Kerala every year to the Travancore Devaswom
Fund; and a sum of thirteen lakhs and fifty thousand rupees
shall be charged on, and paid out of the Consolidated Fund
of the State of Madras every year to the Devaswom Fund
established in that State for the maintenance of Hindu temples
and shrines in the territories transferred to that State on the
first day of November, 1956, from the State of Travancore-
Cochin.
Temple Act, 1959 ( Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959)., Orissa Hindu Religious
Endowment Act, 1951 ( Orissa Act 2 of 1952)., etc.
190 The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras
Act 19 of 1951).
191 Commissioner, Hindu religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
192 Ibid., at 296.
193 Ibid., at 296.
194 Following this case, when cases of this sort arose later on the courts in India
have upheld the validity of levying fee or tax for religious purposes provided
they have been non-discriminatory. See Kidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan
Nambudiripad v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 385; Jagannath Ramanuj
Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400; Commissioner of Hindu Religious
and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. U. Krishna Rao, and AIR 1970 SC
414.
195 Section 19 of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, with effect
from 1.11.1956.
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It is required here, as a matter of clarification, to refer to the
historical background of Article290-A. Prior to the year 1949,
Travancore and Cochin were contiguous Indian States under Hindu
Maharajas. The rulers of these States sanctioned a large annual
grant of money for the maintenance of Hindu temples and shrines
in their respective States and directly controlled the management
of these institutions. The two States were merged in 1949. As the
royal grants were in perpetuity, the obligations involved thereby
were also passed over to the newly created State of Travancore-
Cochin. To this effect the consent of the two rulers and the
Government of India were assented to by an Act of a Covenant.
Hence, in 1956 when the new State of Kerala was reconstituted
from that of Madras (Tamil Nadu), the covenantal obligations were
also passed on and shared by the States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu
by making payments to the Devaswom Funds from the Consolidated
Funds of these States.196
Apart from the historical context of the formation of the
Devaswom Fund, the annual payment to Devaswom funds as
granted in article 290-A of the Indian Constitution remains open to
objection. This is a continuation of the old system of State patronage
to religious institutions prevalent in India from ancient time. Similarly,
in another case197 the Delhi High Court uphold the constitutional
validity of the State assistance to the celebrations associated with
the 2500th anniversary of the attainment of salvation by Mahavira,
the founder of Jainism. The Court said that the assistance of the
State on an occasion like this neither amounted to State giving support
to Jainism nor infringed on article 27 of the Constitution.
1.3.4.3. State Aid, Education and Religion
Education is one of the important sectors where India’s commitment
to the philosophy of the secular State comes to force. Organized
education in India traditionally remained closely associated with
religion, specially confined to Hindu and Muslim religious
institutions.198 The Mughal emperor Akbar, nevertheless, made an
attempt to impart secular education by means of government
schools.199 It was also one of the duties of the Indian rulers to
patronise classical learning that basically remained religious in
character. The British government in India followed this policy.
Consequently, in 1781 the British government founded the Calcutta
Madrasa for Islamic study, in 1784 the Asiatic Society of Bengal
for Oriental study, and in 1792 the Benaras Sanskrit College for
Hindu classical learning. The Christian missionaries were also
permitted to establish educational institutions of their choice to which
some grants were defrayed by the government.200
On the other hand, certain attempts were made by the British
officials to follow the policy of religious neutrality in all government
educational institutions. In 1854 Lord Bentinck, for instance,
asserted:
The fundamental principle of British rule, the compact to
which the government stands solemnly pledged, is strict
neutrality… The same maxim is peculiarly applicable to
general education. In all schools and colleges supported by
government, this principle cannot be too strongly enforced.
All interference and injudicious tampering with the religious
belief of the students, all mingling of direct or indirect teaching
of Christianity with the system of instruction ought to be
positively forbidden.201
The dispatch of Sir Charles Wood, dated July 19, 1854, laid the
foundation of the present-day system of education in India. The
dispatch asserted that the government educational institutions should
be strictly secular as these were founded for the benefit of the
whole population of India.202 The dispatch, at the same time, brought
out the grants-in-aid system to private educational institutions with
196 For details see Donald E. Smith, op.cit., pp. 130-131. Devaswom Fund means
fund meant for the Hindu religious purposes.
197 Suresh Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Del 168.
198 R. C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhury and K. Dutta, An Advanced History of
India, op.cit., p. 816.
199 Abid S. Husain, The National Culture of India, op.cit., p. 71.
200 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 336.
201 Ibid., p. 336-337.
202 Ibid., p. 340.
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financial support where the government required to take no
notice whatsoever of the religious doctrines that may be taught.203
The framers of the Constitution of India laid great emphasis on
education to eradicate illiteracy and backwardness prevalent in the
country and to place the nation in the path of advancement in every
field of knowledge with the hope of achieving integrated welfare
of the citizens that furthers the cause of human dignity. For this
purpose, they brought out a number of provisions under the Directive
Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution.204
Besides the encouragement given to education through
constitutional provisions, the State in India encourages private
agencies including the religious communities to run educational
institutions with the objective of speeding up literacy for the progress
of the nation. The Constitution, moreover, guarantees that in
imparting education, the minorities are free to conserve their
respective language, script, culture and religious tenets. The State
in India assists with substantial aid to facilitate education through
these institutions. In giving aid, the Constitution prohibits the State
from religious or linguistic discrimination.
Article 28 of the Constitution is specifically concerned with the
question of religious instruction in three categories of educational
institutions. It provides:
(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational
institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational
institution which is administered by the State but has been
established under any endowment or trust which requires
that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institutions.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be
required to take part in any religious instruction that may be
imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship
that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises
attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a
minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.
Clause (1) of the Article 28 refers to the first category of
educational institutions, which is wholly owned by the State, where
the prohibition to impart religious instruction is absolute. Neither
the State nor a private agency may provide religious instruction in
such institutions. Clause (2) of Article 28 deals with the second
category of educational institutions in which the State does the
administration in the place of a trustee. However, under this
category the institution itself is established under a trust or an
endowment wherein the terms of the trust or endowment require
imparting religious instruction,205 which is protected under this
clause.
Clause (3) of Article 28 deals with the third category of
educational institutions. These are owned and managed by religious
denominations, but come under the system of grants-in-aid. These
institutions are free to impart religious instruction. The provision
under article 28 (3) assures the conscience clause by which the
State protects the individual’s right to freedom of conscience by
placing them above religion while at the same time the State
acknowledges as well as protects religious pluralism.
203 Ibid., p. 341.
204 “The State shall, within limits of its economic capacity and development,
make effective provisions for securing the right…to education…” Article 41,
Constitution of India.
“The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the
commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all
children until they complete the age of fourteen years”. Article 45, Constitution
of India.
“The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interest
of the weaker sections of the people and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes.” Article 46, Constitution of India.
205 The Benaras Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim University were founded
on endowments, which required that religious instruction must be imparted in
Hinduism and Islam respectively though these universities come under the
administrative care of the Union Government. These and similar institutions are
protected under clause (2) of article 28.
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1.3.4.4. State Aid and State Control
Professor J.J. Anjaria and Dr. Abid S. Husain indicate that the
policy of aiding educational institutions has been in existence in the
Indian political system for long, even before the making of modern
India.206 It is necessary that a welfare State like India need to
make use of all facilities and personnel, both from public and private
sectors of the society, including the capabilities available in the
religious institutions to spread literacy and advance in knowledge
for the benefit of the people so that all sections of the society have a
variety of opportunities for progress and human resource development
that may sustain a civil society informed by the principles of human
dignity.
In the present state of affairs, education is a costly sector in
India as it is elsewhere. So, educational institutions need substantial
grants by way of aid from the State. In this context, in dealing with
education in the country, the Constitution guarantees to minorities
the right to conserve their language, script and culture. The State
also grants to all minority communities, whether based on language
or religion, the right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice as given in the articles 29 and 30. Article
29 reads:
(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of
India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or
culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.”
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational
institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of
State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language
or any of them.
Article 30 provides:
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language,
shall have the right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice.
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational
institutions, discriminate against any educational institution
on ground that it is under the management of a minority,
whether based on religion or language.
Clause (1) of article 30 guarantees to all minorities the right to
establish educational institutions of their choice and clause (2) of
the same article saves educational institutions managed by minority
communities from discrimination in giving State aid. This article is
supplementary to clause (a) of article 26, which empowers religious
denominations to establish institutions for charitable purposes.
State aid involves also State control over beneficiary institutions
in order to see that the goal set by the government is better realised.
Some of the methods of control exercised by the State such as
inspection, process of granting recognition, auditing and qualification
of teachers etc., are acceptable to all. The conflict of interest arises
when control becomes a matter of interference with the internal
administrative policies, which are proper to these institutions. The
requirement here is a harmonious understanding between the
general interest of the society at large and affirmative interest of
the minority communities to maintain their identity as well as their
development. On several occasions the Supreme Court has been
appealed to on account of conflicts arising from State encroachment
on the autonomy of the minorities to manage their educational
institutions as alleged by the latter. Christians have brought most of
these allegations as they run the highest number of educational and
charitable institutions across the country. We shall examine for our
purpose three important cases207 of this sort to see in the judicial
decisions values that protect human dignity.
The propriety of interference in the management of schools
206 J.J. Anjaria, The Nature and Growth of Political Obligation in the Hindu State,
op.cit., pp. 29-30., Abid S. Husain, The National Culture of India, op.cit., p. 71.
207 Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re The, AIR 1958 SC 956 (Hereafter it will be
referred to as Kerala Education Bill)., Sidhrajbhai Sabbai, Rev. v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1963 SC 540 ( Hereafter it will be referred to as Sidhrajbhai Sabbai)., W.
Proost. Rev. Father v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 465 (Hereafter it will be
referred to as Fr. Proost). We have chosen these three cases because in dealing
with subsequent cases of this sort, the Courts have often recalled to the
judgements of these cases as a point of reference.
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aided by the State arose for the first time in a historic case in
1957 in reference to the Kerala Education Bill case.208 The object
of the Bill was to lay down certain rules for the better management
of all aided educational institutions in the State of Kerala. Clause 3
(5) of the Bill warned that failing to comply with the stipulations of
the Bill would amount to forfeiture of State recognition of the
concerned schools. Sub-clause (3) of clause (8) made it known
that the fees collected from the students in an aided school must be
deposited with the government. Clause 9 dealt with certain
regulations regarding the salary of the teachers employed in the
State aided schools. Clauses 10, 11 and 12 authorised the State to
prescribe qualification for the appointment of teachers and
regulations to improve the working conditions of the school staff.
In particular clause 11 provided that appointment of teachers should
be made by the Public Service Commission with due regard to the
principle of communal reservation. Clauses 14 and 15 contained
provisions for government take over of the schools in case of
mismanagement.209
The Managers of the Christian minority schools pleaded before
the Supreme Court that the impugned Bill was an infringement of
their rights guaranteed under clause (1) of article 30 of the
Constitution. The State of Kerala, on the contrary, defended the
Bill on the ground that so long as the institutions did not receive any
aid from the State, they had a right to establish and maintain their
educational institutions within the meaning of article 30 (1) of the
Constitution. However, if the minorities were the beneficiaries of
any State aid, they had to abide by the terms of the aid, provided
there was no discrimination.
In giving verdict to this case, the Supreme Court rejected the
extreme positions taken by the State of Kerala and the Managers
of the Christian minority schools. The Supreme Court held that
without infringing the rights guaranteed to the minorities under article
30 (1), it was open to the State through proper channel to lay down
reasonable rules and regulations governing the institutions receiving
the aid. The Court observed:
It stands to reason… that the constitutional right to administer
an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily
militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to
grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to
ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided.210
But the Supreme Court held that such rules could not violate
the fundamental right of the minority educational institutions to
administer them as protected under Article 30 of the Constitution
because the legislative power of the State was subject to
fundamental rights.211 In regard to the over-all tenor of the Bill,
one writer observed that the most fundamental Christian objection
to the Bill was that it took away the freedom of the management to
appoint the kind of teachers needed to maintain the distinctive
Christian orientation and atmosphere in the school.212
A couple of years later the Sidhrajbhai Sabbai case213 was
brought before the Supreme Court for protection under article 30
of the Constitution. The Sidhrajbhai Sabbai case was about a minority
Christian society, known as the Gujarat and Kathiawar Presbyterian
Joint Board, which was running several primary schools and a
Teacher’s Training College in the State of Gujarat. The college
was getting an annual grant under the Education Code of the State
of Gujarat. The Education Department of the State held
examinations and granted certificates to teachers trained in the
college of the Sidhrajbhai Sabbai Board. The State was interfering
with the admission policy of the college and ordered that 80 per
cent seats of the college should be reserved for the nominees of
the Government of Gujarat on the ground that the State of Gujarat
need to train 40,000 teachers to staff the primary schools in that
State. On refusal to comply with the State order, State aid was
suspended.
208 In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956.
209 Ibid., at 983.
210 Ibid., at 983,
211 Ibid., at 983.
212 C.P. Mathew, “Church in Kerala and the New Education Act”, in N.C.C.
Review, vol. 79 (1959), pp. 271-272.
213 Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540.
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As the college belonged to the minority religious community,
the Managing Board of the college appealed to Supreme Court for
constitutional protection under article 30 (1), in addition to a few
other provisions of the Constitution. In its observation of the instance
case, the Supreme Court found that the order of the Gujarat
Government made serious inroads into the rights guaranteed to the
Managing Board to administer the college under clause (1) of article
30. In issuing the judgment, the Court compared this article with
article 19 under which reasonable restrictions can be placed on the
fundamental rights of citizens.
The Supreme Court observed in the instant case:
Unlike Art. 19, the fundamental freedom under clause (1)
of Art.30, is absolute in terms: it is not made subject to any
reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental
freedoms enunciated in Art.19 may be subjected to. All
minorities, linguistic or religious have by Art. 30 (1) an
absolute right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice; and any law or executive
direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that
right under Art. 30 (1) would to that extent be void. This,
however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose
regulations upon the exercise of this right…Regulations made
in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline,
health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may
undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions
on the substance of the right which is guaranteed: they secure
the proper functioning of the institutions, in matters
educational.214
The Supreme Court, furthermore favouring the argument of
the appellants that the regulatory measures of the State could only
be in the interest of the minority institution, emphasised:
The rights established by Art. 30 (1)…is intended to be
effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative
measures conceived in the interest not of the minority
educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a
whole...Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either
by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving
grant or of recognition must be directed to making the
institution while retaining its character as a minority institution.
Such regulation must satisfy a dual test – the test of
reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the
educational character of the institution and is conducive
to making the institution as effective vehicle of education
for the minority community or other persons who resort
to it.215
These judicial observations led the Supreme Court to decide
that State’s order to reserve 80 per cent of the seats for its nominees
was an unreasonable demand on the minority college and, therefore,
violated the protection granted to minority institutions under clause
(1) of article 30 of the Constitution.
Similarly, in the case of Fr. Proost216 the Supreme Court had to
decide once again on the extent of protection guaranteed to minority
educational institutions under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In
this case, the petitioners were the Jesuit Fathers of the Catholic
Church who established the St. Xavier’s College and got it affiliated
with Patna University, who wanted to secure to the college the
rights appertained to a minority educational institution.
The management of the college under consideration contended
that the college was founded to give Catholic youth a full course of
moral and liberal education by imparting religious instruction and
maintaining “a Catholic atmosphere in the institution”.217 The
management however, asserted that the college was also open to
all non-Catholic students. The State of Bihar, nevertheless, argued
that even though the college came under minority community, the
protection of Article 30 (1) could not be extended to the college
because the provision of the said article applied only to the
institutions, which were founded to conserve the language, script
214 Ibid., at 545. Our emphasis is in italics.
215 Ibid., at 547. Our emphasis is in italics.
216 W. Proost, Rev. Father v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 465.
217 Ibid., at 466. Our emphasis is in italics.
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or culture as referred to under article 29 (1) of the Constitution.
The State of Bihar further contented that the college under
consideration in the instant case was, moreover, open to all sections
of the people and there was no programme of such kind as specified
under Article 29 (1) of the Constitution and, therefore, the college
did not qualify to seek protection of the Constitution as guaranteed
under Article 30 (1).
The Supreme Court rejected altogether the position taken by
the State of Bihar. The Court asserted that articles 30 (1) and 29
(1) had specific purposes. Article 30 (1) applied to all minority
educational institutions. The fact that the members of the other
community were given admission in a minority community did not
prevent it to secure protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court observed that the benefit of article 30 (1) was
not limited to the needs of a single community exclusively, but it
grants minorities the right to establish educational institutions to
cater to the educational need of the citizens or section thereof.
The Courts in India have upheld two principles in the aforesaid
cases. Firstly, under clause (1) of article 30, the Courts have
defended in absolute term the protection guaranteed to the minority
institutions to establish and administer educational institutions of
their choice. Secondly, the Courts have also approved the State-
intervention to impose reasonable regulations on them in the interest
of efficiency of the institution and to maintain certain fundamental
human values, such as public order, morality and health218 which
are necessary for people to organise their lives in a manner that
protects human dignity.
In the case of the Kerala Education Bill,219 while admitting
State intervention, the Supreme Court upheld the State action on
basis of human welfare for the benefit of employees and backward
classes.220 Similarly, in the case of Sidhrajbhai Sabbai221 the Supreme
Court held valid State intervention in the minority institutions in the
interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation,
morality, public order and the like. The Court, nevertheless, observed
that “such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of
the right”222 granted to minorities under clause (1) of article 30
but to secure the proper functioning of the institutions in a way that
is affirmative of human dignity.
These judicial decisions on minority institutions reiterate the
principle of tolerance by respecting plural ways of life in the civil
society, which is an integral aspect of Indian ethos. The value
significance of this principle finds constitutional protection under
articles 29 and 30. While clause (1) of article 29 guarantees to any
section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part
thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own the
right to conserve the same, article 30 protects the right to minorities
based on religion or language to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice. Therefore, minorities are given space to
preserve and promote the value potentials of their respective
traditions as well as to put them in the service of the nation by way
of educational institutions. Supreme Court’s position on these cases
also indicates that the judiciary recognises the reality of the Indian
people characterised by a pluralism of identities, namely religious,
cultural and linguistic. Constitutional recognition of this pluralism is
a veritable affirmation of the dignity of human persons in their
individual self-identities and in their collective community identities.
1.3.4.5.  State Aid Conditioned by Indian Political Ethos
The preceding sections dealt with constitutional matters regarding
financial assistance of the State to religion and to minority
educational institutions. This calls us to clarify the constitutional
values implied in this unique manner of operation of the State in
India towards religion and minority institutions under a secular
Constitution. As seen elsewhere, the State in India is free to tax or
grant tax exemption to religious institutions on the condition that in
either approach there is no discrimination against any religion or
any section thereof. As a matter of fact, religious institutions enjoy
218  Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540, at 545.
219  In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958.
220  Ibid., at 983.
221  Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540. 222  Ibid., at 545. Our emphasis is in italics.
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tax exemption in India. This is a form of assistance the State grants
to religion.
However, the Supreme Court has observed in some instances
that the State is entitled to impose levy on religious institutions if
the proceeds are meant to defray the administrative and
maintenance expenses when the State takes care of the vast religious
properties and ceremonies within the purview of religious
Endowments.223 It has been held that such levy measures would
not amount to infringement of religious freedom protected under
articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is, moreover, constitutionally
valid for the State to extend direct financial assistance for even purely
religious purposes if such assistance is non-discriminatory. 224
Similarly, the Constitution guarantees to all minority educational
institutions the entitlement to State aid. In granting aid to educational
institutions, the State is prohibited to exclude any educational
institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority
whether based on religion or language.225 Furthermore, educational
institutions run by the religious denominations are free to impart
religious instruction. The State, at the same time, safeguards the
freedom of the individual person by guaranteeing a conscience
clause.226
The State’s support to religion and educational institutions by
way of financial assistance is not something new added into the
Constitution but only an integration of an indigenous political value
into the Constitution. For, as we have studied in chapter two, all
round welfare of the people was the aim of the ancient Indian
political system.227 The State in ancient India took care of religion
and classical learning. By integrating these indigenous duties of the
State in the secular Constitution of modern India, the framers of
the Constitution first of all made it clear that the secular polity of
Indian people has been largely shaped for a pluralistic nation-state
where diverse religions with competing claims of world views
flourish, and they are very much part of every day life.
This means firstly, the political philosophy of Indian secularism
does not opt for a theory of absolute separation between State and
religion, but commits for a model of secular State that expands the
space needed in the civil society for the growth of religious pluralism
on reasonable grounds.228 It treats religion as an important institution
of a free society for people to organize their way of life according
to their perspectives of God and the good. Hence, through various
provisions,229 the Constitution not only protects religious freedom
but also does not prohibit the State to grant indirect or direct aid to
religion if such aid is non-discriminatory.230
Secondly, the constitutional entitlement to minorities to establish
and administer educational institutions of their choice and State aid
for the same231 is the recognition of the fact of multifaceted
pluralism of the Indian people. Once again, the framers of the
223 Commissioner, Hindu religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.; Kidangazhi Manakkal
Narayanan Nambudiripad v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 385; Sri Jagannath
Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400.
224 Articles 27 and 290-A of the Constitution of India.
225 Clause (2) of article 30 of the Constitution of India.
226 Clause (3) of article 28 of the Constitution of India.
227  See above Chapter two, especially pp. 78-79.
228 This was singularly emphasized in a case that came before the High Court of
Madras when the court held valid clause (1) of section 76 of the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, (Madras Act 19 of 1951).
The impugned section of the Act authorised the State to collect 5 per cent of the
annual income of the Hindu temples covered under the Act to pay the salary to
the officers appointed under the Act. The court held constitutionally valid the
State’s power to collect a contribution from temple income. While discussing
various sections of the Act, the High Court of Madras noted that the Indian
Constitution did not have provision like the establishment clause in the American
Constitution. The court said: “It must be noted that while Arts.25 and 26
reproduce the law as enacted in the second clause of the First Amendment,
there is nothing in our Constitution which corresponds to the first clause
therein. The inference is obvious that the framers of our Constitution were not
willing to adopt in its entirety the theory that there should be a wall of separation
between Church and State which the first clause of the First Amendment was
interpreted to embody.” See Kindangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nanbudiripad
v. State of Madras, AIR 1954, Mad 385, at 390. Our emphasis is in italics.
229 Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
230 Articles 27 and 290-A, of the Constitution of India.
231 Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
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Constitution made it clear that the civil society is characterized
by diversity of community identities, such as the religious, cultural,
ethnic and linguistic diversity as well as the composite character of
Indian people by way of coexistence as a national community of
communities in one nation-state under a secular polity.232
Thirdly, the affirmation of the religious, cultural, ethnic and
linguistic identity of the communities by way of constitutional
safeguards is the confirmation of the value of dignity in diversity
accorded to each community as a human community in their specific
community identities in a plural society. This is a veritable
substantiation of the fact that the value of human dignity is central
to the political philosophy of Indian secularism.
1.3.5. The Welfare State and Religion
A welfare State means a State that expands its activities to render
maximum welfare to its citizens so as to provide a wide range of
social services and social security, especially keeping in view the
benefit of the weak and underprivileged members of the society. It
is committed to promote social and economic justice among its
citizens without sacrificing their essential liberty. The welfare State
aims to establish a humane and progressive society. It is opposed
to the extremes of the totalitarian Communist State on the one
hand and the unbridled individualism of the Laissez Faire State on
the other.233 Commenting on the institutional nature of the welfare
state Girvetz writes:
The welfare state is the institutional outcome of the
assumption by a society of legal and therefore formal and
explicit responsibility for the basic well-being of its members.
Such a society or its decision-making groups become
convinced that the welfare of the individual…is too important
to be left to custom or informal arrangements and private
understandings and is therefore a concern of government.234
In a welfare State, the political community as a whole recognises
a sense of collective responsibility towards the weaker or the less
fortunate members of that community. The State, therefore, takes
definite action to assist them and gives legal safeguards against
social evils violating human dignity because its fundamental value
is respect for the dignity of the individual person. Some of the
constitutive principles of the welfare State are equality, liberty,
fraternity, social justice, social security, social service, and
humanitarianism and world peace. Most of these are coming from
the fruits of the French Revolution and from Fabian socialist thinkers
of the late nineteenth century.235
The idea of welfare State originated in the Western countries
in two separate historical situations and developed through two
different kinds of State action. The first was the State action
undertaken in the nineteenth century in the form of social service
to alleviate the problems created by industrial revolution affecting
public health, factory regulation, education, basic amenities of life
and the like. The second was the State policies carried out in the
Western countries in the twentieth century to prevent gross poverty
and destitution both at home and abroad, a devastating process
accelerated by the political and economic fall out of the Second
World War. Hence, the European democratic States resorted to
State planning and other socialistic measures to achieve speedy
reconstruction and rehabilitation of their shattered economy and to
build a new social order in which every citizen was entitled to a
“national minimum” within the framework of a democratic political
order.236
India is committed to the ideals of the welfare State. This is
evident from the Preamble of the Constitution. After referring to
India as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, the
232 Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp. 84-85.
233 Bishwanath Singh and Veena Singh, “Some Problems and Prospects of a Welfare
State”, in Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, vol. XI, No.4
(October-December 1977), p. 101.
234 Harry K. Girvetz, “Welfare State” in David L. Sills, ed., International
Encyclopaedia of the Social Science (London, Longmans, 1956), p. 164.
235 Bishwanath Singh and Veena Singh, op.cit., pp. 102-106.
236 Ibid., p. 103.
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Preamble declares the Constitution’s resolve to secure certain
basic objectives to all its citizens. Among them, pride of place is
given to providing social, economic and political justice for all.237
This object in view, the framers of the Constitution have
incorporated a number of provisions to protect social and economic
welfare under Directive Principles of State Policy in Part VI of the
Constitution.
The core of the Directive Principles lies in article 38 of the
Constitution, which echoing the Preamble reads:
The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people
by securing and promoting as efficiently as it may a social
order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall
inform all the institutions of the national life. The State shall,
in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income,
and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities
and opportunities, not only amongst the individuals but also
amongst groups of people residing in different areas or
engaged in different vocations.
Hence, the Preamble of the Indian Constitution envisages that
the positive and constructive content of political freedom must be
the creation of an egalitarian society protected under the
Fundamental Rights as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution,
which is to be informed by the principles of a welfare state as spelt
out in Part IV of the Constitution in a manner that defends human
dignity.
The Indian judiciary has further corroborated the importance
of welfare state as enshrined in the Constitution. Commenting on
the purpose of the Directive Principles in relation to the Fundamental
Rights as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, Mr. Justice
Hegde of the Supreme Court said that these directives were to fix
certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by
means of non-violent social revolution so as to change the structure
of the Indian society into a more humane and progressive one.238
The former Chief Justice Dr. P.B. Gajendragadkar stated, “It
is often said that a Preamble to a Constitutional document affords
a key to its spirit and its meaning…the basic philosophy of the
Constitution of India is to be found in essence, in the Preamble
itself…India is committed to the ideals of the Welfare State and
must establish socio-economic justice.”239 Another former Chief
Justice Mr. Subba Rao also underscored that commitment to the
principles of Welfare State was an essential feature of the Preamble
of the Constitution of India, which embodied “all the ideals and
aspirations for which the country had struggled during the British
regime”.240 Similarly, in Keshavanand Bharati case241 while debating
on the basic structure of the Indian Constitution, Mr. Jusice Shelat
and Mr. Justice Grover added the mandate to build a welfare state
as contained in Part IV of the Constitution to its basic
structure. 242
1.3.5.1. Religious Freedom Subject to Social Welfare and
              Reform
One of the areas where the operation of the welfare State comes
into conflict with religion is in the matters associated with social
reform. The ambit of religious jurisdiction in some communities in
India is so vast that it covers every aspect of a person’s life from
birth to death. Religious usage pervades and governs all domestic,
social and property relations contravening social welfare and reform
237 “WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India
into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRAIC REPUBLIC and
to secure to all its citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and opportunity; and to promote among them all
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of
the Nation…” The preamble to the Constitution of India as amended by
Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s.2.  For explanation see
especially P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., pp.13-21.
238 K.S. Hegde, “Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India”,
in Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, vol.5, No.1 (January-
March 1971), pp. 131-134.
239 P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., pp.12-14.
240 See I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
241 Keshavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, Air 1973 SC 1461
242 Ibid., at 624.
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of the State. The framers of the Constitution were aware that these
problems were linked with the religious practices in India.243 Hence,
they have spelt out saving provisions for State intervention in the
matters of social welfare and reform244 to strengthen the values of
human dignity. In this section we study only those reforms associated
with religion and egalitarian society.
In the Sri Lakshmindra case245 the petitioner questioned the
State’s right to interfere with religious freedom in the name of
promoting social welfare and reform. Mr. Justice Mukerjea of the
Supreme Court observed that the State could legislate under sub-
clause (b) of clause (2) of article 25 for the purpose of social welfare
and reform, even though such statutes might interfere with religious
practices. In such instances, opined the learned judge, the Courts
in India have to balance the essential and obligatory features of a
religious practice on the one hand and the social welfare and reform
to be achieved by the State on the other hand. As a matter of fact,
the judiciary in India does not sit in judgment over the laws enacted
by the legislature for the promotion of social welfare and reform.
The legislature’s right to enact statutes for the purpose of social
welfare and reform has been further reiterated in the Narasu Appa
case246 when the Bombay High Court had to deal with the
appellant’s objection against a statute of the State prohibiting the
custom of bigamy.247 Mr. Chagla, Chief Justice of Bombay High
Court, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said:
A question has been raised as to whether it is for the
legislature to decide what constitutes social reform…They
are responsible for the welfare of the State and it is for them
to lay down the policy that the State should pursue.
Therefore, it is for them to determine what legislation to put
upon the statute book in order to advance the welfare of the
State. If the Legislature in its wisdom has come to the
conclusion that monogamy tends to the welfare of the State,
then it is not for the Courts of law to sit in judgment upon
that decision.248
The Allahabad High Court took a similar position in Ram Prasad
Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh.249 In 1955 the Government of Uttar
Pradesh issued an order prohibiting government servants of that
particular State contracting bigamous marriages. The plaintiff who
was employed in the Public Works Department wanted to have a
second marriage as he had no son surviving from the first wife. He
claimed that his religious obligation required him to marry again with
the hope of raising a son. The plaintiff pleaded that the government
service rule was in conflict with his religious belief and practice.
The Allahabad High Court held the State order valid since it
was part of social reform under article 25 (2) (b). Mr. Justice
Mehrotra who spoke for the Court indicated that in a democratic
State the legislature represented the will of the people. As the law
making authority, if the legislature regarded that certain measure
as a measure of social reform, the Court should not say that it
should not be regarded as a measure of social reform.250 In giving
the judgment of the Court, he said:
243 It should be noted that in India, the state’s right to legislate in matters of
religious and social customs was first asserted only during the British rule and
that also with the insistence of the Reformers of the Indian Renaissance who
initiated socio-religious reform and sought for legal protection from the state. It
is because both the Hindu and Muslim rulers lacked legislative power. In matters
of law, their only function was to uphold and execute the traditional laws of the
various sections of the people.  For detail see R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit.,
vol. 10, pp. 89-159, 256-294;  K.M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads ,
op.cit.,   p. 41.
244 “(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or
prevent the State from making any law –
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.”
Article 25 (2) (b), Constitution of India.
245 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
246 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84.
247 Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriage Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 25
of 1946) (as amended by Bombay Act 38 of 1948).
248 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84, at 86-87.
249 AIR 1957 All 411.
250 Ibid., at 414.
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The Act of performing a second marriage in the presence
of the first wife cannot be regarded as an integral part of
Hindu religion, which is protected under Art.25 of the
Constitution. Even if bigamy be regarded as an integral part
of Hindu religion the impugned rule is protected under Art.25
(2) (b) of the Constitution.251
In another case of historic importance252 the Supreme Court
reiterated that the religious practices are subject to social welfare
and reform measure initiated by the State. Following is the history
of the case. As a social welfare and reform measure, the Tamil
Nadu Government ruled out the appointment of priests by hereditary
succession in a Hindu temple.253 The petitioners contented that
hereditary priesthood was an integral part of the Saivite and
Vaishnavite temple practices in Tamil Nadu. The Supreme Court
rejected the petitioners’ claim and held that since the appointment
of the priest was a secular act, which was different from the priestly
function performed in the temple, the State was entitled under article
25 (2) (b) to regulate these appointments for purposes of social
welfare and reform.
1.3.5.2. Abolition of Untouchability
The practice of untouchability based on the caste system has been
a blot on the Indian society. Here we are concerned with the practice
of untouchability whereby a certain section of the Indian community
on account of their birth or profession were shunned and excluded
in the past from religious practices in the Hindu temples. Various
theories and opinions have been proposed on the origin of the caste
system and untouchability.254 Some regard it as part of Hindu religion
and others treat it as merely a social structure, which happened to
develop in India.
In one of the early studies, Hutton wrote, “The social habits of
caste are inextricably tied up with religions”.255 Similarly, Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar, the leader of the depressed classes256 declared, “To
ask people to give up caste is to ask them to go contrary to their
fundamental religious notions”.257 On the contrary, K. M. Panikkar
asserted that the social institutions of the Hindus “are unconnected
with their religion and based wholly on law and custom and are
therefore secular”.258 In his sociological analysis of the Hindu
society, Dr. M.N. Srinivas, one of the renowned sociologists of
India, indicated that in the traditional Hindu society religion and
caste were bound together by the strongest ties of mythology,
metaphysics, ethics and ritual. In terms of popular religion, Dr. M.N.
Srinivas concluded, “If and when caste disappears, Hinduism will
also disappear”.259
Among the multitudinous caste divisions of Hindu society, it
was the people who belonged to the untouchable castes who
suffered maximum disabilities and received from their fellow
religionists the most uncivilized treatment for ages. In most of the
Hindu kingdoms, especially in South India, for centuries people of
the untouchable castes were treated as slaves and their women
251 Ibid., at 414.
252 His Holiness Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. The State
of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586.
253 Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act (Act 22 of 1959
as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1971).
254 Numerous books have been written on the caste system and the practice of
untouchability in India. For extensive study see M.A. Sherring, Hindu Tribes
and Castes, (Calcutta, 1881) 3 vols; L.S.S. O’Malley, Indian Caste Customs
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1932); B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation
of Caste (Bombay, Bharat Bushan Publishing House, 1937); J.H. Hutton, Caste
in India: Its Nature, Function and Origin (Bombay, Oxford University press,
1951); Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and
Buddhism (Illinois, Glencoe, Free press, 1958); G.S. Ghurye, Caste and Class
in India ( Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1971).
255 J.H. Hutton, op.cit., p. 23.
256 The ‘depressed classes’ is another term for the untouchable castes. In the
Government of India Act of 1935 and in the Constitution of India as promulgated
in 1950 the term ‘Scheduled Castes’ is used to denote in general term the same
groups of people. Gandhiji called them ‘Harijans’ which means the children of
God and thereafter this term is also used in official documents and also in
common usage. Of late, the people of the depressed classes call themselves
Dalits. See, Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 303;
257 B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, op.cit., p. 39.
258 K.M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, op.cit., p. 3.
259 M.N. Srinivas, “A Note on Sanskritization and Westernisation”, in Far Eastern
Quarterly, vol. 15 (1956), p. 495.
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were not allowed to wear clothing above the waist.260 During
the British rule, one of the measures adopted by the government to
establish legal equality was the government policy to admit the
children of the untouchable castes in all government schools and in
all State aided schools. By 1878, this policy was enhanced by giving
special fee concessions to these children.261
The significant contribution of the British regime in this regard
was that the State under British rule reduced the power of the
caste-based village political institution known as the panchayat
and expanded the secular jurisdiction of the State. The British
administration inculcated the secular principle that it was within
the purview of the State to regulate and change society by legislation
and, therefore, marginalized the traditional caste regime, which held
its power by the authority of the sacred texts and immemorial
customs.262
The Indian Secular State disregards caste in the same way as
it disregards religion in defining an individual’s rights and duties in
terms of citizenship. An egalitarian society of individuals has become
the legal basis of the social order as against a hierarchy of persons
of lower and higher before the law. Equality before the law and
equal protection of the law has been the positive expression of this
principle as given in article 14 of the Constitution, which reads,
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.
In fact, prior to the creation of the Constitution, determined
efforts were made by Indian reformers in many parts of the country
to abolish untouchability. These efforts had enabled many States
during the British Raj to enact legislations proscribing the practice
of untouchability in any form.263 These efforts received
constitutional expression in article 17 of the Constitution, which
abolished untouchability and made its practice in any form a
punishable offence. Article 17 states, “Untouchability’ is abolished
and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any
disability arising out of “Untouchability” shall be an offence
punishable in accordance with law.”
In pursuance of article 17, the Parliament enacted in 1955 the
untouchability (offences) Act264 prescribing punishments for the
practice of untouchability. This Act applies not only to Hindus but
also to all who take part in the excommunication of, or imposition
of any social disability on, any person who refuses to practice
untouchability.265 In regard to the practice of religion and
untouchability, the Act makes it an offence to prevent any person
from entering places of public worship due to the practice of
untouchability. The Act says:
(i) Whoever on the ground of untouchability prevents any
person: from entering any place of worship which is open to
other persons professing the same religion or belonging to
the same religious denomination or any section thereof, as
such person; or
(ii) from worshiping or offering prayers or performing any
religious service in any place of public worship, in the same
manner and to the same extent as is permissible to other
persons professing the same religion or belonging to the same
religious denomination or any section thereof, as such
persons; shall be punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to six months, or with a fine which may extend to
five hundred rupees or with both.266
260 J.H. Hutton, op.cit., pp. 94-148.
261 G.S. Ghurye, op.cit., pp. 189-190
262 Donald E. Smith, op.cit., p. 304.
263 Some of these enactments are: The Madras Removal of Civil Disabilities Act,
1938 (Madras Act 21 of 1938); The Travancore-Cochin Removal of Social
Disabilities Act, 125  (Travancore-Cochin Act 8 of 1125); The Mysore Removal
of Civil Disabilities Act, 1943 (Mysore Act 42 of 1943); The Bombay Harijan
(Removal of Social Disabilities) Act, 1946 (Bombay Act 10 of 1946); The
Orissa Removal of Civil Disabilities Act, 1946 (Orissa Act 11 of 1946); The
Central Provinces and Bihar Scheduled Castes ( Removal of Civil Disabilities)
Act, 1947 ( CP & B Act 24 of 1947); etc.
264 Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 (Act 22 of 1955).
265 Section 7, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955.
266 Section 3, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955.
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In a case267 brought before the Allahabad High Court, the Court
upheld the conviction of two dhobis (washer men) under the United
Provinces Act,268 who refused to wash the clothes of Chamars, an
untouchable caste, in that Province. Similarly, a barber who refused
to cut the hair of individuals belonging to the caste of cobblers and
leather workers was convicted under the West Bengal Hindu Social
Disabilities Removal Act.269 The petitioner in the instant case270
registered his contention before the Calcutta High Court claiming
that the impugned Act contravened his constitutional right to carry
out his profession as barber. The Court rejected his claim and held
that regulations imposed by the Act were reasonable ones, which
were meant to remove social evil, and, therefore, in no way deprived
the petitioner of his constitutional rights.
In the famous Vishwanath temple case of Banaras271 the
petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh
Removal of Social Disabilities Act.272 The Act provided that a
person could not prevent another from having access to any public
temple or enjoying the advantages, facilities and privileges of any
such temple to other Hindus. Traditionally the Vishwanath temple
of Banaras was open to high caste Hindus only. The low-caste
Hindus, the so-called Harijans, were not allowed to enter the main
portion of the temple for darshan (worship) of the presiding deity.
When the Harijans demanded entry on the basis of the enabling
Act, the temple authorities objected on the ground that the Act
was unconstitutional. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court rejected the petitioners’ objection and held the impugned
Act valid on the basis of social welfare and reform initiated by the
State of Uttar Pradesh.
In 1966 another important case of a similar kind273 was appealed
before the Supreme Court. In this case the appellants challenged
the Bombay Act,274 which permitted to open Hindu places of
worship to all sections and classes of Hindus. The appellants, who
belonged to a certain Swaminarayan sect, known as the Satsangi
sect, registered their contention that theirs was a sect, which was
entirely separate and distinct from rest of the Hindu community.
Therefore, the appellants claimed that the untouchables and even
other non-satsangis could not claim entry to their temples.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the contention of the
petitioners on the ground that the Satsangis formed part of Hindu
religion and, therefore, they could not exclude entry to low caste
Hindus even if they were non-Satsangis. Dr. Gajendragadkar, Chief
Justice, who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
instant case, asserted that the main objective of the temple entry
act was “to establish complete social equality between all sections
of Hindus in the matter of worship”.275
While giving the decision of the Supreme Court, first of all the
Chief Justice traced the long history and nature of Hinduism. He
relied on the authoritative scholarly interpretation of Hinduism
written by such scholars as Monier Williams, Dr. Radhakrishnan,
Max Muller and Bal Gangadhar Tilak,276 and then indicated the
evolution of the Satsangi sect and its religious ideal as having based
on the philosophy of Visishtadvaitavada of Ramanuja Chari.
Consequently, the honourable Chief Justice declared though the
Satsangis could be considered as reformers, yet they were not out
of the Hindu fold. Summing up the observations of the Court he
then asserted:
In conclusion, we would like to emphasise that the right to
267 State of U.P. v. Banwari, AIR 1951 All. 615. Quoted in Donald E. Smith,
op.cit., p. 307
268 U.P. Removal of Social Disabilities Act, 1947 (U.P. Act 14 of 1947).
269 The West Bengal Hindu Social Disabilities Removal Act, 1948 (West Bengal
Act 37 of 1948).
270 Banamali Das v. Pakhu Bhandari, AIR 1951 Cal. 167. Quoted in V.D. Mahajan,
The Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., p. 126.
271 Swami Hariharanand Saraswati v. The Jailor in Charge, District Jail, Banaras,
AIR 1954 All. 601.
272 U.P. Act 14 of 1947.
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273 Shastri Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhunardas Vaishya, AIR 1966 SC 1119.
274 The Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act,
1956 (Bombay Act 31 of 1956).
275 Shastri Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhunardas Vaishya, AIR 1966 SC 1119, at
1127.
276 Ibid., at 1128-1129, 1130-1134.
enter temples which has been vouchsafed to the Harijans
by the impugned Act in substance symbolises the right of
Harijans to enjoy all social amenities and rights for, let it
always be remembered that social justice is the main
foundation of the democratic way of life enshrined in the
provisions of the Indian Constitution.277
In summing up these observations, we stress that the caste
based hierarchical social order of the Hindu society has been a
stumbling block for the creation of an egalitarian social order because
the caste system divides the human community into high and low
before the law. Implicit in this system is the concept of hierarchical
anthropology according to which human persons in their essential
nature are not equal by birth. The caste-based anthropology denies
the dignity of human persons as moral subjects and remains opposed
to an egalitarian social order, which is a pre-requisite to establish
secular State. Therefore, religion must give way to these legal
measures amounting to social welfare and reform.
1.3.5.3.  Egalitarian Society in Defence of Human Dignity
Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India deal with the
right to equality. Article 17 is the special provision that abolishes
‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form. Right to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law to all citizens
irrespective of religion, race, sex and place of birth is one of the
basic values of a secular democratic State.278 Article 14 of the
Constitution provides both aspects of equality to all persons,
including aliens who reside within the territory of India.279
There are at the same time some provisions of the Constitution
that recognise exception to the general rule of equality on various
reasonable grounds. These are given in clauses (3) and (4) of article
15 and in clauses (4) and (5) of article 16. Exceptions to the general
rule of equality granted under clause (4) of article 15 and clause
(4) of article 16 would be of interest for our consideration.
Article 15 reads:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability,
liability, restriction or condition with regard to –
(a) access to shop, public restaurants, hotels and places of
public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places
of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds
or dedicated to the use of general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for women and children.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall
prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.
Article 16 reads:
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in
matters relating to employment or appointment to any office
under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from
making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes
of employment or appointment to an office (under the
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277 Ibid., at 1135.
278 Both aspects of the equality right are also found in the Charter of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations: “All are equal before the
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”
Article 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948).
279 V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., 86-87.
Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State
or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within
that State or Union territory) prior to such employment or
appointment.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for the reservation of appointments, or posts
in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any
law which provides that the incumbent of an office in
connexion with the affairs of any religious or denominational
institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall
be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a
particular denomination.
Article 15 of the Constitution provides for a particular application
of the general principle of equality embodied in Article 14. Clause
(1) of article 15 directs the State not to discriminate against any
citizen on the ground only of religion, race, caste sex or place of
birth or any of them. The prohibition contained in this clause applies
to the State in dealing with citizens.280 Clause (2) of the article 15
prohibits the private individual as well as the State from inflicting
any discrimination or disability with regard to citizen’s access to
shops, hotels etc., and all places of public entertainment and
resort.281 The social and religious impact of this clause is to be
seen in the context of the dreadful history of the so-called
‘untouchable people’ who, for centuries in the past, were subject
to social segregation and humiliation in many parts of the country.282
Similarly, clauses (1) and (2) of article 16 embody the principle of
equality laid down in article 14 with reference to appointment and
employment under the State.
Let us now analyse and see the rationale behind the exception
clauses to the general doctrine of equality, which are known as
provisions of “protective discrimination”283 or “compensatory
discrimination.”284 Clause (3) of article 15 makes exception in
favour of women and children and clause (4) of the same article
provides exception in favour of some backward classes of citizens
and for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for their
advancement in the field of education. Similarly, clause (4) of article
16 gives exception in favour of any backward class of citizens in
the area of appointment for jobs under the State, if they are not
adequately represented in such services.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that women and
children needed a humane social order conducive to their growth
and empowerment affirmative of their dignity and, therefore, the
State is free to enact provisions to that effect. The constitution-
makers thought out also the socially and educationally backward
communities as a ‘class of people’285 who deserved, on reasonable
grounds, certain concessions or differential treatment - also known
as affirmative action - to catch up with the progress of the society
so that these communities would be eventually enabled to join the
national mainstream with dignity and self-respect.286
These exception clauses for differential treatment provided in
the Constitution add a new dimension to what the right to equality
means in a secular democratic State, which is committed to the
principles of egalitarian social order and social justice in order to
further the cause of human dignity for all citizens. It means equal
treatment of equals in equal circumstances. However, this does
280 Ibid., pp.109-110.
281 P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., p.25.
282 J.H. Hutton, op.cit., pp. 94-148; Harold G. Coward, “India’s Constitution and
Traditional Presuppositions Regarding Human Nature” in Religion and Law in
Independent India, ed., Robert D. Baird ( New Delhi, Manohar Publications,
1993), pp. 35-37.
283 C.H. Alexanderowicz, “The Secular State in India and the United States”, in
Journal of Indian Law Institute, vol.2 (1960), p. 289.
284 Gregory H. Stanton, “Three Concepts of Equality: Compensatory
Discrimination in India and America”, in Indian Journal of Public Administration,
vol. XXVII (January-March, 1981), pp. 1-28.
285 For various kinds of classification permitted under the provisions of the
Constitution of India for protective discrimination see V.D. Mahajan,
Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp. 87-90.
286 Ibid., pp. 112-126; P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., pp.
25-26.
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not prohibit the State to make exceptions on reasonable grounds,
if the exception sought by the State should be consistent with the
advancement of the weaker sections of people in the society so
that they may engage themselves with the rest of the society in
self-respect and dignity.287 This principle was the defining to add
clause (4) to article 15 by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951.288
The reason to amend article 15 of the Constitution arose as a
result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the historic
Champakam Dorairajan case.289 The facts of the case were as
follows: The Government of Madras had issued an order known as
the Communal Government Order (Communal G.O.), which, inter
alia, classified students on the basis of caste and community; and
accordingly allotted a proportionate number of seats to each
community in the State-run medical and engineering colleges. In
1951 Srimathi Champakan Dorairajan, who sought admission in a
medical college in the State of Madras, complained that she was
denied admission on the ground that she was a Brahmin because
more meritorious Brahmin candidates already filled the seats meant
for that community. Therefore, she registered her case290 before
the Madras High Court challenging the constitutionality of the
communal G.O as ultra vires of the Constitution.
The advocate General of the State of Madras justified the
Communal G.O, because he pointed out that its objective was to
afford facilities to backward classes to get into higher education
for their advancement in the society. The Madras High Court,
however, declared the communal G.O void as it contravened clause
(1) of article 15 of the Constitution that prohibits discrimination on
the grounds only of religion and caste. The Madras High Court
observed that in the present case, the classification was solely based
on the petitioner’s caste and religion and, therefore, the Court
concluded that the “Communal G.O … flies in the face of article
15 (1) of the Constitution”.291
On appeal, the Supreme Court favoured the decision of the
Madras High Court.292 The Supreme Court, however, examined
the case under clause (2) of Article 29,293 since the impugned G.O.
came under the admission policy of the Government of Madras in
educational institutions run by the State. The Supreme Court then
observed:
The right to get admission into any educational institution of
the kind mentioned in clause (2)…is not to be denied to the
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them. If a citizen… has the academic qualifications
but is refused admission only on grounds of religion, race,
caste, language or any of them, then there is a clear breach
of his fundamental right.294
Under these judicial observations within the purview of article
29 (2), the Supreme Court declared that the Communal G.O was
void because its implementation amounted to discrimination only
on grounds of religion and caste.295
As a sequel to this decision296 of the Supreme Court, clause (4)
was added to article 15 to empower the State to enact special
provision for the advancement of the socially and educationally
backward classes of the citizens as directed by article 46 of the
287 Commenting on the principle of equality before the law in a free society, the
International Commission of Jurists stated, “The law passed by the legislature
must not discriminate between human beings except insofar as such
discrimination can be justified on a rational classification consistent with the
progressive enhancement of human dignity within a particular society.”
International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a free Society (Report
on the International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, 5-10 January 1959), p.
212. Crf. P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., p. 26.
288 V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., p.523.
289 The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) SCJ 313.
290 Champakam Dorairajan, Smt v. The State of Madras, ILR (1951) Mad. 149.
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292 The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) SCJ 313.
293 “No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained
by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, language or any of them.” Clause (2) of article 29, Constitution of India.
294 The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) SCJ 313, at 315,316.
295 Ibid., at 317.
296 The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) SCJ 313.
Constitution.297 It is to be noticed, at this point of our
investigation, that the backwardness of some sections of people is
closely connected with caste and religion to which they belonged.
In instances of this sort, religious freedom must give way to the
operation of the enabling provisions for affirmative action, which is
appropriate to the objectives of the welfare State as intended by
the framers of the Constitution.298
Hence, clause (4) of article 15 is an enabling provision to carry
forward the objectives of the welfare State in defence of human
dignity of the weaker sections of citizens in the society. It does not
impose any obligation but only empowers State Governments to
take appropriate measures necessary when situations arise to
further the cause of social welfare consistent with the progressive
enhancement of human dignity in a particular socio-historical context.
The affirmative actions permitted by the State in India under article
15 (4) are available to those citizens who come under the
classification of backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes.299
Similar objectives of the welfare State in view, some special
provisions benefiting certain sections of citizens have been provided
in Articles 330 to 334 in Part XVI of the Constitution. Article 330
provides for the reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the Parliament, whereas article 332 gives
reservation facilities in the Legislative Assemblies. Articles 331
and 333 provide for representation of the Anglo-Indian community
in the Parliament and Legislative Assemblies by nomination. Article
334 recommends certain time frame for the termination of these
special considerations. These provisions do not amount to
fundamental rights. However, like the constitutional intension implied
in article 15(4),300 they are meant to facilitate certain weaker
sections of society to regain their rightful place in the plural society,
which is consistent with the progress of the nation and civilized
thoughtfulness in solidarity with those sections of citizens who
haven’t caught up with the national mainstream.
The foregoing study enables us to see the meaning of the right
to equality as provided in article 14 of the Constitution. It means
equal treatment of equals in equal circumstances. It does, however,
permit the State in India, under its constitutional provisions, to provide
differential treatment to citizens from marginal sections of the
society with the objective of improving their social, economic and
educational position befitting to a standard of life worthy of human
dignity.301 The implied principle is that a society is egalitarian when
all are treated with respect in their dignity as human persons. This
egalitarian principle of the Indian Constitution, when seen in the
context of the welfare State, demands the protection of human
dignity by promoting the development of all sections of the people.
Religion must cooperate in the functioning of the Constitution to
achieve its humane objectives.
The Preamble of the Constitution of India and the various
provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution explicitly enunciate
that the positive content of the political freedom consists in
establishing an egalitarian social order based on the principles of
300 Clause (4) of article 15 of the Constitution of India reads: “Nothing in this
article or in Cl. (2) of Art.29 shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.” This
clause had been added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
Sec.2.
301 V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp. 114-116.
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297 “The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people and, in particular, of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice
and all forms of exploitation.” Article 46, Constitution of India.
298 The Supreme Court had the most thorough and thoughtful discussion on the
meaning of equality guaranteed in the Constitution of India when it dealt with
the concept of ‘classification’ for reservation of jobs in State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490. In this case, while speaking on classification for
reservation, Mr. Justice Mathew distinguished what he called ‘formal’ equality
from ‘proportionate’ equality. Formal equality, which means absolutely identical
treatment for all persons, would result in equality in law but inequality in fact.
Equality in fact, he pointed out, “may involve the necessity of differential
treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between
different situations.” Ibid., at 513.
299 For explanatory note see V.D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., p.
113.
the welfare State and Democracy. The purpose of the
constitutional vision is to create a mighty solidarity302 of all citizens
of India and to safeguard the dignity of the individual as well as to
protect the unity and integrity of the nation.303 In pursuance of
these ideals, the State in India has been empowered to enact legal
measures for social welfare and reform. Religious beliefs and
practices that contravene these legislations, which are intended to
promote all round welfare of the people consistent with the
progressive enhancement of human dignity, must be redefined and
updated in order to create space for these State measures.
For centuries in the past, the Indian society had been a divided
society before the law as it was structured on a caste based
hierarchical social order according to which human persons in their
essential nature are not equal by birth. In this particular social and
religious milieu, which seems to be unique to Indian society, article
17 together with article 15 (2) (4) and article 25 (2) (b)304 have the
revolutionary potential to carry forward social reform and to
transform the caste ridden Indian society into an egalitarian social
order, wherein the inalienable worth and dignity of each individual
person as a moral subject is affirmed and protected by the secular
law of the Constitution.
1.3.6. Conclusion: A Humanistic Secularism
The preceding study of the secular provisions of the Constitution
of India indicates that the framers of the Constitution envisaged a
particular form of secularism that is appropriate to Indian ethos as
well as responding to the political need of the country.  As a political
ideology for the governance of the State, the Indian form of
secularism stands for the separation of the State from religion, equal
protection of all religions – popularly known as respect for all
religions (Sarva-dharma-sambhava)305– and active opposition to
communalism. This particular form of secularism embedded in the
secular provisions of the Constitution is not hostile to religion. It
also does not marginalize religion from public sphere but the State
keeps a principled distance from all religions.306
The Constitution, moreover, approves intervention of the State
to care for the welfare of religious institutions.307 By virtue of articles
27 and 290 - A, it would not be constitutionally invalid for the State
to extend direct financial assistance even for purely religious
purposes, if such assistance is non-sectarian. It also means the
autonomy of the State and religion in their proper sphere of function
in the society.308 The State and religion are seen not opposed to
each other but in an ambience of harmony and cooperation, because
religion is protected, from the humanistic point of view, as an
institution to care for an important human need in view of integrated
development of the people under the auspices of liberal democratic
political system.309
302 The preamble of the Constitution refers to it as to promote among all citizens
“Fraternity.”
303 See ibid.
304 Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability. Clause (2) of article 15
prohibits discrimination against any citizen in any public place on the grounds
of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Clause (4) of the same article
empowers the State for affirmative action for the advancement of socially and
educationally backward classes of the citizens or for the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe. Sub-clause (b) of clause 2 of article 25 empowers the state to
make any law providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of
Hindus. Under this provision, the State can eradicate social practices and dogmas,
which stand in the way of the progress of the country.
305 Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp. 115-118; Sarla Jhingran,  op.cit.,  pp. 142-
143.
306 Rajeev Bhargava, op.cit., pp. 511-522.
307 Some of the State Government and Central Government enactments for state
intervention are the following: The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19 of 1951); The Bihar Hindu Religious
Trust Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951); The Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950
(Bombay Act 29 of 1950); The Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923 (Act 42 of 1923);
The Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920 (Act 14 of 1920); etc.
308 This has been especially stressed when the Supreme Court of India was
appealed to define “matters of religion.” See Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt,
AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR
1954 SC 388, at 391-392.
309 See debate in the Constituent Assembly, CAD, vol. VII, pp. 818-882;
Keshavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 292-294, 297,
299, 302, 624, 682.
HUMAN DIGNITY CENTRAL TO INDIAN SECULARISM 231 232 HUMAN DIGNITY…
Under the Indian form of secularism, the State is, nevertheless,
empowered to intervene with secular practices associated with
religion for the purpose of social and religious reform. Likewise,
the State in India has wide powers to regulate religious freedom to
maintain the public order, morality and health. These measures may
contravene the free exercise of religion. On several occasions, the
Supreme Court has justified these legislative measures of the State.310
The free exercise of religion is also subject to the other provisions of
the fundamental rights as spelt out in Part III of the Constitution
whose objectives are to protect human dignity from violation.311
These outstanding features of the secular provisions of the
Indian Constitution lead us to classify the Indian form of secularism
as humanistic secularism. We qualify it as humanistic, because the
constitutional approach towards the separation between religion
and State and their co-operation as well as State’s intervention in
the matters associated with the free exercise of religion are
governed predominantly by some substantive moral and social
values intrinsic to human nature, which protect human dignity.312
From the anthropological point of view, implicit in this humanistic
character of the Indian form of secularism is a belief in the
inalienable worth and dignity of the human person as a moral subject
in one’s self-identity and the community of persons in their distinct
community identities in the pluralistic society. In other words, the
constitutional approach to individuals is seen in terms of dignity and
social nature of the person. Human dignity is inclusive of the social
nature of the person. This humanistic value significance of the Indian
form of secularism is known from the constitutional objectives of
making India a secular State.
The first of its objectives is to provide a secular political order
that protects religious liberty worthy of human dignity which is also
expected to promote a sense of human solidarity among all citizens
in the religiously plural society as well as to protect the unity of the
nation.313 On account of this constitutional objective, the Constitution
grants separate rights to minority communities, whether based on
religion, culture or language,314 to enable them to live with dignity
in their plural community identities. It is because the philosophy of
the humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution believes, that
pluralism adds richness to political community as against ethnic or
religious regimentation in terms of homogenisation, which leads to
totalitarianism.
The second objective is to ensure security to people’s lives and
property against religious bigotry315 and to manage interreligious
conflicts, but subject to public order, morality and health and to the
other provisions of the fundamental rights, to allow religions to have
their proper space in the public sphere.316 The third objective is to
create a social order in a free society on the principles of justice
and egalitarian anthropology.317 In this regard, Constitution prohibits
discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex and place
310 See The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84; Ratilal
Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388; Mohammad Hanif
Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v.
State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255; His Holiness Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja
Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586;
Acharya Jagadiswaranda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta, (1984)
SCC 522.
311 In its solemn affirmation, the Preamble of the Constitution of India resolves
“to promote among them all [among all citizens of India] FRATERNITY assuring
the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation.” Preamble of the
Constitution of India. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, while
commenting on the purpose of the fundamental rights as guaranteed in Part III
of the Constitution, Justice P.N. Bhagawati of the Supreme Court of India said,
“These fundamental rights …are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual
and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality
to the fullest extent.” AIR 1978 SC 597, at 619.
312 Keshavanand Bharti v. State of kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 292-297.
313 See the Preamble of the Constitution of India; Keshavanand Bharti v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 682.
314 Articles 29 (1) conserves the linguistic and cultural pluralism. Article 30 (1)
provides right to all religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administrate
educational institutions of their choice.
315 Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961).
316 Articles 25 and 26, of the Constitution of India.
317 The Constitutional vision of a civil society on the principles of justice, equality,
liberty and fraternity is given in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The
civil liberties in general terms are given in article 19 of the Constitution.
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of birth;318 and outlaws the practice of untouchability in any
form.319 Every individual person will have, in that order, an equal
right to freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion. The
operations of these substantive values through constitutional
institutions guide the process of humanisation of the Indian society.
These are the benchmark of the philosophy of humanistic secularism
embedded in the Indian Constitution as they protect human dignity.
The fourth objective is to empower the State through the law
to enact legal measures for social and religious reform.320 Some of
these legislations may affect religious beliefs and practices in so
far as they are in contravention of the measures legislated by the
State, which are intended to promote all round human welfare,
consistent with the progressive enhancement of human dignity.321
In pursuance of this objective, the Central and State Governments
in India have carried out social and religious reforms by declaring
sati322 and untouchability crimes punishable in accordance with
law.323 The State and Central Governments in India have abolished
the practice of child marriage and the devadasi system; introduced
the temple-entry rights to Dalits, and declared by law polygamy
illegal.324 These reforms have been pursued on humanistic grounds
to create a social order founded on human dignity and to protect
from violation the ordinary life of the citizens so that people may
arrange their way of life in a manner worthy of human dignity in a
free society.
Hence, the State’s intervention or non-intervention in religious
matters is guided by non-sectarian principles. These constitutional
principles are in consonance with humanistic ethics, which is
intended to promote a life of equal dignity for all in such a way that
individuals and communities of people are enabled to relate
themselves in the civil society by way of peaceful coexistence.325
Therefore, the philosophy of humanistic secularism conditions the
principled distance that the State in India keeps from religion, so
that people, as individuals and communities in their specific personal
and community identities, may benefit the politically defined goods
in a manner worthy of human dignity.
318 Articles 15(1), (2); 16 (1), (2); 29 (2), of the Constitution of India. Articles 14
to 18 of the Constitution of India guarantee the right to equality in general.
Article 14 guarantees equality in general. Article 15 prohibits discrimination.
Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
Article 17 abolishes untouchability and article 18 abolishes titles other than the
military or academic distinctions.
319 Article 17, the Constitution of India.
320 Most of these reform measures had been initiated in India by the beginning of
the 19th century by Indian Reformers. See R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit.,
vol. 10, pp. 86-159, 256-310.
321 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; Sri Venkataramana
Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v.
State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
322 Sati was abolished by law throughout India by 1929. See The Regulation XII
of the Bengal Code passed on December 4, 1829. Crf. R.C. Majumdar, History,
op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 268-275.
323 Article 17 of the Indian Constitution abolishes untouchability and declares
that its practice in any form is an offence publishable in accordance with law.
324 The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84; Ram Prasad
Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 All 411.
325 Article 25 (1) and article 26 of the Constitution of India.
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PART TWO
The Christian Concept of Human Dignity :
A Significant Theological Resource
to Further the Cause of the
Humanistic Secular Ethos of India
2. Introduction
Part one dealt with the development of the concept of political
secularism in the Western and Indian traditions. In both traditions,
political secularism arose in a religiously plural society to protect
citizens from religious violence and conflicts. As a political ideology
in the governance of the State, secularism in the liberal democratic
tradition advocates the separation of the State from religion,
guarantees civil liberties and egalitarian political order.
Although the Indian polity is constitutionally structured on liberal
democratic principles, the particular form of secularism enshrined
in the Indian Constitution is something unique. We have described
it as humanistic secularism. Its concept of separation between
religion and the State is different from the conventional
understanding of a secular State. The State in India is endowed
with wide powers to intervene in religious matters on humanistic
grounds. It means, as we have discussed it in Part One, the State
intervention or non-intervention depends upon which one better
protects human dignity in the civil society.
Therefore, the principle of separation amounts to the State
keeping a “principled distance” from religion. The idea of “principled
distance” is conditioned by its philosophy of humanistic values.
These values protect and promote a life of equal dignity for all
citizens in the civil society in a manner that the people of diverse
community identities are enabled to relate themselves in the civil
society by way of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, the
constitutional approach to secular policies is centred on human
dignity.
In accordance with the research project, the aim of part two is
to inquire about the importance of human dignity in the Christian
theology and show its significance for dialogue and collaboration
with the civil society to advance the objectives of the philosophy of
humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution. This aim is pursued
in three ways in three proceeding chapters. Firstly, in chapter four,
we investigate the theological development of the idea of human
dignity in the history of Christian thought. We do it by researching
through the development of theological anthropology based on
imago Dei in the Bible, Patristic tradition and the Middle Ages.
We also look into the contemporary theological trends in their effort
to define and defend human dignity, human rights and to protect
the integrity of creation in the light of theological anthropology based
on the doctrine of imago Dei. Our inquiry is not exhaustive but
only exemplary to underscore the importance of human dignity in
the Christian tradition.
For our research in this chapter, we include the vast corpus of
the social encyclicals of the Popes. It is because in addressing
social issues, the Popes of the contemporary times relied on insights
drawn from the image theology of the human person to defend
human dignity, human rights and for the justification of the temporal
order for the common good. All these areas have become part of
our research for the sole purpose of highlighting the importance of
the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person in the Christian
thought in so far as every person is created in God’s image,
redeemed by Christ and called to live in communion with God and
in solidarity with one another in the civil society.
Secondly, in chapter five, we study the relevant documents of
the Second Vatican Council. It is due to the fact that, for the first
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time in the history of the Ecumenical Councils, the Second
Vatican Council in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, developed a theological
anthropology in a systematic way based on imago Dei but in the
horizon of Christology. This conciliar theological anthropology of
Vatican II is centred on human dignity. Its purpose is to dialogue
with the secular world in defence of human dignity and collaborate
with the civil society in building up a civilization centred on human
dignity. In the same chapter, we also study the conciliar document
Dignitatis Humanae in which the Church developed, for he first
time, its doctrines of religious freedom and constitutional State, all
based on human dignity and in defence of it. Its purpose is also to
dialogue with people of all persuasions in the civil society for the
cause of human dignity. The cumulative results of our investigation
lead us to identify the centrality of human dignity in the Christian
thought.
Thirdly, in chapter six, which is the concluding chapter of our
research project, we collate the findings of our research on the
centrality of human dignity as seen in the philosophy of Indian
secularism as well as in the Church’s teachings with a special
emphasis on the Church’s teaching regarding religious freedom
and the constitutional State as given in Dignitatis Humanae. We
highlight their salient features. We indicate a common
anthropological approach underlying in both systems of thought.
This we refer to as “relational anthropology” and interpret it
theologically. Consequently, we also point out the value commonality
found in both systems of thought. This leads us to conclude that,
following the conciliar path of dialogue with the civil society, human
dignity can be a significant concept for the Indian Church to engage
in dialogue and collaboration with the civil society to further the
constitutional objectives of the humanistic ethics for the humanization
of the civil society in defence of human dignity.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Image of God Doctrine and Human
Dignity in the Scripture and Tradition
2.4. Introduction
The concept of human dignity received an explicit affirmation
as a theological category in the Catholic social teaching tradition.
The term ‘Catholic social teaching’ refers to the hierarchical
documents of the Catholic Church dealing with matters of social,
economic and political importance from the point of view of Catholic
faith and morality, which began with the Leonine encyclical Rerum
Novarum published in 1891.1 In his Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II2 defined the Catholic social teaching
tradition as a “doctrinal corpus” updated by the Magisterium of the
Roman Pontiff, beginning with the encyclical Rerum Novarum.3
1 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891) in Claudia Carlen,
The Papal Encyclicals: 1875-1903 (U.S.A., Consortium Books, McGrath
Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 241-262.
2 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 30 December 1987 (Vatican
Polyglot Press).
3 Ibid., n. 1. Pope John Paul II gave an explicit definition to the social teaching of
the Church and said, “The Church’s social doctrine is not a “third way” between
liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism, nor even a possible alternative to
other solutions less radically opposed to one another: rather, it constitutes a
category of its own. Nor is it an ideology, but rather the accurate formulation of
the results of a careful reflection on the complex realities of human existence, in
society and in the international order, in the light of faith and of the Church’s
tradition. Its main aim is to interpret these realities, determining their conformity
with or divergence from the lines of the Gospel teaching on man and his vocation,
a vocation which is at once earthly and transcendent; its aim is thus to guide
Christian behaviour. It therefore belongs to the field, not of ideology, but of
theology and particularly of moral theology.” Ibid., n. 41.
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These documents teach general ethical principles about just
social order and deal with issues involving mostly matters of social,
economic and political affairs. They also comment on matters of
religion, culture and family.4 As these documents contain magisterial
proposals for Catholics, they maintain a theological approach to
social ethics. The logical grounding of the theological perspective
to social ethics is anthropology. Pope John Paul II holds, “[T]he
guiding principle of Pope Leo’s encyclical, and of all the Church’s
social doctrine, is a correct view of the human person and of the
person’s unique value.”5 Two fundamental anthropological principles
guiding the Catholic social teaching are the dignity of the human
person and the social nature of the person.
Vatican II’s document, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, which provides us with
the most systematic theological treatment of the foundations of
Catholic social teaching, insists that these two anthropological
principles are grounded in the theology of creation of human persons
in the image of God as given in the biblical revelation and as
developed in the tradition of the Church.6 Further, the Second Vatican
Council in its Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis
Humanae, applies the theology of human dignity as developed in
The Pastoral Constitution on the Church, Gaudium et Spes, as the
foundation for the rights of the individual persons and of communities
to civil freedom in matters religious as well as for the constitutional
order of the political community, the State.7
Hence, in this chapter we shall present an overview of the
image theology of the human person and its significance to human
dignity as developed in the tradition of the Church. We begin our
inquiry with the biblical sources. We trace its developments and
implications for the theological understanding of human dignity in
the classical and contemporary theological thought. For the purpose
of our study, we investigate mostly the Catholic theological tradition,
though in some instances we have integrated the thought of
Protestant theologians. We have expanded the ambit of our study
to touch upon some contemporary theological trends, namely the
theology of liberation, feminist theology and eco-theology. And finally,
we study the vast corpus of the contemporary papal encyclicals
beginning with Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII to the present day
social encyclicals. This is to give a historical updating of the Church’s
teaching on human dignity as well as to substantiate the importance
of human dignity in the Christian tradition.
2.4.1. The Significance of Image of God Doctrine to Human
          Dignity
The concept, “Imago Dei,” is explicitly referred to human persons
only in three passages in the Old Testament. All of them occur in
the Book of Genesis, namely Gen 1:26-28; 5:1-3 and 9:5-6. These
texts come under the Priestly account of Genesis. Let us present
these texts here for our study. The first application of the concept
of image of God to human persons is given at a place where the
Hebrew thought had to deal with the mystery of the creation of
human persons. So in the story of creation in Genesis 1:26-28, after
the creation of the living beings, God said:
Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let
them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the
birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth,
and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth”.
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God
4 David A. Boileau, “Introduction” in David A. Boileau, ed., Principles of Catholic
Social Teaching, (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1998), p. 10.
5 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, 1 May 1991 (Vatican Polyglot
Press). The Pope insists, “It follows that the Church cannot abandon man, and
that “this man is the primary route that the Church must travel in fulfilling her
mission…the way traced out by Christ himself, the way that leads invariably
through the mystery of the Incarnation and the Redemption.” Ibid., n. 53.
6 In one of its general conclusions Gaudium et Spes states that as befits to a
conciliar pronouncement most of what it sets forth in the Constitution is
“teaching already accepted in the Church”. It has integrated in its reflection the
Catholic thinking as laid down in the vast corpus of the encyclicals on social
issues from Leo XIII to Paul VI (See GS, article 91). In defining the dignity of
the human person, the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes refers to Gen.1:
26 ff; Psalms 8: 5 ff and also to Patristic tradition as well as to scholastic
theology (See GS, articles 12, 21, 39, 25, etc). 7 DH, article 2.
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he created him; male and female he created them. And God
blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply,
and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the
fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every
living thing that moves upon the earth. And God blessed
them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill
the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of
the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living
thing that moves upon the earth.8
The second passage in Genesis 5:1-3 appears after the fall of
Adam and in the context of the story of the descendants of Adam.
The author writes:
This is the book of the generations of Adam. When God
created man, he made him in the likeness of God. Male and
female he created them, and he blessed them and named
them Man when they were created. When Adam had lived
a hundred and thirty years, he become the father of a son in
his own likeness, after his image, and named him Seth.
The third passage in Genesis 9:5-6 is given after the story of
the Flood and in the context of the Noahic covenant. God promises
protection to Noah and gives him dominion over all creatures; and
then God prohibits homicide and says to Noah:
For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of every
beast I will require it, and of man; of every man’s brother I
will require the life of man. Whoever sheds the blood of
man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in
his image.
2.4.1.1. Image of God Central to Biblical Anthropology
The image of God concept is central to biblical anthropology although
its explicit references are only few. Many Bible scholars in their
findings have emphasised it. Gerhard von Rad points out that the
biblical thought of the creation of the human persons in the image
of God appears only, as it were, on the margin of the Old Testament
insight, because Old Testament emphasises the absolute holiness
of God before whose presence human persons are insignificant.
But the image of God passage does appear at a place where the
Old Testament thought had to deal with the mystery of the origin of
human persons.9 In other words, divine transcendence and exaltation
over nature is of supreme importance in Hebrew thought. This,
however, did not allow the Hebrew thinkers to categorise human
persons as wholly one with nature as being submerged in it. Hebrew
thought also perceived that human persons are spiritual personalities
- embodied spirits - and, therefore, in their manner of creation, they
are raised above the order of nature by virtue of their special
relationship to God.
A comparative study between the creation accounts of Genesis
chapter 1 of the Priestly tradition written around the fifth century
BC, and Genesis chapter 2 of the Jahvist tradition written about
four hundred years before the Priestly account would clarify this
point.  The Jahvist account of creation is primeval and
anthropomorphic in character in which God is depicted as directly
involved in creating the world.
Unlike the Jahvist, the Priestly account places the emphasis on
the distance that separates God from the world of his creation.
Hence the Priestly account describes creation and all categories
of creation through the Word of God. But before the creation of
human person the scene and the manner of creation show a visible
change: there is a pause, a counsel is taking place in the heavenly
places, and then humans are created in God’s image. Commenting
on Gen. 1: 26-27, Von Rad says:
On the top of this pyramid stands man, and there is nothing
8 Bible scholars hold that Genesis 1:26-28 is the fundamental text for the Image
of God doctrine and other image of God texts depend on it. In this text the
author of the Priestly tradition says in clear language that God created humankind
in God’s image and likeness. See Gerhard von Rad, “The Divine Likeness in the
OT” in Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 10
vols. (Michigan, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1964-76), vol. 2, p. 390. It will be
henceforth referred to as TDNT. All biblical texts are taken from the Revised
Standard Version containing the Old and New Testaments. See The Holy Bible,
RSV, Catholic Edition for India (Collins for TPI, Bangalore), 1973. 9 See Gerhard von Rad, “The Divine Likeness in the OT”, in TDNT, vol. 2, p.390.
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between him and God: indeed, the world, which was in fact
made for him, has in him alone its most absolute immediacy
to God. Also, unlike the rest of Creation, he was not created
by the word; but in creating him God was actuated by a
unique, solemn resolve in the depth of his heart. And in
particular, God took the pattern for this, his last work of
Creation, from the heavenly world above. In no other work
of Creation is everything referred so very immediately to
God himself as in this.10
Elsewhere he further states:
The divine likeness is not to be found either in the personality
of man, in his free Ego, in his dignity or in his free use of
moral capacity etc…Man is here designated as a creature
whose being is not from below but who belongs by nature to
the upper regions.
Thus, the Priestly tradition highlights the human person’s
otherness from the rest of creation and the person’s affinity with
God that is the foundation for human dignity.
At this point of our study, it is worthwhile to brief on the findings
of Walter Eichrodt, another bible scholar, whose findings also
underline the understanding of the Hebrews as suggested by von
Rad. According to Eichrodt, for the people of the Old Testament,
God was supreme over nature. It was this religious conviction that
saved them from any attempt at mystical union with a supposedly
divine power of nature by means of sexual orgy or worship of
idols. At the same time they perceived that humans were endowed
with spiritual qualities that differentiated them from nature but
uniquely related them to God. This was the reason for the dignity
of human persons as responsible spiritual beings.12
The God of Israel is “One”13 and he cannot be represented by
any idol or image. This is central to Israel’s creed.14 Yet God created
human beings in his own image and likeness. This insight has
tremendous value potential for biblical anthropology, which stresses
on the dignity of human persons. Human beings are not just like
other creatures, but they are singled out with a designation that is
similar to God. It would be our task now to identify in what might
seem to consist in the similarity of human beings to God. Hence,
we proceed to study the meaning of the double designation accorded
to human beings: that they are created in the “image and likeness
of God” as given in Genesis 1:26.
2.4.1.2. The Meaning of God’s Image and Likeness
In the Priestly documents of the creation story, the designation of
human beings is given in two different Hebrew terms, tselem and
demuth. These are generally rendered into Greek as eikon and
homoioma or as homoiosis; in Latin as imago and similitude;
and in English as ‘image’ and ‘likeness’. In our study of the meaning
of these terms, we begin by scanning through the contributions of
the scholars.
In his finding about the rendering of the term Demuth in the
Septuagint and in the Latin Vulgate of the Old Testament, D.H.
Preuss writes:
The LXX usually renders demuth by homoioma, <likeness>,
form, appearance (14 times), but we also find homoiosis,
<likeness, resemblance> (5 times), eikon, <image, likeness>
(once, Gen.5: 1), idea, <appearance, aspect, form> (once,
Gen.5: 3), and homoios, <like> (once Isa. 13:4), while the
Vulgate predominately translates it by similitude, <likeness>
(19 times).15
It is fascinating to note, as described by Preuss, that the
Septuagint translates the term Demuth in some places as image
10 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols., trans. D.M.G. Stalker (New
York, Harper & Row, 1962-65),vol.1, p.144.
11 Gerhard von Rad, in TDNT, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 391.
12 Crf. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (London, Collins, 1973), p. 26.
13 Dt.6: 4-9.
14 See the Decalogue, Ex. 20: 1-18; Dt.5: 1-21.
15 D.H. Preuss, ”Damah, Demuth” in G.J. Botterweck and H. Riggren, eds.,
Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, 14 vols. Reprint (Michigan, Grand
Rapids, Eerdmans, 1997), vol. 3, p. 257.
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(eikon) and in other places as likeness (homoioma).
Nevertheless, scholars stress that tselem primarily means image
(eikon) in the sense of an artistic representation, a statute or an
impression on a coin. Likewise, Demuth primarily means likeness
in the sense of ‘something like.’16 They also suggest that ‘Image’
(tselem) denotes more of a physical representation of something
whereas ‘likeness’ (Demuth) tones down its starkness and thereby
one complements the other.
This has been further explained by D. H. Preuss in his study of
Gen.1: 26 and 5:1, 3, where he describes:
[T]he use of Demuth in the story of early man (Gen.1: 26;
5:1, 3) has always been of particular interest. Demuth is
used here with tselem,    < image >… [I]t appears after
tselem in Gen. 1:26 and before tselem in 5: 3; while tselem
occurs alone in 5:1. This interlacing and substitution suggest
that very little distinction can be made between the two
words. In 1:26 the terms are used with the prepositions be,
< in >, and ke,       < after > (the latter with Demuth), while
in 5: 1, 3 Demuth is used with be (in v.3 tselem is used with
ke). This dovetailing opposes too strong a differentiation
between Demuth and tselem…It also opposes an
overemphasis on the use of the words with prepositions in
contrast to their use alone.17
We have here in the double designation of human beings as
image and likeness of God, the use of the linguistic style known as
the Hebrew “ parallelism “18  in which the second term defines
more closely than the first what is meant by image of God. So,
human beings are created in the image of God means that they are
created in God’s likeness.
We are in a position to state from what we have seen in our
preceding analysis that like God - in an analogous sense (more
unequal than equal, but still real), human beings are endowed with
some characteristics of God. Everything one can say of God also
has a meaning for human beings. This implies that the quest for the
meaning of human beings, according to the Bible, can only be
answered from a comparison with God and in relationship to God.
Walter Kasper has theologically substantiated this aspect of human
nature. In his research on theological anthropology in relation to
social ethics, Walter Kasper points out, “Man is a being related to
God, a being corresponding to God, God’s conversation partner, his
ally, addressable by God and addressing God.”19
This has been also succinctly brought out by Walter Eichrodt in
his observation of the meaning of image of God as referred to
human beings by the author of the Priestly document of creation
account. He commented:
If we remember the whole manner of and fashion in which
the Godhead is pictured in Genesis 1, how he appears from
the first lines as conscious and powerful will, and continually
bears witness to himself through insistent purposive creation,
we shall be forced to find man’s likeness to God as indicated
by the author, in his spiritual superiority, which expresses
itself not only in his higher rational endowment, but above all
in his capacity for self-consciousness and self-determination;
in short, in those capacities which we are accustomed to
regard as typical of personality…[T]he gift to man of the
imago Dei in the formal sense indicated by us implies nothing
less than a connection with God through which man, even
as a sinner, remains a rational being capable of spiritual
fellowship with God. His pre-eminence over all other
creatures consists in the fact that as a conscious self he can
be reached by God’s word, and thereby called to
responsibility.20
16 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, op.cit, vol.1, p. 144 f.
17 D.H. Preuss, op.cit, p. 259.
18 D. Cairns, op.cit., p.28; von Rad, Theology of the Old Testament, op.cit., vol. 1,
p. 144 f.
19 Walter Kasper, “Das theologische Wesen des Menschen”, in Unser Wissen
vom Menschen.Moglichkeiten und Grenzen anthropologischer Erentnisse, (red.
W. Kasper, Düsseldorf, 1977, 95-116, 105). As quoted in Dr. L. Roos, “The
Human Person and Human Dignity as Basis of the Social Doctrine of the Church”,
in David Boileau, ed., Principles of Catholic Social Teaching,  op.cit., p. 54.
20 As quoted in D. Cairns, op.cit., p.29.
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These findings enable us to corroborate the concept of human
person in the Old Testament thought. It means that in so far as
endowed with spiritual qualities analogous to God human beings
are persons before God; and as such they are capable acting on
God’s behalf, and responsible to him. As conscious, free and
responsible beings, human beings order their lives; shape their
destiny and that of creation. Therefore, they participate in the work
of God as referred to in Genesis 1:26b and 28. As God’s counterpart
(collaborators) on earth, they are God’s partners in dialogue. God
intends to speak to them and expects their response. God sees
God’s self reflected in them and, therefore, they are the appearance
(presence) of divine splendour and glory on earth.21
In like manner, human persons are truly human only when they
tend towards God and reflect the divine purpose in their entire
lives. Hence, biblical anthropology sees the meaning of human
dignity theologically; especially it sees the greatness of human beings
as partners of dialogue with God. For, as von Rad insists, “Israel
very seldom spoke of man. She always sees men vis-à-vis God,
either turning to him or turning away from him.”22 This divine
endowment is the reason for the dignity, nobility and majesty with
which God has created them as recounted by the Psalmist.23
2.4.1.3. Universalization of the Divine Image in Humankind
Scholars are of the opinion that Hebrews borrowed the imago Dei
concept from the divine kingship ideology of the ancient Near
Eastern cultures,24 especially from Egyptian royal theology, where
the king was apotheosised. It was held that the king was the image
of God, the one who mediated between the reigning deity of the
kingdom and the people. The king was the reigning copy of God on
earth, his deputy, his reflection and his mode of appearance in the
world.
According to the representational motive, images were often
thought to represent and even to mediate the presence of one who
was physically absent, whether this absent reality was the
conquering king whose throne was installed in a distant land or a
deity whose abode was in one of the remote mountains of the
gods.25 By extension, the concept of the imago Dei also - as used
in Genesis 1: 26-28, inculcates the value that it is not the king alone,
but every human person in his or her nature as being human is the
image of God. They are born equal in their nature as being human
and, therefore, mediate within creation the immanence of the
transcendent creator.
Another anthropological value implied in the idea of the creation
of human beings in the “image and likeness of God” is the social
nature of human persons. To be created in the image and likeness
of God means that human persons are called to live in a community
and communion with the other, which is constitutive of being human.
Scholars are unanimous that Adam who was created in the image
and likeness of God represents the entire human family.26 This has
been reiterated by the author of the Priestly account of Genesis as
stated in Genesis 1:27b, which reads, “[I]n the image of God he
created him; male and female he created them”. This means, as
image of God, being human means being-in-relationship-with. In
other words, as Stanley J. Grenz suggests in his research article, a
human person is a “relational self.”27 In like manner, the difference
of the sexes and their equality as being human belong to the very
image of God in human persons as given in Genesis 1:27b.
The narrative style of the creation story of man and woman as21 For similar corroboration of the Old Testament View of human person, see
Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation, An Eschatological Doctrine of Creation,
trans. M. Kohl (London, SCM Press, 1991), p. 220.
22 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, op.cit., vol. II, p. 347.
23 Ps. 8: 5-8. See especially vv.5-6: “Yet thou hast made him little less than God,
and dost crown him with glory and honour. Thou hast given him dominion over
the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet.”
24 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, op.cit., vol. I, p. 144 f; Jürgen
Moltmann, God in Creation, op.cit., p. 219.
25 Stanley J. Grenz, “The Social God and the Relational Self: Toward a Theology
of the Imago Dei in the Post-modern Context” in Horizons in Biblical Theology,
vol.24, No.1 (June 2002), p. 43.
26 The Hebrew word adam is a collective noun. It means literally mankind /
humankind. For detail see Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, op.cit.,
vol. I, p. 141.
27 Stanley J. Grenz, op.cit., p. 43.
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given in Genesis 1:27b, allows us to state that it is not the human
person as an individual only, but as individual-in-community who
corresponds to God, because in this community of men and women
God finds his own likeness. Likeness to God cannot be lived in
isolation but can be lived only in community. This means that being
human is being-in-solidarity-with-others in someway. Hence, the
biblical narrative of human beings indicates that from the very outset,
human persons are social beings.28
John C. Dwyer further suggests that the social nature of
humankind as referred to in Genesis 1:26-27 implies, “We become
human persons in the act of responding to God and to other human
persons and to the world… which is the context in which we are
called to live our lives as persons.”29 Hence, Genesis1: 26-28 stands
at the pinnacle of the biblical creation narrative. Stanley J. Grenz
suggests that the Hebrew Bible posits a God who creates a world
that is different and external to God’s being and then places human
persons within that creation as a creaturely representation of the
transcendent deity.30 The first creation story (Gen.1; 26-28) brought
out a revolution in thought by universalising the divine image in all
human beings. Consequently, it contained affirmative value potential
for human dignity, freedom and equality as well as for the importance
of social nature of human beings.31
2.4.1.4. Image of God Intrinsic to Human Nature
The second and third texts that provide us with explicit reference
to imago Dei designation to humankind are Genesis 5:1-3 and 9:3.
In these passages, the author of the Priestly tradition emphasizes
that in spite of sin and human vulnerability, God remains committed
to the special relationship with which God created humankind in
God’s image. This has been highlighted in the story in a manner
that after the transgression Adam became father and passed on
the divine image and likeness to his descendants (Gen 5:3). Similarly,
after the deluge, God promises protection to Noah and his
descendants (Gen 9:6b) and grants them dominion over nature (Gen
9:7).
In his commentary on the Book of Genesis, von Rad insists on
this theological insight. He writes:
According to Gen.v.3, Adam begot Seth in his own likeness
after his image. This means that God authorized man to
transmit this, his supreme dignity, along the way of continuing
procreation of the generations. So it cannot be said that the
image of God is lost - all the less as its existence still comes
into account in the days of Noah (Gen.ix.6b). Certainly, the
story of the Fall tells of grave disturbances in the creaturely
nature of man. But as to the way in which these affected
the image of God in man, the Old Testament has nothing
explicit to say.32
This means that sin and all kinds of human estrangement from
God may certainly pervert humans’ relationship to God, but not
God’s relationship to them. God resolved God’s relationship to human
persons as God’s image, which is a divine endowment,33 which
can never be withdrawn except by God. Even though humans have
estranged themselves from God, yet they remain wholly and entirely
God’s image. Therefore, even the most inhuman person cannot
escape the responsibility of being God’s image.34 All categories of
people - the physically and mentally deformed ones, are image of
God in the fullest sense of the word. Such is the greatness of dignity
with which God created human persons.
Human dignity cannot be lost and it is indestructible on account
of God’s abiding relationship to humankind as God’s image.
Nevertheless, under the conditions of universality of sin, the state
28 Jürgen. Moltmann, op.cit., pp. 222-223.
29 John C. Dwyer,” Person, Dignity Of”, in Judith A. Dwyer, ed., The New
Dictionary of Catholic Thought (Collegeville, Minnesota, Liturgical Press, 1994),
724-737, 734.
30 Stanley J. Grenz, op.cit, p.43.
31 J.Moltmann claims that this passage had a ‘democratising’ effect throughout
the whole of Jewish and Christian political history. See J. Moltmann, op.cit, p.
219.
32 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, op.cit, vol, 1., p. 147.
33 Gen. 1: 26a.
34 J. Moltmann, God in Creation, op.cit., p. 223.
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of humankind as God’s image is seen theologically as grace,
because it is the free gift of God’s faithfulness to humankind that
keeps them as God’s image in spite of their estrangement.35 This
gracious act of God’s faithfulness to the family of humankind as
God’s image is ordained towards the mystery of the person of Jesus
Christ in the divine plan of salvation, in so far as in him human race
is called to encounter the incarnate image of the invisible God and
in whom all things were created, renewed and ordained to their
original destiny.36
2.4.2. Image of God and Christocentric Anthropology
In the New Testament, the meaning of imago Dei attains
christological significance. The application of the image of God
concept in the New Testament is complex. It is used often with
christological meaning, though some passages render it with the
Old Testament meaning. A detailed treatment of this matter would
exceed the scope of our work. It is still necessary to present an
overview of the image doctrine in the New Testament, because it
has influenced the Christian theology of the human person greatly,
especially as developed in Vatican II’s document, Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.37
The imago Dei concept is used in the New Testament more
often than in the Old Testament, though its frequency is not as
common as to be a dominant theological motive. Most of the direct
application of the concept occurs in the Pauline literature.38 Paul
uses it for two purposes, namely to emphasize Christ’s unique divine
sonship and the universality of his redeeming work who in his risen
glory reflects the true image of God, and that humankind is
predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.39 Moreover, in
the Pauline writings the concept acquire a profound theological
meaning with christological, soteriological and eschatological
significance that we proceed to study in the proceeding sections. It
is because in the Pauline writings the concept attain rich theological
meaning to understand human dignity.
Apart from these Pauline usages of the image concept with
specific christological meaning, there are three New Testament
passages where the image concept appears in substantial agreement
with Old Testament meaning, namely humankind in general as
created in God’s image. In 2 Cor 11:7, Paul uses it in a colloquial
style as it was held at that time to refer to man in contra-distinction
to woman to be the image.40 It is also found quite explicitly in one
of the passages in the Letter of James. Among all authors of New
Testament writings, James remains both in his language and thought35 For the doctrine of original sin and justification see the Doctrinal Decrees of the
6th Council of Carthage (418) and of the General Council of Trent’s Decree on
Original Sin (1546) in J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, eds., The Christian Faith: in the
Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, 5th Revised and Enlarged Edition
(Bangalore, Theological Publication of India, 1991), pp. 147,149-151.
36 Jn.1: 1-3; 1Col.1: 15 f; Eph.1: 10 f; Heb. 1:2-3. In all these passages we have
what is known as Logos Christology or Wisdom Christology or Cosmic
Christology. All these Christological reflections are based on the concept of
‘archetypal image’ as referred to in the Old Testament: see Proverbs 8:22-
23,30-31.
37 For a treatment of the Christocentric anthropology of Gaudium et Spes and its
follow up in the writings of Pope John Paul II see David L. Schindler,
“Christology and the Imago Dei: Interpreting Gaudium et Spes”, in Communio,
23 (Spring 1996), pp.156-183. For the   development of the theological
anthropology in the light of christology in the documents of Vatican II see
Walter Kasper, “ The theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”, in
Communio, no. 23 (1996), pp. 129-155; Luis Ladaria, “ Humanity in the Light
of Christ in the Second Vatican Council”, in R. Latourelle, ed., Vatican II
Assessment and Perspectives, Twenty-five Years After (1962-1987) (New York,
Paulist Press, 1989), vol. II, pp. 386-401.
38 Commenting on the frequency of the use of the concept ‘eikon’ in the New
Testament, John Reumann points out, “When we move to the New Testament,
references are more frequent than in the Old, but still not so common as to make
the image of God a statistically prominent theme. Eikon, e.g., occurs twenty-
three times, but the three references in the Gospels are to the image or likeness
of the emperor in a coin (Mark 12:16 and parallels), and the ten examples in the
Apocalypse refer to the image of a deity or idol (the beast and its image, Rev.
14:9). The really significant occurrences are in the Pauline epistles (nine times)
and Hebrews (once).” J. Reumann, op.cit, p. xiii.
39 In the New Testament Christ is twice said to be the likeness or the image of God
(2 Cor. 4:4 and Col.1: 15). The common use in the Pauline literature is that
humankind is said to be predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ
(Rom.8: 29) or changed into his likeness (2 Cor.3: 18) or renewed after the
image (Col.3: 10).  D. Cairns, op.cit., p. 60.
40 Crf. ibid., p. 60; G.A. Jonsson, op.cit., p. 11.
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the man of the Old Testament thought. In his Letter (James
3:9), James comments on the dangers of the tongue and says, “With
it we bless the Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who are
made in the likeness41 of God”.
The third passage where the concept, ‘image of God’, is referred
to is given in the Synoptic Gospels.42 It occurs in the story of paying
tax to Caesar in which the ‘image of God’ does not come into view
directly but appears to make a clear reference to it. In this
controversial story-setting between Jesus and the Pharisees, Jesus
asked for a denarious and inquired,” Whose likeness and inscription
was this?” They said to him, “Caesar’s.” Approving their reply,
Jesus said to them,” Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,
and to God the things that are God’s.”43 In his interpretation of this
passage, David Cairns observes that the unspoken argument of
Jesus is that, “Give to Caesar the taxes that are his due. But the
image that is printed on you is not Caesar’s, but God’s; therefore
you yourselves belong to God.”44 Here we have the Old Testament
use of the concept ‘image of God’ as given in the Book of Genesis.
2.4.2.1. Image of God and Christ’s Divine Sonship of God
We attempt to study, in what follows, the subject of our interest in
the writings of Paul. In his Second Letter to the Corinthians,45 Paul
designates the concept “likeness of God” to Christ and connects it
with the glory-christology or exaltation-christology of the Easter
experience that is common in the New Testament writings.46 For
Paul, the Christ of the Easter experience is the true image of the
invisible God, because he radiates the very glory of God. In this
Pauline perspective, image and glory are one and the same.47
Hence, Paul claims that as Son of God, Christ is the true image
of God on earth. Paul does not present a speculative theology on
the ontological nature of Christ in his divine sonship, but gives a
narrative theology providing us with an implicit allusion to the creation
story of humankind as given in Genesis 1: 26-28 and as recounted
in Psalm 8. Therefore, Paul writes that the Gospel proclaims the
appearance of the glory of God in the face of Christ who is the
“likeness of God” (2 Cor 4:4).
In his Letter to the Colossians,48 Paul49 retro-projects the
christology of glory-image-sonship combination to the origin of
creation with the aim of highlighting not only Christ’s pre-eminence
over all creation in heaven and on earth but also of extolling his
centrality in creation and redemption. This has been brought out in
the famous Pauline text on the christological hymn, which reads:
He has delivered us from the dominion of darkness and
transferred us to the kingdom of his beloved Son, in whom
we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins.
He is the image of the invisible god,50 the first-born of all
creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on
earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or
principalities or authorities - all things were created through
him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things
hold together. He is the head of the body, the church; he is
the beginning, the first-born from the dead, that in everything
he might be pre-eminent. For in him all the fullness of God
was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself
all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by
the blood of his cross. (Col 1:13-20).
Commenting on Col 1:15-20 and seeing in it a similarity of
christological intent with that of the Johannine Prologue, Stanley J.
Grenz in his seminal study observes:
41 The term used for likeness is homoiosis. Crf. D. Cairns, op.cit., p.38.
42 Mt.22: 15-22; Lk.20: 19-26; Mk.12: 13-17.
43 Mk.12: 16b-17.
44 D. Cairns, op.cit., pp. 38-39.
45 2 Cor.4: 4-6.
46 J. Dupuis, Who Do You Say I Am? : Introduction to Christology (New York,
Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 2002), p. 65.
47 See Gerhard von Rad, art. cit. in TDNT, vol. 2, p.242 f; D. Cairns, op.cit.,
pp.32-34.
48 Col.1: 13-20.
49 On the contentious issue of the authorship of Colossians, see James D.G.
Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon (Michigan, Grand Rapids,
Eerdmans, 1996), p. 35 ff.
50 Italics are ours for emphasis.
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Similar to the great Johannine declaration, “the Word became
flesh and lived among us” (John 1:14…), Paul draws together
into a single whole the entire life of Jesus as it centres on his
resurrection as the prolepsis of the eschaton (v.18) and on
his death as God’s great act in reconciling all creation (v.20).
The apostle’s intent is to declare that this historical life is the
dwelling place of the fullness of deity, understood in
accordance with the wisdom tradition and as the fulfilment
of the creation story. Or stated in the opposite manner, the
entire narrative of the invisible God’s self-disclosure th[r]ough
the divine wisdom, together with the Genesis story of
humankind being created in the divine image, can only be
rightly understood when viewed in the light of the narrative
of Jesus who as the preemiment Christ is the eikon of God.51
It is interesting to note that just as Christ is designated as the
“image (eikon) of the invisible God” in Col 1:15, the author of the
Letter to the Hebrews in the introductory verses52 says that Christ
“reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp (charakter)
of God’s nature” (Heb 1:3). So, in both passages (Col 1:15 and
Heb 1:3), the glory, which is absolutely unique, is ascribed to Christ
to designate his unique dignity as the divine Son of God. For, in the
New Testament whenever the concept of image of God is designated
to Christ, it stands for his divine sonship of God and, therefore, his
equality with God.53
Hence, by proclaiming that Jesus is the reflection of God’s
glory and that he is the one who bears the very stamp of God’s
nature, the author of the Letter to the Hebrews fuses in Hebrew
1:1-4, the glory-image-son christology to declare that Jesus Christ
who as the divine Son is the visible manifestation of the image of
the invisible God. According to the Letter to the Hebrews, moreover,
it is in and through Jesus’ historical mission of his saving death on
the cross on behalf of sinful humankind that the image or the stamp
(charakter) of the invisible God is made pre-eminently visible.
In other words, the redeeming death of the Son incarnate is the
supreme event of visibilization of the image of God. This combination
of the glory-image-son christology as developed in Col.1: 15-20
and Heb.1: 1-4, resonates with the Incarnation christology of the
Johannine prologue54 in which John gives witness to the world that
it is in the divine Son incarnate, that God’s real glory55 has been
made manifest. These texts emphasise that in and through his
redemptive mission, Jesus Christ fully reveals God in so far as he is
the divine Son incarnate and, therefore, he is the incarnate image
of the invisible God par excellence. This is central to all New
Testament christology.56
2.4.2.2. The Image of God and New Humanity in Christ
The Pauline theology expands the significance of the image
christology to soteriology and eschatology, because as the perfect
image of God, Jesus Christ the divine Son incarnate, in fulfilment
of God’s intent for humankind from the beginning of creation,
recreates and renews the sin-ridden image of God in humankind.
Consequently, the New Testament narrative of the image of God
does not end with christology but finds its completion in the
eschatological narrative of new creation in the glorified Christ.57
The restoration of God’s image in the fallen or estranged humanity
comes about in and through the fellowship of believers with Christ
(Rom 8:29). For Jesus Christ is designated by Paul in his writings
51 Stanley J. Grenz, op.cit., p. 45.
52 “In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets;
but in these days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed the heir of
all things, through whom also he created the world. He reflects the glory of God
and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe by his world of
power. When he had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of
the Father, having become as much superior to angels as the name he has
obtained is more excellent than theirs.” (Heb. 1:1-4).
53 G. Kittle, op.cit., vol. II, p. 395.
54 John 1:1-18. In this regard, Jn.1: 14 is emphatic, which reads, “And the Word
became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory,
glory as of the only Son from the Father”.
55 For the parallel use and meaning of the terms image, likeness and glory of God in
the writings of the New Testament, see in D. Cairns, op.cit., pp. 45-52.
56 See on Christocentrism and Theocentrism in J. Dupuis, op.cit., pp.3-4.
57 In 1 Cor. 15:49, St. Paul connects the imago Christi with the resurrected new
humanity by means of the Adam-Christ typology, with its correlate last-Adam
Christology.
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as the last Adam (1 Cor 15:45b) in contra-distinction to the first
Adam of Gen 1:26-28, who represents the entire humanity since in
him God’s image has been tarnished by sin.
In a similar vein, in his Letter to the Romans and his First Letter
to the Corinthians,58 Paul uses the Adam-Christ typology. Paul’s
theological motive is to highlight the universal restoration of the
God’s image in humankind by the redemptive death of Christ.
Hence, in Romans chapter five, he explains that the first Adam
was made in the image and likeness of God and was to pass on
that image unblemished to his descendants. But the first Adam
sinned, and handed down only a flawed image of God, that is, a
tainted human nature to his progeny.
In Romans chapter five, Paul claims that just as the first Adam
brought the universal reign of sin and death, so through Jesus Christ,
the last Adam, grace super-abounds and reigns unto life everlasting
(Rom 5:12-21). Hence, those who are in fellowship with Christ are
conformed to his image, that is, conformed to the image of his Son
(eikon tou huiou autou), in order that Christ might be the first-
born among many brothers (Adelphoi) (Rom 8:29). This means,
as Leon-Dufour comments, in the fellowship with Christ, all
humankind become children of God and, therefore, come to enjoy
once again the dignity of God’s children.59
In 1 Cor 15:20-28, we encounter once again the Pauline image
of Adam-Christ typology where Paul further stresses on Christ’s
resurrection as the guarantee of the eschatological general
resurrection and the consummation of creation in the pleroma
Christi (fullness of Christ’s glory) so that God may be everything
to every one (v.28), which is the telos, the end, towards which the
Old Testament creation narrative points. In vv. 44-49, Paul once
again uses the Adam-Christ typology to set forth Jesus’ risen body
as the paradigm for the divinely ordained destiny of humankind
created in God’s image.
For the purpose of bringing out the eschatological meaning of
the Adam-Christ typology, Paul presents a narrative in antithetical
style about the physical body (psychikon soma) and spiritual body
(pneumatikon soma) and then portrays a contrast between Adam
and Christ as the representations of these two corporeal realities
(1 Cor 15: 44). In this manner, the Pauline theology presents Christ
as the true image of God imparting his supernatural characteristics
to his spiritual progeny – that is, to his redeemed community, in a
manner similar to Adam passing on his natural traits to his physical
offspring.60
Hence, in the New Testament theology, the realisation of the
meaning of humankind’s original status as creatures in God’s image
begins with life in Christ, which is justification and divine filiation –
that is, making them children of God in the Son (crf. Rom 8:17).61
The finality of this spiritual process of filiation is the eschatological
glorification of the entire person in the glory of the Risen Christ.62
This realisation is communitarian,63 universal64 as well as cosmic65
in character. Such is the New Testament understanding of the
greatness and dignity of human beings created in the image and
likeness of God (Gen 1:26-28).
2.4.2.3. Image of God as Children of God
Our study of the biblical teaching of human dignity as image of
God would not be complete until we have seen how this theological
thought is reflected in the central teaching of Jesus.66 The Gospels
don’t provide us with Jesus’ direct sayings about image of God.
Our position, nevertheless, is that Jesus’ teaching of the Fatherhood
58 Rom.5: 12-22; 1 Cor. 15, especially vv.21ff, 44-49.
59 X. Leon-Dufour, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, trans. Cahill, P.J., (New York,
Seabury, 1973), p.254.
60 S.J. Grenz, op.cit., pp.47-48.
61 See also Rom 8:15-17; Gal 3:26-29; 4:5-7.
62 J. Moltmann, God in Creation, op.cit., p. 227; A.M. Ramsey, The Glory of God
and the Transfiguration of Christ (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1949), p.
151 f.
63 1 Cor. 15: 22-24.
64 Eph. 2:15-22; 1 Tim. 2:4.
65 Rom. 8:19-22; 1 Cor. 15:28.
66 David Cairns has provided significant contribution in this line of thought. See
D. Cairns, op.cit., pp. 52-60.
IMAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN DIGNITY… 259 260 HUMAN DIGNITY…
of God and humankind’s filial relationship to God contains all that he
needed to say on the subject that human persons are image of God.
It is because created by God in God’s image and likeness, human
persons are children of God in an analogical sense. This biblical
sense of the image of God has been bought out by Paul Lamarche
in his study of the genealogical narrative of Adam as given in Gen
5:1-32, and that of Jesus as referred to in Lk 3:23-38. He comments:
[M]an is constituted in a situation that is altogether special
vis-à-vis God. Just as man procreates children ‘in his own
likeness according to his image’ (Gen.5: 3), so was man
created by God. This is to say that man is a child of God. In
the genealogy presented by Luke, the relation which is
established between Seth and Adam is identical with that
which exists between Adam and God in Lk. 3: 38. David
Cairns has provided significant contribution in this line of
thought. See D. Cairns, op.cit., pp. 52-60.67
According to Paul Lamarche, the authors of these narratives
mean that just as Adam is the biological father of Seth as he begot
him in his image and likeness (Gen 5:3), in the same manner, but in
an analogical sense, God is the Father of Adam (Lk 3:38) in so far
as God created Adam in God’s image and likeness. Consequently,
it implies that as an image of God every human person is a child of
God because Adam is a generic concept68 referring to the entire
humanity. Moreover, scholars suggest that some New Testament
expressions, such as “You, therefore, must be perfect, as your
heavenly Father is perfect,”69 “He who has seen me has seen the
Father,”70 “No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the
bosom of the Father, he has made him known,”71 are equivalents
of the “image of God” concept.72
It is this biblical insight into the meaning of image of God concept
that resonates with Jesus’ approach to Kingdom of God, which is
central to his message and mission. The content of Jesus’ kingdom
message is derived from his unique “abba” experience of God.73
It is equally important to note that this core-experience of Jesus
defines his self-identity as the divine Son of God74 and all humankind
as God’s children.75 Our claim calls for explanation to substantiate
our position, which we provide in what follows.
The coming of the Kingdom of God76 was the central
eschatological hope of the Old Testament faith expressed through
67 Crf. Paul Lamarche, “Image et Ressemblance” dans  Dictionnaire de Spiritualite,
vol.7, col. 1402 (English translation as quoted in A.O. Erhueh, op.cit, p.15,
footnote 57).
68 Eugene H. Maly, “Genesis”, in R.E. Brown, et al., eds., The Jerome Biblical
Commentary (Englewood Cliff, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 11.
69 Mt 5:48.
70 Jn 14:9b.
71 Jn 1:18.
72 G. Kittle, op.cit., p.395; Leon-Dufour, op.cit., p. 253.
73 Joachim Jeremias and others have shown credibly that Jesus’ way of addressing
God as abba, especially in prayer was unknown to contemporary Judaism of
Jesus’ time. They stress that it goes to Jesus himself. See J. Jeremias, The
Prayer of Jesus (London, SCM Press, 11967), pp.11-65; James Dunn, Jesus
and the Spirit (London, SCM Press, 1975), pp.12-40.
74 Jacques Guillet has succinctly noted the continuity of expression between
Jesus’ self-revelation as the Son of God and the christological faith of the
apostolic Church. He commented: “If ‘Son of God’ is probably a Christian
creation, the content which it encompasses comes not from its previous history
but from the object which it designates; and if the expression as such has
probably never been pronounced by Jesus, it is the echo of a word certainly
authentic by which Jesus allowed its deepest secret to come through in some
decisive moments: he is the Son. Such moments are rare: the synoptics mention
but two, the “hymn of jubilation”: “No one knows the Son except the Father
and no one knows the Father except the Son” (Mt 11:27; Lk 10:22), and the
admittance to not knowing at the end of the eschatological discourse: “But of
the day and hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but
the Father only” (Mt 24: 36; Mk 13:32). Two texts the authenticity of which
seems well assured both by the unique character of their content, hard to
imagine, and their inimitable style.” J. Guillet, Jesus devant sa vie et sa mort,
Paris, Aubier, 1971, pp. 228-229, (English translation quoted from J. Dupuis,
op.cit., pp. 48).
75 Following the example of Jesus and his frequent manner of addressing God as
abba in prayer in the company of his disciples and friends with whom he used
to have table-fellowship, the early Christians dared to address God as Father
with the same intimacy as Jesus himself had used, especially as given in Gal 4:6
and Rom 8:15. They were conscious of being  “sons in the Son”.
76 For the Jewish concept of the Kingdom of God see, K.G. Kuhn, “malkut
shamayim in Rabbinic Literature” in TDNT, vol. I, pp. 571-72.
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messianic expectation.77 It originated from Israel’s belief that
as Creator and Lord of the universe, Yahweh their God, who
intervened in their past history with mighty acts to redeem them
whenever they were caught up with desperate peril.78 In like manner,
Yahweh’s definitive future redemptive intervention was expected
to happen. This was known as the “Day of Yahweh”,79 the day on
which Yahweh’s Messiah would establish God’s sovereignty as
Creator and Lord of the universe, once and for all. At the time of
Jesus, different messianic preachers conceived this messianic
expectation differently. The latest among them was John the
Baptiser for whom the Kingdom of God was an imminent divine
judgment.80
Seen in this biblical background, Jesus’ concept of the Kingdom
of God and its coming was, however, something new and original.81
It was drawn from his unique experience of God as abba, his
beloved daddy.82 In other words, God, who revealed himself in the
Old Testament through his mighty deeds of redemptive interventions
as Creator and the Lord of the universe, and who created all
humankind in his image and likeness, was experienced by Jesus as
abba, the dear Father, who loves all people as his children with a
fatherly love which is universal and wholly unconditional. Hence
“revelation of God’s unconditional love”83 towards all people in
their dignity as God’s children, is the content of the Kingdom of
God concept that Jesus preached.
Consequently, when Jesus announced the coming of God’s
Kingdom, he was telling to his listeners that in and through his
person, God was revealing God’s fatherly love towards all people
in order to renew their relationship towards God as his beloved
children, as well as to restore their relationship with one another in
human solidarity as brothers and sisters in a way appropriate to the
dignity of God’s children. Jesus’ entire way of life and manner of
ministry to people was the way that this sort of love of God had
been put into action84 and he asked his disciples to follow the path
set by him.85 When Jesus commanded love for everybody, including
one’s enemies, he unequivocally implied that all people were children
of God, and, therefore, they possessed the image of God in the
sense that they were God’s image. Hence, Jesus intended that all
be loved and respected, as their heavenly Father loves them.86
In this connection, an important point for our inquiry regarding
human dignity is to be noted here. The Kingdom of God, which has
77 On Jewish messianism see Sigmund Mowinckel, He that Cometh (Oxford,
Blackwell, 1956), pp. 155-186; E. Jenni, “Messiah, Jewish”, in The Interpreter’s
Dictionary of the Bible, ed., G.A. Buttrick (New York, Abingdon Press, 1962),
vol. 3, pp. 360-364.
78 The people of the Old Testament believed that Yahweh their God saved them
from slavery in Egypt as recounted in the Book of Exodus, that he preserved
them from starvation in the wilderness as given in the Book of Numbers, that he
defended them from annihilation by powerful enemies during the wars of
conquest as narrated in the Books of Joshua and Judges, that he rescued them
from Babylonian exile as said in the Deutro-Isaiah.
79 The “Day of Yahweh” means to the people of the Old Testament, the day of
rejoicing because it is the day on which God their redeemer, goel, (Is 41:14; Jer
50:34; Ps 78: 35) definitively intervenes to save Israel, his people who were his
prized possession (segullah) (Ex 19:5; Dt 7:6; Ps 135:4). By this act of
redemptive intervention Yahweh faithfully manifests his covenantal love and
mercy. But by the end of the 6th century B.C., not only God’s saving acts but
also his terrible punishments are included with the “Day of Yahweh”. For
eventually the people of the Old Testament realized that God would not treat
the virtuous and the evildoers equally. Crf. Is 3:12-22; 10:24-27; Ez 5:1 ff, 7: 1
ff.
80 See Mt 3; Mk 1: 4-11; Lk 3.
81 For Jesus’ understanding of the Kingdom of God and its proclamation see
Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus (London, SCM
Press, 1963); for recent discussion and research on the subject see Id.,
Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (London, SCM Press, 1967); Id., Jesus
and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in the New Testament
Interpretation (Philadelphia, Fortress press, 1976).
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82 For a specific analysis of the abba-experience of Jesus in the context of social
transformation see George M. Soares-Prabhu, “The Kingdom of God: Jesus’
Vision of a New Society”, in D. S. Amalorpavadass, ed., The Indian Church in
the Struggle for a New Society  (Bangalore, NBCLC, 1981), pp. 597-607.
83 Ibid., p. 599.
84 E. Fuchs, Studies of the Historical Jesus (London, SCM Press, 1964), pp. 11-
31.
85 Mt 5: 44-45; Lk 6:35.These sayings of Jesus stress on the unconditional and
universal nature of God’s fatherly love towards all people as his children, even
towards those who do evil.
86 Leon-Dufour, op.cit., p. 253.
come in and through Jesus’ life and action, was predominantly
addressed to the poor, the anawim of God.87 These were the
despised and detested categories of people to whom dignity was
denied in the Jewish society at the time of Jesus. Moreover, Jesus
identified his mysterious presence with them.88 A common sight in
the company of Jesus was the presence of sinners89 who were
also looked down and alienated by the society as cursed by God.
These were treated as if they lost their dignity in the eyes of God.
The invitation of Jesus extended to these so-called sinners to
join his company was the ultimate affirmation that Jesus gave in
the days of his ministry to the inalienable dignity of every human
person as image of God, which even sin is unable to eradicate. By
offering God’s fatherly bond of love through these acts, which is
unconditional and universal in character to these categories of
people, Jesus affirmed that created in God’s image, every human
person is a child of God and, therefore, he or she is unconditionally
loved, accepted, sustained and supported by God. Hence, as children
of God, human dignity is a divine bestowal, and consequently no
human hand can abrogate it.
2.4.2.4. Divine Image Reveals the Dignity of Being Human
We sum up our investigation into the biblical foundations for human
dignity. The theological insights of the Old Testament thought, that
God created human beings in God’s image as narrated in the Book
of Genesis,90 constitute the immutable basis of all Christian
anthropology.91 These insights expose the fundamental truths about
the mystery of human existence92 and provide reasons for human
dignity inherent in the nature of being human.93
The theological insights, which come into view from the biblical
concept of imago Dei, as given in the book of Genesis94 imply that
God’s calling of human beings into existence in God’s image involves
a divine endowment with spiritual qualities analogous to God.
Consequently, human beings are persons before God. As persons,
they are conscious, free and responsible beings,95 capable of acting
on God’s behalf.96 They are called by God to order their lives,
shape their destiny and creation and, therefore, participate in the
work of God.97 Hence, human beings are God’s dialogue partners
on earth because God shares with them God’s intention for the
integrity of creation.98 God sees God’s self reflected in them and,
therefore, they are the divine splendour and glory on earth.99
Seen in this perspective, the theological reason for human dignity
is the bond of inter-personal relationship that God established with
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87 On the poor of God in the understanding of Jesus and his option see George M.
Soares Prabhu, “Good News to the Poor! The Social Implications of the Message
of Jesus”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society, op.cit, pp.
609-626; Id., “Class in the Bible: The Biblical Poor a Social Class?” in R.S.
Sugirtharajah, ed., Voice from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third
World (New York, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 147-171.
88 Mt 25: 31-46. Serving the poor in the margins of the society seems to be the
criterion on which one is judged on the Last Day.
89 Mk 2:13-17; Mt 9:9-13; Lk 5:27-32.
90 Gen 1:26-28; 5:1-2; 9:6.
91 Crf. Claus Westermann, Genesis: An Introduction, trans. J. Scullion (Minneapolis,
Fortress Press, 1992), p. 111.
92 John Paul II, LE, 4.
93 The magisterial teaching of the Church invariably connects the image of God
concept as the basis for human dignity. See J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, eds.,
Christian Faith, op.cit., pp. 135-144.
94 Gen 1:26-31; 5:1-3; 9:1-7.
95 Freedom and responsibility are existentials of human existence as persons. See
Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of
Christianity, trans. W.V. Dych (New York, Crossroad, 1999), pp. 93-96.
96 John Paul II has often stressed this aspect: “The sense of the dignity of the
human person must be pondered and reaffirmed in stronger terms. A beneficial
trend is advancing and permeating all peoples of the earth, making them ever
more aware of the dignity of the individual: the person is not at all a “thing” or
an “object” to be used, but primarily a responsible “subject”, one endowed
with conscience and freedom, called to live responsibly in society and history
and oriented towards spiritual and religious values.” See John Paul II, Apostolic
Exhortation Christifideles Laici, 30 December 1988 (Vatican Polyglot Press), 5.
It will be henceforth referred as CL.
97 Gen 1:28-31.
98 Walter Kasper succinctly said it: “Man is a being related to God…his ally,
addressable by God and addressing to God.” Crf. L. Roos, “The Human person
and Human Dignity as Basis of the Social Doctrine of the Church”, in Principles
of Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., p. 54.
99  Ps 3:5.
human beings as persons by calling them into existence in God’s
image. In spite of sin, God remains committed to this bond of
communion that God established with the human family as God’s
image.100 God’s faithfulness to humankind as God’s image is the
heart of human dignity.101 Hence, humankind is destined to live in
communion with God and responsibly participate in the work of
God from which arises inalienable rights and duties that are inherent
in human nature in the protection of human dignity appropriate to
the divine image.102
God’s calling of men and women into existence as God’s image,
moreover, entails equality of all people in their nature as being human.
They are called to live in solidarity with others because as image of
God, human persons are relational-selves.103 This divine image,
which constitutes the nature of being human, “is passed on by man
and woman, as spouse and parents, to their descendants”.104
Therefore, in accordance with this divine calling of human beings,
the creator has empowered them with responsibility to order creation
in a manner appropriate to their dignity as the divine image on
earth.105
The doctrine of the image of God and its significance to human
dignity does not stop with Old Testament theology, but re-emerges
as a fundamental aspect of the New Testament theology, especially
in christology, soteriology and eschatology. It is because the creation
story in the book of Genesis106 only hints at the nature of the
resemblance of humans as image of God107 and leaves it there to a
large extent as a speculative insight, namely as a “non-historical
view.”108 However, in the context of salvation history, the image
concept finds its proper theological configuration in the Paschal
mystery of Jesus Christ, the Son of God incarnate,109 who as the
visible image of the invisible God110 called all people to share in the
filial relationship (sonship) of the Son111 so as to re-establish their
communion with God and with one another as God’s beloved
children112 for which every one is created in divine image.113
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100 Gen 5:1-3; 9:1-7.
101 Crf. M. Douglas Meeks, “Introduction”, in Jügen Moltmann on Human Dignity:
Political Theology and Ethics, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (London, SCM Press,
1984), p. xi.
102 This has been especially emphasized by the Pontifical Commission Justitia et
Pax in its first official document condemning racism in all forms. This document
condemns the various forms which racism has taken in the past or are current
even today. It suggests the application of the “principle of the equal dignity of
persons” to overcome racism. The document indicates that in Christine doctrine,
this equal dignity of persons is based on the revealed truth of the creation of all
human persons in God’s image and likeness, with the same nature and origin,
the same calling and destiny in Jesus Christ. This doctrine, which has been
often affirmed by the Magisterium (crf. GS, article 29), is here developed with
vigour. The document reads: “According to biblical revelation, God created the
human being - man and woman - in his image and likeness (cf. Gen. 1:26-27; 5:1-
2; 9:6). This bond between the human person and the Creator provides the
basis of his or her dignity and fundamental inalienable rights of which God is
the guarantor.  These personal rights obviously correspond to duties towards
others. Neither the individual nor society, the state or any human institution
can reduce a person or a group of persons to the status of an object.” (PCJP,
The Church and Racism: Towards A More Fraternal Society (1988), 19. Quoted
from The Christian Faith, op.cit., pp.143-144.
103 Gen 1:27b; see John C. Dwyer, op.cit., p. 734.
104 Crf. Gen 1:28a; 5:1-3; John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 15
August 1988 (Vatican Polyglot Press), n. 6.
105 Gen 1:26b, 28b-29.
106 Gen 1:26-28.
107 Jürgen Moltmann holds that the Gospel of Christ illumines the Old Testament
creation story. The true likeness of God in human beings is to be found not at
the beginning of God’s history with humankind, but at its end; and as its goal,
it is present in the beginning of salvation history and during every moment of
that history. See Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation, op.cit., pp. 223-224.
108 David L. Schindler, “Christology and the Imago Dei: Interpreting Gaudium et
Spes”, in Communio, 23 (Spring 1996), p.158.
109 Jn 1:1-18; Phil 2: 6-11; Col 1:15-20; Eph 1:3-13.
110 Col 1:15-20; Heb 1:1-3.
111 Crf. Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15.
112 Crf. Jn 1: 12; 1 Jn 3:1-3.
113 What is involved here is a process of christologization, i.e., the christological
interpretation of the image doctrine of the creation story. Various christological
approaches can be followed in giving interpretation to the image of God doctrine
in the light of the mystery of Christ, namely the salvation history approach,
the eschatological approach and the anthropological approach, etc. Oscar
Cullmann represents the salvation history approach. According to this approach,
the Christ event is situated in the overall economy of God’s way of dealing with
humankind throughout history in terms of God’s self-revelation and self-gift.
Hence, according to Cullmann, the Christ event from incarnation to Paschal
The image of God inscribed in the saving mission of Jesus is
that of a God who, in his parental concern for all people, has
indissolubly bound his self in a bond of self-giving love in the
affirmation of human existence created in the divine image.114 The
saving mission of Jesus reveals in historical form God’s faithfulness
to the bond of communion that he established with human beings at
the time of creation and God’s infinite readiness to suffer for the
sake of re-establishing that bond of communion with the human
family to which every one is created in their dignity as God’s children.
Hence, according to the christological hermeneutic of the image
doctrine in the New Testament, the realisation of the meaning of
humankind’s original status as creatures in God’s image begins, in
the subjective order of existence, with one’s life in Christ. In Pauline
language it is known as being “conformed to the image”115 of God’s
Son or “changed into his likeness”116 or “renewed in knowledge
after the image of its creator,”117 which is justification and filiation
– that is, making them children of God in the Son,118 whose finality
is the eschatological glorification of the entire person in the glory of
the Risen Christ.119 Such is the dignity of the human persons that
they are created in God’s image, redeemed by Christ and destined
for the glorification in the glory of Christ.
2.4.3. Image of God and Human Dignity in the Tradition of
 the Church
The purpose of our study in this section of our investigation is to
indicate the importance of the doctrine of imago Dei for human
dignity in the tradition of the Church. For this purpose, we highlight
some theological developments of historic importance about the
image of God concept from the Patristic period to the contemporary
times and their significance to human dignity in the Christian thought.
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mystery is not only the real centre of history but also the dynamic principle of
intelligibility of the entire historical process. Consequently, what precedes the
Christ event is oriented towards it as evangelical preparation; what follows
after it falls under the unfolding process of the potentialities of the event in the
time of the Church [See Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time (London, SCM
Press, 1965)]. The eschatological approach is very much represented in the
recent time by J. Moltmann. For him the entire history of humankind tends
towards the realization of a divine plan (divine promise / divine intention) of an
eschatological salvation. In this perspective, the death and resurrection of Jesus
is the prolepsis of the eschaton. In this model, the Christ event is irreplaceable,
but the focal point of the entire salvation history is the eschaton, that is, the
consummation of the entire creation in the glory of Christ on the last day. He
uses this model in his interpretation of the creation story of Genesis according
to which the original designation of human beings as imago Dei gains meaning
only in the light of imago Christi who as the raised and transfigured Messiah
reveals the true image of God. But imago Christi is only the prolepsis of the
eschatological glorification of humankind as divine image in the Gloria Dei [See
J.Moltmann, op.cit; pp. 215-228; see also one of his important works in the
recent time, J. Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ. Christology in Messianic
Dimensions (London, SCM Press, 1990)]. The anthropological approach may
take different forms. We consider here Karl Rahner’s philosophico-theological
approach, the well-known “Transcendental Christology”. Rahner argues that
from a philosophical point of view humankind is open to self-transcendence in
God and capable of receiving the free gift of God’s self-communication. From
theological point of view he holds that humankind is created by God and
destined for divine-human communion. Hence, we concretely and actively tend
towards the realization of such a self-transcendence which he terms as
“supernatural existential”. The supernatural existential, which inheres in us,
constitutes the a priori condition for the possibility of the incarnation of the
Son of God. Therefore, the Mystery of Christ is what happens if God
gratuitously brings to pass the realization of this deepest longing, which is
inherent to human nature. Hence, christology becomes the perfect realization
of anthropology in so far as in Jesus Christ the divine-human communion is
actualised and, therefore, in him the mystery of being human or the mystery of
being created in the divine image is revealed.     [See K. Rahner, Foundations of
Christian faith, op.cit., pp. 116-138, 203-227; Ibid, “On the Theology of
Incarnation”, in Theological Investigations, vol.4 (London, Darton, Longman
and Todd, 1974), pp. 105-120].
114 Crf. Jn 3:16-17; 2 Cor 5:19. See also J. Dupuis, op.cit., pp.141, 170; Edward
Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture: Mysticism, Ethics and Politics,
trans. J. Bowden (London, SCM Press, 1987), pp. 15-26.
115 Rom 8:29.
116 2 Cor 3:18.
117 Col 3:10.
118 Crf. Rom 8: 17.
119 The entire chapter 15 of St. Paul’s First letter to the Corinthians speaks about
the Christian hope of resurrection and final glorification in the glory of Christ.
In 1 Cor 15:20-28, Paul describes Adam-Christ typology to present Christ’s
resurrection as the guarantee of the eschatological general resurrection. In 1 Cor
15:49 Paul connects the image of Christ with the resurrected new humanity by
means of an Adam-Christ typology with its correlate last-Adam Christology.
A certain methodological difficulty arises in dealing with this subject
in its historical perspective during these two millennial stretches of
time.
First of all, from the Patristic time to the modern age, there is
no extensive elaboration and proliferation of thought about image
doctrine between one leading theologian to another. Secondly, there
is also no clear line of development of thought from century to
century. Nevertheless, the image of God doctrine is all pervasive,
especially in the writings of the Fathers of the Church and in the
theology of the Middle Ages. John E. Sullivan, who has done an
extensive study on this subject as developed during the Patristic
period, commends:
In the theology of Augustine, as in the teaching of all the
Fathers (and especially the Greek Fathers), the theme of
the image is truly a central one. Here can be seen at the
same time Christology and Trinitarian theology…
anthropology and psychology, the theology of creation and
grace, the problem of nature and supernature, the mystery
of divinization, the theology of the spiritual life, the laws of
its development and progress.120
Thus to embark on an investigation into each leading
theologian’s contribution seems not required and also not possible
for our purpose. We have to make a choice of method to organise
the material needed in this section of our study based on some
principles. Accordingly, we have selected the works of some leading
theologians whose writings were instrumental to checkmate the
spread of certain ideas of the time which were detrimental to human
dignity.121 We have also chosen the works of some theologians
whose contributions brought clarity of thought to the image doctrine
as well as highlighted the ethical policies affirming human dignity.122
This in view, we have selected for our study the contributions of
Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Gregory of
Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.123
For contemporary period, we have chosen some innovative
popular theological trends of historic importance wherein image
concept has been a catalyst for the development and justification
of these thought. These are, namely Theology of Liberation, Feminist
Theology and Echo-theology. Finally we have chosen some social
encyclicals of the Popes in which the image concept has been a
rallying point for the social teaching of the Church. For this purpose
we have chosen the following encyclicals: Rerum Novarum (1891),
Quadragesimo Anno (1931), Mater et Magistra (1961), Pacem
in Terris (1963), Populorum Progressio (1967), Laborem
120 John Edward Sullivan, The Image of God: the Doctrine of St. Augustine and its
Influence (Dubuque, Priory, 1963), p.69.
121 The oldest concern with regard to the doctrine of creation is the doctrinal
assertion of the one God, Creator of heaven and earth. Related to this affirmation
is the struggle against all forms of dualistic conception of the world. It is
incompatible with the biblical concept of God that the material universe, and
consequently also the human body, be excluded from God’s creation and
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considered as evil, as caused by the realm of darkness. Hence, the Church’s
relentless defence against all forms of Manichaeism and Gnosticism which
continued to prevail right unto the middle ages. At the same time, while affirming
God’s intimate union with his creatures, and in an unique manner with humankind
created in God’s image, the Church kept insisting on the divine transcendence
so that the dividing line between the infinite and the finite may never be blurred
as against all sorts of pantheism and emanationism which kept exerting their
decisive influence right up to the modern times (see The Christian Faith, op.cit.,
pp. 125-135).
122 In this regard, the contribution of St. Thomas Aquinas is of great importance.
Insisting on the goodness of creation, Aquinas recognized a considerable role
for human reason as a source of moral wisdom and knowledge. His theory of
natural law exemplifies a teleological rather than a deontological model. For St.
Thomas the end plays the primary role in morality. His view is that human
being must strive to attain the true end of all of the God-given inclinations and
powers, namely passions, intellect and will, which make up human nature and
which reveals the divine image in the human being. See Summa Theologiae, I a
II a, q.90-97. On the moral significance of the image of God in the thought of
Aquinas, see Michael A. Dauphinais, “Loving the Lord your God: The Imago
Dei in Saint Thomas Aquinas”, in The Thomist, 63 (1999), pp. 241-2467.
123 Some works of these theologians were also mentioned in the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, of the
Second Vatican Council, which explains that human dignity is founded on the
theology of Image of God. See for example St. Augustine’s Confession I, 1(PL
32, 661) in GS, article 21; St Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses, V, 36, 1(PG 7, 1222)
in GS, article 39; St. Thomas’ Ethica Lect.1, in GS, article 25, etc.
Exercens (1981), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), and
Centesimus Annus (1991).
2.4.3.1. The Eastern Development of the Doctrine
Irenaeus is the first among the Fathers of the Church who had
much to say on the doctrine of image of God and human dignity.
His contribution to Christian anthropology had a lasting impact on
later thinkers. One of the most important questions asked in the
history of interpretation of the image of God concept is the extent
to which humankind was corrupted by the fall;124 and whether it is
possible to designate divine image to humans after the fall, and if
so in what sense? In this connection, Irenaeus has been regarded
as the theologian who, in his exegesis of Gen 1: 26, made a
distinction between image (imago) and likeness (similitudo).125
He held that likeness (similitudo) be construed as the human
person’s original righteousness which was lost after the fall, while
image (imago) be taken to mean the divine image in humans which
still continues to exist.126
For Irenaeus the divine image in human beings means the divine
bestowal of human nature endowed with reason and freedom which
is not lost by the sin but found universally in all people.127 This
becomes clear in his approach to divine justice against the wicked.
He comments:
But man, being endowed with reason, and in this respect
like to God, having been made free in his will, and with power
over himself, is himself the cause to himself, that sometimes
he becomes wheat, and sometimes chaff. Wherever also he
shall be justly condemned because, having been created a
rational being, he lost the true rationality, and living irrationally,
opposed the righteousness of God, giving himself over to
every…earthly spirit and serving all lusts.128
Again in another place while commenting on the place of Adam
after the fall, Irenaeus stresses on the retention of reason and
freedom with which humankind is endowed as image of God. He
says, “For never at any time did Adam escape the hands of God.”129
In Irenaean language “the hand of the Father” and “the hands of
God” are Trinitarian terms referring to the Son and the Holy Spirit.130
For Irenaeus, God in himself is true reason and human rationality is
a participation in the divine reason. This means that just as Adam,
all are endowed with the dignity of spiritual nature, which is to be
construed as reason, freedom, and responsibility with which humans
are capable of deciding their destiny and to have communion with
God.
Irenaeus affirms the substantial unity of the human person. He
says that, as image of God, human being is a totality of body, soul
and spirit.131 He explains that the human person is composed of
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124 Almost a century ago, W.H. Robinson pointed out, “The theory of the fall
occupied a place as central and unquestioned in the Christian anthropology up
to the modern era as the theory of evolution occupies in any discussion of
human nature at the present times. Wheeler H. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine
of Man (Edinburgh, 1913), p. 164; as quoted in Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson, The
Image of God, op.cit., p. 12.
125 It is generally held today by most of the Bible scholars that Irenaeus’ exegesis
to Gen 1: 26 is based on a wrong premise. For detail see David Cairns, op.cit.,
p. 28.
126 Irenaeus says, “But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is
indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being,
possessing indeed the image in his formation, but not receiving the similitude
through the Spirit, and thus is this being imperfect.” Adversus Haereses 5.6.1,
in Johannes Quasten, Patrology, op.cit., vol.1, p.309. David Cairns in his exegesis
of Irenaeus’ text explains that for Irenaeus the man “of an animal nature” means
the natural man after the Fall, who has still the image, while a special gift of the
Spirit is needed to perfect him, and give him the likeness or similitude which
was lost at the Fall (See David Cairns, op.cit., p. 81). According to one common
variety of this line of interpretation is that imago means the human nature,
which cannot be lost, while similitudo means human person’s original relation
to God, which may be lost. However, similitudo has been lost since Adam. See
Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt:  A Christian Anthropology (London, Lutterworth
Press, 1939), p. 505.
127 It is significant to note that after Irenaeus, Christian thinkers generally held
that reason, freedom and moral responsibility as essential qualities of being
human, rooted in the soul, i.e., rooted in the bestowal of image of God in human
beings. See J.H. Walgrave, “Man’s Self-understanding in Christian Theology”,
in Louvain Studies, vol. VI (Spring 1974), p.49.
128 Adversus Haereses 4.4.3. See also David Cairns, op.cit., pp. 81-82.
129 Adversus Haereses 5.1.3. See also David Cairns, ibid., p. 88.
130 See David Cairns, p.88.
131 Irenaeus follows the Platonic anthropology of trichotomy where body, soul
“a body taken from the earth and a soul which receives from
God his spirit.”132 Having a body, the person is naturally inclined
towards perishable things; having a spirit, the person is naturally
turned towards the immortal God. According to Irenaeus, the
spirit is mixed with the soul as he says elsewhere:
For by the hand of Father, that is, by the Son and the Spirit,
man, and not merely a part of man, was made in the likeness
of God. Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a part of
the man, but certainly not the man; for the perfect man
consists in the commingling and the union of the soul receiving
the Spirit of the Father, and the mixture of that fleshly nature
which was also moulded after the image of God…Neither is
the soul itself, considered apart by itself, the man; but it is
the soul of a man and part of a man. Neither is the spirit a
man, for it is called the spirit, and not a man; but the
commingling and union of all three constitutes the perfect
man.133
It must be noted that Irenaeus stressed on the unity of body-
soul-spirit composition of person to highlight on the dignity of the
whole person as image of God as against Gnostics, who promoted
the view that matter was intrinsically evil originating from an evil
principle. For Irenaeus God creates the whole person. Moreover,
in his christology, Irenaeus insists that Jesus Christ, the divine Son
incarnate, took on a body, not only to redeem humankind but more
precisely to be our perfect image or exemplar according to which
humankind is fashioned. According to Irenaeus humankind is made
not directly in the image of God the Father but according to the
image of Jesus Christ, divine Son incarnate.134
Irenaeus’ emphasis on the dignity of human person as image
of God becomes explicit in his Christocentric anthropology written
against the Gnostics. The passage reads:
And then again, this Word was manifested when the Word
of God was made man, assimilating himself to man and man
to himself, that by means of his resemblance to the Son,
man might become precious to the Father. For in times long
past, it was said that man was created after the image of
God. Wherefore also he did easily lose the similitude. When,
however, the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed both
these, for he both showed forth the image truly, since he
became himself what was his image, and he re-established
the similitude after a sure manner, by assimilating man to the
invisible Father through means of the visible Word.135
David Cairns observes that this line of thought is in harmony
with Irenaeus’ reaction to the most prevalent thought of the time,
that is, Gnosticism,136 which in its various forms, devalued human
persons in their physical nature. On the contrary, Irenaeus stressed
that, as God’s image the whole of human person is precious to God
and, therefore, destined for redemption. This is one of his valuable
and enduring contributions to the value of human dignity in Christian
thought.
Like Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria asserted the universality
of divine image in all people137 against the Gnostic teaching of
Valentinus and Basilides who held that only some were of divine
origin. Consequently, these were superior to others in the society
by birth and in the enjoyment of spiritual destiny.138  This was the
and the spirit are considered to be three functions within the human whole. The
platonic approach has been generally followed by the Greek Fathers of the
Alexandrian school. See J. Kirchmeyer, ” La Vocation de l’homme” in
Dictionnnaire de Spiritualite, op.cit., vol. VI, col.813.
132 Adversus Haereses 3.22.1, in Johannes Quasten, Patrology, op.cit., vol.1,
p.308.
133 Adversus Haereses 5.6.1, in Johannes Quasten, Patrology. op.cit., vol.1, p.309-
310.
134 George A. Maloney, Man, the Divine Icon: The Patristic Doctrine of Man
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Made according to the Image of God (New Mexico, Dove Publications, 1973),
p. 37.
135 Adversus Haereses 5.16.2, as quoted in David Cairns, op.cit., p. 82.
136 Regarding the impact of Gnosticism on Christian thought and Christian Gnostics
see Johannes Quasten, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 254-275.
137 Protreptikos, 120.3 & 4, as quoted in David Cairns, op.cit., p.89.( Protreptikos
are  the exhortations of St. Clement of Alexandria written to the Greeks for
conversion to Christianity).
138 John Quasten, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 256-257,260-261.
most prevalent thought in the city of Alexandria at the time
Clement. Just as Irenaeus, Clemet’s writing located the divine image
to human reason universally found in all humankind.139
Contrary to the divisive anthropology of the Gnostic thought,
Clement preached the values of human dignity and egalitarian world
order founded on the theological principles of the unity of divine
will in creation and universality of salvation for all in the Paschal
mystery of Christ, the incarnate image of the invisible God. Arnold
Struker,140 who had done a detailed study of the image of God
doctrine as developed by the Fathers of the Church during the
early centuries, pointed out that the Fathers identified the divine
image common to all humankind in “the spiritual likeness between
God and man revealing itself through reason and freedom”141
Athanasius proposed a theory of anthropology based on the
Logos- theology of Johannine prologue (Jn 1: 1-18). According to
Athanasius, humankind’s special affinity to the eternal Logos is the
foundation for human dignity that is universally applicable to all
people. He held that humans were image and likeness of God
through their special participation in the Logos that gave them the
possibility and desire to know God. Commenting on Athanasius’
theory of anthropology, Walgrave writes, “There is in the nous, the
soul’s faculty of knowing, something by which he has a special
affinity with God. In virtue of this divine seed, immortality and
deification, although not attainable by man’s efforts, but freely given
by God, are the proper object of his inner dynamism”.142
Athanasius claimed that the mystery of the redemptive
incarnation of Jesus Christ, the eternal Logos, further reveals the
greatness of human beings in the plan of God. In De Incarnatione
Athanasius explains, “He was made man that we might be made
God…and He manifested Himself by a body that we might receive
the idea of the unseen Father; and He endured the insolence of
men that we might inherit immortality.”143
Gregory of Nyssa had the most decisive influence in the later
development of Christian anthropology in Greek theology.144 In
contrast to the ancient Greek philosophical idea that human person
is a microcosm, Gregory comments that human being is much more
than an imitation of the material universe. A human being’s
excellence and greatness rests “not upon his likeness to the created
universe, but upon the fact that he has been made in the image of
the nature of the creator”145
According to Gregory of Nyssa, a human being is the faithful
image (eikon) of God by possessing reason, freedom and
supernatural grace. To create human beings in God’s image means
that God has made human nature as participation in all good.
Commenting on Gregory of Nyssa’s interpretation of the divine
eikon in human beings, Walgraeve observes that there is “in man
certain connaturality with God,”146 which Gregory describes in a
glowing manner in his commentary on the beatitude, “Blessed are
the pure in heart, for they shall see God” (Mt 5:8). Gregory of
Nyssa explains:
I think that in this short saying the Word expresses some
such counsel as this: There is in you human beings, a desire
to contemplate the true good. But when you hear that the
Divine Majesty is exalted above the heaven…and Its nature
inaccessible, do not despair of ever beholding what you desire.
It is indeed within your reach…For He who made you did at
the same time endow your nature with that wonderful quality.
For God imprinted in it the likeness of the glories of His
143 De Incarnatione 54, in J. Quasten, op.cit., vol. III, p. 71.
144 Gregory of Nyssa’s theological reflection on the mystery of human existence
is given in his work De opificio hominis which contains his anthropological,
physiological and theological interpretation of Genesis 1:26. See Johannes
Quasten, Patrology, vol. 3, p. 290.
145 De opificio hominis XVI (PG 44, 180 A), in Johannes Quasten, Patrology, vol.
3, p.292.
146 J.H. Walgraeve, op.cit., p. 53.
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139 Protreptikos, 98.4, as quoted in David Cairns, op.cit., p. 90.
140 Crf. Edward Mason Curtis, Man as the Image of God in Genesis in the Light
of Ancient Near Eastern Parallels (UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1984),
pp. 20 -22.
141 Ibid., p. 21.
142 J.H. Walgraeve, op.cit., p. 53.
nature, as if moulding the form of a carving into wax. But
the evil that has been poured all around the nature beating
the Divine Image has rendered useless to you this wonderful
thing that lies hidden under vile coverings. If, therefore, you
wash off by a good life the filth that has been stuck on your
heart like plaster, the Divine beauty will again shine forth in
you.147
Hence, Gregory concludes that a human being is the greatest
of all things known “because none of the existing things has been
made in the likeness of God except that creature which is man.”148
In Gregory’s thought, we have a theologically advanced
anthropology of the Eastern Church that expresses in a profound
manner the greatness and invaluable dignity of human beings as
image of God.
2.4.3.2. The Western Development of the Doctrine
The Western theological thought on the imago Dei began with
Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, because prior to him there wasn’t
any significant attempt made on the subject in the Western theological
tradition. Augustine’s influential work is presented in his great work
on the Trinity (De Trinitate)149 Augustine brought out the
psychological and moral aspects of the imago Dei doctrine as seen
from the perspective of the spiritual realisation of God who is Triune.
He located the divine image in the rational faculty of the immortal
soul. Augustine says, “[T]he human soul is never anything save
rational or intellectual, and hence, if it is made in the image of
God…that it is able to use reason and intellect in order to understand
and behold God.”150
According to him, certain initial knowledge of God belongs to
human nature as such, which drives human beings on the path to
discover God and become like God. Augustine, moreover, held the
view that since God is Triune, human reason in its manner of
operation must have Trinity like character, which he identified as
memory,151 understanding and will (memoria, intelligentia,
voluntas). Resulting from this interpretation, he defined the
universal image of God inherent to human nature as the power or
capacity to remember, know and love God (capax Dei). Augustine
says:
[A]lthough worn out and defaced by losing the participation
of God, yet the image of God still remains. For it is His image
in this very point, that it is capable of Him; which so great
good is only made possible by its being His image. Well,
then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we
discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but
now at last an image of God…This trinity, then of the mind,
is not therefore the image of God, because the mind
remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but
because it can also remember, understand and love him by
whom it was made.152
It is this mystery of human persons created in the image of the
Triune God, which is wonderfully summarised in Augustine’s well-
known words, “fecisti nos ad te (our very being is a being-towards-
God) et irrequietum est cor nostrum (the movement of restless
cogitation and desire of the heart) donec requiscat in te (the final
rest in you).153 Augustine’s thought awakens in the hearts of men
and women for ages the wonder and awe at the greatness and
dignity of human persons created in the image of the Triune God.
In his work on the doctrine of the imago Dei, Thomas Aquinas
largely adopted what Augustine had taught, making it more explicit
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147 De Beatitudinibus. Oratio VI (PG 44, 1267-1271), in Johannes Quasten,
Patrology, vol. 3, p. 294.
148 De opificio hominis XVI (PG 44, 180 A), in John Quasten, Patrology, vol. III,
p. 293.
149 See Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 12. For discussion of Augustine’s doctrine
of the image of God, see David Cairns, op. cit., pp. 93-101.
150 De Trinitate, XIV, ch.8, in Philip Schaff, A Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Michigan, Grand Rapids,
Eerdmans, 1956), vol. 3, p. 189.
151 For Augustine ‘memory’ does not mean the capacity to remember the past
only. It has got a special meaning in his thought, which means the “self as a
reflective subject”. See David Cairns, op.cit., p. 102.
152 De Trinitate, XIV, ch.8, in Philip Schaff, op.cit., vol. 3, p. 189.
153 English translation as rendered by J. H. Walgraeve, op. cit., p.55.
in intellectual and psychological terms so as to fit it into his
elaborate system of thought in Aristotelian language.154 The
theological foundation of Thomas’ approach to the imago Dei
doctrine is the theory of analogy of being. God is being, and therefore
all created things image him in a certain degree. But Thomas held
that God’s image is not to be found, strictly speaking, in non-rational
beings. For Thomas Aquinas the image of God in humans consists
in their intellectual nature. He says, “Some things are like God first
and most generally inasmuch as they exist, some inasmuch as they
have life, and a third class inasmuch as they have mind or
intelligence.”155
When asked whether God’s image is universal to all humankind
Thomas answers:
We must say that when man is said to be made in the image
of God in virtue of his intellectual nature, he is chiefly in
God’s image. His intellectual nature chiefly imitates God in
this that God understands and loves himself. Whence the
image of God can be considered three ways in man. In one
way, according as man has a natural aptitude for
understanding and loving God and this aptitude consists in
the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men.
In another way, according as man by act of habit knows
God and loves him, but imperfectly, and this is the image by
conformity by grace.
And in the third way according as man knows and loves
God in act perfectly and this is the image according to the
likeness of glory.156
David Cairns suggests that these three senses of the image as
described by Aquinas refer to the biblical understanding of divine
image in humankind.157 Aquinas’ first sense of the image specifies
the Old Testament concept of image that refers to the common
humanity shared by all people endowed with spiritual quality as of
rationality. The second sense of the image points out exclusively to
the New Testament concept of image that believers are conformed
by grace into the image of Christ.158 This involves an active
participation on their part into the life of Christ. The third sense of
the image denotes life in Christ in a full and perfect way in glory.
St. Thomas Aquinas located the divine image in the soul whose
nature is intellectual and which does not exclude the image of the
Trinity. He argued that rational beings tend in a certain way to a
specific representation of God.159 Aquinas compared the thought
of the intellect (the thinking self) and the love that emerges from it
with the Trinitarian processions and, therefore, analogically imaged
the Trinity in the human intellect. He says, “We must, therefore,
say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the
Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of persons; for also in
God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.”160
Hence, Thomas saw the meaning of divine image in humankind
through the Aristotelian thought form, which views reason as the
essential quality that defines the universality of human nature.161
Suffice for our purpose to point out that the divine image as referred
to in the book of Genesis162 is regarded in the Scholastic thought as
the rational capacity of the human person, which is construed as
universal divine endowment. This Scholastic position implies that
by virtue of this divine endowment, all are born equal in dignity;
and they are responsible partners before God to order life in
accordance with laws ordained in nature, which is known through
reason.163
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154 The elaboration of Thomas Aquinas on the doctrine of the image of God in
humankind is given in his work: Summa Theologica, I a, q.93; q.35; 2a, 2ae,
q.175, a.1 ad 2. De Veritate q.10, a.7; De Potentia q.9, a.9. Contra Gentiles IV,
26.
155 Summa Theologica, 1, 93, 2.
156 Summa Theologica, 1, 93, 4.
157 David Cairns, pp. 121-126.
158  Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 3:18.
159  Contra Gentiles III, 25.
160 Summa Theologica 1a,q.93, a.5
161 For a perceptive theological critique on Thomas Aquinas’ approach to image
as reason, see David Cairns, op. cit., pp.116-126.
162 Gen 1:26-28.
163 Natural law is understood in the Thomistic tradition in relation to eternal law.
Consequent to Scholastic thought,164 the Catholic moral
theological tradition has consistently accorded primacy to natural
law known by reason as an expression of the nature of the human
person. The whole realm of the ethical dimension of human life
eventually began to enjoy autonomy due to the importance accorded
to reason with which every human person is endowed. It was also
instrumental to recognise the legitimate autonomy of the secular
order from the sacred in the political society.165 In concluding our
study of Thomas Aquinas’ contribution to the concept of image of
God, we note that he distinguished between the natural image that
is retained by all and the supernatural image, which is restored to
those who are led by faith to live in Christ.166
During the last one hundred years or so, the biblical concept of
imago Dei, moreover, attracted Bible scholars and systematic
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Eternal law is God’s plan or God’s ordering for the world. Natural law is the
participation of eternal law in the rational creature. It means by reflecting on
creation we can know how God wants us to act or what constitutes our own
flourishing and happiness in accordance with the dignity of being human (See
Summa Theologica, I a II ae, q.91, a2). For further explanation see Charles E.
Curran, Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present (Washington, D.C., Georgetown
University Press, 2002), p.25. For a discussion on different contemporary
understanding of Thomas Aquinas and natural law, see Charles E. Curran and
Richard A. McCormick, eds., Natural Law and Theology: Reading in Moral
Theology No.7 (New York, Paulist press, 1991), pp. 101-463.
164 The Council of Trent adopted the Scholastic doctrine of human person as
synthesized by St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica as the official position of
the Catholic Church. See John E. Sullivan, op.cit., p. 296. In the nineteenth-
century, in opposition to Enlightenment, which propagated absolute autonomy
of the human person, Pope Leo XIII called for the re-establishment of Thomism,
known as neo-Scholasticism, as the Catholic philosophy and theology. For
detail see James Hennessey, “Leo XXIII’s Thomistic Revival: A Political and
Philosophical Event”, in Celebrating the Medieval Heritage: A Colloquy on the
Thought of Aquinas and Bonaventure, ed., David Tracy, Journal of Religion,
No. 58 (Supplement, 1978), pp. 85-197; Victor B. Brezik, ed., One Hundred
Years of Thomism: Aeterni Patris and Afterwards, A Symposium (Houston,
Centre for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, 1981).
165 See S. Arokiasamy, “Religious Pluralism & Secularism - Ethical and Theological
Perspective” in Secularism in Indian Context, Commission for Justice, Peace
and Development, op.cit., p.62.
166 Crf. Summa Theologica 1, 93, 4; see also Edward M. Curtis, op.cit., p.23.
theologians of all denominations on account of its significance to
human dignity in the Christian thought.167 During this long span of
time, whenever the concept of imago Dei came for detailed
theological treatment, it is taken to mean the universal human nature
endowed with spiritual likeness between God and humankind
revealing itself in reason and freedom, and in virtue of which all
are born free and equal in their nature and dignity as being human.168
However, the Christian exegetes and theologians add to the image
concept soteriological and christological significance. They point
167 We refer to some of the works on this subject written in English. A complete
study of the biblical scholarship from the time of Wellhausenian School (1882-
1918) to date has been provided by Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson in his recently
published doctoral research work. See Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson, op.cit., pp. 15-
225; Edward M. Curtis, Man as the Image of God in Genesis in the Light of
Ancient Near Eastern Parallels, op.cit., David Cairns, The Image of God in
Man, op.cit ; George A. Maloney, Man, the Divine Icon: The Patristic Doctrine
of Man Made According to the Image of God, op.cit ; John E. Sullivan, The
Image of God: the Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence, op.cit; Charles
Francis D. Moule, Man and Nature in the New Testament: Some Reflections on
Biblical Ecology (Philadelphia, Fortress press, 1967);  A. O. Erhueh, Vatican II:
Image of God in Man: An Inquiry into the Theological Foundations and
Significance of Human Dignity in the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the
Modern World, Gaudium Et Spes, op.cit., Rene Latourelle, Man and His Problem
in the Light of Jesus Christ, trans. M.J. O’Connell, (New York Alba House,
1983.) ; John Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity: A Theological and
Philosophical Approach (SCM Press, London1982); Jürgen Moltmann, On
Human Dignity, Political Theology and Ethics ( London, Fortress press/ SCM
Press,1984);  Geores Crespy, , “The Image of Man According to Vatican II and
Uppsala 1968”, in Concilium, No.9, (1973), pp. 103-110; Anton Strukelj,
“Man and Woman under God: The dignity of the human being according to
Hans Urs Von Balthasar”, in Communio, vol. 20 (Summer 1993), pp. 377-388;
Joseph Ratzinger, “Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the notion of person
in theology”, in Communio (Fall 1990), pp. 439-464; Lawrence J. Welch, ,
“Gaudium et Spes, the Divine Image, and the Synthesis of Veritastis splendor”,
in Communio, vol.24 (Winter 1997), pp. 794-814; Walter Kasper, “The
theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes,” in Communio, vol. XXIII, No.1
(Spring 1996), pp. 129-140 ; David L. Schindler, “Christology and Imago Dei:
Interpreting Gaudium et Spes”, ibid, pp. 156-184; The Discourse Of Human
Dignity, eds., Ammicht-Quinn, Regina, Junker-Kerry, Maureen and Tamez,
Elsa, Concilium, No.2 (2003).
168 Crf. Curtis, op.cit., p.21; C.F. Keil, Genesis, in Commentary on the Old Testament
( English trans., 1976), p.63; Quoted in Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson, op.cit., p.14.
out that only in the mystery of Christ, the perfect image of the
invisible God, can the true meaning of humankind created in the
divine image be understood.169
2.4.3.3. The Image of God doctrine in the Contemporary
    Theology
The concept of image of God is an important source for
contemporary theological thought when theology is called upon to
deal with matters of human dignity, equality and social responsibility.
This is evident from the contemporary theological discourse on
human rights, ecology, feminist movements and social justice. In
dealing with the matters of human rights, theologians argue that, as
image of God, human beings are persons before God. They own
responsibility before God. Therefore, a person’s rights and duties
are inalienable and indivisible.
In the contemporary debate on ecological crisis, some scholars
have directly attacked the image of God passages from the Book
of Genesis. They feel that these passages are responsible for
creating in the Western mind the sense of domination over nature,
which in the long run caused environmental hazard.170 On the
contrary, most Bible scholars and theologians believe that the image
of God concept entails that human beings are called by God to
assume ecological responsibility to protect the integrity of creation
befitting to human dignity as trustees of God’s creation.171 Similarly,
the feminist theologians, who often find themselves disappointed in
their search to find out biblical sources in the Old Testament in
support of gender equality and dignity, claim that they have found a
theological source in Gen 1: 27 in which a correct concept of gender
equality and dignity may be built.172
The image of God concept has played a decisive role as a
theological premise in the Liberation theology movement,173 which
began in the early 1970s in Latin America. Its aim is to conscientize
the poor of that continent against abject poverty and to reclaim
their rightful place in the society worthy of human dignity. Gustavo
Gutierrez, in his work, highlights three theological reasons for the
rejection of poverty and all kinds of dehumanisation. He says that
firstly, it is against the Mosaic religion of liberation that led the
people from slavery to freedom in order that “they could live with
human dignity.”174 Secondly, it is “against the mandate of Genesis
(1:26; 2:15). Man is created in the image and likeness of God and is
destined to dominate the earth.”175 Thirdly, he insists that “man not
only has been made in the image and likeness of God, he is also the
sacrament of God.”176 The theological conclusion is obvious: any
act of dehumanisation infringing on human dignity is an offence
against God.
2.4.3.4. The Image of God Doctrine in the Social Teaching
    of the Church
In this section we take a cursory glance at the contemporary Catholic
social teaching177 as found in the papal encyclicals, beginning with
172 Phyllis Bird, “Male and Female He created them: Gen 1:27b in the Context of
the P Account of Creation”, in Hythrope Theological Review, no. 74 (1981),
pp. 129-159; John C. L. Gibson shares the view that “the Church has still a
long way to go before it measures up to the standard of Gen 1:27, where male
and female together are appointed as God’s representatives.” Quoted in
Gunnlaugur A. Jonsson, op.cit., and p.185.
173 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. & eds., C. Inda and J.
Eagleosn (New York, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1973). Gutierrez book has been
considered as a classic of this genre of theology.
174 Ibid., p. 294.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Many excellent works on Catholic social teaching are available: John A. Coleman,
ed., One Hundred Years of catholic Social Thought (New York, Orbis Books,
Maryknoll, 1991); Peter J. Henriot, E.P. De Berri and M.J. Schulteis, Catholic
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169  David Cairns, op.cit., pp. 121-127; Walter Kasper, “The Theological
Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”, op.cit., p. 137; Pedro Morande, “The
Relevance of the Message of Gaudium et Spes today: The Church’s mission in
the midst of epochal changes and new challenges”, in Communio 23 (Spring
1996), pp. 150- 151; G.S., 22.
170 See for instance, Lynn White’s claim in his article “The Historical Roots of Our
Ecological Crisis”, in Science, 145(1967), pp.1203-1207.
171 John F. A. Sawyer, “The meaning of beselem elohim (in the image of God) in
Genesis I-XI”, in Journal of Theological Studies, 25 (1974), pp.418-426; Bernard
W. Anderson, “Creation and Ecology”, in Bernard W. Anderson, ed., Creation
in the Old Testament (London / Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 1-24.
the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII written in 1891.178
The reason to include this area of study in the general body of our
work is threefold. Firstly, since the publication of Rerum Novarum
in 1891,179 the concept of human dignity gained an ever-increasing
importance in the social teaching of the ecclesiastical Magisterium
in dealing with matters of socio-economic, political and cultural
issues as part of pastoral ministry of the Church to promote integral
human development and humanisation of the world.
Secondly, the Church’s magisterial teaching on social issues is
based on an anthropological vision that is theological in origin. It
means that human persons are ontologically endowed with a dignity,
which is totally unique, because they are created in the image of
God and redeemed by Christ.180 Thirdly, in the social encyclicals,
the universal divine image in human persons is taken to mean the
universal human nature endowed with reason and free will. It is a
position held by the Patristic as well as the Scholastic traditions.
Hence, the social teaching of the Church consistently stresses that,
as image of God, every human being is a person endowed with
reason and freedom and by virtue of which every one has rights
and duties of one’s own, flowing directly and simultaneously from
one’s very nature. These are universal, inviolable and inalienable
which should constitute the criterion for a well-organised society in
defence of human dignity.181
2.4.3.4.1. Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum (1891)
In responding to the problems raised by the industrial Revolution,182
Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum183  written in 1891
saw in human dignity the norm and standard by which the political,
social, and economic structures of society are to be judged. In an
increasingly industrialised Europe, the management sector of
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Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret (New York, Obis Books, Maryknoll,
1992); Charles E. Curran, Directions in Catholic Social Ethics (Indiana,
University of Notre Dam Press, 1985); Idem, Catholic Social Thought 1891-
Present, op.cit; David A. Boileau, Principles of Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit;
Donald Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching
( New York, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1983); David J. O’Brien and Thomas J.
Shannon, eds., Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (New
York, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1992).
178 In his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II, defined the Catholic
social teaching tradition as a “doctrinal corpus” which begins with the Leonine
encyclical Rerum Novarum. See SRS, 1. However, it should be noted that
Professor Michael J. Schuck in his work, That They Be One: The Social teaching
of the papal encyclicals, 1740-1989 (Georgetown University press, 1991), has
shown that the social teaching of the Papal Encyclicals began in 1740 under the
pontificate of Benedict XIV (1740-58). He points out that nine Popes from
1740 to 1877 wrote against social issues regarding the erosion of societal life in
the traditional Catholic countries founded on the medieval concept of territorial
communitarian ethic in which one’s personal identity and calling in life were
defined and protected by one’s societal function and obligation. The Popes
considered that this social anomaly was caused by the philosophies of
Enlightenment and French Revolution, which were rampant in the 18th and
19th centuries. In particular, the Popes spoke against the culture of excessive
individualism, affirmation of the liberty of rights devoid of corresponding duties,
privatisation of religion and positivistic ethic not submitting to moral scrutiny
(ibid, pp. 1-43). It should be noted also that the Church’s social commitment
did not just begin for the first time with the publication of Rerum Novarum in
1891. Throughout the history, the Church has involved itself with the social
issues of the time. See for detail Charles E. Curran, op.cit., pp.2-6; Dominic P.
Cerrato, op.cit., pp.6-14.
179 History holds, nonetheless, a special place for Pope Leo XIII because he
stands out at the forefront of an ecclesiastical tradition, which speaks aloud the
radical primacy of human dignity as image of God in dealing with socio-political,
economic, and cultural matters affecting ordinary life of the people in the
society. See David A. Boileau, op.cit., p. 10; J. Brayn Hehir, “The Social Role
of the Church : Leo XIII, Vatican II and John Paul II”, in Oliver F. Williams and
J.W. Houch, eds., Catholic Social Thought and the New World order ( London,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) , pp. 29-49.
180 Crf. Pius XII, Christmas Broadcast, 1942: AAS 35 (1943), pp. 9-24; John
XXIII, Sermon, 4 January 1963: AAS 55 (1963), pp. 89-91; PT, 16; John Paul II,
First Christmas Radio Message to the World: AAS 71(1979), p. 66; CL, n. 37.
181 Pope John XXIII enunciated this principle in clear terms in his encyclical
Pacem in Terris. He wrote, “This principle must lie at the basis of each well-
organized and fruitful human society: that every human being is a person. This
means that they are gifted with the power of reasoning and free will. Therefore,
they obviously have rights and duties that directly and simultaneously result
from their own nature. They are therefore universal, inviolable, absolute, and
inalienable”. (PT, n.  9).
182 For a study of the socio-economic situation of Europe at the time of Pope Leo
XIII see Paul de la Gueriviere, “Lessons From History: Separation Without
Hope?” in D. S. Amalorpavadass, ed., The Indian Church in the Struggle for a
New Society, op.cit., pp.733-770.
183 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum (May 15, 1891) in Claudia Carlen,
The Papal Encyclicals: 1978-1903(U.S.A., Consortium Books, McGrath
industry often made the workers mere means for maximalization
of productive forces and accumulation of wealth. As a corrective
measure to this industrial ethics, Pope Leo XIII wrote:
Workers are not to be treated as slaves; justice demands
that the dignity of human personality be respected in them,
ennobled as it has been through what we call Christian
character. If we hearken to natural reason and to Christian
philosophy, gainful occupations are not a mark of shame to
man, but rather of respect, as they provide him with an
honourable means of supporting life. It is shameful and
inhuman, however, to use men as things for gain and to put
no more value on them than what they are worth in muscle
and energy. Likewise, it is enjoined that the religious interests
and the spiritual well being of the workers receive proper
consideration. Wherefore, it is the duty of employers to see
that the worker is free for adequate periods to attend to his
religious obligations…and in no way to alienate him from
care for his family and the practice of thrift. Likewise, more
work is not to be imposed than strength can endure, nor that
kind of work, which is unsuited to a worker’s age or sex.184
According to Leo’s thinking, human dignity demands that
workers have economic rights to pursue a meaningful job, which is
compatible with their nature as human persons.185 Work should be
an ennobling profession to workers and their earnings must be
sufficient to meet the basic necessities of their families.186 Therefore,
it is a responsibility laid upon the employers and the State to treat
workers in a manner that it protects the nobility of human persons,187
“because work energy inheres in the person and belongs completely
to him by whom it is expanded and for whose use it is destined by
nature.”188
The encyclical Rerum Novarum reflects Pope Leo XIII’s
realisation that the nineteenth century Catholicism in the Western
world was faced with systemic moral challenges caused by
revolutionary changes in the socio-economic and ideological
orders.189 In this context, he wanted to specify the principles that
truth and justice dictate in dealing with the misery and wretchedness
caused by rapid changes in the traditional pattern of social life. In
this regard, he stressed on the transcendent value of human persons
on the basis of the universality of divine image in all people.
Therefore, the Pontiff held that no one has the right to outrage the
dignity of human persons created in God’s image but every one is
duty bound to protect it with which creator has endowed them.
Rerum Novarum declares:
[I]n the case of the worker, there are many things which the
power of the State should protect; and, first of all, the goods
of his soul. For however good and desirable mortal life be,
yet it is not the ultimate goal for which we are born, but a
road only and a means for perfecting, through knowledge of
189 The Leonine pontificate was marked by a period known for great ideological
and structural changes in Europe. The Enlightenment of eighteenth century had
affected the Catholic Social life, above all its political theory and practice. The
Catholic Church stood strongly opposed to the Enlightenment’s emphasis on
individualism, human autonomy and reason, which rejected God and divine
law. The Enlightenment had two lively offshoots, namely Philosophical liberalism
and Political liberalism. The former extolled individual freedom and the power
of reason; while the latter propagated the role of the individual citizen and
political decision by the majority in deciding the shape of the society from
which divine law eclipsed. And then in the second half of the nineteenth century,
there irrupted in Europe Economic liberalism and Marxist Socialism. The first
one was instrumental for the emergence of Industrial Revolution and the market
economy with its capitalistic underpinnings and exploitation of labour where the
workers had no rights to legal safeguards. The second one, Karl Marx’s Socialism,
arose to defend by way of class war the rights of the poor and working class who
thronged the European cities that resulted from the Industrial Revolution. The
flight of the workers and the poor and their dreadful condition in the cities also
became a matter of pastoral concern for the Church. In dealing with the problems
of the workers, in his encyclical Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII avoided the
dangers of liberalism and socialism and followed a middle path. This middle
ground approach is maintained in the Social teaching of the Church to this day.
See Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., pp. 4-7.
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Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 241-262. (It will henceforth be referred to as
RN).
184 RN, n. 31.
185 Ibid., nn.  29-41.
186 Ibid., nn. 19-20.
187 Ibid., nn.  60-62.
188 Ibid., n.  62.
truth and love of good, the life of the soul. The soul bears the
express image and likeness of God, and there resides in it
that sovereignty through the medium of which man has been
bidden to rule all created nature below him and to make all
lands and seas serve his interest…In this respect all men
are equal, and there is no difference between rich and poor,
between master and servants, between rulers and
subjects…No one may with impunity outrage the dignity of
man, which God Himself treats with great reverence, nor
impede his course to that level of perfection which accords
with eternal life in heaven. Nay, more, in this connection a
man cannot even by his own free choice allow himself to be
treated in a way inconsistent with his nature, and suffer his
soul to be enslaved; for there is no question here of rights
belonging to man, but of duties owed to God, which are to be
religiously observed.190
In the above quoted passage the Pope stresses on the inviolable
nature of human dignity and that it is a fundamental value of being
human. Moreover, the passage grounds human dignity theologically
and claims that   no person can be treated as a thing to be used.
Therefore, all authentic human acts must be in accord with human
dignity. Human dignity also calls for a holistic development of the
person, both temporal and spiritual. In defence of human dignity, in
his approach to socio-economic questions, Pope Leo XIII
condemned not only the one-sided individualism associated with
liberalism and Enlightenment but also the socialist alternative with
its subordination of the individual to society.191 Thus the beginning
of modern Catholic social teaching insists on what might be called
a “relational anthropology that avoided the opposite extremes of
individualism and collectivism.”192
Reconstructing the Social Order),193 written on the fortieth
anniversary of Rerum Novarum, reaffirmed Leo XIII’s conviction
of the normative principle of human dignity in dealing with matters
of social institutions.194 When the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno
appeared, the world had already gone through the revulsion of World
War I and experienced worldwide depression. This pathetic geo-
political situation made it clear that threads to human dignity could
not be confined to conventional political borders. Pius XI felt that
human dignity demanded structural changes in the society in order
to avoid the arbitrary injustice of capitalism and the regimented
injustice of socialism. Therefore, Quadragesimo Anno treats that
both are contrary to the nature of human person who is an individual
as well as a social being in one’s dignity as a person.195
The most distinctive feature of the Quadragesimo Anno is its
advocacy for a corporative State as a remedy to the individualism
of capitalism and collectivism of socialism in order to protect the
welfare of all as human dignity demands. Pius XI writes:
[T]he riches that economic-social developments constantly
increase ought to be so distributed among individual persons
and classes that the common advantage of all…will be
safeguarded; in other words, that the common good of all in
the society will be kept inviolate.196
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2.4.3.4.2. Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno (1931)
Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (On
190 RN, n.  57.
191 Ibid., nn. 28 and 29.
192 Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., p.9.The subsequent social
encyclicals would insist upon these values.
193 Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931), in Claudia
Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals: 1903-1939 (U.S.A., Consortium Books,
McGrath Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 445-458. (It will henceforth be
referred to as QA).
194 The concept of human dignity is specifically used at QA, nn.  23, 28 and 50.
In as much as it is used in a manner similar to Leo XXIII’s usage in RN, it will
not be necessary to elaborate on these passages.
195 About Capitalism and its irresponsible craze for wealth, Pius XI wrote, “This
accumulation of power, the characteristic note of the modern economic order, is
a natural result of limitless free competition…the whole economic regime has
become hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly measure”(QA, n. 48). Regarding
Communism’s heartless obsession for class-war, he pointed out, “Communism
teaches and pursues a two-fold aim: merciless class warfare, and complete abolition
of private ownership…To obtain these ends, communists shrink from nothing
and fear nothing; and when they have acquired power it is monstrous beyond
belief how cruel and inhuman they show themselves to be”(QA, n. 49).
196 QA, n. 57.
Hence, with the objective of promoting and protecting human
dignity in the socio-economic order, the encyclical insists upon a
decentralised economy,197 which would provide space for individual
development and encourage responsibility for peaceful collaboration
with various classes. Pius XI believed that this system would go
well with the nature of human person who is an individual and a
social being, and who has the responsibility to care for oneself and
for others.
2.4.3.4.3. Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra (1961)
In 1961 Pope John XXIII issued the encyclical Mater et Magistra
(On Christianity and Social Progress)198 to commemorate the
seventieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum. The title translated in
English “Mother and Teacher”, reveals the fundamental two-fold
mission of the Church in the domain of Catholic social teaching.
As “Mother” the Church gives herself freely and unconditionally
to nourish her faithful. As “Teacher” the Church fulfils her primary
mission by proclaiming the Gospel particularly as it pertains to social
and economic matters in the civil society.199
The dominant themes of the encyclical are socialization of the
people,200 also known as people’s participation in the socio-economic
and political affairs of the State; and solidarity among nations to
ensure peace and to safeguard the common good of all. These
social values protect human dignity in a world that has become
interdependent. John XXIII points out that the socialisation process
opens to people a way of societal life based on many basic social
rights, namely:
[T]he satisfaction and the pleasure of numerous personal
rights, especially of those which have relation to the economic
and social life… [and] the right to those means indispensable
for a real dignified existence, the right to health services, the
right to the expansion and deepening of elementary education,
the right to more appropriate occupational training, to housing,
to labour, to suitable leisure free time, and appropriate
recreation.201
Speaking on his vision of “world solidarity,”202 for human
development and advancement of peoples of the nations of the
world, especially the peoples of the underdeveloped nations, the
Pope says that the ultimate norm of this international cooperation
for development is unmistakably human dignity. He writes:
The solidarity, which unites all people to one family, compels
as it should all nations that are saturated with an overflow of
goods, not to stand indifferently towards the countries in which
the inhabitants find themselves in such difficult situations
that they nearly die of want and hunger and cannot even
enjoy the most elementary human right. The nations of the
world are becoming more and more dependent on one
another and it will not be possible to preserve a lasting peace
so long as glaring economic and social imbalances persist.
The only possible solution to this question is one which
envisages the social and economic progress both of
individuals and of the whole of human society, and which
respects and promotes true human values. First
consideration must obviously be given to those values which
concern man’s dignity generally, and the immense worth of
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197 The master plan of Pope pious XI was to reconstruct the whole economic
system gradually through the creation of corporations based on vocational
groupings. Workers would have a share in the ownership of these corporations.
Owners would have to belong to these organizations and would not have complete
control over labour, capital and profit. Policy decisions would be governed by
the principle of common good and not profit motive. Workers would have job
security and escape the status of mere wage earners, but become responsible
partners of the enterprise (See QA, nn. 64-65, 81-97).
198 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra, 15 May 1961 (Vatican
Polyglot Press).It will henceforth referred to as MM.
199 It is one of the longest encyclicals, well received by both the Catholic and
secular press. See Robert A. Graham, “Catholic Press and the Encyclical”, in
America, 105 (August 26, 1961), pp. 654-656.
200 Socialization refers to the act of the growing mutual inter-dependence of the
citizens which is both cause and effect of a continually increasing interference
by the State (Crf. David A. Boileau, op.cit., p. 138). John XXIII treats that it
is also the result and expression of “scarcely resistible inclination of humans, an
inclination namely to unite with each other to the reaching of goals which each
one desires, but which exceed the capacity of single individuals” (MM, n. 60).
201 MM, n. 61.
202 Ibid., n. 157.
each individual human life.203
2.4.3.4.4. Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963)
In his encyclical Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth),204 Pope John
XXIII takes as his fundamental starting point the human being as
“person.” The Pope considers that social order must be rooted in
the reality that men and women are persons; and as such they
possess, by their very nature, a lofty dignity from which flows rights
and duties. On account of its strong personalistic and natural law
perspective, the appeal of Pacem in Terris was widespread among
the world community.205
Describing the universal rights and duties of people inherent in
their nature as persons, the Pope writes:
We must devote our attention first of all to that order which
should prevail among men.
Any well-regulated and productive association of men in
society demands the acceptance of one fundamental
principle: that each individual man is truly a person. His is a
nature, that is, endowed with intelligence and free will. As
such he has rights and duties, which together flow as a direct
consequence from his nature. These rights and duties are
universal and inviolable, and therefore altogether inalienable.
When, furthermore, we consider man’s personal dignity from
the standpoint of divine revelation, inevitably our estimate of
it is incomparably increased. Men have been ransomed by
the blood of Jesus Christ. Grace has made them sons and
friends of God, and heirs of eternal glory.206
 The Pontiff calls these rights natural rights because they have
their ontological roots in the nature of the person. Regarding human
dignity, the encyclical stresses two things. On the one hand, there
is a strong emphasis on personalist approach to human dignity, in
so far as centrality is given to the human person; and on the other
hand, Pacem in Terris introduces a christological principle in the
discourse on human dignity and sees the meaning of human dignity
in the light of the Paschal mystery of Christ. Esteem for human
dignity is heightened because every human person is precious in
the sight of God. Every one is a child of God because every one is
redeemed by the blood of Christ and destined for eternal glory.207
Finally, the encyclical develops the concept of human solidarity.
It explains the idea of common good and connects solidarity and
common good with the international project of world order to
improve the already existing bond of international solidarity among
peoples and nations since both concepts contain correlated values
bound up with human nature. Therefore, they are necessary for
the flourishing of human dignity at the local, national and international
levels of human-existence-in-community. In view of this emphasis,
the encyclical Pacem in Terris states that as the image of God, the
social character of the human person is ordained in the nature of
being human. Human persons are persons-in-relationship with
others.208 These relationships consist in various levels of inter-
personal relationships among people, namely the relationship
between individuals as citizens and the State, the political relationship
between States, and the relationship between political communities
with the world community.209 It is under these conditions of solidarity
that the good of all should be promoted for the progress of human
life in dignity, which avoids the use and abuse of human persons in
any way.
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203 Ibid., nn. 157, 192. John XXIII holds that the need for this world solidarity is
not a duty of love, but primarily a challenge of justice and humanity, which is
a demand arising from human dignity (see ibid., nn. 158, 159 and 161).
204 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, 11 April 1963 (Vatican Polyglot
Press).It will be henceforth referred to as PT.
205 For an observation of the international evaluation of the encyclical see the
following: Donald R. Campion, “World Reaction to Pacem in Terris”, in Catholic
Mind, 62 (February 1964), pp. 28-36; James Gregory, “The Encyclical and Its
Critics”, in The Priest, 19 (July 1963), pp. 556-564.
206  PT, nn. 9-10.
207 Ibid., n. 10.
208 The Pope says that the laws governing the relationships between human
beings are to be sought “where the Father of all things wrote them, that is, in
human nature.”(PT, n. 6).
209 It is worth referring here to the text which bears enduring value to our time:
“[T]he world’s creator has stamped man’s inmost being with an order revealed
to man by his conscience; and his conscience insists on his preserving it. Men
Hence, consistent with the personalist approach to the dignity
of human persons as image of God, the Pontiff expands and
nuances210 the definition of common good. For John XXIII, human
person is the centre and the goal of the common good. Therefore,
the principles of common good should not be contrary to justice
and equity, especially in providing protection to the poor and the
disadvantaged people because they are also equally entitled to
benefit from the common good intended by the Creator of all. He
writes:
Among the essential elements of common good one must
certainly include the various characteristics distinctive of
each individual people. But these by no means constitute the
whole of it. For the common good, since it is intimately bound
up with human nature, can never exist fully and completely
unless the human person is taken into account at all times.
Thus, attention must be paid to the basic nature of the common
good and what it is that brings it about.211
He further expounds on the responsibility of the civil authorities
to promote the common good and says:
We must add, therefore, that it is the nature of the common
good that every single citizen has the right to share in it -
although in different ways, depending on his tasks, merits
and circumstances. Hence every civil authority must strive
to promote the common good in the interest of all, without
favouring any individual citizen or category of
citizen…Nevertheless, considerations of justice and equity
can at times demand that those in power pay more attention
to the weaker members of society, since these are at the
disadvantage when it comes to defending their own rights
and asserting their legitimate interests.212
Pope John XXIII observes that in an emerging interdependent
world of the human solidarity, the universal application of the
common good is an essential requirement for the construction of a
humane world order that respects human dignity. Consequently, he
points out that a global international structure with universal public
authority is needed to promote, protect and defend the common
good on an international scale.213 Human dignity requires that this
structure would not be imposed on nations by force but be
established by common accord.214
The Pope proposes that under the purview of this international
structure, the relationship among the nation-states ought to be
marked by truth,215 justice,216 proactive solidarity217 and freedom.218
The international world-body must have as its goal the dignity of
the human person and the preservation of rights and duties that
flow them.219 The Pope saw his vision of the international world
body, which arises from the social nature of the human person, to
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‘show the work of the law written in their hearts. Their conscience bears witness
to them’. [Rom. 2:15]…All created being reflects the infinite wisdom of God.
It reflects it all the more clearly, the higher it stands in the scale of perfection.”
Ibid., n. 5.
“The Father of the universe has inscribed them in man’s nature, and that is where
we must look for them; there and nowhere else.” Ibid., n. 6.
“These laws clearly indicate how a man must behave toward his fellows in
society, and how the mutual relationships between the members of a State and
its officials are to be conducted. They show too what principles must govern
the relations between States; and finally, what should be the relations between
individuals or States on the one hand, and the world-community of nations on
the other. Men’s common interests make it imperative that at long last a world-
wide community of nations be established.” Ibid., n. 7.
210 Pope John XXIII’s concept of common good is not altogether new but taken
from the deontological model of morality based on natural law as expounded in
the neo-Scholastic system of thought and as used by his predecessors, namely
Pius XII, Pius XI and Leo XIII. For example see their encyclicals: Pius XII,
Summi Pontificatus, AAS XXXI (1939), 412-453; Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris,
AAS XXIX (1937) 65-106; Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, Acta Leonis XIII, V,
(1885), p. 121; Rerum Novarum (1891), nn. 28-31.The deontological approach
to moral order sees morality primarily in terms of duty or law and conformity
to duty or law as ordained in nature, i.e., as ordained in the nature of human
person: See Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., pp. 80-81.
211 PT, n. 55.
212 Ibid., n. 56.
213 Ibid., n. 137.
214 Ibid., n. 138.
215 Ibid., nn. 86-90.
216 Ibid., nn. 91-96.
217 Ibid., nn. 98-114.
218 Ibid., nn. 120-125.
219 Ibid., n. 139.
promote the common good of the people among the nations of
the world is in harmony with human dignity. This has been already
reflected in the United Nations Organization and its Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.220
The Johannine encyclical Pacem in Terris has some important
contributions for our study of the image of God doctrine in relation
to human dignity on four accounts. First of all, in this encyclical, the
Pontiff interprets the image doctrine in personalist language. Human
beings are persons because they are created in God’s image and,
therefore, they participate in God’s dignity, which is the summum
bonum.221 An immediate result of this approach is that all men and
women are born equal in dignity because they are created in God’s
image.222 This intrinsic and inalienable worth, which is inherent in
every human person as divine image, constitutes the anthropological
ground for the entitlement to rights and duties flowing from human
dignity.223
Secondly, the Pope refers to truth, justice, charity / solidarity
and freedom as four foundational values that constitute a well
ordered civil society, beneficial for all in keeping with human
dignity.224 Among them, charity / solidarity225 and freedom are
personalist value categories. Moreover, it is also the first encyclical
that treats freedom as one of the four foundational values for a just
social order. This shows the growing importance given to the meaning
of freedom in the Catholic social teaching as an inalienable value
issuing forth from human dignity.
Thirdly, Pacem in Terris is the first encyclical that proposes to
appeal to the conscience (moral force) of the citizens in fulfilling
their duty for the sake of common good226 rather than advising the
State to resort to coercive force of law. The idea of conscience is
also a personalist language category. John XXIII indicates in Pacem
in Terris that the Church is open towards a democratic view of
society and decision making process227 instead of an authoritarian
view of society which has been generally proposed by the Catholic
Church in the past in matters of State and citizenship.228 The
Pontiff’s hermeneutic of the image of God doctrine in personalist
language gives him the reason to place people at the centre of
society and all institutions. Hence, founded on the imago Dei
doctrine, John XXIII presents an alternative to replace the natural
law centred world order229 by an anthropocentric world order, which
is also one of the foundational principles of democracy.
2.4.3.4.5. The Post-Conciliar Encyclicals in the backdrop of
Vatican II
Pope John XXIII, who opened the Second Vatican Council with
his programme of aggiornamento to update the Christian thought
so as to renew it ever fresh and make it congenial to contemporary
thought, set a new theological trend in the Church. It is to engage
in dialogue with the world in a language, which the contemporary
world understands. The most striking aspect of the Council’s
theological innovation can be seen in the document Gaudium et
Spes in its effort to formulate a theology for a democratic and
urban society; and for a secularised culture in contrast to a sacral
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220 Ibid., nn. 143-145.
221 Ibid., n. 38.
222 Ibid., nn. 44, 89.
223 Ibid., nn. 9-10, 20, 44.
224 Ibid., n. 25.
225 The Pontiff replaces charity with solidarity when commenting about the
relationship, which ought to exist among nation-states in the international order.
See Chapter III of Pacem in Terris.
226 Ibid., nn. 46-48, 70.
227 Ibid., n. 60.
228 See for example Pope Leo XXIII’s hierarchical view of society. He permitted
no participation by ordinary citizens in running society and government. He
called rulers “princes”. The citizens’ primary duty was to obey the laws enacted
by the princes, which must be in conformity with divine law and natural law.
He considered the citizens as the untutored or ignorant multitude that must be
led and protected by the benevolent rulers. He saw the state and the citizens in
terms of shepherd and sheep. See Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, nn. 19-
37; Quod apostolici muneris, nn.5-6, Quoted in The Church Speaks to the
Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII, ed., Etienne Gilson (New
York, Doubleday Image Books, 1954), pp. 70-79,190-193.
229 The principles of natural law do find sufficient space in Pacem in Terris (see
ibid, numbers 12-13, 28). Nevertheless, the Pope projects in a significant way
an anthropocentric world vision. PT is the first of the social encyclicals with
this vision of society.
world order of the past centuries, and for a dynamic and egalitarian
society as opposed to a stable and aristocratic medieval social
order.230
The Church is no longer seen as a perfect society standing
over against the perfect society of the Civitas, but stands ready to
serve all people, humbly conscious of what it can learn from history
and from the social context.231 The documents of the Council,
including the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes - although
the second apart of this document deals with many contemporary
social, economic and political concerns - do not come under the
category of the social teaching of the Church. Vatican II’s vision is
broader in scope and less focused on specific social issues than
they are addressed in the social encyclicals. However, for the first
time, the Council provided an ecclesiological foundation for the
social ministry of the Church that was missing in the previous social
encyclicals.232
This ecclesiological foundation arises from the nature of
Church’s mission to proclaim the gospel of Christ to the world. The
Council makes it clear that Christ “gave his Church no proper
mission in the political, economic, or social order.”233 Nevertheless,
from the religious mission, which he set before the Church, arises
“a function, a light, and an energy which can serve to structure and
consolidate the human community according to the divine law”.234
The Church’s ecclesial commitment to human dignity also receives
a deeper foundation based on biblical anthropology in the horizon
of christology.235 For, the Council states that by the mystery of the
Incarnate Word, humankind created in God’s image, share in the
filiation of God.
This christological insight into the mystery of God’s love revealed
in Christ implies a social ethics to recognise the dignity and the
rights of every human person.  Therefore, Gaudium et Spes brings
out the grandeur of the vocation of humankind, their dignity and the
fundamental rights that flow from it. Therefore, the Council stresses,
“The root reason for human dignity lies in man’s call to communion
with God”236. This affirmation contains the essence of the Council’s
teaching on the dignity of the human person.237 Its approach to the
question of human worth is positive and optimistic.
Furthermore, the conciliar teaching has made it clear that social
ministry of the Church is a constitutive element in the proclamation
of the Gospel and the salvific mission of the Church. Faith in Christ
and commitment to bring about the kingdom of God in all the spheres
of human life is the basis for any political action or socio-economic
programme.238 Hence, the Council calls the Church to fulfil its
religious ministry in a way that protects human dignity, fosters human
rights and contributes to the unity of the human family.239 The post-
conciliar social encyclicals articulate this ecclesial mandate on
specific issues and at specific levels of Church’s social ministry,
namely local, national and international. Hence, following the
conciliar path of dialogue and human solidarity, these encyclicals
also underscore that this social enterprise is a joint venture with all
people of good will.
2.4.3.4.5.1. Encyclical Letter Populorum Progressio (1967)
The encyclical Populorum Progressio (On the Development of
Peoples) of Pope Paul VI, written in 1967,240 marks the next
advance in the Church’s commitment to human dignity. This
encyclical is a response to the alarming scale in which the gap
between the rich nations and the poor nations has become widened
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230 John Cyley, Religion in a Secular Age, the Search for Final Meeting (New
York, Frederick A Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 122 f.
231 Walter M. Abbott, Documents of Vatican, op.cit., 185-186.
232 John Bryan Hehir, “The Social Role of the Church: Leo XIII, Vatican II and
John Paul II, op.cit.,  pp. 29-31.
233 GS, article 42.
234 Ibid.
235 This theme will be dealt with in detail in chapter 5. See section 2.5.4 : Human
Dignity in Christological Horizon, pp. 355–357.
236 GS, article 19.
237 Ibid., articles 11-22.
238 GS, articles 40-45, 76, 93
239 Ibid., article 41.
240 Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Populorum Progressio, 26 March 1967 (Vatican
Polyglot Press). It will be henceforth referred to as PP.
in terms of development.241 In this context, the new emphasis of
the papal document is that human dignity bestowed by God demands
total development of all nations.242 Commenting on the Christian
vision of development, the encyclical Populorum Progresso states:
Development cannot be limited to mere economic growth.
In order to be authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is,
it has to promote the good of every man and of the whole
man…In the design of God, every man is called upon to
develop and fulfil himself, for every life is a vocation. At
birth, everyone is granted, in germ, a set of aptitudes and
qualities for him to bring to fruition. Their coming to maturity,
which will be the result of education received from the
environment and personal efforts, will allow each man to
direct himself toward the destiny intended for him by his
Creator. Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he is
responsible for his fulfilment as he is for his salvation.243
The new concept of development expounded in Populorum
Progressio has three important insights for our study. Firstly, it
stresses that human person in one’s totality - in the scholastic sense
body and soul - is the image of God. Secondly, the encyclical claims
that as the divine image on earth the dignity of the human person is
protected only by promoting all round development and progress
that benefits the whole person. Thirdly, the encyclical also reminds
the world community about the need to cultivate spirit of human
solidarity among peoples and nations, which would create favourable
international concord and peace to work for the total development
of the people244 and to sustain it for the promotion of human dignity
on global level.245
Rerum Novarum, Pope John Paul II issued his first social encyclical
Laborem Exercens (On Human Work).246 In a more philosophical
and theological language, the Pontiff expounds on the Christian
concept of work247 and the rights of the worker.248 The encyclical
deals specifically with human dignity as seen in the light of labour
and enhanced by work.249 The source of the Church’s conviction
about the dignity of work is the revealed word of God and the
transcendent destiny given by the living God. Hence, based on the
Word of God, John Paul II writes:
Man is the image of God partly though the mandate received
from his Creator to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying
out this mandate, man, every human being, reflects the very
action of the Creator of the universe…
As man, through his work, becomes more and more the
master of the earth, and as he confirms his dominion over
the visible world, again through his work, he nevertheless
remains in every case and at every phase of this process
within the Creator’s original ordering. And this ordering
remains necessarily and indissolubly linked with the fact that
man was created, as made male and female, “in the image
of God”. This process is, at the same time, universal: it
embraces all human beings, every generation, every phase
of economic and cultural development, and at the same time
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2.4.3.4.5.2. Encyclical Letter Laborem Exercens (1981)
In the year 1981, on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of
241 Ibid., n. 3-4.
242 Ibid., n. 14.
243 Ibid., nn. 14 and 15.
244 Ibid., nn. 43-44.
245 Ibid., nn. 48-52.
246 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Laborem Exercens, 14 September 1981 (Vatican
Polyglot Press). It will be henceforth referred to as LE.
247 Ibid., nn. 4-6, 25-27.
248 It is worth mentioning here that right from the beginning of his pontificate,
Pope John Paul II paid great attention to the doctrinal foundations of the social
teaching of the Church. He stressed on two principles in all his social encyclicals.
Firstly, he brought in a personalistic approach to social issues because human
person as subject of action is central in his social thought. Secondly, he saw the
meaning of human dignity in the mystery of Christ and, therefore, added a
christological dimension to social questions (Crf. Door, op.cit., pp. 270-273).
249 Gregory Baum says that LE, by emphasizing the priority of labour over
capital with the belief that capital is meant to serve labour and those who make
up the labour force, brings in a significant development in the Church’s social
teaching. See Gregory Baum, The Priority of Labor (New York, Paulist press,
1982), p. 3.
it is a process that takes place within each human being, in
each conscious human subject.250
John Paul’s creative reflection on work and dignity provide us
with new insights on the theological meaning of divine image and
human dignity. According to his encyclical Laborem Exercens
human dignity consists in the fact that human beings are persons in
that they are subject of society.251 The theological reason for this
conclusion is that created in God’s image and endowed with the
mandate to “dominate the earth,”252 human beings reflect the very
action of God and, therefore, in an analogous sense, they are
subjects, just as God is subject per se. This theological insight has
been eloquently articulated at length by the Pontiff elsewhere:
Man has to subdue the earth and dominate it, because as the
“image of God” he is a person, that is to say, capable of
deciding about himself, and with a tendency to self-realization.
As a person, man is therefore the subject of work. As a
person he works, he performs various actions belonging to
the work process; independently of their objective content,
these actions must all serve to realize his humanity, to fulfil
the calling to be a person that is his by reason of his very
humanity...
And so this “dominion” spoken of in the biblical text being
mediated upon here refers not only to the objective dimension
of work but at the same time introduces us to an
understanding of its subjective dimension…This dominion,
in a certain sense, refers to the subjective dimension even
more than to the objective one: this dimension conditions the
very ethical nature of work. In fact there is no doubt that
human work has an ethical value of its own, which clearly
and directly remains linked to the fact that the one who carries
it out is a person, a conscious and free subject, that is to say,
a subject that decides about himself.253
Hence, as image of God, endowed with the mandate to dominate
the earth, human beings are persons and, therefore, they are subjects
and, in virtue of which, work has its ethical value because the
workers are conscious free subjects who, in the process of work,
shape themselves and at the same time as subjects remain
independent of the work done. It follows that Human subjectivity
becomes the guiding norm for all society.
This theological insight, that human persons are subjects, has
profound value potential for human life in the contemporary society,
which is more and more getting controlled by the forces of market
economy. First of all, it means that work is for the person, not vice
versa; and all people are equal regardless of the sort of work they
do. Secondly, it means that labour takes priority over capital. The
Pope is emphatic in pointing out that giving priority to capital over
labour involves a fundamental error of economism and materialism
in which the person is subordinated to productive forces and material
pleasure. Thirdly, there is scope for certain legitimate demands,
such as living family wages, participatory economy and organisation
of workers solidarity.254 All this implies that work and labour
conditions must be at the service of human person in his / her
dignity as image of God in the society.
2.4.3.4.5.3. Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987)
John Paul II’s subsequent social encyclicals, Sollicitudo Rei
Socialis (On Social Concern), issued in 1987255 and Centesimus
Annus (On The Hundredth Anniversary of Rerun Novarum),
published in 1991,256 continue to stress on human subjectivity while
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250 LE, n. 4.
251 Ibid., n. 6.
252 Ibid., n. 4.
253 Ibid., n. 6.
254 Ibid., nn.  6-8, 13, 19.
255 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 30 December 1987
(Vatican Polyglot Press). It will henceforth be referred to as SRS. This encyclical
is written to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Populorum Progressio
and builds further on the concept of Development in reference to the emerging
nations of the Southern hemisphere. SRS criticizes liberal capitalism and Marxist
collectivism and takes up the issues of the developing world and stresses on
solidarity.
256 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, 1 May 1991 (Vatican Polyglot
Press). It will henceforth be referred to as CA. CA begins by summarizing the
teaching of Rerum Novarum and emphasizing momentous events and ideas
dealing with social questions. In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis the Pontiff
says that the Church is concerned with social, economic and political
problems of the contemporary times because human person is at
the centre in all these sectors of society. Therefore, “at stake is the
dignity of the human person, whose defence and promotion have
been entrusted to us [the Church] by the Creator.”257 In Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis, he observes, “it is always man who is the protagonist
of development.”258
Looking at the panoramic world of work, he comments that the
perennial phenomena of human developments and achievements
are the human responses to divine vocation given to humankind as
image of God. He writes:
The story of the human race described by Sacred Scripture
is, even after the fall into sin, a story of constant
achievements, which, although always called into question
and threatened by sin, are nonetheless repeated, increased
and extended in response to the divine vocation given from
the beginning to man and to woman (cf.Gen.1: 26-28) and
inscribed in the image which they received.
It is logical to conclude, at least on the part of those who
believe in the word of God, that today’s “development” is to
be seen as a moment in the story which began at creation, a
story which is constantly endangered by reason of infidelity
to the Creator’s will, and especially by the temptation of
idolatry. But this “development” fundamentally corresponds
to the first premises. Anyone wishing to renounce the
difficult yet noble task of improving the lot of man in his
totality, and of all people, with the excuse that the struggle is
difficult and that constant effort is required, or simply because
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of the experience of defeat and the need to begin again, that
person would be betraying the will of God the Creator.”259
The Pontiff envisages that in this way people will be able to
face the hardship of work with a deep sense of meaning and
purpose. Furthermore, he declares that people appreciate work
only when the worker is treated as the subject of work and labour
attains its due dignity of the one who does the work. In like manner,
a nation will improve its work culture only when its citizens are
treated as subject of the national life. It is because as image of
God, people are subject of the work in all its dimensions to which
God has endowed them in his calling. Hence, drawing on from the
biblical source, the Pope reminds the world that as God’s image on
earth, human persons stand for the spirit of initiative and creativity,
the spirit of national progress, sovereignty and democracy.260
One of the liveliest debates sparked by Sollicitudo Rei Socialis
stems from the Pope’s treatment of the two dominant ideological
blocs: the Marxist East and the capitalist West. When John Paul II
introduces his discussion of the two blocs, his interest focuses on
how each of them conceives the development of individuals and
peoples. Without at first specifying any differences between them,
he considers each of them to be seriously flawed. Both East and
West harm the Third World because each in its own way widens the
gap between the more developed and the less developed countries.
This is a major reason, the Pontiff says, “why the Church’s
social doctrine adopts a critical attitude towards both liberal
capitalism and Marxists collectivism.”261 The rigid ideologies of
each bloc give rise to a spirit of imperialism and neo-colonialism,
rather than to one of interdependence and solidarity. Between these
two systems of thought, the Pope points out that the Catholic social
teaching is “not a third way between liberal capitalism and Marxist
collectivism. It constitutes a category of its own”,262 based on the
transcendent value of human dignity.
that developed and shaped world history in the meantime. It also deals with the
fall of Communism and argues against atheism and socialism. But the failure of
Communism does not mean that CA uncritically endorses capitalism and free
market economy. CA accepts the benefits of the free market system, such as
initiative and entrepreneurial ability (ibid., n. 32), legitimate place of profit
(ibid., n. 35) but only within a strong juridical framework to protect the rights
of all people, especially those who are poor and needy (ibid., n. 15).
257 SRS, n. 47.
258 Ibid., n. 30.
2.4.3.4.5.4. Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (1991)
The concept of human subjectivity gains further accent in
Centesimus Annus in which Pope John Paul II insists that the
human subjectivity is known better through the theological insight
about the “transcendent dignity”263 of the human person. The core
of this insight comes up from the doctrine of the imago Dei in
human person. It means that a “human person [is] the visible image
of the invisible God.”264
According to John Paul II the theological insight inherent in the
imago Dei doctrine implies that every person in one’s individuality
is of a unique value before God. Therefore, human persons can
never be reduced to any sort of utilitarian value. Every person is
endowed with a transcendent calling to flourishing of life in
communion with God. This transcendent calling has the value
potential for enduring motivation to build the earthly city; but its
immanent well-being does not exhaust it. Hence, a person by his /
her very nature is the subject of rights and duties, which no individual,
group, class, nation or State may violate. Not even the majority of
a social body or a political community may violate these rights, by
going against the minority, by isolating, oppressing or exploiting them
or by any other means.265
The Pope qualifies human dignity as transcendent dignity
because it comes from God’s free gift of creating human beings in
God’s image whose final goal is the flourishing of human life in the
blessed communion with God for which God is the final guarantor.
It does not depend on human effort or any sort of accomplishment.
All persons have fundamental equal dignity; inviolable rights and
duties in protection of that dignity because all share the generous
gift of creation and redemption from God and all are destined for
eternal communion with God.266 This sort of theological perception
about human dignity runs counter to the culture of competitive
society where people generally believe that human dignity is
something people earn by their own effort for themselves. It also
goes against the totalitarian State, which “tends to absorb within
itself the nation, society, family, religious groups and individuals
themselves.”267
In Centesimus Annus, the Pontiff indicates that the guiding
principle of Church’s social teaching is the correct understanding
of the human person as the subject of all social activities. He
reiterates the Church’s position in the following passage:
[T]he main thread and, in a certain sense, the guiding
principle of Pope Leo’s encyclical, and of all the Church’s
social doctrine, is a correct view of the human person and of
his unique value, in as much as “man …is the only creature
on earth which God willed for itself”. God has imprinted his
own image and likeness on man (cf. Gen 1:26), conferring
upon him an incomparable dignity, as the encyclical frequently
insists. In effect, beyond the rights which man acquires by
his own work, there exist rights which do not correspond to
any work he performs, but which flow form his essential
dignity as a person.268
Therefore, Centesimus Annus asserts unambiguously and
forcefully that “every individual - whatever his or her personal
convictions - bears the image of God and therefore deserves
respect”.269
Our survey of the social encyclicals leads us to see two things
for our consideration. Firstly, these papal documents show the
importance of the doctrine of imago Dei in defining human dignity
and the concern of the Church to protect those values that support
the dignity of human person in the society. Secondly, it directs us to
see that in the recent social encyclicals the image doctrine is
interpreted in personalist language. Human persons are the subjects
of all human activities and institutions because they are image of
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264 Ibid.,  n. 44.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid., nn. 47, 53.
267 Ibid., n. 45.
268 Ibid., n. 11.
269 Ibid.,  n.22.
God. Thirdly, as a result, the recent social encyclicals also
highlight personalist values, namely freedom, responsibility,
participation, equality and solidarity as substantive values. Therefore,
the human person in his / her subjectivity is seen as the centre of
multiple relationships, namely with God, neighbour and world, and
one is expected to act responsibly in these relationships.270 This is
an important development in the Christian theology of the human
person, which has high value significance for our time.
2.4.4. Conclusion: Divine Image and Human Dignity
We sum up our inquiry about the doctrine of the imago Dei and its
significance to human dignity as developed in the Scripture and
tradition of the Church. The Old Testament regards the image as
universal.271 All people are the image of God. In that sense, the
image doctrine denotes a divine endowment of universal human
nature, which differentiates human beings from all other creatures
on earth but uniquely relates them to God as persons.272 The
theological raison d’etre for human dignity is God’s faithfulness to
the bond of inter-personal communion that God established with
humankind as persons in God’s calling them into existence in God’s
image and to participate in God’s work.273
In the context of the divine kingship ideology of ancient Near
Eastern World, the Old Testament held that not the king or any one
class of people alone the image God on earth but all people are
created in the divine image and, therefore, all are born equal in
dignity. This theological insight must be the reason for the Hebrew
prophets to condemn acts of inhumanity as actions against the will
of God, since such acts defaced the divine image in people.274
In the New Testament the meaning of human dignity attains
profound theological intensity through the mystery of the redemptive
incarnation of Jesus Christ, the perfect visible image of the invisible
God. It is because, in a unique and unrepeatable way, the paschal
mystery is the intensification and concretisation of God’s already
existing unbounded faithfulness to the bond of communion that God
established with human beings at the beginning of the saving history
by creating them in God’s image.275
Hence, according to the christological hermeneutic of the image
doctrine, created by God in God’s image and redeemed by the
most precious blood of Christ, every person is called to be a child in
the Son and a living temple of the Holy Spirit and destined for
eternal life of blessed communion with God. For this reason, any
violence against human dignity is an offence against God. This has
been brought out in the New Testament by underscoring the ethics
of love and respect for all people as God’s children beginning with
the least in the society, even towards one’s enemy.276
In the Christian tradition, the image doctrine is used generally
to bring out the importance of human dignity and equality of all
people. In this sense, image of God refers to universal human nature
endowed with capacity for reason and freedom. The Patristic
theologians came out with avant-garde ideas founded on image
doctrine that eventually changed the social values and attitudes in
the Greco-Roman world. Against Gnostic dualism and sectarianism
which claimed salvation of the souls only and also reserved salvation
only to select classes of people in the society, the Patristic
theologians propagated values of universalism, egalitarianism and
affirmative values towards the material world. They held as image
of God, human person is a totality of body and soul. All are destined
IMAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN DIGNITY… 311 312 HUMAN DIGNITY…
270 See Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., pp. 80-81.
271 See above, section 2.4.1.3: “Universalization of the Divine Image in
Humankind”. p.249–251.
272 Gen 1:26b, 28b-29.
273 Gen 5:1-3; 9:1-7; M.D. Meeks, op.cit., p. xi.
274 Ex 3:7-10; Amos 2:6-12; 3:9-15; 4:1-12; Mariaselvam, A., “Prophetic Vision
of the Ideal Hebrew Society: Pre-Exilic Prophets”, in The Indian Church in the
Struggle for a New Society, op.cit., pp. 537-550.
275 See above chapter 4, section 2.4.2:  “Image of God and Christocentric
Anthropology”, p. 253-255.
276 See above chapter 4, section 2.4.2.3: “Image of God as Children of God”,
pp.234-238.  See also Mk 2:13-17; Mt 9:9-13; Lk 5:27-32; Mt 5:44-45; Lk
6:27-36; X. Leon-Dufour, Dictionary of the Biblical Theology, op.cit., pp. 253-
254; W. Günter & H.G. Link, “Love”, in C. Brown, ed., The New International
Dictionary of New Testament ( Exeter, Devon, Paternoster Press/Michigan,
Grand Rapids, 1978), vol. 2, pp.538-551; V.P. Furnish, The Love Commandment
in the New Testament ( London, SCM Press, 1973), pp. 262-265.
for salvation, including the material world, which would be
transformed into the glory of God.277
Following the path of Augustine278 and Thomas Aquinas,279
Scholasticism spelt out the rational aspect of the image doctrine.
Accordingly, as image of God, human dignity consists in human
person’s capacity to know and love God that culminates in one’s
friendship with God, which is made possible by God’s revelation in
Christ.280 Human dignity also consists in the fact that through natural
light of reason humans can know the divine law ordained in nature
and to order life in the path of perfection.281 Furthermore, Scholastic
philosophy stressed on the order of natural law known through
natural light of reason. This laid the foundation for the eventual
separation of the temporal order from matters spiritual.
Consequently, it was also instrumental to set at liberty the secular
sciences from the tutelage of theology as well as to recognise the
legitimate autonomy of the secular order.
In the contemporary theological thought, the image doctrine is
used as a theological resource for the legitimisation of a set of
humanistic values, which affirm human dignity. On the basis of the
image doctrine, advocacy for gender equality is held valid in the
feminist theological debate as against patriarchy and
androcentrism.282 In the Latin American theology of liberation, the
image of God doctrine is one of the foundational principles to
denounce every form of oppressive structure. The proponents of
liberation theology hold that any act of dehumanisation is an
infringement on the dignity of the human person created in God’s
image as well as an affront to God. Similarly, in the eco-theological
weltanschauung, insights from the imago Dei doctrine are adduced
in support of humane echo-system appropriate to human dignity,
since God has entrusted human persons with responsibility to protect
the integrity of creation.
The dignity of the human person and their social nature constitute
the leitmotif of the social encyclicals of the Popes.283 These are
centred on the theology of human persons created in God’s image.
The social teaching of the Church has been guided by these two
principles of the theological anthropology. It views that human persons
are ontologically endowed with a dignity of transcendent value in so
far as they are created in God’s image, redeemed by Christ and
destined to live in blessed communion with God.284 The social
encyclicals present the social nature of the people as an essential
quality of being created in divine image. Hence, as image of God, all
persons are born equal in dignity and with inalienable right to defend
that dignity. In their social nature, people are called to live in
communions with God and in solidarity with one another in the society.
The Social encyclicals treat these two anthropological principles
as guiding norms while dealing with social, political and economic
matters to avoid extremes of liberalism and socialism so as to protect
and defend human dignity, because the former is controlled by
heartless individualism and the latter is dictated by faceless
collectivism. Liberalism deifies reason and freedom and ignores
social responsibility while socialism absorbs the individuals and social
groups into the impersonal State mechanism and fails to recognise
human dignity, rights and duties of the individual person. These
findings from the long expanse of the Christian tradition lead us to
investigate the systematic presentation of theological anthology of
Gaudium et Spes and its historic contribution to the Christian
theology of human dignity.
IMAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN DIGNITY… 313 314 HUMAN DIGNITY…
277 Johannes Quasten, Patrology, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 254-275; vol.3, p.71.
278 Augustine, De Trinitate, 14. 6,11.
279 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 93, a.8, sc.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Conciliar Theology of Human Dignity :
Its Significance for Religious
Freedom and Constitutional State
2.5. Introduction
SevIn this chapter we study the teachings of the Second Vatican
Council on human dignity. We also point out that the Council has
chosen the path of dialogue and collaboration with the world
community to offer the service of the Church for the advancement
of human dignity in the civil society. For this purpose, we study two
documents of Vatican II, namely the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes,1 and the
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae.2
First we study Gaudium et Spes. This document presents, for
the first time in the Catholic Church’s teachings, a theological
anthropology in a systematic form. It is centred on human dignity.
The Council claims that its teaching is in continuation with the
previous teachings of the Church.3 Vatican II’s approach to human
dignity is based of the doctrine of imago Dei but seen in the
christological horizon. In our research, we bring out the conciliar
theology of human dignity, the centrality of human dignity in the
structure of the theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes and
the doctrinal tenets of human dignity as given in the document. We
also enquire how the Council presents the exalted character of
human dignity when seen from the christological point of view as
given in article 22 of Gaudium et Spes. This article has set the
criterion of the Catholic Church’s approach to human dignity.
Secondly, we study the conciliar document Dignitatis
Humanae. Based on the theology of human dignity as expounded
in Gaudium et Spes, Vatican II developed, for the first time, the
Catholic Church’s doctrines4 of religious freedom and its approach
towards constitutional State. We study in this document the
significance of the theology of human dignity to the principles of
religious freedom and constitutional State, that is, a State with limited
power in a free society. The modern concept of secular democratic
State comes under this category. From the teachings of Gaudium
et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae, we point out that the Church’s
advocacy for constitutional State is based on the value of human
dignity and in defence of it. This would set the stage for dialogue
with the humanistic philosophy of Indian secularism as seen in the
Constitution of India and the call of the Church in India for dialogue
with the civil society in defence of human dignity.
2.5.1. The Church in Dialogue with the World to protect
 Human Dignity
The Second Vatican Council, shaped by the Pontiffs John XXIII
and Paul VI, had a grand design for the Catholic Church’s
relationship with the world. It involved, on the part of the Church, a
paradigm shift from isolation to participation and from confrontation
to dialogue with contemporary world.5 The world is understood as
the secular order of politics, knowledge - comprising of culture and
science, economics and international affairs.  Pope John XXIII
4 DH, article 1, para 5.
5 Keeping in mind the wishes of the late Pope John XXIII and his immediate
successor Paul VI, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World, Gaudium et Spes, at the conclusion of its deliberations speaks of the
Church’s awareness of its mission to stand forth “as a sign of that brotherliness
which allows honest dialogue and invigorates it.” The Constitution claims “the
desire for such dialogue, which can lead to truth through love alone, excludes no
one…We include those who cultivate beautiful qualities of the human spirit,
but do not yet acknowledge the Source of these qualities…We include those
who oppress the Church and harass her in manifold ways”.  GS, article 92.
1 Hereafter it will be referred to as Gaudium et Spes.
2 Hereafter it will be referred to as Dignitatis Humanae.
3 Crf. GS, article 91.
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saw them as challenges and opportunities for the mission of the
Church in the world to collaborate with all people of good will in
building up the family of humankind in a manner appropriate to
human dignity. This he spelt out in his Apostolic Constitution
“Humanae Salutis”6 issued for the convocation of the Council.
Looking at the painful world scene from the pastoral point of view,
he wrote:
Today the Church is witnessing a crisis under way within
society. While humanity is on the edge of a new era, tasks
of immense gravity and amplitude await the Church, as in
the most tragic periods of its history. It is a question in fact
of bringing the modern world into contact with the vivifying
and perennial energies of the gospel, a world which exalts
itself with its conquests in the technical and scientific fields,
but which brings also the consequences of a temporal order
which some have wished to reorganize excluding God. This
is why modern society is earmarked by a great material
progress to which there is not a corresponding advance in
the moral filed.
Hence there is a weakening in the aspiration toward the
values of the spirit. Hence an urge for the almost exclusive
search for earthly pleasure, which progressive technology
places with such ease within the reach of all. And hence
there is a completely new and disconcerting fact: the existence
of a militant atheism which is active on a world level.7
At the same time, he saw reason for confidence and hope in
the midst of these tragic events of the contemporary world and to
assume pastoral responsibility. He also realised that ecclesial
responsibility had to be carried out in collaboration with all people
of good will to work for a world order of peace and amity beneficial
to the dignity of humankind created in the image of God and
redeemed by Christ. He added:
These painful considerations are a reminder of the duty to
be vigilant and to keep the sense of responsibility awake.
Distrustful souls see only darkness burdening the face of
the earth, we, instead, like to reaffirm all our confidence in
our Savior who have not left the world which he redeemed…
The bloody wars that have followed one on the other in our
times, the spiritual ruins caused by many ideologies, and the
fruits of so many bitter experiences have not been without
useful teachings. Scientific progress itself, which gave man
the possibility of creating catastrophic instruments for his
destruction, has raised questions. It has obliged human beings
to become thoughtful, more conscious of their own limitations,
desirous of peace, and attentive to the importance of spiritual
values. And it has accelerated the progress of closer
collaboration and of mutual integration toward which, even
though in the midst of a thousand uncertainties, the human
family seems to be moving. And this facilitates, no doubt,
the apostolate of the Church, since many people who did not
realize the importance of its mission in the past are, taught
by experience, today more disposed to welcome its
warnings.8
It was precisely in this existential scenario of the contemporary
world of great scientific achievements and, at the same time, a
world known for terrible human suffering and oppression, Pope
John XXIII saw the historic importance of the Second Vatican
Ecumenical Council for the Church and its ministry to the secular
world.9 Hence, in his opening speech to the Council, he announced
that the Council was expected to equip its faithful with sound
doctrine and spiritual vitality so as to give the Church the possibility
of contributing more efficaciously in solving the problems of the
contemporary society.10
In his opening speech to the Council, the Pope made it known
to the world community that the Church is aware of the world’s
problems and its painful experiences.11 He also made it clear to all
6 John XXIII, Apostolic Constitution Humanae Salutis, December 25, 1961, in
Walter M. Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., pp.703-707.
7 Ibid., pp. 703-704.
8 Ibid., p. 704.
9 See “Pope John’s Opening Speech to the Council”, ibid., pp.710-719.
10 Ibid., pp. 714-715.
11 Ibid., p. 716.
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peoples of the nations the keen desire of the Church to bring
unity among Christians and unity among peoples by way of
compassionate dialogue and cooperation to advance the cause of
peace, and social justice and whatever concerns to the dignity of
the people as God’s children.12 In particular, stressing on what the
Church can offer from its spiritual heritage to protect and promote
these values and to foster solidarity among peoples, he said:
[T]he Church does not offer to the men of today riches that
pass…But she distributes to them the goods of divine grace
which, rising men to the dignity of sons of God, are the most
efficacious safeguards and aids towards a more human life.
She opens the fountain of her life-giving doctrine which allows
men, enlightened by the light of Christ, to understand well
what they really are, what their lofty dignity and their purpose
are, and, finally, through her children, she spreads everywhere
the fullness of Christian charity…in eradicating the seeds of
discord, nothing more efficacious in promoting concord, just
peace, and brotherly unity of all.13
Most of the social concerns of the Church outlined in the Pope’s
opening speech to the Council became the matter for theological
reflection in the Pastoral Constitution, Gaudium et Spes. These
reflections have been centred on human dignity as seen in the light
of the mystery of Jesus Christ, the incarnate image of the invisible
God.
Thus the social ministry of the Church, which began with the
Leonine Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum (1891) to promote and
defend human dignity in all sectors of human life in the society,
gained ecclesiological validation in the Second Vatican Council’s
documents, Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. In other
words, the Church’s social service to the world is no longer treated
as an addition to its pastoral ministry but regarded as an integral
part of its evangelising mission because the Church is concerned
with human persons and their vocation, a vocation, which is at
once earthly and transcendent in character.14
This has been made clear in Gaudium et Spes in the context
of Church’s ministry to civil society. The document states, “The
role and competence of the Church being what it is, she must in no
way be confused with the political community, nor bound to any
political system. For she is at once a sign and safeguard of the
transcendence of the human person.”15 It is the centrality of human
person in the mission of the Church, which has been reiterated in
the Preface to Gaudium et Spes. It declares, “[T]he pivotal point
of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire,
body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will.”16
The commitment of Vatican II to human persons as God’s image,
its unflagging emphasis on the sacredness of every man and
woman17 and its interest for dialogue to cultivate solidarity with
peoples all over the world18 have been further made known to the
world community by John XXIII’s immediate successor, Pope Paul
VI. In his closing homily to the Council, Paul VI pointed out that
the Council condemned none. There was no place for constructing
enemy image of even those who were hostile to Church and
humanity. But the over all perspective and the tenor of the Council
was love and compassion for the humannum and respect for the
dignity of humanity. The Pope reminded the world community:
We prefer to point out how charity has been the principal
religious feature of this Council. With such a basic orientation,
no one can accuse the Council of irreligious or infidelity to
the gospel. We recall that Christ Himself taught us that love
for our brothers is the distinctive mark of His disciples (John
13:35); when we listen to the words of the Apostle: “If he is
to offer service pure and unblemished in the sight of God,
who is our Father, he must take care of orphans and widows
in their need, and keep himself untainted by the world” (James
12 Ibid., pp. 715-717.
13 Ibid., pp. 716-717
14 See especially GS, article 11, para 3.
15 Ibid., article 76, para 2.
16 Ibid., article 3, para, 2. The post- Vatican II encyclicals repeat the centrality of
human person in the social teaching of the Church. See John Paul II‘s Encyclical
Letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987), op.cit., n. 41.
17 This has been especially explained in GS, articles 12 and 22.
18 Chapter IV of Part I of GS (articles 40-45) deals with the theme of fostering
solidarity among people in the national and international order.
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1:27) and again: “He has seen his brother, and has no love
for him; what love can he have for the God he has never
seen?”(1 John 4:20).
Yes, the Church of the Council has been concerned, not just
with herself and with her relationship of union with God, but
with man - man as he really is today: living man, man all
wrapped up in himself, man who makes himself not only the
centre of his every interest, but dares to claim that he is the
principle and explanation of all reality. Every perceptible
element in man, every one of the countless guises in which
he appears, has, in a sense, been displayed in full view of the
Council Fathers, who, in their turn, are mere men, and yet all
of them are pastors and brothers whose position accordingly
fills them with solicitude and love…
Secular humanism, revealing itself in its horrible anticlerical
reality has, in a certain sense, defied the Council. The religion
of the God who became man has met with religion…of man
who makes himself God. And what happened? Was there a
clash, a battle, a condemnation? There could have been, but
there was none. The old story of the Samaritan has been the
model of the spirituality of the Council. A feeling of boundless
sympathy has permeated the whole of it. The attention of
our Council has been absorbed by the discovery of human
needs…But we call upon those who term themselves
modern humanists, to give the Council credit at least for one
quality, and to recognize our own type of humanism. We too,
in fact, we more than any others, honor mankind.19
With the promulgation of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, on December 7, 1965,
“dialogue between all men”20 has been proclaimed as a proper
pastoral approach of the Catholic Church towards the contemporary
world.
Pope Paul VI in his encyclical letter Ecclesiam Suam,21 which
he issued, while the Second Vatican Council was in session,
explained the practical reason for this historic decision:
Clearly, relationships between the Church and the world can
be effective in a great variety of ways. The Church could
perhaps justifiably reduce such contacts to a minimum, on
the plea that its wishes to isolate itself from secular society.
It might content itself with conducting an inquiry into the
evils current in the secular society, condemning them publicly,
and fighting a crusade against them. On the other hand, it
might approach secular society with a view to exercising a
preponderant influence over it, and subjecting it to a
theocratic power; and so on.
But it seems to Us that the sort of relationship for the Church
to establish with the world should be more in the nature of a
dialogue, though theoretically other methods are not excluded.
We do not mean unrealistic dialogue. It must be adapted to
the intelligences of those to whom it is addressed, and it
must take account of the circumstances. Dialogue with
children is not the same as dialogue with adults, nor is dialogue
with Christians the same as dialogue with non-believers. But
this method of approach is demanded nowadays by the
prevalent understanding of the relationship between the
sacred and the profane. It is demanded by the dynamic course
of action which is changing the face of modern society. It is
demanded by the pluralism of society, and by the maturity
man has reached in this day and age. Be he religious or not,
his secular education has enabled him to think and speak,
and conduct a dialogue with dignity.22
In the above passage, the Pontiff spells out why the Church
opts for dialogue approach towards secular society in its service to
contemporary world. He also refers to the two previous approaches
that the Church pursued towards the secular society:  one followed
19 Paul VI, Homily, December 7, 1965, in Catholic Mind (April 1966), p. 60.
20 Crf. GS, article 92.
21 Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Ecclesiam Suam, On the Church, in Claudia
Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals: 1958-1981 (U.S.A., Consortium Books,
McGrath Publishing Company, 1981) pp. 135-160, [A A S 56 (1964), pp.
609-654]. Hereafter it will be referred to as ES.
22 Ibid., nn.78-79.
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a policy of minimal approach and the other held a policy of
maximal approach towards secular order. He also hints at their
legitimacy, because they were based on the spiritual and temporal
nature of the Church. However, he rejects both since they don’t
correspond with the maturity of contemporary secular ethos, which
sees the relationship between the secular and the sacred in a healthy
way and remains committed to a culture of human dignity. This
needs explanation, which we present below.
In the past centuries, both approaches (minimal and maximal)
claimed for their justification by their respective one-sided emphasis
of the “divine and human constitution” of the Church.23 The first
approach (the minimal approach) strived for a policy of separation
of the Church from the world and tended to maintain a minimum
required functional relationship with the world. The second approach
pursued a policy intended to exert maximum influence on the secular
realm so as to dominate it. The first approach was apocalyptic and
otherworldly in its attitude towards the world. It despised the
“earthly” by overemphasizing the “spiritual” and the “heavenly.”
In this approach, the Church became suspicious and distrustful on
matters secular. The second approach kept up a sort of utopian
temptation towards the secular order in that it used the secular
realm as instrument of religion and then destroyed the autonomy
proper to the secular order so as to build a Christian society, societas
Christiana.24
The first approach was prevalent in the early centuries of
Christianity at a time when the Church was a persecuted
community in the Roman Empire. This world-negating sort of
spirituality eventually got into the Christian monastic tradition in
different ways.25 The second approach reached its zenith in the
medieval European civilization, known as the Western Christendom.
Contrary to the apocalyptic and utopian approaches of the past,
Vatican II acknowledges the autonomy and order proper to the
secular realm as ordained by God.26 Therefore, the Council opts
for dialogue and solidarity between the Church and secular world,
including the political community, because the spiritual and temporal
realms are meant for the human person who is the crown of
creation.27 Moreover, the contemporary society is also marked out
by such values as freedom, equality, solidarity, world peace and
cooperation. These values are affirmative of human dignity. They
are also the concerns of the Church in its mission for the world.28
2.5.1.2. Conciliar Design of Dialogue on Three Levels
Vatican II spelt out the Catholic Church’s dialogue with the
contemporary world on three levels, namely ecumenical dialogue,
interreligious dialogue and dialogue with the secular world. Once
again, we need to look at Ecclesiam Suam, which is written in the
ambiance of Council’s openness to the world, to understand better
these three levels of dialogue. Paul VI, who sets forth the road
map for dialogue in Ecclesiam Suam, makes clear that dialogue is
not merely a matter of policy. From the Theological point of view,
it is based on God’s free initiative of revealing God’s love to
humankind and God expects a free response. God’s revelation
discloses God’s own intimate life with humankind and God invites
all people to that divine life. These theological insights are repeated
in the conciliar documents published one year after the publication
of Ecclesiam Suam.29
23 Crf. Pius XII’s Encyclical Letter Mystici Corporis [AAS 35 (1943), pp. 221 ff].
Crf. SC, article 2; LG, article 8. It Suffices for us to read the text of Lumen
Gentium which explains the divine and human aspects of the Church: “Christ
the one Mediator, established and ceaselessly here on earth His holy Church,
the community of faith, hope and charity, as a visible structure…But the
society furnished with hierarchical agencies and the Mystical Body of Christ
are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly and the
spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with
heavenly things. Rather they form one interlocked reality, which is comprised
of a divine and a human element. For this reason, by an excellent analogy, this
reality is compared to the mystery of the incarnate Word”. (LG, article 8, para 1).
24 For a detailed discussion on this point see Bernd Groth, “From Monologue to
Dialogue in Conversations with Nonbeleivers on the Difficult Search for Dialogue
Partners”, in Vatican II Assessment and perspectives, op.cit., vol. III, pp. 186-
187
25 Crf. Yves Congar, op.cit., pp. 208-209.
26 GS, article 36.
27 Ibid., article 12, para 1.
28 Crf., ibid., article 9. For a detailed discussion on this point see Bernd Groth,
op.cit., 184-188; Herve Carrier, op.cit., pp.455-458.
29 ES, 56; NA, articles 2-3; AG, articles 16, 34, 41; GS, article 28. It is note
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In this backdrop, Paul VI distinguishes in Ecclesiam Suam, by
way of concentric circles, four classes of people with whom the
Church must enter into dialogue in its mission in the contemporary
world.30 The first circle is the widest circle.31 It comprises all people.
There is scope for dialogue with all on the common problems and
challenges of human life that affect all, and on the need to cultivate
fundamental human values needed for humane temporal order. In
the second circle, the Church reaches out to all believers.32 It came
to be known as interreligious dialogue. In the third circle Christians
meet in the fellowship of their faith for unity among Churches,
known as interecclesial dialogue or ecumenism.33 The fourth circle
or the inner most circle consists of the Catholics who are also in
need of engaging themselves into dialogue to sort out problems
arising among them and to solve them not by fighting but in amity,
known as intra-ecclesial dialogue.34 Thus, the first three circles
comprise the Catholic Church’s dialogue with others.
No one is excluded from the path of dialogue intended to work
for human welfare and dignity because these are substantive human
concerns that belong to all people. The Pope writes:
The first of these circles is immense. Its limits stretch beyond
our view into the distant horizon. It comprises the entire
human race, the world …All things human is our concern.
We share with the whole of the human race a common nature,
a common life, with all its gifts and all its problems. We are
ready to play our part in this primary, universal society, to
acknowledge the insistent demands of its fundamental needs
and to applaud the new and often sublime expressions of its
genius. But there are moral values of the utmost importance
which we have to offer it. These are of advantage to
everyone. We root them firmly in the consciences of
men…Wherever the councils of nations come together to
establish the rights and duties of men, we are honoured to
be permitted to take our place among them. If there is in
man a “soul that is naturally Christian,” we wish to respect
it, to cherish it, and to communicate with it.35
Hence, we see in Ecclesiam Suam the realisation of the Church
that it must go out of its limited circle of followers and beyond the
circle of the followers of Christ and even beyond the circle of
believers in God and reach out to all people on account of their God
given dignity as God’s image. Church in its mission to the world
needs to give witness to its love for all peoples and its respect for
the dignity and freedom of every human person by committing itself
to promote these values. It needs to involve itself in collaboration
with all people of good will in the task of nurturing in the world of
today unity, love and peace in a manner that is helpful for people to
live in dignity.
In this context, the path of dialogue envisaged by the Council
involves three levels of dialogue. Firstly,36 it consists in dialogue
with Churches and ecclesial communities (ecumenical dialogue).
It is given in the conciliar Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis
Redintegratio).37 The first chapter of this document is most
important because it lays down the Catholic principles of interchurch
relationship.38 It exposes the mystery of the Church’s unity as that
of a dynamic communion in faith and sacramental life, at once
visible and invisible. It affirms that this communion is realised,
according to the will of Christ, in the Catholic Church governed by
the Pope and the bishops in communion with him.
The ecclesial reality and the salvific efficaciousness of the other
Christian Communities are also affirmed. They are said to be in
worthy to mention what has been referred to in article 28 of Gaudium et Spes:
”Respect and love ought to be extended also to those who think and act
differently from us in social, political and even religious matters. In fact, the
more deeply we come to understand their ways of thinking through sympathy
and love, the more easily shall we be able to enter into dialogue with them.”
30 ES, nn.93-117.
31 Ibid., nn.97-106.
32 Ibid., nn.107-108.
33 Ibid.,nn.109-112.
34 Ibid., nn.113-115.
35 Ibid., n.97.
36 The order of three sectors of dialogue as we have given here is only numerical
arrangement but not the order of priority.
37 W.M. Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., pp. 341- 366.
38 UR, articles 3-4.
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real, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church.
The ecumenical communion that has been hoped for is seen as
enriching and perfecting not only the other Churches, but also the
Catholic Church. Another positive contribution of this document is
the recognition that there is a hierarchy of truths. Therefore, not all
the truths of Catholic doctrine are equally connected with the
fundamental Christian faith.39 Ecumenical fellowship should contribute
to the appreciation of human dignity and peace among people.40
The second conciliar path of dialogue is dialogue among religions.
As a result, Vatican II’s Declaration on the Relationship of the
Church to non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, is the first
conciliar document dealing directly and explicitly with religions and
calling for dialogue.41 While maintaining unshaken the belief in the
uniqueness and universality of Jesus Christ in the divine plan of
salvation,42 the entire document breathes an atmosphere of respect
and appreciation to religions.
Nostra Aetate sees religions in the broad context of humankind’s
common origin and destiny, and their search for ultimate questions
that beset them. It states:
For all peoples comprise a single community, and have a
single origin, since God made the whole race of men dwell
over the entire face of the earth (cf. Acts 17:26). One also
is their final goal: God. His providence, His manifestations
of goodness, and His saving designs extend to all men (cf.
Wis.8: 1; Acts 14:17; Rom. 2:6-7; 1 Tim.2: 4) against the day
when the elect will be united in that Holy City ablaze with
the splendour of God, where the nations will walk in His
light (cf.Apoc.21: 23 f).43
The second article of the Nostra Aetate gives a positive
description about religions and exhorts Christians that they may
“prudently and lovingly, through dialogue and collaboration with the
followers of other religions, and in witness of Christian faith and
life, acknowledge, preserve, and promote the spiritual and moral
goods found among men, as well as the values in their society and
culture.”44 The document denounces all forms of discrimination
among people on the ground of “race, color, condition of life, or
religion”45 because it is against the dignity of the people created in
God’s image.
2.5.2. Dialogue with the Secular World
The third area of dialogue is the secular order with which the Church
wishes to collaborate. It is given in the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern Word, Gaudium et Spes, and the Declaration
on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae. These documents
are centred on the theology of human dignity. The Church’s dialogue
with this sector of society as provided in these documents is the
matter for our study in this chapter. The aforementioned documents
were among the most controversial documents debated on the floor
of the Council, since they scored a definite break-through in the
attitude of the Church towards the contemporary world.46 There
are three concepts frequently occur in these documents in connection
with the theology of human dignity in the context of secular society.
These are ‘world’, ‘Church’ and ‘dialogue’. At the outset of our
study, we explain their theological significance.
39 Ibid., article 6.
40 Ibid., article 12.
41 Jacques Dupuis, “Interreligious Dialogue in the Church’s Evangelizing Mission:
Twenty Years of Evolution of a Theological Concept”, in Vatican II Assessment
and Perspectives, op.cit., vol. III, pp.237-263. Besides the Declaration Nostra
Aetate, other documents of Vatican II, especially Lumen Gentium, Gaudium et
Spes and Ad Gentes, also contain valuable theological references to the place of
religions in the divine plan of salvation. See LG, articles 16, 17; GS, articles 12,
22, 57, 92; AG, articles 3, 4, 10, 11, 15, and 18.
42 Ibid., article 2, para 5; Crf. Jn 14:6; 2 Cor 5:18-19.
43 NA, article 1, para 2.
44 Ibid., article 2, paras 5 and 6.
45 Ibid., article 5, para 3.
46 See J. Neuner, “The Role and Responsibility of Lay People in the Struggle for
a New Society”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society, op.cit.,
pp. 447-456, at 450.
2.5.2.1. The Concept of World
The concept ‘world’ is polysemous in nuance as used in the Pastoral
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Constitution.47 In the preamble of the Constitution48 alone it appears
many times with wide-ranging emphasis. Generally the concept
‘world’ means the totality of reality created by God and sustained
by his love. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes takes a
positive approach towards the world because God saw that it was
“very good.”49
Moreover, though the world has fallen into the bondage of sin,
it is good because Christ redeemed it and renews it in him50 and
waits for the final restoration in the glory of God.51 In Gaudium et
Spes the concept ‘world’ is used very much in the biblical sense
referring to the world of humankind, especially as used in the
Johannine Gospel. On the one hand John depicts the world as God’s
creation, object of God’s love, on the other, the world as refusing
the light of life coming from God.52
The Pastoral Constitution sees the meaning of the world in the
light of Trinitarian theology.53 It understands God not as an outsider
to the world, but the permanent mover, who is in the depth of the
world, and “constitutes its ontological impulse towards
accomplishment, the real promotor mundi.”54 Hence, the world is
not only related to the Creator but also to the Redeemer and the
Sanctifier who fills the earth.  Gaudium et Spes describes, “[T]he
same God is Savior and Creator, Lord of human history as well as
of salvation history.”55 In the present condition of existence, the
world is under the all-pervading influence of the Holy Spirit.56
Consequently, the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes sees the
world from the theological perspective and declares, “[T]he earthly
and the heavenly city penetrate each other.”57 It avoids the
dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, the spiritual and
the earthily; but maintains their distinction and respects the autonomy
and order proper to the earthly realities endowed by God.58
In Gaudium et Spes the concept ‘world’ is used more
specifically as a comprehensive concept of theological anthropology
referring to humankind’s calling in life in the world as image of
God.59 For this reason, the concept ‘world’ connotes the existential
state of affairs of the family of humankind with all earthly realities
and temporal tasks that the people are called upon to perform during
their life on earth in a manner fitting to their dignity as image of
God.60 Gaudium et Spes places the Church in dialogue with this
world of secular realities. The preamble61 of the document
comments about this world of temporal realities and says:
Therefore, the Council focuses its attention on the world of
men, the whole human family along with the sum of those
realities in the midst of which that family lives. It gazes upon
that world which is the theatre of man’s history, and carries
the marks of his energies, his tragedies, and his triumphs;
that world which the Christian sees as created and sustained
47 Angel Anton, “Postconciliar Ecclesiology: Expectations, Results, and Prospects
for the Future”, in Vatican II Assessment and Perspectives, op.cit., vol. I, pp.
431-435.
48 Articles 2 and 3 constitute the preamble of the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.
49 GS, article 12, para 6; Crf. Gen 1:31.
50 Ibid., article 2, para 2.
51 Crf. Ibid., articles 2, 13.
52 In opposition to the prevalent Gnostic dualism of the time, John states in his
Gospel, “all things were made through him.” [through the Logos] (Jn 1:3).
Finally the Logos was made flesh and so became part of this world to bring it
to salvation as he states, “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son,
that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life.” (Jn 3:16).
Yet the same Gospel depicts the world as hostile to God’s light and life. There
is a conflict: “The light shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome
it.”(Jn 1:5), etc.
53 Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, in CD, op.cit., p.
216.
54 Alfons Auer, “Man’s Activity throughout the World”, in CD, op.cit., vol. V,
p.201.
55 GS, article 41, para 6.
56 Ibid., articles 22, para 6; and 41, para 2.
57 Ibid., article 40, para 4.
58 Ibid., article 36.
59 Angel Anton, “Postconciliar Ecclesiology: Expectations, Results, and Prospects
for the Future”, in Vatican II Assessment and Perspectives, op.cit., vol. 1, pp.
431-432.
60 Charles Moeller, “History of the Constitution”, in CD, op.cit., vol. 5, pp. 1 ff;
The Christian Faith, op.cit., p. 136.
61 Articles 1 and 2 make up the preamble of the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.
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by its Maker’s love, fallen indeed into the bondage of sin,
yet emancipated now by Christ…so that this world might be
fashioned anew according to God’s design and reach its
fulfilment.62
Hence, Church’s dialogue with the world means dialogue with
the contemporary secular society. It is distinct from ecumenical
dialogue and interreligious dialogue as these are separately dealt
with on different levels and aspects in other conciliar documents.63
2.5.2.2. The Concept of Church
Church is another important concept which occurs often in most of
the articles of Gaudium et Spes.64 Yves Congar suggests that the
Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes follows the definition of
the Church as given in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,
Lumen Gentium.65 This needs explanation. The ecclesiology of
the Second Vatican Council begins with the key image of Church
as the sacrament of God’s communion66 with all peoples and of the
unity among them.67 The Council goes on explaining that this
communion wished by God is actualised in the image of the Church
as “the People of God” of the New Covenant,68 which has Christ
as head. This plan of the Church is in accordance with the universal
saving plan of God the Father, who has revealed himself in a fully
open and irrevocable way in the mission of the Son, and through the
mission of the Holy Spirit preserves its integrity in time and space
until the eschatological consummation, when God will be all in all.69
The predominant image of Church as used in the Pastoral
Constitution is, however, that of the people of God (populus Dei),70
though the concept ‘people of God’ as such is used only sparingly.
The reason for its judicious use seems for the following reasons.
First of all, it is to avoid the wrong impression that as people of God
Christians might be regarded as a segregated group, a kind of set
aside religious sect from the rest of the people in the secular
society.71 Secondly, it is to keep away from the impression that the
Church as a people of God is ‘a people’ or ‘a nation’ existing side
by side with the rest of the people in a civil society, a sort of “tertium
genus” in the sociological sense. It has been pointed out that the
concept “Ecclesia” (Church) is frequently used in the pastoral
Constitution because it has the advantage of being generally
accepted by the civil society without prejudice.72
In Gaudium et Spes the concept ‘Church’ portrayed as the
People of God is not something separated from the world but exists
in the midst of the world, living and acting with it and sharing the
joys and anxieties of all the peoples of the world.73  As a community
reborn in Christ, it is sanctified as a whole74 but this does not isolate
its believers from their earthly tasks. The primary emphasis in the
62 Ibid., article 2, para 2.
63 See Vatican II‘s Decree on Ecumenism (Unitatis Redintegratio), in Walter M.
Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., pp. 341-366 and Vatican II‘s
Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions
(Nostra Aetate), ibid., pp. 660-668.
64 Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World,” in CD, op.cit.,
vol. 5, pp. 222-223.
65 Ibid., p. 223; cfr. LG, Chapter I and II (articles 1-17).
66 For a critique of the model of the Church as mystery of communion see Angel
Anton, “Postconciliar Ecclesiology: Expectations, Results, and Prospects for
the Future”, op.cit., pp.416-420.
67 See LG, Chapter I, articles 1-8.
68 See ibid., Chapter II, articles 9-17, especially article 9. Chapter II of the Dogmatic
Constitution, Lumen Gentium, is devoted to the imaging of the Church as the
“people of God.” This title, sourced from the Scripture, highlights the historical,
human and communion aspects of the Church, rather than on the institutional
and hierarchical aspects, which have sometimes been over stressed in the past.
“People of God” refers to the entire communion and fellowship of believers in
Christ in the Church, the pastors and laity. Lumen Gentium highlights that
mystery of the Church finds its concrete expression and realization in a historical
people (crf. LG, article 9). It is a sacramentally structured community of believers
in Christ who continues his saving work through them (crf. LG, articles 10-11).
This chapter keeps stressing on the common dignity and vocation of all members
of the Church.
69 Crf. 1 Cor 15:28.
70 Charles Moeller, “Preface and Introductory Statement”, in CD, op.cit., vol. 5,
p. 83 f.
71 Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, in CD, op.cit.,
vol. 5, p. 208.
72 Ibid., p. 222.
73 GS, article 1.
74 Crf. LG, articles 9-12.
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Gaudium et Spes is that by its very vocation of sanctification,
the Church as People of God is called upon to follow the path of
Christ in loving and serving the world in the task of building up the
earthly city as the integral part of its calling in the world. This has
been vividly expressed in the concluding article of the document
that reminds Christians:
Mindful of the Lord’s saying: “By this will all men know that
you are my disciples, if you have love for one another” (Jn.
13:35), Christians cannot yearn for anything more ardently
than to serve the men of the modern world ever more
generously and effectively. Therefore, holding faithfully to
the gospel and benefiting from its resources, and united with
every man who loves and practices justice, Christians have
shouldered a gigantic task demanding fulfilment in this world.
Concerning this task they must give a reckoning to Him who
will judge every man on the last day.75
In the task of building the earthly city the Church, moreover,
recognises the positive values and the autonomy of the secular
realm and does not reduce the world to the role of mere means of
getting to heaven.76 The Church seeks to sanctify and consecrate
the world in its secular order as endowed by God in harmony with
the transcendent purpose of all things according to the Maker’s
design.77
2.5.2.3. The Concept of Dialogue
The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes envisages the Church’s
relation to the world specifically in terms of dialogue. The starting
point of this dialogue is the anthropological crisis of the contemporary
world, which consists in the question about the essential nature,
and meaning of human existence. This has been repeatedly stated
in the document.78 The dialogical approach of the Church towards
the secular society furnishes the Church with a twofold purpose.
Firstly, the Church labours with others to decipher through dialogue
the authentic signs of God’s presence and purpose in the happenings,
needs and desires of the contemporary world. In this existential
context, the Church shares with the world “the light of Christ, the
image of the unseen God,”79 to recall to people the transcendent
dignity of their calling in life and to show its supremely human
character.80 Secondly, the Church encourages Christians for active
involvement in shaping the world in a manner that resonates with
these noble human values of life.81 This includes a search together
with others in the civil society to find solutions to the basic problems
of the people and to engage with them in discussion to solve these
problems in a most effective way.82
The dialogical move towards the world involves on the part of
the Church to follow the principles of coexistence and cooperation
with the civil society, in all matters of human concern to streamline
a humanistic world order that is affirmative of the substantive values
of human dignity. In this way the Church shares with the world the
gift of the Gospel of Christ, its founder.83 It is one of the crucial and
far reaching decisions of the Council that it changed the Church’s
defensive attitude of the past into a positive and proactive approach
towards the secular world in terms of solidarity and dialogue.84
2.5.3. The Theology of Human Dignity in Gaudium et Spes
All that we have explained in the previous sections about the conciliar
concept of world, Church and dialogue in their specific meaning,
lead us to look into the theology of human dignity as it emerges
from the articles of the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.
The Council’s call for dialogue between the Church and the world
75 GS, article 93, para 1.
76 Crf. Ibid., articles 36,47,56,76.
77 Crf. Ibid., articles 34, 39, 42.57. For an over all interpretation of the role of the
Church in the World as given in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, Gaudium et Spes see Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in
the Modern World”, in CD, op.cit., vol. 5, pp. 213-221.
78 See GS, articles 10, paras 1, 6, 7; 11, para 3; 12, paras 1, 2, 3.
79 Ibid., article 10, para 8.
80 Ibid., article 11. Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp. 116-118.
81 Ibid., articles 40, 43.
82 Ibid., article 3, para 1.
83 Ibid., article 3, para 2.
84 Ibid., article 3, para 1; article 40, para 1; article 92, paras 1, 2, 3.
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is based on the Christian anthropology, which is centred on the
theology of human dignity.85 It envisages that created in the image
of God86 and redeemed by Christ,87 every person in his or her
transcendent dignity88 is the centre and subject of all activities in
the world.89 This Christian vision of human dignity as articulated in
the Gaudium et Spes needs elucidation. It is given in concise form
in article 12, which sets forth the basic theological structure90 of
the entire exposition of this document. The relevant portion of the
article states:
For sacred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the
image of God”, is capable of knowing and loving his creator,
and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures
that he might subdue them and use them to God’s glory.
“What is man that thou art mindful of him or the son of man
that thou visited him? Thou hast made him a little less than
the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honor:
thou hast set him over the works of thy hands, thou hast
subjected all things under his feet” (Ps. 8:5-6).
But God did not create man as a solitary. For from the
beginning “male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27).
Their companionship produces the primary form of
interpersonal communion. For by his innermost nature man
is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he
can neither love nor develop his potential.
Therefore, as we read elsewhere in Holy Scripture, God
saw “all the things that he had made, and they were very
good” (Gen. 1:31).91
The above quoted passage from Gaudium et Spes contains a
set of fundamental principles of theological anthropology. They are
collated from the Bible and patrology.92 The passage depicts a
dynamic narrative about human person. The conciliar document
highlights in this text three important aspects of human dignity,
namely the dignity of the human person in relation to God, which is
to be construed as human capacity for communion with God  (capax
Dei); the dignity of human activities in the world, which stands for
the dignity of work; and the dignity of societal life, which means
human calling in life to live in community that articulates the relational
nature of human being.
Among them, the first constitutes the religious dimension of
human life and the other two are concerned with life in the secular
world of temporal realities. The first is the horizon and in its
background radiance the other two aspects of human dignity, namely
the dignity of human activities in the world and the dignity of the
social life are explained. Hence, the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, as the title of the
document suggests, deals with a special emphasis on the dignity of
humankind’s vocation in the world but invariably in the irresistible
aura of their transcendent vocation for communion with God,93
who is the terminus a quo (the beginning) and the terminus ad
quem (ultimate end) of human dignity.94 This is frequently repeated
throughout the document.95
First of all in article 12 of the Gaudium et Spes the Council
makes a categorical distinction between the content or the essential
85 Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
86 GS, article 12.
87 Ibid, article 22. We study the christological aspect of the human dignity in
chapter 5, section: 2.5.4:  “Human Dignity in the Christological Horizon”,
pp.355-357, ff.
88 Ibid., articles, 12, 19.
89 Pope John Paul II developed on this perspective of human person in his
encyclicals and expounded the concept that human person is the subject of all
activities, rights and duties in the world. He qualified human dignity as
transcendent dignity. We have studied his thought on this subject in our previous
chapter. For detail see above chapter 4, sections 2.4.3.4.5.3: “Encyclical Letter
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987)”, pp. 306-308, ff.
90 We study the theological structure of the entire Gaudium et Spes, which is
centred on the concept of human dignity in the section that follows.
91 GS, article 12, paras 4-6.
92 Crf. Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., p. 119.
93 Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, op.cit., pp. 203-
204; for a critical study on this subject see A. O. Erhueh, op.cit., pp.126-128.
94 GS, article 21, para 3 says, “[T]his dignity is rooted and perfected in God”.
95 GS, articles 2, 12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 41, 76, 91. Our references do not claim to
be exhaustive.
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meaning, and the essential consequences of creating human
persons in God’s image. Taking its cue especially from Augustine’s
thought,96 Gaudium et Spes interprets the essential content of the
“image of God” (imago Dei) as capacity for God (capax Dei)97
qualifying it as capacity for “knowing and loving” God, which is the
foundation of human transcendence. Knowing and loving are also
interpersonal concepts.98
In other words, the conciliar document Gaudium et Spes
reiterates the classical theological proposition that human persons
are image of God because God has endowed them with capacity
for God, to have communion with God.99 Capacity for God (capax
Dei) is the essential nature of human persons as having created in
the image of God. Hence, the fundamental reason for the dignity
of the human persons is that they are created with capacity for
absolute openness towards God, which constitutes the other-
orientation of the human person, that is, human transcendence.
Human person’s capacity for God signifies human freedom for
God which is the ultimate horizon of freedom and, therefore, also
of human dignity. Capacity for God constitutes the religious
dimension of human dignity because the document repeats again
that “this dignity is rooted and perfected in God…For man was
made an intelligent and free member of the society by God who
created him…[and] is called as a son to commune with God.”100
In a similar vein, elsewhere the document emphasizes that the
humankind’s capacity for communion with God is the outstanding
reason for human dignity. The text elaborates:
An outstanding cause of human dignity lies in man’s call to
communion with God. From the very circumstance of his
origin, man is already invited to converse with God. For man
would not exist were he not created by God’s love and
constantly preserved by it. And he cannot live fully according
to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes
himself to his Creator.101
Hence, the human capacity to know and love God, and to have
communion with God as God’s children is the content or the essential
meaning of creating human persons in God’s image. This capacity
for God bestows on every person a value, which cannot be reduced
to any other aspects of life in the temporal order but surpasses
them all. Accordingly, later magisterial teaching qualifies this aspect
96 De Trinitate, XIV, 8, 11 (Quoted in Joseph Ratzinger, ”The Church and Man’s
calling, op.cit., p. 121). St. Augustine used the term “capax Dei” to indicate
human person’s innate capacity to recognize the Triune God. He also applied
this term to human person’s natural capacity to love God and human person’s
“obediential capacity” for God. For St. Augustine, human person means
“openness to God”. During his protracted theological exploration into the
mystery of human existence, he seemed to have inspired by the Scriptural text,
Colossians 3:10, to define the essential nature of human person as “capax Dei”.
For detail see John E. Sullivan, The Image of God: the Doctrine of St. Augustine
and its Influence, op.cit., pp. 50- 52 f, 76 f, 257 ff.
97 A.O. Erhueh, op.cit., pp. 126-129.
98 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” op.cit., p. 121.
99 We studied the classical tradition in chapter 4. For the contribution of St.
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas see above section 2.4.3.2: “The Western
Development of the Doctrine”, pp. 279-285.
100 GS, article 21, para 3.
101 Ibid., article 19, para 1.This article highlights the transcendent dignity of the
human person. It epitomizes the essence of the Pastoral Constitution’s teaching
on human dignity (see Donald R. Campion, “The Church Today”, in W.M.
Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., p. 186). It is also the foundational
article of the conciliar Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae
(see Joseph Ratzinger, ”The Church and man’s Calling”, op.cit., pp. 146-147).
Besides Dignitatis Humanae, the other documents of Vatican II maintain the
same position on human dignity. See for example:  The Dogmatic Constitution
on the Church, Lumen Gentium, holds that all the faithful in the Church are
equal in their dignity and to the activity common to all in building up the Body
of Christ (LG, article 32). Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to
Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, and Decree on the Church’s Missionary
Activity, Ad Gentes, state that the human race has a common origin and shares
in a common destiny as designed by God (NA, article 1; AG, article 3) because
all are created in the image of God (NA, article 5; AG, article 7). Similarly, the
conciliar Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, Inter Mirifica,
comments that in accordance with human dignity, the mass media
communications system must uphold in its policy the norms of morality and
legitimate rights of the people for information (IM, article 5). In a similar vein,
the Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissimum Educationis, states that
corresponding to human dignity and destiny, every one has an inalienable right
to an education (GE, articles 1, 2, 3) and parents have the inalienable duty and
right to educate their children. They should also enjoy the freedom in their
choice of schools for their children (Ibid., article 6).
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of the human dignity as transcendent dignity102 because it is
rooted in God and perfected in the flourishing of human life in the
blessed communion with God for which God is the guarantor. This
vision of human dignity is all pervasive in the document of the
Gaudium et Spes. It is the over-riding perspective and in the
brightness of which the other aspects of human dignity have been
explained.
Secondly, article 12 emphasises two essential consequences of
creating human beings with capacity for God (capax Dei). The
first of the two essential consequences is the dignity of work, which
comprises the world of human activities in the temporal order. It is
generally known as the human activities in the secular realm, which
is distinct from the world of religious cult. It is for the reason that
human persons have the capacity for communion with God, they
are “appointed” to have dominion over the world.103 In other words,
since human persons have capacity for interpersonal communion
with God, God can entrust to them the work of God and they can
own responsibility for the same in freedom.
In other words, human persons are partners in the work of God
as they are called to be in communion with God. Consequently,
they are called to involve themselves in the work of God and realise
their divine destiny. In this manner they glorify God in all their work
in the secular city.104 For this reason, work is an essential dimension
of human vocation,105 consequent to human person’s capacity for
God (capax Dei).
The second essential consequence of the human capacity for
God is the dignity of social life. For the text underlines, “God did
not create man as a solitary.”106 It is because human persons are
endowed with capacity for interpersonal communion with God the
absolute Thou, every person is an  ‘I ’ – that is, a subject, who can
become a ‘Thou’ for another ‘I’107. Therefore, the human capacity
for God is the ground for the possibility and necessity for human
partner in life. Capacity for God (capax Dei) is the reason that
they are social by nature (socialitas), which is the foundational
principle for building up human communities.108 It means that, by
their very nature, human persons are relational subjects. The
institutions of family and political community are the foremost among
them as they relate with greater immediacy to people’s innermost
relational nature.109 Therefore, these are the natural institutions as
they are inherent in the nature of being human.
In what we have seen so far, it is obvious that the Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes maintains a holistic perspective
towards human dignity. It implies that human persons in all their
activities and in all situations of life in the secular city are worthy of
a dignity in what they are, which is transcendent in character. For
as image of God, at all time and everywhere, they are endowed
with freedom for fullness of life with God. At the same time, by
drawing attention to the distinction between the essential content
and the essential consequences of creating human beings in divine
image, the Vatican II in Gaudium et Spes illustrates in a profound
way the unity and distinction between the spiritual and the temporal,
religious and secular dimensions of human activity.
Gaudium et Spes sees from an existential point of view the
religious and secular dimensions of human activity in terms of
ultimate and relative aspects of human life together with the values
proper to each order. But they are not opposed to each other. The
relative (the temporal order, etc) is seen in the context of the
ultimate, which is capax Dei (human person’s freedom for
communion with God). In this way, the conciliar vision of the human
person excludes any sort of simple identification of the totality of
human excellence with the world of work or with the world of
102 CA, nn.44, 46.
103 GS, article 12, para 4.
104 Ibid., articles 34, 35.
105 For a creative hermeneutic of Pope John Paul II on work as “an essential
dimension of man’s vocation” see SRS, n.30; and his hermeneutic on work with
specific reference to the book of Genesis and the contemporary world of
industrial labour and technology, see LE, nn.4-6.
106 GS, article 12, para 5. God’s calling of human persons into existence (i.e.,
human vocation to exist) is always communitarian: see Otto Semmelroth, “The
Community of Mankind”, op.cit., pp. 166-167.
107 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., p. 122.
108 GS, articles 12, para 5; 25, para 1. Crf.  A.O. Erhueh, op.cit., pp. 158-160.
109 GS, article 25, para 2.
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socialization110 but sees them both in conjunction with the
transcendent horizon of human existence. For as God’s image the
person stands always and everywhere before God in freedom with
capacity to respond to the divine vocation for fullness of life. Here
one may notice the basis of religious freedom, which is human
persons’ capacity to know and love God. It is the foundation of all
other freedoms.
Christianity is concerned with human dignity, since it is part of
Christian faith that every human person is created in God’s own
image, and redeemed by Jesus Christ, the parable of God’s
continuous saving love in the world.111 Every one is called for the
flourishing of life eternally in the Trinitarian communion of God
because God’s love is eternal.112 Hence, the Christian faith is
concerned with the total welfare of humanity since the person in
his / her totality deserves respect worthy of God’s image. From
this anthropological perspective, as implied in the articles of the
Pastoral Constitution, what is truly human proves to be religious,
just as truly religious proves to be human.113
Consequent to this conciliar anthropological perspective,
Gaudium et Spes treats the world both as the theatre of human
history and the realisation of God’s saving plan for the family of
humankind.114 This has been succinctly expressed in the preamble
o the document. It is gives in a poetic style but forcefully describes,
“[T]he pivotal point of our total presentation will be man himself,
whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and
will.”115 Thus, everything in the world is to be considered and
approached from the point of view of human calling in life
(vocatio)116 as image of God (imago Dei), which is at once
transcendent, and by that very reason, supremely human in
character.117
The message of the conciliar document Gaudium et Spes is
meant for all in so far as it holds that humankind is created to the
imago Dei as well as it recognises the universal longing of all for a
life worthy of human dignity.118 Hence, this document is addressed
to the world community, to believers and non-believers alike. Its
intention is to establish dialogue with people of various persuasions
in all sectors of the civil society to further the cause of human life
in the world in a manner appropriate to human dignity. What we
have described above is the content of the preamble of the Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes, which permeates throughout the
entire document. We reproduce the full text of the preamble that
reads:
[T]his Second Vatican Council, having probed more
profoundly into the mystery of the Church, now addresses
itself without hesitation, not only to the sons of the Church
and to all who invoke the name of Christ, but to the whole
humanity. For the Council yearns to explain to everyone how
it conceives of the presence and activity of the Church in
the world of today.
Therefore, the Council focuses its attention on the world of
men, the whole human family along with the sum of those
realities in the midst of which that family lives. It gazes upon
110 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., pp.121-122.
111 Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus an Experiment in Christology, trans. H.
Hoskins (London, Collins, 1974), pp. 626-639.
112 Leonarddo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. P. Burns, (Kent, Burns & Oates /
Orbis books, Maryknoll, New York, 1988), pp. 124-128; Luis M. Bermejo,
Light Beyond Death (Anand, Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, 1985), pp. 187-188.
(Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, op.cit., p.206.
113  Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, op.cit., pp.206
- 207.
114 GS, article 2.
115 Ibid., article 3, para 2.
116 Closely connected with the theological concept of “imago Dei” is the human
calling in life “vocatio”. In Gaudium et Spes, the concept” vocatio” is also used
in terms of integral vocation, calling, invitation, destiny, mandate, etc. See crf.
GS, articles 3, 17, 18, 19, 22, 34, 57, 76. For a study on the theological connection
between “imago Dei “and “vocatio” as used in Gaudium et Spes see A.O.
Erhueh, op.cit., pp. 153-155.
117 Crf. GS, article 11. This article qualifies the “transcendent” character of the
human calling as “religious” and claims, “the mission of the Church will show
its religious, and by that very fact, its supremely human in character” (ibid,
para 3).
118 Crf. Ibid., article 9.
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that world which is the theatre of man’s history, and carries
the marks of his energies, his tragedies, and his triumphs;
that world which the Christian sees as created and sustained
by its Maker’s love, fallen indeed into the bondage of sin,
yet emancipated now by Christ. He was crucified and rose
again to break the stronghold of personified Evil, so that this
world might be fashioned anew according to God’s design
and reach its fulfilment.119
Following the example of Christ who came to the world to
serve the family of humankind and not to be served,120 the preamble
highlights the kind of service the Church, through dialogue, wishes
to offer to the world, which raises anxious questions about current
trends emerging in the world community and searches for meaning
of human existence. The preamble further explains:
Though mankind today is struck with wonder at its own
discoveries and its power, it often raises anxious questions
about the current trends of the world, about the place and
role of man in the universe, about the meaning of his individual
and collective strivings, and about the ultimate destiny of
reality and of humanity. Hence, giving witness and voice to
the faith of the whole People of God gathered together by
Christ, this Council can provide no more eloquent proof of
its solidarity with the entire human family with which it is
bound up, as well as its respect and love for that family, than
by engaging with it in conversation [dialogue]121 about these
various problems.
The Council brings to mankind light kindled from the gospel,
and puts at its disposal those saving resources which the
Church herself, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit,
receives from her Founder. For the human person deserves
to be preserved; human society deserves to be renewed.
Hence the pivotal point of our total presentation will be man
himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and
conscience, mind and will.
Therefore, this Synod proclaims the highest destiny of man
and champions the godlike seed which has been sown in
him. It offers to mankind the honest assistance of the Church
in fostering that brotherhood of all men which corresponds
to this destiny of theirs. Inspired by no earthily ambition, the
Church seeks but a solitary goal: to carry forward the work
of Christ Himself under the lead of the befriending Spirit.
And Christ entered this world to give witness to the truth, to
rescue and not to sit in judgment, to serve and not to be
served.122
Hence, the method of communication between the Church and
the world is one of sympathy, understanding, cooperation and
dialogue. The key to this dialogue with the world is the transcendent
dignity of very person created in the image of God and redeemed
by Christ. This is the central theme of the theological structure of
the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, which is written in the
context of the contemporary world. We study it in detail in what
follows.
2.5.3.1. Conciliar Theological Anthropology Centred on
     Human Dignity
The Second Vatican Council took place at a time when the
contemporary world has taken gigantic strides in the development
of human activity on various fields.123 The Pastoral Constitution
acknowledges with a sense of optimism these deep changes globally
affecting the material,124 social,125 psychological, moral and religious
spheres126 of life in the secular society.  It also recognizes the
positive values of the contemporary world’s anthropological
119 Ibid., article 2.
120 Crf. Mk 10:45; Mt 20: 28; Jn 18: 37.
121 Flannery Austin in his edition of the Vatican document uses the term dialogue
while Walter M. Abbot maintains the term ‘conversation”. See Flannery Austin,
O.P., ed. Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents
(Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1975), p.904.
122 GS, article 3.
123 GS, articles 4, 5.
124 Ibid., article 4.
125 Ibid., article 6.
126 Ibid., article 7.
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approach towards “all things on earth”,127 and supports its affirmative
stance towards substantive values of human dignity, such as
freedom, responsibility, equality and human solidarity, etc.128
All the same, the same world is also known for confusion and
despair about the essential meaning of human existence and calling
in life. Gaudium et Spes portrays this world of human confusion
and despair as contemporary anthropological crisis about the
meaning of human existence.129 In this context, the Council believes
that the mystery of Christ can shed light to solve this crisis by
revealing the mystery of human existence, the values of human
solidarity and human activities, and the meaning of human struggles
and achievements in the world. The introductory statement130 of
the document depicts this world scenario and the concluding article
tersely describes:
The truth is that the imbalances under which the modern
world labors are linked with that more basic imbalance rooted
in the heart of man. For in man himself many elements
wrestle with one another. Thus, on the one hand, as a creature
he experiences his limitations in a multitude of ways. On the
other, he feels himself to be boundless in his desires and
summoned to a higher life…
[I]n the face of the modern development of the world, an
ever-increasing number of people are raising the most basic
questions or recognizing them with a new sharpness: What
is man? What is this sense of sorrow, of evil, of death, which
continues to exist despite so much progress? What is the
purpose of these victories, purchased at so high a cost? What
can man offer to society, what can he expect from it? What
127 Crf. ibid., article 12, para 1.
128 Ibid., article 9.
129 Walter Kasper claims that the historical background of the contemporary
anthropological crisis in the Western civilisation goes back to the dichotomous
anthropology of Descartes. For detail see Walter Kasper, “The theological
anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”, in Communio, 23 (Spring 1996), pp. 129-
140.
130 Articles 4 to 10 form the “Introductory Statement” of the Pastoral Constitution
Gaudium et Spes.
follows this earthly life? The Church believes that Christ,
who died and was raised up for all, can through His Spirit
offer man the light and the strength to measure up to his
supreme destiny.131
Similarly, the first part of the Pastoral Constitution,132 which
deals with the dignity of the human persons as image of God in
their individual and social aspects as well as the dignity of their
activities in the world, begins once again with the portrayal of the
contemporary anthropological crisis and concisely depicts:
According to the almost unanimous opinion of believers and
unbelievers alike, all things on earth should be related to man
as their center and crown.
But what is man? About himself he has expressed, and
continues to express, many divergent and even contradictory
opinions. In these he often exalts himself as the absolute
measure of all things or debases himself to the point of
despair. The result is doubt and anxiety.
The Church understands these problems. Endowed with light
form God, she can offer solutions to them so that man’s true
situation can be portrayed and his defects explained, while
at the same time his dignity and destiny are justly
acknowledged.133
Hence, anthropological crisis is the context and the common
ground for the Church’s dialogue with the world. In the words of
Walter Kasper, “Anthropology is the Archimedean point of the
Pastoral Constitution, the basis for a dialogue with the world of
today.”134
In this existential context of the contemporary society, the
Pastoral Constitution expounds on the general principles of
theological anthropology grounded on the transcendent dignity of
131 GS, article 10, paras 1, 6, 7.
132 Ibid., articles 11-45.
133 Ibid., article 12, paras 1, 2, 3.
134 Walter Kasper, “The theological anthropology of the Gaudium et Spes”, op.cit.,
p.135.
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the human person as God’s image and presents it to the world
community, to Christians and others alike. Its purpose is to help
people of all persuasions to gain deeper insight into the destiny of
human life so that, as the document says,  “they can fashion the
world more to man’s surpassing dignity, search for a brotherhood
which is universal and more deeply rooted, and meet the urgencies
of our age with a gallant and unified effort born of love.”135 The
document also provides with theological reasons for the Church’s
engagement into dialogue with the world to find solutions to these
human problems in the light of the Gospel136 and to work towards
a world order worthy of human dignity.137
In this broad anthropological perspective, the Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes presents a general systematic
structure of Christian anthropology138 centred on human dignity139
and takes it for granted the traditional doctrine about creation and
human nature and re-asserts them only in passing.140 The real
anthropological concern of Vatican II as outlined in the theological
structure of the document is deeper. It deals with the Christian
understanding of the human existence in the world. It focuses on
the human calling in life and gives more emphasis to life in the
secular world, which resonates with the transcendent dignity of
the human person.141
This theological concern in view, the systematic treatment of
the Christian anthropology as structured in Gaudium et Spes is
divided into two parts. The first part is titled as “The Church and
Man’s Calling”142 and the second part as “Some Problems of Special
Urgency.”143 These two parts constitute the main body of the
Pastoral Constitution.144 The first part is chiefly doctrinal in
character. It provides us with exposition on the doctrinal principles
arising from theological anthropology centred on human dignity and
finally explains its surpassing value in the light of the mystery of
Christ. This is the matter for our study in this section.
The second part of the document contains many doctrinal points
but primarily pastoral in tone. Most of its materials have been taken
from the Johannine encyclicals, Mater et Magistra (1961) and
Pacem in Terris (1963) which we have analysed in the previous
chapter.145 Suffice for us to provide here a brief explanation to
point out the centrality of human dignity as used in the pastoral
structure of the second part. In this part the document deals with
some important “subjects arousing universal concern”146 in the
contemporary society, namely the institution of marriage and
135 Ibid., article 91, para 1.
136 Ibid., articles 3, 10, 12.
137 GS, articles 2,3,11.12, 40; Walter Kasper, “The theological anthropology of the
Gaudium et Spes”, op.cit., pp. 129-130;Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and
Man’s Calling”, in CD, vol. V, op.cit., pp.115-118; A.O. Erhueh, Vatican II :
Image of God in Man, op.cit., pp. 143-145.
138 Crf. GS, article 91.
139 See especially ibid., articles 12,19, 21.
140 For example the Scholastic concept of body-soul composition of the human
person is referred to without going into detail in terms of classical theology (See
GS article 14).
141 Crf. Charles Moeller, “History of the Constitution”, in CD, op.cit., vol. V, pp.
1 ff.
142 GS, articles 11-45.
143 Ibid., articles 46-90.
144 Besides the main parts of the Pastoral Constitution, articles 1 to 10 constitute
the long Introduction, which consists of a preface (article 1), a preamble (articles
2-3) and an introductory statement (articles 4-10). The Preface stresses on the
intimate bond of solidarity that exists between the Church and the world. The
Preamble informs that the Constitution is addressed to all to tell the world
community that the Church enters into dialogue with the world in the light of
the Gospel in defence of human dignity. The Introductory statement describes
in an astounding manner the contemporary world scenario in a language, which
is personalist, existential and pastoral in tonality. In particular, it specifies the
contemporary anthropological crisis and the Church’s reason for engaging in
dialogue with the world. Articles 91 to 93 contain the general conclusion. It
recapitulates certain basic themes of the document. It states that the Constitution
presents general teaching already accepted in the Church, i.e., referring to the
previous Social Encyclicals (art.91). It informs that the Church stands forth “as
a sign of that brotherhood which allows honest dialogue and gives it vigor”
(art.92); and states that the Church esteems harmony through full recognition
of lawful diversity in the world (ibid) and wishes that by its service to the
world “will share with others the mystery of the heavenly Father’s love”(art.93).
145 See above chapter 4, section 2.4.3.4.3: “Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra
(1961)”, p. 262 and section 2.4.3.4.4: “Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963)”,
pp. 295-300.
146 GS, article 46, para 2.
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family,147 development of culture,148 socio-economic order149
and political community150 as well as the issue of world peace and
solidarity among the nations.151
While dealing with the institution of marriage and family, the
document stresses that the dignity of the human person as God’s
image is the foundation for the natural dignity and nobility of marriage
and family life.152 In addition, it calls to attention the dignity of
Christian marriage as a reflection of “the loving covenant uniting
Christ with the Church.”153 Similarly, the document comments on
the nobility of culture on account of human dignity because culture
flows from the spiritual and social nature of human person to
humanise the world. Consequently, the Church supports the just
liberty and autonomy of culture.154
The dignity of the human person is the leitmotif of what the
Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes says concerning socio-
economic order. It states, “[M]an is the source, the center, and the
purpose of all economic and social life.”155 Therefore, the human
labour itself must always be seen in its true dignity.156 Similarly,
human dignity is the criterion for the support of democratic form of
political community since Vatican II considers that constitutional
government safeguards better the substantive values of human
dignity and the rights that proceed from it.157 Finally in its advocacy
for world peace, the document declares that a firm determination
to respect people in their dignity and affirmation of human solidarity
(brotherhood) are absolutely necessary for the promotion of world
peace.158
2.5.3.2. Human Dignity in the Doctrinal Structure of Gaudium
   et Spes
The first part of the Pastoral Constitution presents an expansive
doctrinal exposition on the defining theological principles of human
dignity. This part consists of four chapters. They are theologically
structured and thematically sub-titled as “The Dignity of the Human
Person”;159 “The Community of Mankind”;160 “Man’s Activity
throughout the World”;161 and “The Role of the Church in the
Modern World”.162 From the methodological point of view, these
four chapters are grouped into two sections.163 Chapters 1 to 3
form the first section and chapter 4 makes up the second section
of the first part of the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.
The first three chapters explain human dignity by relating it
with human existence in the world under three aspects. This is
based on the classification of the essential content and the essential
consequences of creating human persons in God’s image.164 Hence,
the first chapter deals more categorically with the dignity of the
human person in one’s individual aspect and in one’s relationship to
God. The second chapter treats the dignity of the human person in
147 Ibid., articles 47-52.
148 Ibid., articles 53-62.
149 Ibid., articles 63-72.
150 Ibid., article 73-76.
151 Ibid., articles 77-90.
152 Ibid., article 47. For the theological perspectives of Gaudium et Spes on the
sacrament of marriage see  Bernard de Lanversin, “Vatican II and Marriage: The
Sacred Foundations of the Order of Creation in Natural Marriage”, in Vatican II
Assessment and Perspectives, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 177-200.
153 GS, article 48, para 8.
154 GS, articles 53, 59. For a detailed study on this topic see Herve Carrier, “The
Contribution of the Council to Culture”, Vatican II Assessment and Perspectives,
op.cit., vol. III, pp. 442-465.
155 GS, article 63, para 1.
156 Ibid., article 69. It is this conciliar principle of the dignity of labour that has
been later philosophically and theologically elaborated by Pope John Paul II in
his first social Encyclical Letter Laborem Exercens (1981). We have studied it
in chapter eight. See supra section 3.8.3.4.6.
157 GS, articles 73. The principles of political community as expounded in the
articles 73 to 76 of Gaudium et Spes are based on John XXIII’s Encyclical
Letter Pacem in Terris (1963). On human rights and the relation between the
individuals and the state, the Pastoral Constitution follows the principles given
in Pacem in Terris, nn.8-79.
158 Ibid., article 78, para 3.
159 GS, articles 12-22.
160 Ibid., articles 23-32.
161 Ibid., articles 33-39.
162 Ibid., articles 40-45.
163 See Otto Semmelroth, “The Community of Mankind”, in CD, vol. V., op.cit.,
p. 165.
164 See above section 2.5.3: “The Theology of Human Dignity in Gaudium et
Spes”, pp. 334-344.
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document, moreover, extols the dignity and primacy of the moral
conscience171 as well as the dignity and excellence of liberty.172
However, the Constitution does not overlook the reality of sin173
and the consequent possibility of misusing freedom, a self-evident
fact in daily life.174
Commenting on the sacredness of conscience, the document
asserts that we know the imperatives of the divine law through the
mediation of conscience. Therefore, it claims that human dignity
demands obedience to one’s conscience, and says:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he
does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to
obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid
evil…
Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man.
There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his
depths…In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with
the rest of men in the search for truth…175
Correspondingly, the Gaudium et Spes is categorical in its
affirmation of the centrality of freedom that is inalienable to the
dignity of human persons created in God’s image, and declares:
[A]uthentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine
image within man. For God has willed that man be left “in
the hands of his own counsel” [cf. Eccl. (Sir) 15:14] so that
he can seek his Creator spontaneously…Hence man’s dignity
demands that he acts according to a knowing and free
choice.176
Insistence upon the indispensable value of freedom led Vatican
II to make a special declaration on religious freedom as the right of
the person and communities to immunity from coercion in matters
one’s social aspect, that is, the human person as a relational
self. The third chapter relates human dignity with human activity in
the world in which one is called upon to participate in the work of
God and develop one’s personality. It explains the dignity of human
activity in the world.
It is in this total perspective of the dignity of human existence
in the world, which consists in a complex network of human
relationships and activities, the fourth chapter presents the role of
the Church in terms of dialogue with the world in defence of human
dignity as well as its pastoral responsibility to commit for the cause
of human dignity in the civil society. This ecclesial intention has
been declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter.165 It states
that everything that has been said about human dignity,166 and about
human community167 and the profound meaning of human activity,168
lays the foundation for the relationship between the Church and
the world, and presents the basis for dialogue between them. After
studying the theological structure of Gaudium et Spes in the
comprehensive perspective of the theology of human dignity, we
are now in a position to collate the basic doctrinal principles of
human dignity. These are also the constitutive principles of the
theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes.
2.5.3.3. The Doctrinal Principles of Human Dignity
We highlight in this section the doctrinal principles of human dignity,
which are intrinsic to Christian vision of human person. First of all,
Gaudium et Spes stresses that the creation of human persons “to
the image of God”169 is the foundation of human dignity. As image
of God, human persons are capable of knowing and loving God.
For this reason, the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes exalts
the dignity of human intellect with which persons surpass the
material universe and share “with the light of divine mind.”170 The
165 GS, article 40.
166 It refers to part 1; chapter 1 of GS (articles 12-22).
167 It refers to part 1; chapter 2 of GS (articles 23-32).
168 It refers to part 1; chapter 3 of GS (articles 33-39).
169 GS, article 12, para 4. For detail see above section 2.5.3: “The Theology of
Human Dignity in Gaudium et Spes”, pp. 334-344.
170 GS, article 15, para 1.
171 Ibid., article 16.
172 Ibid., article 17.
173 Ibid., article 13.
174 Ibid., article 17, para 3.
175 Ibid., article 16, paras 1, 2.
176 Ibid., article 17, para 2.
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religious in the civil society.177 It is also important to note that
the Constitution upholds in an excellent manner the dignity of human
body and forbids despising it,178 since God has created it and will
raise it up on the last day. It explains that “the very dignity of man
postulates that man glorify God in his body.”179 The document
describes the mystery of death with a deep sense of hope and
sobriety in the light of the paschal mystery of Christ.180
The second doctrinal principle is the dignity of the human persons
in their social nature, which is grounded in and flows from the
human capacity for interpersonal communion with God (capax
Dei). Gaudium et Spes declares, “by his innermost nature man is
a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he can neither
live nor develop his potential.”181 Consequently, emphasis is laid on
the interdependent nature of the person and the need for society.
Human persons develop their unique personalities through societal
relationship and fulfil their calling in life in the context of society.
God ordains it on account of their creation in God’s image. Therefore,
the document claims:
Man’s social nature makes it evident that the progress of
the human person and the advance of society itself hinge on
each other…Hence, through his dealings with others, through
reciprocal duties, and through fraternal dialogue he develops
all his gifts and is able to rise to his destiny.182
The transcendent dignity of the human persons and their social
nature require promoting the values of human solidarity (fraternity),
equality and respect for all people.183 Commenting on the need for
human solidarity (fraternity), Gaudium et Spes states:
God, who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that
all men should constitute one family and treat one another in
a spirit of brotherhood. For having been created in the image
of God…all men are called to one and the same goal, namely,
God Himself.
For this reason, love for God and neighbour is the first and
greatest commandment…184
Likewise, Gaudium et Spes reiterates that the doctrine of
imago Dei is the theological foundation for egalitarian social order
and for eradicating discrimination of the people in any form in the
society. It explains:
Since all men possess a rational soul and are created in God’s
likeness, since they have the same nature and origin, have
been redeemed by Christ, and enjoy the same divine calling
and destiny, the basic equality of all must receive increasingly
greater recognition… [E]very type of discrimination, whether
social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social
condition, language, or religion, is to be overcome and
eradicated as contrary to God’s intent.185
The dignity of human persons in their social nature and the
values flowing from it are also indicative of the need to protect and
promote common good186 which allows communities and their
members to attain their legitimate aspirations to lead a life worthy
of human dignity.
The third doctrinal principle is the dignity of work. The Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes describes the value of human activity
by seeing it from the perspectives of protology,187 soteriology188
and eschatology.189 The conciliar document emphasises that
endowed with capacity for God and redeemed by Christ, human
activity is participation in the divine creative will in developing the177 Crf. DH, article 2. This is the subject of our study in section 2.5.6,
“Transcendent Dignity and Religious Freedom”, pp. 367-370, ff.
178 GS, article 14.
179 Ibid., para 2.
180 Ibid., article 18.
181 Ibid., article 12, para 5.
182 Ibid., article 25, para 1.
183 Ibid., article 28.
184 Ibid., article 24, paras 1, 2.
185 Ibid., article 29, paras 1, 2.
186 Ibid., article 26.
187 Ibid., article 34.
188 Ibid., article 38.
189 Ibid., article 39.
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world throughout history for the advancement of the family of
humankind and thereby preparing the final state of the world, which
Christ will bring about on His return.190 For this reason, the Christian
faith sees that “the triumphs of the human race are a sign of God’s
greatness and the flowering of His own mysterious design.”191
Therefore, faith does not deter Christians from building up the
secular city, but “they are, rather, more stringently bound to do
these very things.”192 In this context, the Pastoral Constitution
acknowledges the rightful autonomy of the secular realities and
holds that matters of reason need not be in conflict with concerns
of faith because both “derive from the same God.”193
2.5.4. Human Dignity in the Christological Horizon
The theological understanding of the human person as expounded
in the first part of the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, which
constitutes its doctrinal part, is the most extensive presentation on
a specific theme in the Council’s documents.194 The document claims
that this anthropological narrative grounded on human dignity, finds
meaning only in the light of Christ. The definitive text in Gaudium
et Spes asserts, “The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate
Word does the mystery of man takes on light.”195 Commenting on
this text, Walter Kasper says, “This sentence is, as it were, the
standard and the short formula of the Gaudium et Spes. It entitles
us to call the anthropology of the Second Vatican Council not only
as a Christian, but also a christological anthropology.”196 This text
informs us about the place of christological hermeneutics in the
detailed account of the anthropology of Gaudium et Spes. It invites
us to see anthropology in the light of christology.
The commentators of the Documents of Vatican II also remind
us that, while no Council document is explicitly devoted to the
mystery of Christ, christological perspective is present everywhere
as the criterion of the Council’s teaching.197 Pope Paul VI has
particularly commented on this point and reminded:
The Council did not expressly deal with dogmas related to
Christ as did the Councils of Nicaea, Ephesus and Chalcedon.
Its central theme was the Church. But just because it
endeavoured to understand the Church in her innermost
reality, in the source of her vitality rather than in her historical
and juridical aspects, the Council was happily obliged to refer
everything to Christ Our Lord, not only as to the founder, but
as to the Head, the principle of action and life of His Body
which is the Church…If then we wish to understand the
central doctrine of the Council, we must understand the
Church; but to understand the Church, we must refer
everything to Christ.198
The Pontiff’s observation is particularly true in the case of
Gaudium et Spes in which the occurrence of the christological
texts is rather frequent than in other documents.199 Its clearest
expression is found in article 22 of the Pastoral Constitution that
190 Ibid., articles 34-39.
191 Ibid., article 34, para 3.
192 Ibid. The eschatological optimism of the world-affirming Christian
anthropology is given almost in a poetic style in the last two paragraph of the
third chapter of the first part of the Gaudium et Spes: “Earthly progress must
be carefully distinguished from the growth of Christ’s kingdom. Nevertheless,
to the extent that the former can contribute to the better ordering of human
society, it is of vital concern to the kingdom of God.
For after we have obeyed the Lord, and in His Spirit nurtured on earth the
values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and indeed all the good
fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will find then again, but freed of stain,
burnished and transfigured. This will be so when Christ hands over to the
Father a kingdom eternal and universal…On this earth that kingdom is already
present in mystery. When the Lord returns, it will be brought into full flower”
(Ibid., article 39, paras 4, 5).
193 Ibid., article 36, para 3.
194 Luis Ladaria, “Humanity in the Light of Christ in the Second Vatican Council”,
in Vatican II Assessment and Perspectives, op.cit., vol. II, p. 387.
195 GS, article 22, para 1.
196 Walter Kasper, op.cit., p. 137.
197 Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp.143-147.
198 As quoted in J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, Christian Faith, op.cit., p. 202 (Paul VI,
Public audience, Nov.23, 1966).
199 The Fathers of the Council were emphatic that the anthropological narrative
was to be seen in the christological horizon. Crf. Luis Ladaria, op.cit., p. 390;
Walter Kasper, “The theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”, op.cit., p.
136. The following articles of the Gaudium et Spes contain christological texts:
Articles 10, 18, 22, 32, 38, 39, 41,45, 57, 61.
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interprets the mystery of the human person in the light of the
mystery of Christ, the incarnate image of the invisible God. It is the
subject of our study in the following sections.
2.5.4.1. The Transcendent Dignity of the Human Person
The theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes indicates that
the mystery of Christ highlights the transcendent character of human
dignity. It is explained in article 22 of Gaudium et Spes. Our study
begins with the first paragraph of the said article, which describes
about the light shed by Christ on the mystery of humankind. The
text declares:
The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word
does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first
man, was a figure of Him who was to come, namely, Christ
the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the
mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to
man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not
surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths
find their root and attain their crown.
We start with the last sentence of this paragraph that holds the
key to the text. It says that all the known facts about humankind as
narrated in the first chapter, namely the dignity of creating the human
person in God’s image, the dignity of human body, intellect,
conscience, liberty, tragic reality of sin and the mystery of death,
etc., “find their root and attain their crown”200 in the mystery of
Christ, the incarnate image of the invisible God (Col. 1:15).201
Hence, the mystery of the incarnation reveals what human persons
are and to what purpose they are created in God’s image.
The text also mentions Adam-Christ typology of the Pauline
theology202 and refers to its christological hermeneutics as found in
the great patristic tradition, especially in the writings of Tertullian203
and Irenaeus.204 They commented that the first Adam fashioned
by God from the slime of the earth, already imaged the incarnation
of Christ as the perfecting image of God in humankind. The
christological relevance of the test for our study is that Adam created
in the image of God, which is to be construed as humankind in the
generic sense created in God’s image, does not explain Christ. But
Christ, the divine image incarnate, enlightens every one what it
means to create human persons in the image of God. Hence, in
Gaudium et Spes the systematic link between anthropology and
christology is the concept of the “image of God.”205
The application of the concept of image of God in relation to
christology and anthropology requires our explanation. What is
involved here is the theological methodology used in the document
of the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, which is addressed
to all, Christians and non-Christians alike.206 To meet this
requirement, the fathers of Vatican II used an inductive
anthropological method, which advances from facts better known
and generally acknowledged by all to less known and less talked
about anthropological insights.207 As a result, christological insights
are generally given as the concluding faith reflection on
anthropology. This pattern is repeated at the end of each chapter in
the first part of Gaudium et Spes. It means that anthropology is
the starting point, and christology is the horizon and criterion of all
reflections on human dignity, and the connecting link between the
two is the concept of the imago Dei.
This becomes evident from the theological structure of the first
chapter of the first part of Gaudium et Spes, which deals
specifically with human dignity.208 In this chapter, there is a direct
theological link between article 12, which is the first article, and
200 GS, article 22, para 1.
201 Ibid., para 2.
202 Rom 5:14.
203 Crf. Walter M. Abbott, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., p.220, footnote
54.
204 Crf. Luis Ladaria, op.cit., pp.390,400).
205 Walter Kasper, op.cit., p. 137. For detailed study of this point see the following:
Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp. 159-160; Lawrence J. Welch, “Gaudium et Spes,
the Divine Image, and the Synthesis of Veritatis Splendor “, in Communio,
24(1997), pp. 794-814.
206 Crf. GS, article 2.
207 Crf. Yves Congar, op.cit., p. 206.
208 GS, articles 12 to 22.
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article 22, which concludes the narrative on human dignity in
that chapter. In article 12 the anthropological narrative of human
dignity begins with the image of God theology of the Old Testament.
This narrative culminates with article 22 that presents Christ as the
New Man, which is substantiated by the image christology of the
New Testament with the affirmation that Jesus Christ is the
incarnate image of the invisible God.209 Hence, image of God
concept is the systematic theological connection with which the
fathers of the Council explained the essential nature of humankind,
their social constitution and their creative organisation of the world
in relation to the mystery of Christ. Therefore, the significance of
human person’s openness to God (capax Dei), human relationality
- that is, the social nature of the human person - and human activity
are viewed in the light of the mystery of Christ.
One may wonder why christology should be the horizon for
anthropology. The reason is that as image of God, human persons
find their ultimate and definitive fulfilment of their vocation in life
only in that intimate communion with God, which has occurred in
an unique and unsurpassable way in Jesus Christ, the incarnate
image of the invisible God, who is truly God and truly human.210
Hence, by revealing God’s love for humankind and thus revealing
himself as Son sent by the Father, Jesus Christ reveals through his
life, death and resurrection God’s gracious intention of creating
humankind in God’s image for communion with God (capax Dei).
This means that from the beginning of creation, human persons
are called to be in communion with God, to be God’s children in the
Son. The dignity of the human person is seen in the christological
horizon not only because Christ identified himself with the family
of humankind through the mystery of his redemptive incarnation
but also as the eternal Word of God the Father, in him everything is
created.211 This is the reason for the christological interpretation of
the transcendent character of human dignity. It is because the divine
intention of creating humankind in God’s image does not exhaust
with life temporal but for the flourishing of life in the glory of the
Risen Christ212 who is presented in Gaudium et Spes as “the goal
of the human history, the focal point of the longings of history and
of civilization, the center of the human race, the joy of every heart,
and the answer to all its yearnings.”213
2.5.4.2. The Mystery of Incarnation Exalts Human Dignity
The second paragraph of article 22 begins with the image christology
of the New Testament. It presents Christ as the eschatological
Adam, and stresses on the exalted character of human dignity
because of Christ’s solidarity with every human person.
Consequently, the article describes that by the mystery of incarnation
the nature of humankind has been raised to a divine dignity. The
text reads:
209 Crf. Col 1:15; 2 Cor 4:4.
210 Walter Kasper, op.cit., p. 137. See also “Symbol of the General Council of
Chalcedon (A.D. 451)” in J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, op.cit., pp. 165-166.
211 Crf. Jn 1: 1-18; Col 1: 15-20; Eph 1: 15-23; 2:10.
212 Luis Ladaria, op.cit., p. 391.
213 GS, article 45, para 2. This text needs our attention because next to article 22
of Gaudium et Spes, it is the second richest christological text in the entire
documents of Vatican II (crf. Jacques Dupuis, op.cit., p. 144). It is given as the
concluding article of the doctrinal part of Gaudium et Spes which follows an
inductive anthropological method leading to christological anthropology. We
reproduce the full text: “For God’s Word, by whom all things were made, was
Himself made flesh so that as perfect man He might save all men and sum up all
things in Himself. The Lord is the goal of human history, the focal point of the
longings of history and of civilization, the center of the human race, the joy of
every heart, and the answer to all its yearnings. He it is whom the Father raised
from the dead, lifted on high, and stationed at His right hand, making Him Judge
of the living and the dead. Enlivened and united in His Spirit, we journey
towards the consummation of human history, one which fully accords with the
counsel of God’s love: ‘To re-establish all things in Christ, both those in heavens
and those on the earth’ (Eph. 1:10).” This text projects a holistic approach
towards nature and grace, creation and redemption, secular history and salvation
history. Dichotomy between natural and supernatural orders has been ironed
out while distinction is maintained. Christ is sent into the midst of human
history as a new ontological principle, by which the creation achieves its ultimate
meaning and so attains fulfilment. The whole function (munus) of the Church
as the “universal sacrament of salvation of Christ” (crf. LG, articles 1, 8, 15,
and 17) is nothing but to serve this saving plan of God. The text also suggests
that evangelisation is a comprehensive ecclesial service to the world. It is more
than proclamation (crf. Yves Congar, op.cit., pp. 221-222).
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He who is “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15), is
Himself the perfect man. To the sons of Adam He restores
the divine likeness which has been disfigured from the first
sin onwards. Since human nature as He assumed it was not
annulled, by that very fact it has been raised up to a divine
dignity in our respect too. For by His incarnation the Son of
God has united Himself in some fashion with every man. He
worked with human hands, He thought with a human mind,
acted by human choice, and loved with a human heart. Born
of the Virgin Mary, He has truly been made one of us, like
us in all things except sin.214
In this text, the document accentuates the theology of
“assumptio hominis” in full depth and intensity.215 Precisely, as
the incarnate image of the invisible God, Christ reveals God in an
excellent way through his perfect humanity.216 Consequently, Christ
reveals in his humanity the true nature of humankind created in
God’s image. Just as the human nature that Christ assumed was
not absorbed by his divinity;217 likewise our human nature, by coming
into contact with Christ, does not disappear nor become diminished.
On the contrary, it is exalted to its supreme dignity. Moreover,
recalling the great patristic tradition,218 Gaudium et Spes tells in
an emphatic language that by the mystery of incarnation, Christ
has joined himself with every human person.
In its attempt to show how Christ united himself with every
one, the document does not resort to essentialist language of the
ontological christology like that of the Council of Chalcedon219 but
uses existential and practical language. Therefore, the text describes,
“He [Christ] worked with his human hands, He thought with a
human mind, acted by human choice, and loved with a human
heart.”220 It means that Jesus’ human actions have become the
instrument of the divine Logos and remained open to divine action,
since by the mystery of the incarnation, all human actions of Jesus
are the human actions of the Son of God.221 Christology, therefore,
posits that human persons are free subjects. They are endowed
with capacity to hear and respond to the Word of God and to organise
their lives responsibly in the world.222 The mystery of incarnation
affirms the anthropological truth that the human person in his or
her totality, that is, in his or her thinking, willing, loving and acting in
the world is openness to God (capax dei). This suggests that
freedom and responsibility are integral to the fact of being human.
2.5.4.3. Human Dignity and Christ’s Universal Redemption
Christology leads us to see the meaning of human dignity in the
light of Christ’s redemptive incarnation. Therefore, paragraphs 3
to 6 of the article 22 of Gaudium et Spes explain the soteriological
significance of Christ’s death for all. We begin our study with the
third paragraph, which is focused on Christ’s vicarious death for
our sins and the new life that he merited for us. The text reads:
As an innocent lamb He merited life for us by the free
shedding of His blood. In Him God reconciled us to Himself
and among ourselves. From bondage to the devil and sin, He
delivered us, so that each one of us can say with the Apostle:
The Son of God “loved me and gave himself up for me”
214  GS, article 22, para 2.
215 Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp. 160-161.
216 Crf. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith, op.cit., pp. 166-167, nn.614-
615.
217 The Christological definition on the Two Wills and Actions of Christ
promulgated by the Council of Constantinople III (681), crf. ibid., pp. 184-
185, nn.635-637.
218 St. Gregory of Nazianzus, in PG 44, 802. Quoted in Luis Ladaria, op.cit., p.
391.
219 J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, Christian faith, op.cit., pp.165-167.
220 GS, article 22, para 2.
221 Commenting on the human personality of Christ, Walter Kasper in his
systematic christological reflection writes: “The assumption of Jesus’ humanity,
the act of highest possible union, at the same time posits this in its own
creaturely reality. Jesus’ humanity is therefore hypostatically united with the
Logos in a human way, and this means in a way that includes human freedom
and human self-consciousness. Precisely because Jesus is no other than the
Logos, in the Logos and through him, he is also a human person. Conversely,
the person of the Logos is the human person.” Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ
(London, Burns and Oates, 1976), p. 248.
222 Walter Kasper, “The theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes”, op.cit.,
138.
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(Gal. 2:20). By suffering for us He not only provided us with
an example for our imitation. He blazed a trail, and if we
follow it, life and death are made holy and take on a new
meaning.223
Christ’s solidarity with every person, which is mentioned in the
previous paragraph, reaches its finale in his death and glorious
resurrection. It is precisely because not only life but also “the riddles
of sorrow and death”224 attain new meaning in him, who as the
incarnate image of the invisible God reveals, “the supreme calling”225
of every one created in God’s image. This is to live a life of
communion with God and with all people in terms of human solidarity
in the society.
However, the emphasis in this paragraph is not on Christ’s
solidarity with us in death as such, but on his vicarious death, since
the text describes, “As an innocent lamb He merited life for us by
the free shedding of His blood.”226 This has got particular interest
for our study of the universal significance of human dignity in the
light of Christ’s universal redemption. From the christological point
of view, it means that through the ignominious death of Jesus Christ,
God shares with the sin-ridden world two truths: (1) that God remains
ever faithful to the supreme calling of human persons for communion
with God, which is the divine bestowal, by creating them in God’s
image; and (2) that God shares with the world God’s infinite
readiness to suffer, that is, to empty God’s self in self-giving227 for
restoring humankind’s communion with God and humankind among
themselves. It is because by sin human persons have disfigured
their relationship to God and among themselves as the text affirms,
“In Him [Jesus Christ] God reconciled us to Himself and among
ourselves.”228
Hence, God’s faithfulness to the transcendent calling of human
persons as intended by God from the beginning of creation is the
heart of human dignity. Christologically speaking, the dignity of every
person is to be seen in the value of the precious blood of the Son of
God shed on the cross for the redemption of every one.229 Hence,
the university of Christ’s redemption affirms the university of human
dignity and equality of all people before God and among themselves.
God’s faithfulness to the humankind’s calling in life is salvation
whose content, from the christological point of view, is the paschal
mystery, which is the summary of Christ’s total solidarity with the
entire family of humankind. This has been presented concisely in
the sixth paragraph of article 22 of Gaudium et Spes, which says:
All this holds true not only to Christians, but for all men of
good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way.
For, since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate
vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe
that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to
every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal
mystery.230
In this paragraph we have the categorical affirmation of Vatican
II on the universal possibility of salvation.231 Hence, all are called
to unite themselves with Christ and all given the possibility of being
associated with the paschal mystery through the working of the
Holy Spirit. The mention of the pneumatological dimension of the
universality of salvation in Jesus Christ is appropriate, because it is
the Holy Spirit who associates men and women everywhere, even
beyond the ecclesial community with the paschal mystery in a way
known to God who wills all people be saved and come to the
knowledge of the truth232 about their vocation in life.
Thus Christ, the dead and the Risen Lord of the universe, sheds
light on the mystery of sorrow and death as well as on the vocation
of human persons. He lavishes upon all people life “so that as sons
[children] in the Son, we can cry out in the Spirit: Abba, Father!”233223  GS, article 22, para 3.
224 GS, article 22, para 7.
225 Ibid., para 1.
226 Ibid., para 3.
227 Crf. Phil 2: 5-8
228 Ibid., para 3; crf. 2 Cor 5: 18-19; Col 1: 20-22.
229 Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp. 160-161.
230  GS, article 22, para 6.
231 Ibid., pp.162-163; J. Dupuis., Who Do You Say I Am?, op.cit., p.148.
232 Crf. 1 Tim 2: 4.
233 GS, article 22, para 7.
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Humanity reaches the goal of its calling in life when the entire
family of humankind flourishes in the divine life of the Trinitarian
communion of God. Therefore, the universality of the paschal
mystery affirms not only the university of human dignity and equality
of all but also the nobility of human solidarity234 and interpersonal
communion as constitutive of the essential nature of humankind
created in God’s image. It is for the reason that God who is imaged
in all people is given in the biblical revelation as the Trinitarian
Communion of Persons.235 Hence, human solidarity in societal life,
which is inalienable to human nature, is seen as a sign of divine
communion of the Trinitarian God.236
At the same time, human solidarity involves a sense of
inalienable duty claiming on every one to promote common good,
which can only be maintained through the responsible use of
freedom. This entails a sense of self-giving and self-sacrifice for
the welfare of all. These values inherent in the nature of human
relationality find their soteriological significance in the paschal
mystery. Therefore, these human actions are redemptive in
character, though secular in application237 because all good actions
are of the working of the Holy Spirit who, in a way known to God,
associates all with the paschal mystery. Article 22 of the Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes concludes with a profound sense of
wonder at mystery of the human person and exclaims, “Such is the
mystery of man, and it is a great one, as seen by believers in the
light of Christian revelation…Apart from His gospel, they
overwhelm us.”238
2.5.5. Christian faith safeguards Transcendent Dignity
We sum up our study of human dignity seen in the christological
horizon with the following observations. Human dignity attains an
exalted meaning, when the person’s origin and destiny is seen in
the light of Jesus Christ, the incarnate image of the invisible God.
This has got value significance in the political order for the protection
of human dignity. First of all, from christological point of view, human
dignity attains an exalted value. Every person is an image of God
and Christ redeems every person. The universal vocation of
humankind is to share in the divine communion of the Blessed Trinity.
Secondly, the universality of the redeeming act of Christ claims the
university of human dignity and equality of all people as well as
human relationality as children of God, because all are graced to
live in the relationship of divine paternity and human solidarity
(fraternity). This calls for to strengthen the values of human solidarity
in the societal life, which is an essential human aspect arising from
human person’s capacity for God (capax Dei).239
Thirdly, human dignity seen in the christological perspective
presents that human persons are capable of hearing the word of
God and responding to it in freedom. Adherence to the Christian
234 See above Chapter 4, section 2.4.1.3: “Universalization of the Divine Image in
Humankind”, pp. 249-251 and section 2.4.2: “The Image of God and
Christocentric Anthropology”, pp. 253-255.
235 Leonardo Boff, op.cit., pp. 1-7.
236 Ibid., pp. 147-154. See also Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., p.162; Luis Ladaria,
op.cit., pp. 393-394.
237 From the christological point of view, it is this soteriological meaning about the
societal life and self-giving of persons for the common good, have been repeated
in GS, articles 32 and 38. The relevant portion of article 32 states: “God did not
create man for life in isolation, but for the formation of social unity…
This communitarian character is developed and consummated in the work of
Jesus Christ. For the very Word made flesh willed to share in the human
fellowship. He is present at the wedding of Cana, visited the house of Zacchaeus,
and ate with publicans and sinners. He revealed the love of the Father and the
sublime vocation of man in terms of the most common social realities…Willingly
obeying the law of his country, He sanctified those human ties, especially
family ones, from which social relationship arise…
In His preaching He clearly taught the sons of God to treat one another as
brothers…
He commanded His apostles to preach to all peoples the gospel message so that
the human race might become the Family of God, in which the fullness of the
Law would be love.
This solidarity must be constantly increased until that day on which it will be
brought to perfection. Then saved by grace, men will offer flawless glory to
God as a family beloved to God and of Christ their Brother” (GS, article 32,
paras 1, 2, 3, 5). For a commentary on the soteriological meaning of this article,
see Luis Ladaria, op.cit., pp. 393-397; Otto Semmelroth, op.cit., pp. 180-181;
Alfons Auer, op.cit., pp.194-195.
238 Ibid., article 22, para 7.
239 See above section 2.5.3: “The Theology of Human Dignity in Gaudium et
Spes”, pp. 334-344.
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religion requires faith, which is a free acceptance of God’s
Word, which implies the sense of religious freedom.240
Consequently, the excellence of human freedom consists in the
fact that it is capable of involving God in shaping the destiny of
human history. This disproportion between the limitation of a
contingent creature and the eternal consequence of the creature’s
action would be unintelligible without the divine grace, which Jesus
Christ reveals, as God’s parental faithfulness who loves all people
from the foundation of the world241 for what they are without any
other motive or reason.242 Hence, God’s faithfulness to the calling
of human persons for the flourishing of life in the divine communion
is the heart of human dignity.
Fourthly, the christological affirmation of human dignity is at
once an affirmation of the anthropological truth that freedom is
constitutive of the fact of being human. Christian faith values
freedom as a divine endowment for creating human persons in the
divine image.243 It consists in the transcendent vocation of human
persons that is grounded in their capacity for God.244 It means that
human excellence is not limited to life temporal as implied in religious
freedom.  Hence, the Christian faith proves to be a significant
safeguard for the dignity of the human persons in their exercise of
religious freedom in the secular society. This is the content of
Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis
Humanae. This document expounds on the application of freedom,
especially religious freedom in the political community, in so far as
this freedom is grounded in the dignity of the human person, which
the Christian faith sees in the light of theology of creation and
redemption in Christ. This is the subject matter of our investigation
in the proceeding section.
theological approach to secular realities. The Council sees the facts
of history in the light of the Gospel and discerns in them the working
of the Holy Spirit who fills the earth.245 In this regard, the Council
identifies two significant facts of the contemporary times that have
brought revolutionary changes both in the society and political order.
The first is the growing consciousness of the people about their
dignity as free and responsible persons, which is of historic
importance for free inquiry in search of truth in acquiring knowledge
and for the progress of civilization. The second is the qualitative
increase in people’s awareness of political freedom. It is known
through people’s contemporary aspiration to live in a free society
under a political order with limited power that does not intrude into
their legitimate pursuit of truth and virtue, especially in the exercise
of religious freedom.246
Taking note of these two significant historical events,
Vatican II comments:
This Vatican Synod takes careful note of these desires in
the minds of men. It proposes to declare them to be greatly
in accord with truth and justice…
Over and above all this, in taking up the matter of religious
freedom this sacred Synod intends to develop the doctrine
of recent Popes on the inviolable rights of the human person
and on the constitutional order of society.247
It is of historic importance to note that the text explicitly declares
the Council’s intention to “develop” a Catholic doctrine of religious
freedom as a fundamental right and a political doctrine of
constitutional state, which deals with the function, and limits of the
State in a free society. Both doctrines are based on human dignity
and in defence of it.
240 DV, articles 2, 3, 4, 5.
241 Crf. Eph 1: 3-14.
242 Crf. GS, article 24.
243 DH, article 2 and para 1 of article 4; CA, n.25.
244 GS, article 19; DH, article 2.
2.5.6. Transcendent Dignity and Religious Freedom
The Second Vatican Council is known for historical method in its
245 GS article 4 para 1; article 11 para 1. Vatican II calls these facts of history as
“signs of the times”. Pope John XXIII coined this phrase. The Pontiff frequently
used it in his Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (PT, n. 126 f). For a theological
critique of the phrase “signs of the times” see Joseph Ratzinger, op.cit., pp.115-
116.
246 DH, article 1, paras 1, 2; Crf. GS, article 5.
247 Ibid., paras 3 and 6.
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It is noteworthy to observe, at this point of our study, what the
commentators of the documents of Vatican II point out about these
doctrinal developments.  For instance, scholars like John Courtney
Murray and Pietro Pavan remind us that the document Dignitatis
Humanae was the most controversial document of the whole
Council.248 This was concerned with the question whether the
conciliar doctrines of religious freedom and constitutional State
contradicted the teaching of the recent Popes of the pre-Vatican II
period.249 Most of the Council fathers did not regard that the Popes
in the past defined these doctrines in their final form once and for
all. They saw them as gradually developing doctrines through new
papal contributions on the understanding of human dignity, freedom
and rights in response to contemporary growth in human
knowledge.250
248 John Courtney Murray, “Religious Freedom”, in Walter M. Abbot, The
Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., p. 672; Pietro Pavan, “Declaration on Religious
Freedom”, in On The Documents of Vatican II, ed., Herbert Vorgrimler, vol. 4,
op.cit., pp.59-61.
249 Until the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church strongly opposed all forms
of liberalism and regarded democracy as political liberalism. It is because the
philosophy of liberalism advocated the human individual and human reason
supreme giving no space for God and divine law in the political community. In
terms of papal documents, it was only in the middle of the Second World War,
in his Christmas message in 1944, that Pope Pius XII recognized democratic
form of government as compatible with reason. This statement set the ball
rolling towards further development in Catholic social teaching in support of
democracy. Pope John XXIII’s Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963) brought
out a full blown papal document on human rights based on the principle of
human dignity, advocated democratic form of government and separation of the
three functions of public authority (legislature, executive and judiciary) but left
it open to the people to decide the form of governance they need (PT, n.142).
However, the juridical status of religious freedom in the political society remained
rather unclear in Pacem in Terris. Nevertheless, these papal contributions have
been the immediate prelude to the conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae in
which the Catholic Church for the first time spells out in clear language the
inalienable right of religious freedom and the limitations of the State in matters
religious. For detailed study see Charles E. Curran, op.cit., pp.146-158; Paul E.
Sigmund, “Catholicism and Liberal Democracy” in Catholic Social Teaching
and the New World Order, op.cit., pp.  51-71; George Weigel, “Catholicism and
Democracy: The Other Twentieth Century Revolution”, in Gordon L. Anderson
and Morton A. Kaplan, eds., Morality and Religion in Liberal Democratic
Societies, eds. (New York, Paragon, 1992), pp. 223-250.
250 Pietro Pavan, op.cit., p. 64.
In this historical perspective, Second Vatican Council’s
Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, marks a
watershed in the history of the doctrinal development in the Catholic
Church. By this conciliar declaration, the Catholic Church accepts
as part of its teaching that religious freedom is a fundamental right
equally enjoyed by all in the civil society251 and endorses the principle
of a free society under a State with limited powers. This document
clearly aligns Catholic theology squarely on the side of democratic
polity.
Hence, our task now is to investigate the theological insights
found available in the conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae that
support religious freedom as a fundamental right and provide
reasons for the establishment of the constitutional order of political
society. These theological insights are fundamentally based on the
theology of human dignity as developed in Gaudium et Spes and
their applications for the political society are expounded in the
document Dignitatis Humanae.
2.5.6.1. Religious Freedom as Immunity from Coercion
Our investigation begins with article 2 of Dignitatis Humanae.
The first paragraph of article 2 contains the doctrinal substance of
religious freedom defined by Vatican II. One of the commentators
of this document, Pietro Pavan, suggests that the first two
paragraphs of this article form the first part of the article, which is
the most important part of the entire document.252 The relevant
provisions of the article read:
This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a
right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men
are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or
of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that
in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner
contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained
from acting in accordance with his own belief, whether
251 DH, articles 2, 4.
252 Pietro Pavan, op.cit., p. 64.
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privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with
others, within due limits.253
The Synod further declares that the right to religious freedom
has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as
this dignity in known through the revealed Word of God and
by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious
freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby
society is governed. Thus it is to become a civil law.254
Some salient features of the above passage are the following:
Every individual has a right to religious freedom because he / she is
a person. The content of this right is freedom from coercion on the
part of individuals or of social groups or any human power. Freedom
from force in matters religious has a twofold meaning. First, no is
to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his / her beliefs; second,
no is to be forcefully restrained from acting in accordance with his
/ her beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in
association with others.
The concept “beliefs” is used in a generic sense including
convictions or persuasions. Hence, the unbeliever or atheist is also
entitled to this right to immunity from coercion in matters religious.
This right is grounded in the inalienable dignity of the human person
as moral subject, which is known in the light of revelation and by
reason. Therefore, it is to be regarded as “a fundamental right of
the person or as a natural right, that is, one grounded in the very
nature of man.”255 This right is to be recognised as a civil right in
the constitutional law of the political society, that is, the State.
This is in agreement with the nature of the modern constitutional
States. Under the constitutional form of government people, as
free and responsible citizens, constitute themselves into a people
by their consent to a Constitution, which is approved by all.256 Hence,
under modern constitutional form of political society, people are
the “adequate subject”257 of all immunities and empowerments of
the constitutional law. Nevertheless, a cursory reading of Dignitatis
Humanae informs us that the Council fathers did not opt for a
juridical approach, which is based on the principles of the
constitutional law, to define the content of religious freedom. On
the contrary, they relied on moral and theological arguments grounded
on the principles of human dignity and rights.258 These arguments
are also adduced to claim for the constitutional guarantee of immunity
in matters religious.259 This requires explanation, which we provide
in the section that follows.
2.5.6.2. Immunity from Coercion Grounded on Human
     Dignity
Our explanation begins with the second paragraph of article 2 of
the Dignitatis Humanae that declares:
[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through
the revealed Word of God and by reason itself. This right of
the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in
the constitutional law whereby society is governed. Thus it
is to become a civil right.
The emphasis of this paragraph is on the “right” to religious
freedom. This calls for our attention. Right is a moral claim made
on others in the societal life so that others either give someone
something or do something for someone or refrain from doing
something to someone.260 Two questions arise in connection with a
person’s claim for religious freedom. Firstly, we will have to identify
what is the content of the moral claim that one makes on others?
Secondly, what is the basic reason for making such claims on others?
The conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae defines that in
matters religious the content of this moral claim that every one253 DH, article 2, para 1.
254 DH, article 2, paras 2.
255 This has been the unanimous affirmation of the Council Fathers. Hence, this
statement has been repeated several times in the Declaration. Crf. Pietro Pavan,
op.cit., p. 65.
256 Crf. John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, op.cit., p. 24.
257 Ibid.
258 Crf. Avery Cardinal Dulles, op. cit., p. 165; Charles E Curran, op. cit., p. 229.
259 Pietro Pavan, op.cit., pp. 65-66.
260 Walter M. Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, op.cit., pp. 678-679.
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makes on others is twofold immunity from coercion. This leads
to the second question: What is the reason for the claim of immunity
from coercion? It is the inalienable dignity of every person as a
moral subject, endowed “with reason and free will.” Therefore,
human dignity requires that people act on their own decision in
matters religious and on their own responsibility.261 In this regard,
the use of force in any form in matters religious is an affront to a
person’s dignity and to his or her inalienable responsibility to seek
the truth, especially religious truth, and to order one’s life accordingly.
The conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae stresses that
responsibility is an inalienable aspect of human dignity. It is
specifically brought out in article 2 of document, which states:
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons - that is,
being endowed with reason and free will and therefore
privileged to bear personal responsibility - that all men should
be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral
obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth…
However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a
manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy
immunity from external coercion as well as psychological
freedom. Therefore, the right to religious freedom has its
foundation, not in the subjective disposition of the person,
but in his very nature.262
As stated in the above text, the content of religious freedom is
given positively by grounding it in the dignity of the persons as
moral subjects.263 According to theological anthropology, as image
of God, human persons are moral subjects endowed with reason
and freedom. They achieve their full humanity by acting on their
own initiative and with full responsibility in seeking after the truth.
This is especially true with regard to Christian doctrine of faith
according to which act of faith must be a free response to the
Word of God. It shows God’s respect for human freedom and
human persons’ inalienable responsibility towards the direction of
their lives.264 Hence, responsibility is an essential counterpart of
freedom, which is constitutive of a person’s dignity as a moral
subject.265
In this theological perspective, freedom is not an end in itself
but a means whereby men and women work out their destiny in a
manner befitting to their dignity as persons, especially in their
relationship to God. In his interpretation of the above quoted
conciliar text,266 Avery Dulles suggests, “Freedom is given to human
beings so that they may personally attain and embrace what is
truly good.”267 Hence, Dignitatis Humanae affirms that all are
“at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to
seek the truth, especially religious truth…and to order their whole
lives in accord with the demands of truth.”268 Article 2 of Dignitatis
Humanae complements the negative juridical content of religious
freedom, which is given as immunity from external coercion
protected by the State, with a positive content, which is theological
and moral in approach. In this way Vatican II makes its position
clear on religious freedom on the following three points:
Firstly, religious freedom is neither religious tolerance nor a
concession to religion granted by the State. On the contrary, it is
the recognition in the constitutional law that religious freedom is
inalienable to human dignity so that people may seek after what is
true and good and organise their lives accordingly.269 The reason
why Vatican II stresses on this point is understandable. If religious
freedom means only tolerance or concession granted to people in
the exercise of religion, then there is a definite reason for the State
to marginalize religion in the society. Consequently, as Avery
Cardinal Dulles reminds us, the State can reduce people as
“instruments of society”270 for social convenience. This is a
261 Crf. ibid., p. 679.
262 DH, article 2, paras 3 and 4.
263 Avery Cardinal Dulles, op.cit., p. 165.
264 J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith, op.cit., pp. 56-57; Crf. DV,
article 5.
265 Louis Janssens, op.cit., pp. 63-64.
266 DH, article 2, paras 3 and 4.
267 Avery Cardinal Dulles, op.cit., p.166.
268 DH, article 2, para 3.
269 Pietro Pavan, op.cit., pp. 67-68.
270 Avery Cardinal Dulles, op.cit., p. 165.
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contradiction, because political society is for the benefit of the
people as free and responsible citizens. Secondly, Dignitatis
Humanae recalls that religion is the highest realisation of the dignity
of the human persons as image of God. This entails, as Pope John
Paul II reiterates time and again, religious faith is a free, responsible
and conscientious openness to God.271
Thirdly, the conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae stresses
that religion by its very nature transcends matters temporal.
Therefore, no temporal power may interpose itself, infringing upon
or intruding into that which is of the intimately personal realm of
human existence in which people in their dignity as free and
responsible persons order their lives. These theological and moral
insights embedded in the declaration Dignitatis Humanae lead us
to conclude that the Christian concept of human dignity, presumes
two distinct powers, spiritual and temporal, functioning in the society.
Therefore, the Christian concept of human dignity is amenable with
the concept of secular State whose duty is to protect the personal
and social rights of the citizens and to promote their general
welfare.272 We  further explain it by going through the relevant
texts of the conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae.
2.5.7. Human Dignity and the Concept of Secular State
In article 2 of Dignitatis Humanae, the conciliar advocacy for
religious freedom is proposed on moral grounds. Article 3 presents
the same argument based on human dignity but given in a theologico-
moral ground. It is given in terms of human person’s relation to
self-existing truth,273 which is the divine law, whose imperatives
are known through the mediation of conscience. Human dignity
demands that people responsibly respond to the divine imperatives
known through conscience whose authority transcends powers
temporal.
We reproduce below the relevant parts of the text, which is
self-explanatory in what we have explained:
Further light is shed on the subject if one considers that the
highest norm of human life is the divine law…whereby God
orders, directs and governs the entire universe and all the
ways of human community, by a plan conceived in wisdom
and love. Man has been made by God to participate in this
law…
On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the
imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of
conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his
conscience faithfully, in order that he may come to God, for
whom he was created. It follows that he is not to be forced
to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the
other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance
with his conscience, especially in matters religious…
For, of its very nature, the exercise of religion consists before
all else in those internal, voluntary, and free acts whereby
man sets the course of his life directly towards God. No
merely human power can either command or prohibit acts
of this kind.
However, the social nature of man itself requires that he
should give external expression to his internal acts of religion;
that he should participate with others in matters religious;
that he should profess his religion in community. Injury,
therefore, is done to the human person and to the very order
established by God for human life, if the free exercise of
religion is denied in society when the just requirements of
public order do not so require.
There is another consideration. The religious acts whereby
men, in private and in public and out of a sense of personal
conviction, direct their lives to God transcend by their very
nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs.
Government, therefore, ought indeed to take account of the
religious life of the people and show it favor, since the
function of government is to make provision for the common
welfare. However, it would clearly transgress the limits set
271 Crf. ibid., pp. 165-167.
272 John Courtney Murray, Religious Freedom, op.cit., p. 28.
273 Pierto Pavan, op.cit., p. 68.
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to its power were it to presume to direct or inhibit acts that
are religious.274
In the above passage, the first reason provided for religious
freedom is the dignity of human person created in the image of
God which imposes an obligation on people to seek the truth,
especially religious truth, in freedom and responsibility, and the
consequent obligation to follow one’s conscience, free from external
coercion.275
The second reason is drawn from the nature of religious acts.
They are free and voluntary in character with which people relate
themselves to God through external expressions individually and in
groups as required by embodied and relational nature of the person.
In this context, no human power can either command or prohibit
“the free exercise of religion,”276 provided just requirements of
public order are observed.
The third reason is based on the transcendent calling of human
person for communion with God. The text states, “The religious
acts whereby men, in private and in public and out of a sense of
personal conviction, direct their lives to God transcend by their
every nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs.”277 For
that reason, government has no right to coerce or inhibit acts of
religion, since religious acts transcend the limited power that the
people have vested in the government. Therefore, Vatican II
proposes that the political correlate of religious freedom, which is
in consonance with human dignity, is the secular democratic political
system, known as the constitutional State. Some of its basic
principles have been incorporated in the conciliar declaration
Dignitatis Humanae.278 We identify them by going through the
relevant conciliar texts in the sections that follow.
2.5.7.1. Distinction between the Sacred and the Secular
We begin with paragraph 6 of article 3 of the Vatican II’s declaration
Dignitatis Humanae. This text considerably explains what we are
searching for. The text reads:
The religious acts whereby men, in private and in public and
out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to
God transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial
and temporal affairs. Government, therefore, ought indeed
to take account of the religious life of the people and show it
favor, since the function of government is to make provision
for the common welfare. However, it would clearly
transgress the limits set to its power were it to presume to
direct or inhibit acts that are religious.
The text states that the content of matters religious transcends
by its very nature the terrestrial and temporal affairs. Hence, the
first principle involved in religious freedom is the distinction between
the sacred and the secular order in the society. It implies that the
whole excellence of human life is not confined to the temporal
order of existence. On account of the transcendent calling of human
persons created in the image of God,279 human freedom is opened
to transcendent values and ends.
274 DH, article 3, paras 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6; GS, article 16.
275 Ibid., article 3, paras 2 and 3.
276 Ibid., para 5.
277 Ibid., Para 6.
278 The Catholic theory of religious freedom as developed by John Courtney
Murray, an American Jesuit theologian, had an overriding effect on Vatican II‘s
teaching of religious freedom, especially in its Declaration Dignitatis Humanae.
Murray was an expert of Vatican II. Since 1950’s, he had developed the Catholic
theory of religious freedom as a constitutional concept of the juridical order and
published some of the principles related to Catholic theory of religious freedom
in many American journals. For a summary of Murray’s publications and
critique of his contribution to the conciliar document, Dignitatis Humanae, see
Charles E Curran, op. cit., pp.224-233. For John Courtney Murray’s important
works on religious freedom are, The Problem of Religious Freedom, Woodstock
Papers, Number 7 (Westminster, Maryland, The Newman press, 1965); We
Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (New
York, Doubleday & Company, 1964). For Murray’s critique of Vatican II‘s
Declaration Dignitatis Humanae see John Courtney Murray, “The Declaration
on Religious Freedom: A Moment in Its Legislative History”, in John Courtney
Murray, ed., Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning (New York, Macmillan,
1966), pp. 16-27; “The Declaration on Religious Freedom”, in John H. Miller,
ed., Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal (Notre Dame, University of Notre
Dame Press, 1966), pp. 565-576.
279 Crf. GS, article 19, DH, articles 2 and 3. Recall the concept of human freedom
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From the theological point of view, the reason for the distinction
between the sacred and secular is the content of the image of God
doctrine. Recall our explanation of the content of creating of human
persons in God’s image as absolute openness for communion with
God (capax Dei). Christology sheds further light on this human
transcendence. As image of God, human persons find ultimate
fulfilment of their meaning of absolute openness only in the intimate
communion with God. This intimate communion with God, for which
every one is created, has occurred in history as revealed in a unique
and unsurpassable way in the person of Jesus Christ in his theandric
nature.280
The power of the State does not reach to this spiritual order of
human existence. The relationship between the Church and the
State is built on this principle. Both are autonomous institutions in
their proper order of operation. The Council states, “In their proper
spheres, the political community and the Church are mutually
independent and self-governing. Yet, by a different title, each serves
the personal and social vocation of the same human beings.”281
This test clearly asserts that the Church and the State are
autonomous institutions functioning in the society. The link between
the spiritual and the temporal institutions, between the Church and
the State, is the person who is both a citizen and a Christian. The
State has its secular source of legitimation, that is, the consent of
the governed, while the Church’s legitimation is founded on divine
commission.282
2.5.7.2. Distinction between State and Society
Under a constitutional form of government, the State is one of the
agencies equipped with a limited power and function in the society
as defined by the constitutional law. As John Courtney Murray
emphatically propounded, the State exists to exercise the coercive
power of the law, limiting freedom for the benefit of society.283
Commenting on the limited power of the constitutional State,
Dignitatis Humanae advocates, “For the rest, the usages of society
are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These require
that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed
only when and in so far as necessary.”284 It is a statement of the
basic principle of the free society in a secular State, whose powers
are limited.
Society signifies an area of freedom, personal and corporate.
Freedom is the purpose of the society that sets the life-style in the
society. Secular State acknowledges this aspect of the society. The
theological validation of the freedom of the society is the dignity of
the human person based on image theology.285 Firstly, as image of
God, human persons are called to participate in freedom in the
work of God, which comprises the world of secular activities, and
realise their divine calling by glorifying God in the secular city.286
Secondly, as image of God, human persons participate in the work
of God not alone but in solidarity with others, that is, in and through
community activities on account of their relational nature.287
Therefore, Society consists of the totality of these multifarious
is sourced by human person’s capacity for God (capax Dei). See above section
2.5.3:  “The Theology of Human Dignity in Gaudium et Spes”, pp. 334-344.
280 See above section 2.5.4.1:  “The Transcendent Dignity of the Human person”,
pp.357-360.
281 GS, article 76, para 3.
282 Crf. GS, articles 36, 76; DH, article 13. What we have referred to the Church
and the Christian in relation to secular state applies equally to all religious
communities. The Council has affirmed it in DH, article 13, para 4 which states,
“[T]he Christian faithful, in communion with all other men, possess the civil
right not to be hindered in leading their lives in accordance with their conscience.
Therefore, a harmony exists between the freedom of the Church and the religious
freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and communities and
sanctioned by constitutional law.”
283 John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, op.cit., 29.
284 DH, article 7, para 4. Experts in civil law consider this statement as the most
significant sentence in the Declaration. Crf. Walter M. Abbot, The Documents
of Vatican II, op.cit., p. 687, footnote 21.
285 Catholic social thought consistently maintains that society is to be based upon
the principle of the dignity of human person created in God’s image, directed
towards justice and animated by love (human solidarity). Pope John XXIII, in
his Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris added one more character, freedom.
Freedom is the goal of the civil society (PT, n.35).
286 Crf. GS, articles 34, 35. See above section 2.5.2.1:  “The Concept of World”,
pp. 328-331.
287 Crf. GS, 12, para 5.
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community activities and community interactions through which
people actualise their existence and realise their calling in life not
by force but in responsible freedom.
In terms of religious freedom, it means that religions are not
excluded from their role in the broader society. Commenting on the
public responsibility of religion in the society, Dignitatis Humanae
asserts, “[I]t comes within the meaning of religious freedom that
religious bodies should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to
show the special values of their doctrine in what concerns the
organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human
activity.”288 This statement rejects the outmoded notion that religion
is purely a private affair, but affirms that religious freedom includes
the right to point out the social relevance of religious beliefs. This is
not incompatible with the concept of secular State.
It is due to the fact that the State signifies an area in the society
where it exercises its coercive powers when needed, whereas
society signifies the vast area of personal and corporate freedom,
including religious freedom. To deny this distinction is an affirmation
of secular monism wherein the State and society and all sectors of
human activities are seen as one single ontological unit, which
amounts to totalitarianism.
2.5.7.3. Distinction between Common Good and Public Order
The distinction between common good and public order follows
from the distinction between society and State. This distinction also
has its basis in human dignity. It is not only in relation to the world
of things that human persons have an “exalted dignity”289 but also
in the society in so far as people are the subjects of all rights and
duties in the society in the realisation of their destiny.290 Therefore,
society must not absorb people for itself; because society flourishes
only to the extent people develop themselves in responsible freedom.
Society is not a collection of individuals but a freely accepted
common life of persons who, in communion with each other,
promote the common welfare of all.291
Common good is the purpose of the society. The common good
includes all social goods, namely material, moral and spiritual, which
all pursue here on earth in accord with their personal and social
nature.292 The conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae stresses
that the care of the common good is the responsibility of all in the
society. Therefore, the care of the right to religious freedom devolves
upon the people as a whole, on all communities and institutions of
the society, including government. It is in virtue of the duty, which
is implied in the responsible use of freedom in a free society, that
the care of the common welfare devolves on all in a manner that is
proper to each.293
Maintenance of public order, protection and promotion of
fundamental rights are the purposes of the State. The role of the
coercive power of the State is determined by the purposes of
protecting people from violence in a manner appropriate to the
inalienable dignity of the human persons. This is known as the
maintenance of public order. Vatican II’s description of this role of
the State is self-explanatory. It says:
These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard
of the right of all citizens [fundamental rights] and for
peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. They flow from
the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace…They
come, finally, out of the need for a proper guardianship of
public morality. These matters constitute the basic component
of the common welfare: they are what is meant by public
order.294
Correspondingly, it is the essential duty of the State to
protect and promote religious freedom. The declaration
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291 Otto Semmelroth, op.cit., pp. 170-171.
292 John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, op.cit., 29.
293 DH, article 6, para 1.
294 Ibid., article 7, para 3.
288 DH, article 7, para 4.
289 GS, article 26, para 2.
290 The present Pope John Paul II has developed on the concept of human
subjectivity in relation to society, political order and the world of work. See
SRS, nn. 15, 16, 30, 31; CA, nn. 44, 45.
Dignitatis Humanae says:
The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man
rank among the essential duties of government. Therefore,
government is to assume the safeguard of the religious
freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just
laws…Government is also to help create conditions favorable
to fostering of religious life…in order that society itself may
profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace...295
The conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae enjoins on the
State twofold duty concerning religious freedom. The first duty is
to acknowledge that religious freedom is a fundamental right and
effectively to protect it against violation, because this duty devolves
on the State in what pertains to providing protection to matters of
all fundamental rights. The second duty derives from the general
duty of the government that consists in assisting the people in the
performance of their duties.296 In this case, it is the duty of the
State to assist in creating conditions that will help and not hinder
people in the free exercise of their religious rights and performance
of their religious duties.
2.5.7.4. The Subject of the Right to Religious Freedom
We have seen earlier297 that the right to religious freedom is
immunity from coercion in matters religious. This is how Vatican II
defines religious freedom in articles 2 and 3 of Dignitatis Humanae.
In these texts, the focus is on the general application of this right to
individuals and corporate bodies. Articles 4 and 5 of Dignitatis
Humanae describe the subject of religious freedom in its corporate
aspect, basing it on the social nature of the human person.298 This
we study in this section. In matters religious, the people as such in
their dignity as moral subjects - individually, collectively and in their
corporate associations - are the subjects of religious freedom.299
The corporate religious freedom is the right of religious
communities within society for corporate internal autonomy.
Dignitatis Humanae declares:
The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious
which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to
be recognized as their right when they act in community.
Provided the just requirements of public order are observed,
religious bodies rightfully claim freedom in order that they
may govern themselves according to their own norms, honor
the supreme Being in public worship, assist their members
in the practice of religious life…and promote institutions in
which they join together for the purpose of ordering their
own lives in accordance with their religious principles.
Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered, either
by legal measures or by administrative action on the part of
government, in the selection, training, appointment, and
transferral of their own ministers, in communicating with
religious authorities and communities abroad, in erecting
buildings for religious purposes, and in the acquisition and
use of suitable funds or properties.300
The conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae holds that this
corporate freedom of religion equally applies to family. The
extension of the corporate freedom of religion to family is on
account of the nobility of the family as a basic human community
founded on the theology of human dignity. Therefore, the document
says, “[T]he family is a society in its own original right, it has the
right freely to live its own domestic religious life under the guidance
of parents,”301 including the parents’ right to decide upon the kind
of religious education children are to receive.
The corporate freedom of religion also comprises the freedom
of religious association.302 First, it entails the right to immunity from
coercion in affiliating or in ending affiliation with organised religious
295 Ibid., para 2.
296 Crf. Pietro Pavan, op.cit., p. 72.
297 See above section 2.5.6.1: “Religious Freedom as Immunity from Coercion,”
pp. 370-372.
298 DH, article 4, para 1.
299 Ibid., article 2, para 1; article 4, para 1; Pietro Pavan, op.cit., pp. 69-70.
300 DH, article 4, paras 1, 2 and 3.
301 Ibid., article 5, para 1.
302 Ibid., article 4, paras 4 and 5.
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bodies. Second, it implies the same immunity in the formation
of associations for religious, charitable, educational, cultural
purposes “under the impulse of their own religious sense.”303
Vatican II comments also on the freedom of religious
expression. It is the right both of the individuals and of religious
bodies, to immunity from coercion in what concerns the public
worship of God, public religious observances, public practice, public
proclamation of faith as well as the public declaration of the
implications of religion and morality for the temporal affairs of the
community and for the action of the public powers.304 The reason
is that religion as the ultimate concern is concerned with the whole
person, since human person in his or her totality in terms of total
relationships and activities in the world is the image of God, and
remains open to God.
In concluding our study of the conciliar document Dignitatis
Humanae, we sum up that the Church’s advocacy for religious
freedom in its various aspects are those which the Church claims
for itself as well as for others.305 The juridical content of the right
to religious freedom is same for all religious communities or any
section thereof. This consists in immunity from coercion in matters
religious. However, documents of Vatican II do not treat the religious
freedom only as a political doctrine but sees its raison d’etre from
theological and moral points of view.
Vatican II sees the right to religious freedom grounded in the
dignity of the human persons created in the image of God and the
vocation of all people to share in divine life (capax Dei) as seen in
the mystery of Jesus Christ.306 This theological perspective provides
a substantive ethical reason for the concept of religious freedom
as an inviolable right, which is known through revelation and by
reason.307 The Council also stresses that religious freedom is not
an end in itself, but a means for the fulfilment of the higher purposes
of life in the civil society. For this reason, Human dignity consists in
the responsible use of freedom in one’s search for the truth, and in
one’s relationship to God, to society and to earthly goods. These
responsibilities pervade the entire societal life in the political
community.308
2.5.8. Conclusion: A Human Dignity Centred Political
  Doctrine
We have studied the theology of human dignity and its doctrinal
principles as developed in the theological anthropology of the
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium
et Spes. We have also studied its application for the affirmation of
religious freedom as a legal institution of the juridical order of the
State, and the establishment of the constitutional State as given in
the conciliar declaration Dignitatis Humanae. This document
presents the Church’s teachings on constitutional State in relation
to religious freedom. We sum up the important principles that we
found in our investigation. All of them are intended to protect human
dignity from violation in the civil society.
The first principle implied in the Church’s approach to the
political community regarding matters religious is that the right to
religious freedom is a fundamental right. It has its foundation in the
very dignity of the human person, which is known through revelation
and by reason itself. This right is to be recognised in the constitutional
law, whereby it should become a civil right.309 As a civil right,
religious freedom means that the political community should respect
people in their exercise of religion, which means not to violate
people’s right to free exercise of religion.
The violation of the right to religious freedom is a serious attack
on the inalienable worth and dignity of the people as moral subjects;
because it puts off their right to seek the truth, especially religious
truth, and to organise their lives in accordance with their judgments
of conscience.310 It is for this reason, as a constitutional right, religious
303 Ibid., para 5.
304 Ibid., paras 2, 5. Crf. GS, 76.
305 Ibid., article 13.
306 GS, article 12, 19, 22; DH, article 3.
307 See Avery Cardinal Dulles, op.cit., pp. 171-176.
308 DH, article 8.
309 Ibid., article 2, para 2.
310 Ibid., article 3, paras 5, 6.
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nature of human persons to take care of the two necessary needs,
namely the spiritual and temporal needs.316 Both institutions are
independent and autonomous in their respective order of function.
They are empowered by their respective sources of legitimation.317
Religion derives its legitimation from a spiritual source, while the
State receives its legitimate power from the consent of the governed;
but both meet in the conscience of the individual person who is
both a citizen and a believer. Therefore, the protection of human
dignity demands functional harmony between religion and State
for the integral welfare of the people for whose good religion and
the State exist in the society.
The reason to have necessary cooperation between religion
and State arises from the necessary harmony that should exist
between the two institutions. The contribution of each to the other
is indirect but necessary, because both have their respective
responsibilities for the societal life of the people. Religion is at the
service of the society to impart spiritual and moral values to people
in the civil society. These are substantive values in defence of human
dignity.318 The State provides temporal structures that are conducive
for the religious need of the people in order that people may truly
exercise their rights and duties in matters religious.319
The fifth principle is that the State is a natural institution. It is
founded on the social nature of the people, which is a necessary
consequence of their creation in the image of God.320 The purpose
of the State is for the protection of the common good so that all
people, as ordained by God, benefit the goods of creation.321 The
concept of common good322 avoids the extremes of individualism
and collectivism. Individualism negates the good of the society, while
freedom attaches twofold immunity on everyone. It means that
in matters religious no one is forced to act contrary to one’s belief
or, within due constitutional limits, no one is restrained from acting
according to one’s belief, whether privately or publicly, whether
alone or in association with others.311
The second principle is that religious freedom as a constitutional
right stands for the affirmation of the value of pluralism in the society.
As a civil right, religious freedom means that everyone has the
right to follow the religion of one’s own choice or reject them all.
Consequently, the right to religious freedom requires that the political
community ought to respect the inherent worth and dignity of each
person in his or her self-identity and the community of persons in
their plural community identities, because religious faith provides
enduring and powerful identity both to individuals and communities
in the civil society.312 Hence, religious freedom recognises the
political community as a plural society and the State is duty bound
to protect its plural character.313
The third principle is that the distinctions arising in the
constitutional order of the State, namely the distinction between
the sacred and the secular, State and society, and common good
and public order, are the protective distinctions to avoid the violation
of human dignity. These distinctions function as instruments to
respect and promote the values of a free society founded on the
principle of human dignity. It is only in a free society human life
flourishes in its various aspects with responsible freedom, because,
as image of God, human persons are always and everywhere the
subjects of the society and in all activities that they do.314
The fourth principle is the necessary harmony and cooperation
that should exist between religion and State.315 This is based on the
fact that both are necessary institutions divinely ordained in the
311 Ibid., para 1.
312 Ibid., article 7.
313 Ibid., article 6, paras 3, 4; GS, articles 29-32, 73-74.
314 DH, article 3, para 6; article 7, para 4; GS, article 19; article 26, para 2; article
76.
315 GS, articles 40 - 41.
316 GS, article 25
317 GS, article 76; DH, article 13.
318 DH, article 4, para 5; GS, article 40, para 5; articles 41-42;
319 DH, article 4; article 6, para 2.
320 GS, articles 24-25, especially article 12 para 5 and article 25 para 2;
321 DH, article 6, paras 1, 2; GS, articles 26, 74
322 Common good is an important theological concept in the Catholic social teaching.
The Popes have consistently stressed on this value. See RN, nn.27-29; MM,
nn.65.
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collectivism destroys the good of the individual for the sake of
the society. On the contrary, the concept of the common good aligns
the good of the individual and of the community in the civil society
on the basis of an egalitarian anthropology and welfare State. In
this manner, by promoting common good, the State protects the
values of dignity and the social nature of the people by promoting a
humane social order.
These fundamental human values, which are embedded in the
theological anthropology, are also found in a significant manner in
the philosophy of the secular provisions of the Constitution of India.
For both, dignity and social nature of the human person are the
defining values in their respective approach to the political order.
These are discussed in chapter six which concludes this research
project.
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CHAPTER SIX
Indian Church in Dialogue with
Indian Secularism
2.6. Introduction
In this chapter we discuss, first of all, the importance of human
dignity in the philosophy of Indian secularism and in the teachings
of the Church on religious freedom and constitutional State. For
this purpose, we highlight, from the findings of our research as
given in the preceding chapters, the salient features of Indian
Secularism, which is intended to secure human dignity. Similarly,
we collate the most important features of the Church’s teachings
on religious freedom and constitutional State as seen in the
documents of Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis
Humanae that has been discussed in detail in chapter five. This
conciliar teaching is based on theological anthropology, which
gradually developed in the tradition of the Church as we have shown
it in chapter four. It is, sourced by biblical insights, which is centred
on the dignity of the human persons as image of God.
Secondly, we identify a common anthropological approach,
which we refer to as “relational anthropology,” underlying in the
philosophy of the Indian secularism and in the theological
anthropology of Vatican II. Subsequently, we explain the humanistic
significance of the relational anthropology to the philosophy Indian
secularism and to theological anthropology. This we do by identifying
an ethical principle ingrained in the logic of relational anthropology,
which we term as ethics of “interhuman concerns” because it is
concerned with human care.
Through the mediation of the ethics of interhuman concerns,
we connect the sustentative values of the philosophy of Indian
secularism, which are also ethical in content, though function as a
political principles, with the values of the Kingdom ideals proclaimed
by Jesus. Thereby, we establish a theological correlation between
the Kingdom ideals and the humanistic values of the philosophy of
Indian secularism as seen in the Constitution of India. From
theological point of view, this is the basis for the Church to support
Indian secularism as provided in the Indian Constitution, since the
values of interhuman concerns protect human dignity. The mission
of the Church is precisely to be at the service of the Kingdom that
Jesus inaugurated, and the kingdom values are the values of
interhuman concerns. They are humanistic in so for as they are
concerned with human care.
Thirdly, following the conciliar path of dialogue with the civil
society,1 we discuss the possible areas in which the Indian Church
may offer its services in dialogue and collaboration with the civil
society to strengthen and nurture the humanistic secular political
order in the country. These are the common concerns of the Church
as well as the secular State in India as both are committed to secure
human dignity.
2.6.1. The Importance of Human Dignity to Church and State
We have seen in the preceding chapters the origin and development
of the secular State in the context of Western and Indian traditions.
The theory originated from Christianity when the Church in the
Roman Empire encountered state-coercion in matters religious. The
origination of the theory is based on a distinction that Christianity
advocated between the temporal and spiritual powers and their
limitations in their respective functions in the society.
The modern theories of political secularism, which in the course
of long Western political history led to create the institution of
constitutional State, developed in the context of denominational
1 For the conciliar path of dialogue as proposed by Vatican II see above chapter
5, section 2.5.1.2: “Conciliar Design of Dialogue on Three Levels”, pp. 324-
328 and section 2.5.2: “Dialogue with the Secular World”, p. 328.
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conflicts and the emergence of nation-states in the Western
European countries. As a political answer to religious conflicts, the
proponents of these theories eventually campaigned for the idea of
constitutional State based on civil liberties, egalitarian social order
and equal protection before the law, which rendered religious
affiliation irrelevant to citizenship. As one of the civil liberties,
religious freedom came to be treated as a legal institution in the
juridical order of the State.2
India has adapted a unique kind of secular polity appropriate to
its culture and political need. The Indian form of secularism stands
for the separation of the State from religion, equal protection of all
religions, and active opposition to communalism. According to Indian
secularism, the separation of the State from religion means neither
marginalization of religion from the public sphere nor maintaining a
strict procedural separation3 – the blind law of separation for the
sake of separation – known as the “wall of separation between
religion and State.” This is not warranted by the common Indian
sensibility, but separation means the State keeps a “principled
distance from religion.”4 Surely, the constitutional provisions of the
Indian Secularism uphold the autonomy of the State and religion in
their proper sphere of function in the society.5 Nevertheless, the
State and religion function in an environment of harmony and
cooperation between them. Consequently, the Constitution
guarantees religious freedom, because religion is legislated into the
secular Constitution as one of the important institutions of human
need.6
The Indian form of secularism, moreover, authorises the State
with wide powers for intervention in matters associated with religion.
The State can intervene positively towards religion to care for the
welfare of religious institutions.7 The State intervention can be also
negative towards religion to regulate religious freedom for the
maintenance of public order, morality and health as well as for
social welfare and reform; or for the same reasons, the State can
ban religious institutions and practices from the public domain. On
several occasions, the Supreme Court has justified these state-
measures.8 The free exercise of religion is also subject to the
fundamental rights, since their objectives are to protect human
dignity from violation either by the State or by any agency.9
The Indian secularism is also sensitive to the social nature of
the people and their community identities. Accordingly, the
Constitution grants separate rights to minority communities, whether
based on religion, culture or language,10 to enable them to live with
dignity in their plural community identities. Consequently, the culture
of pluralism is ingrained in the secular vision of the Constitution.
2 See above Introduction, section 0.2: “The Concept of Political Secularism”,
chapter 1, section 1.1.4: “The Reformation: Religious Diversity and
Secularisation”, pp.52-60 and section 1.1.5: “The Separation of the Church
from the State”, pp.60-62.
3 See CAD, vol. 7, pp. 818-882.
4 Rajeev Bhargava, op.cit., pp. 501-522.
5 This has been especially stressed when the Supreme Court of India was appealed
to define “matters of religion.” See Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, AIR 1954 SC
282, at 290; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388,
at 391-392.
6 See Debate in the Constituent Assembly in CAD, vol. 7, pp. 818-882; P.B.
Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., pp. 40-41.
7 Some of the State Government and Central Government enactments for state
intervention are the following: The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19 of 1951); The Bihar Hindu Religious
Trust Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951); The Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950
(Bombay Act 29 of 1950); The Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923 (Act 42 of 1923);
The Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920 (Act 14 of 1920); etc.
8 See The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84; Ratilal
Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388; Mohammad Hanif
Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v.
State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255; His Holiness Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja
Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586;
Acharya Jagadiswaranda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta, (1984)
SCC 522.
9  In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, while commenting on the
purpose of the fundamental rights as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution,
Justice P.N. Bhagawati of the Supreme Court of India said, “These fundamental
rights …are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create
conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the
fullest extent.” AIR 1978 SC 597, at 619.
10 Articles 29 (1) conserves the linguistic and cultural pluralism. Article 30 (1)
provides right to all religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administrate
educational institutions of their choice.
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through revelation and by reason itself.12 Religious freedom protects
pluralism in the civil society by securing freedom of conscience in
defence of human dignity.13 A constitutional State, which is
structured on the principles of distinction between the State and
religion, State and society, and common good and public order, is in
accord with human dignity.14 While preserving the autonomy and
order proper to religion and State, human nature requires harmony
and cooperation between these institutions, since both are meant
for the good of the people.15 The State is a natural institution arising
from the social nature of the people. Its purpose is to protect the
common good and public order keeping in view to secure the
inviolable rights of people in their dignity as moral subject.16
2.6.2. Relational Anthropology in the Constitution of India
We have noted that human dignity in its personal and social aspects
is central to the philosophy of humanistic secularism of the Indian
Constitution and to the teachings of Vatican II on religious freedom
and constitutional State. This leads us to look for the root of common
concern embedded in the conciliar teaching on religious freedom
and constitutional State (the Church) and in the philosophy of the
humanistic secularism as found in the Indian Constitution (the State).
This investigation is needed to classify the kind of approach that
the Church and the State in India take towards human person.
Therefore, we need to look into the kind of anthropology implicit to
both systems of thought.
At first, we look at the State in India in its mode of operation
guided by the secular provisions of the Constitution. As explained
elsewhere, the principled distance, which the State in India keeps
from religion or from any group of people in their specific community
identities, is guided by a set of non-sectarian principles consistent
with certain essential humanistic values. These are the regulating
values to promote a life of equal dignity for all in the political
community in such a way that individuals and communities of people
11 See articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India; P.B. Gajendragadkar,
The Constitution of India, op.cit.,  pp. 12-22.
The political criterion of this form of secularism in the governance
of the State is that in all instances of intervention or non-intervention
of the State in religious matters, the State is directed by non-
sectarian principles. These principles are guided by humanistic
values on reasonable grounds, which enable the State to promote a
life of equal dignity for all in the civil society, so that all people may
coexist in harmony in the pluralistic Indian society.11
On account of these salient features that we have enumerated
above, we have termed Indian form of secularism as humanistic
secularism. It is because the Constitution has committed itself,
through this form of secularism, to substantive values of
humanisation in the governance of the State in defence of human
dignity so as to develop a humane society. Therefore, the philosophy
of humanistic secularism, which secures dignity of the people in
their personal and social spheres of life, conditions the principled
distance that the State in India keeps from religion or from any
sections of the people.
It is precisely this unique feature of the Indian secular State,
which in its mode of governance protects the essential values of
human dignity, resonates with the Church’s teaching on religious
freedom and constitutional State as given in the documents of
Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. These conciliar
teachings are the political application of the insights drawn from
principles of theological anthropology, which is centred on human
dignity as image of God. The objective of Church’s teaching on the
political order is to preserve and promote human dignity in the civil
society. We have investigated their meaning in their theological,
christological and political aspects in chapter five. For the purpose
of our discussion, we present the summary below.
According to the teachings of Vatican II, religious freedom has
its foundation in the very dignity of human persons, that is, beings
endowed with reason and free will, to seek after the truth and to
order their lives in responsible freedom. This dignity is known
12 DH, article 2.
13 Ibid., article 3, paras 3, 4 and 5; article 6; GS, articles 16 and 73.
14 DH, article 3, para 6; article 7; GS, articles 26, 74 and 75.
15 DH, article 6; GS, article 76.
16 GS, articles 25 and 74; DH, article 6.
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in their specific community identities are enabled to coexist in
harmony.17
From the anthropological point of view, implicit in this approach
is a belief in the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person
as a moral subject in one’s personal identity and the community of
persons in their distinct community identities in the pluralistic society.
In other words, the constitutional approach to individuals is seen in
terms of their dignity and social nature. Hence, the person is seen
in his or her dignity as a freely choosing, morally committed (i.e., a
moral subject), and socially related individual (i.e., a relational
being).18 This means that the person who is endowed with dignity
is social by nature. In this case, the human rights, which are intended
to protect human dignity, are interpreted not in an individualistic
sense, but in a relational (social) context with a strong sense of
social responsibility to promote social welfare, especially the welfare
of the weaker sections of society and the common good. In other
words, the individual person in his / her dignity is seen not as a
monad but as a member of a community in a society. This
interrelated approach to human person under the aspects of dignity
and relational (social) nature is what we mean by relational
anthropology.
The first consequence of the relational anthropological approach
is that the constitutional rights of the individuals are accompanied
with a strong sense of duty to protect the common good or to care
for others. This would become clear when we examine article 19
of the Constitution.19  Clause (1) of article 19 reads:
(1) All citizens shall have the right -
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peacefully and without arms;
(c) to form associations of unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
  and20
(f) ***        ***           ***           ***
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation,
 trade or business.
This article contains six kinds of freedom. These are generally
guaranteed in all constitutions of the liberal democratic polity. The
scheme of the article 19 is that clause (1) provides with several
kinds of freedom and clauses (2) to (6) of the same article enumerate
cases in which the said rights to freedom can be regulated by the
State for the common good or for social welfare and reform.21
It means that the secular Constitution of India does not subscribe
to an approach, which absolutizes the liberty of the individual as
advocated by the philosophy of value-neutral liberalism, propagated
by social philosophers like John Stuart Mill and others. John Stuart
Mill, for instance, propounded the theory that the only freedom,
which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our
17 Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. For the judicial
interpretation of these articles with appropriate cases see above chapter 3,
especially section 1.3.3: “The Exercise of Religion Subject to State Restriction”,
p.178.
18 The religious dimensions of the freedom of choice, individual and corporate,
etc., are given in articles 25 and 26. Other general categories of freedoms,
individual and corporate, etc., are given in article 19 of the Constitution of
India.
19 The matters related to the practice of religion subject to common good, etc.,
have been discussed in detail in chapter 3. See above chapter 3, section1.3.3:
“The Exercise of Religion Subject to State Restriction”, pp.178.  This pattern
is maintained in all provisions of the civil rights.
20 Sub-clause (f) provided the right to own private property as one among the
fundamental rights. This right has been omitted by the Constitution (Forty-
fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, Sec. 2 (w.e.f. 29th June, 2979).
21 Clauses 2 to 6 of article 19 read:
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of [the sovereignty and integrity
of India.] the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public
order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public
order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub-clause.
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own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. According to him, all
restraint, qua restraint, is an evil.22
On the contrary, Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, one of the renowned
Chief Justices of India, comments that Indian Constitution seeks to
establish a rational synthesis of harmony between individual freedom,
which is guaranteed by clause (1) of article 19 and the claims for
the public good. Surely, liberty of the individual is an essential feature
of the secular Constitution of India.23 But when “the right of the
individual is in sharp conflict with the claims for the public good,
the former has to yield to the latter,”24 and must submit to the
principle of common good. Therefore, the individual rights are
judicially interpreted in the context of common good on account of
the interdependence of people based on their social nature. What
is implied here, from the ethical point of view, is an “ethics of
interhuman concerns,” that is, to care for the other.
The second consequence of the relational anthropological
approach is seen in the humanistic vision of the civil society ingrained
in the secular provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution
approaches the civil society as a community composed of diversity
of communities with their specific community identities as human
communities. Therefore, community diversities, such as religious,
cultural, and linguistic, are protected as the specific and concrete
forms in which people live in their relational nature in a pluralistic
society.25 It means that the philosophy of the humanistic secularism
of the Indian constitution safe guards human dignity in its personal
and social aspects. The observation of Michael Amaladoss, one of
the Indian theologians, corroborates what we are trying to say.
Looking at the Indian Constitution he comments:
While the western approach to civil liberties is spelt out in
terms of individual rights, the Indian Constitution takes
seriously the identity and rights of groups, especially of the
minorities. Such an approach is very much discussed today
in terms of multiculturalism in North America both in the
USA and in Canada. Particularly in the USA, what was
touted as the “melting pot” is now becoming a “salad bowl”,
in which the identities of different cultural groups have to be
respected and integrated in the ordering of civil society. The
Indian Constitution tried to do this seriously by its recognition
of minority rights.26
In keeping with the relational anthropology, the Constitution
maintains also a supportive approach between the State and religion,
because people are related to both institutions as citizens and
believers. This supportive approach is, nevertheless, held within
the rule of principled distance on rational grounds that the State
keeps from religion or from any group of the people in their specific
community identities. Moreover, the Constitution maintains a
principled approach between individual rights and common good,
and follows a social policy of harmony between various communities
and groups in the political community.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India or] public
order or morality reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by
the said sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in [sub-clause (d) and (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making
any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights
conferred by the said sub-clause either in the interests of the general public or
for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, [nothing
in the sub-clause shall affect the operation of nay existing law in so far as it
relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, -
(i) the professional or technical qualification necessary for practising
any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled
by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to
the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise].
22 Crf. P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., p. 28.
23 See how the “freedom of conscience” is placed over and above religious freedom
as such as given in clause (1) of article 25 of the Constitution of India.
24 P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit.,  p. 29.
25 Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India.
26 Michael Amaladoss, “Religions in Civil Society”, in Jeevadhara, vol. XXIX,
no. 169 (January 1999), p. 43.
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The purpose of this type of constitutional approach is to create
a political order, whereby people may organise their ways of life
according to their perspectives of God and the good in a just and
humane social order, which secures the fundamental values of
human dignity. Certainly, the guiding ethics implied in the idea of
principled distance that the State in India maintains towards religion
and all sections of people in the civil society is the ethics of
interhuman concerns, since the State cares for all in their dignity as
human persons.
2.6.3. Relational Anthropology in Theology
The relational anthropological approach in theological anthropology
is palpable. It is based on the doctrine of imago Dei. According to
theological anthropology,27 human dignity and social nature are
correlated. These are the divine endowments rooted in the creation
of human beings in the image of God. Human beings are image of
God, since God has given them the capacity for interpersonal
communion with God (capax Dei),28 the absolute Thou.29 This is
the foundation of their dignity as persons, endowed with reason
and freedom as well as inalienable rights and obligations, to seek
after the truth and to organise their life in responsible freedom.30
The capacity for God is also the ground for the relational nature of
the people, their possibility and the necessity for relationality and to
live in community.31 So, the rights and obligations are grounded in
the dignity of every person who is called to live in communion with
God and in solidarity with others.32
These principles of theological anthropology have been repeated
throughout the conciliar documents, Gaudium et Spes and
Dignitatis Humanae. To make our point clear, we cite few
passages, which we have studied in detail elsewhere:
[S]acred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the
image of God”, is capable of knowing and loving his Creator,
and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly
creatures…
But God did not create man as a solitary. For from the
beginning “male and female he created them” (Gen.1: 27).
Their companionship produces the primary form of
interpersonal communion. For by his innermost nature man
is a social being and unless he relates himself to others he
can neither live nor develop his potential.33
God, who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that
all men should constitute one family and treat one another in
a spirit of brotherhood. For having been created in the image
of God…all men are called to one and the same goal, namely,
God Himself.
For this reason, love of God and neighbor is the first and
greatest commandment…Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He
prayed to the Father, “that all may be one…as we are
one”…opened up vistas closed to human reason. For He
implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine
Persons, and in the union of God’s sons in truth and charity.
This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on
earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself
except through sincere gift of himself.34
The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word
does the mystery of man take on light. Christ, the final Adam,
by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love,
fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme
calling clear.
For by His incarnation the Son of God has united Himself in
some fashion with every man.
As an innocent lamb He merited life for us by the free
shedding of His own blood. In Him God reconciled us to
Himself and among ourselves.
27 See above chapter 5, section 2.5.3: “ The Theology of Human Dignity in
Gaudium et Spes”, pp. 334-344.
28 GS, articles 12 and 19.
29 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., p. 122.
30 DH, article 2, paras 1-3.
31 Joseph Ratzinger, The Church and Man’s Calling, op.cit., p.122; GS, article, 12.
32 GS, articles 23, 24.
33 Ibid., article 12.
34 Ibid., article 24.
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All this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of
good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way.
For, since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate
vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe
that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to
every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal
mystery.35
[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very
dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known though
the revealed Word of God and by reason itself…
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons – that is,
beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore
privileged to bear personal responsibility – that all men should
be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral
obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth. They
are also bound to adhere to the truth, once known, and to
order their whole lives in accordance with the demands of
truth.36
Obviously, the structure of the relational anthropology is self-
evident in the above passages. Theological anthropology sees
human person in relationship with God, other people and earthly
realities. Accordingly, in keeping with the biblical insight of relational
anthropology, the theological anthropology of Vatican II stresses
on the rights and duties, and brings out the importance of common
good and public order.37 Definitely, here too, from the ethical point
of view, the emphasis is on interhuman concerns.
Furthermore, the christological perspective of the human person
adds a transcendent value to human dignity and social nature. It
means that created in the image of God and redeemed by Christ,
all are children of God. All are destined for the flourishing of life in
the blessed communion with God who is a community of three
divine persons. Therefore, seen from the christological point of
view, the ethics of interhuman concerns is intensified as well as it
provides us with a deeper insight into the theological content of
ethical concerns. Consequently, Christian faith calls for committing
oneself to an ethical policy of interhuman concerns.
Moreover, the theological anthropology sees that the fullness
of human relationality is ultimately rooted in humankind’s relationship
with the Triune God.38 The mystery of the Triune God is an invitation
to Christian believers and to all people to rise above all mechanism
of egoism and monadic existence and to live their vocation of
communion based on the ethics of interhuman concerns. As
Leonardo Boff reminds us,39 a society offends the Triune God by
organising itself on the basis of crass individualism but honours
Trinity by committing to organise itself the more in favour of sharing
and in solidarity with all, thereby to bring about a just and humane
social order and equality of all informed by the values of interhuman
concerns. Christians learn about the ethical policy of interhuman
concerns from the story of Jesus and from the values of the God’s
kingdom that he shared with us.
The kingdom values are the values of interhuman concerns,
because these are the concerns of a God, who cares for the people
created in God’s image as shown in the mission and ministry of
Jesus. Consequently, by the mystery of Incarnation,40 humanity
has become the locus of encounter with God and God-experience
is mediated to us in and through interhuman concerns.41 All kinds
of works people do and all institutions, which uphold and promote
the ethics of interhuman concerns, protect people in their dignity
and, therefore, reflect the Kingdom ideals.
The Kingdom ideals, which Jesus inaugurated, are geared
towards creating human communities of freedom, fellowship and
35 Ibid., article 22.
36 DH, article 2.
37 GS, articles 26, 74, DH, articles 4 and 6
38  Leonardo Boff, op.cit., pp. 23-24
39  Ibid., pp.107-108, 167-170, 236.
40 The Creed of Constantinople I (A.D. 381) states: “For us men and for our
salvation he came down from the heavens, and became flesh from the Holy
Spirit and the Virgin Mary and was made man.” Crf.  J. Neuner and J. Dupuis,
The Christian Faith, op.cit., p. 9.
41 For complete treatment of this theme see above chapter 4, section 2.4.2.2: “The
Image of God and New Humanity in Christ”, pp.258-260 and section 2.4.2.3:
“Image of God as Children of God”, pp. 260-265.
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justice42 for the humanisation of people and their institutions.
These are the acts of interhuman concerns, precisely because they
are the concerns of human care for the protection of human dignity,
beginning with the least in the society, the anawim,43 to whom
dignity is denied in the society. It is with these category of people
Jesus identified his mysterious presence.44 In the Kingdom that
Jesus proclaimed, every person is respected in one’s dignity as the
living image of God, and equality of all are affirmed as children of
God.45 The kingdom ideals Jesus shared are essentially fellowship
and communion among people who accept the reign of God and its
demands. The call of the Kingdom is basically communitarian.
Kingdom is the loving and liberating presence of God among people
as incarnated in Jesus.
The ethics of interhuman concerns as seen in the Kingdom
ideals of Jesus, resonates with the concerns of political institutions
in so far as they are in some way rooted in relational anthropology.
The reason is that, from the ethical point of view, the world vision
of the relational anthropology is humanistic in character. It is directed
towards the creation of a humane social order, which operates
against the forces of oppression and dehumanisation in the political
community. The world vision of the relational anthropology sets
forth in the society a counter-culture, which is inclusive and pluralistic
as well. It implies commitment for the care of the other in the
society, a readiness to defend human life as against a culture of
deprivation of the neighbour. There is no space under relational
anthropology for the question: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”46 In
short, the values rooted in the relational anthropology are the values
that support human dignity. In theological parlance, these values
are intrinsic to the doctrine of imago Dei. They attain, a transcendent
significance in the theologico-ethical order when seen in the
christological horizon.
The philosophy of the humanistic secularism enshrined in the
Constitution of Indian is based on relation anthropology, since the
spirit and the tenor of the ethics of interhuman concerns animate
its secular provisions. Consequently, it reflects the Kingdom ideal
that Jesus proclaimed. As political principles, the values of
interhuman concerns operate through the ‘idea of principled
distance’ that the State in India keeps from religion and from the
interests of all communities, because its objective is to humanise
the Indian society in a manner worthy of human dignity. In chapter
three we have studied in detail its humanising effect on the Indian
society in a manner that is revolutionary in character. Nevertheless,
to make our point clear, we illustrate it once again through the
operation of article 25 of the Constitution.
Article 25 is a key article of the secular provisions of the Indian
Constitution. This article provides the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom but subject to so many conditions: to public order,
morality and health, and to the other fundamental rights guaranteed
to all citizens. In other words, if under the guise of freedom of
conscience or religious freedom, any citizen performs an act, which
is inconsistent with these constitutional conditions, that act will not
be protected in the public sphere under article 25. It is due to the
reason that under the philosophy of humanistic secularism, the State
in India has to balance the benefit of a religious act with the common
good which protects a civilised life for all.47
This is made explicitly clear once again by the provisions as
provided in clause (2) of article 25, since this clause empowers the
42 George M. Soares-Prabhu, “The Kingdom of God: Jesus’ Vision of a New
Society”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a Just society, op.cit., pp.
601- 607.
43 On the poor of God in the understanding of Jesus and his option see idem,
“Good News to the Poor! The Social Implications of the Message of Jesus”, in
The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society, op.cit, pp. 609-626; Idem,
“Class in the Bible: The Biblical Poor a Social Class?” in R.S. Sugirtharajah, ed.,
Voice from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World (New York,
Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 147-171.
44 Mt 25: 31-46. Serving the poor in the margins of the society seems to be the
criterion on which one is judged on the Last Day.
45 See above chapter 4, section 2.4.2.3: “Image of God as Children of God”,
pp.260-265.
46 Gen, 4:9.
47 Judicial decisions related to these constitutional provisions are discussed in
chapter 3. See chapter 3, section 1.3.3: “The Exercise of Religion Subject to
State Restrictions” p. 178 ff.
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State to make laws regulating or restricting any economic,
financial, political or other non-religious activities that may be
associated with religious practice. These regulatory measures of
the State cannot be impeached on the ground that they impede
religious freedom. Similarly, if social reform or social welfare
measures are introduced in any Legislature, they cannot be
challenged on the ground that these legislations contravene or intrude
into religious tenets, beliefs, practices or community interest, etc.48
What one sees in the constitutional objectives implied in article
25? Obviously, religion itself is subject to a process of humanisation.
Religion is challenged to be humane. Recall sabbatical laws cannot
subjugate what is truly of human concern!49 This is how the
Kingdom values of interhuman concerns operate through the secular
provisions of the Indian Constitution because its underlying vision
of the human person is guided by the ethics of relational
anthropology. Certainly, “God’s Spirit…is not absent”50 from the
constitutional objectives, since they are intended for the
humanisation of the Indian society keeping in view to defend human
dignity, which is a divine endowment for creating human beings in
God’s image.
In so far as the secular Constitution of India is based on relational
anthropology, it is committed to humanising values, because these
values are based on the ethics of interhuman concerns. Indeed,
these values of humanisation are also articulated in the Preamble
of the Constitution that contains the ideals and the aspirations of
the people of India, who gave to themselves a Secular Constitution.
These are given in the Preamble in terms of securing to all citizens
social, economic and political justice; liberty of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity;
promotion of human solidarity (fraternity) among citizens with the
aim of assuring the dignity of the individual as well as the unity and
integrity of the nation.51
These constitutional objectives, which are given in the form of
socio-economic and political policies of the secular State, govern in
guiding individuals’ relationship with the State as citizens and their
intercommunity relationship in the political community. They reflect
the values of the Kingdom as they are guided by the ethics of
interhuman concerns, namely care and respect for the other. These
constitutional provisions and institutions influence the relationship
of citizens in the political community to secure human dignity.
Seen theologically, these secular provisions of the Constitution
of India are also the call of God, “the signs of the times,” in the
Indian political scenario. They articulate, in the political context of
India as a nation-state, the cherished will of the people to create a
welfare State for a better human life.52 Hence, together with the
civil society, the Church in India is invited to respond to this call -
“the signs of the times.” Its purpose is to strengthen the humanistic
secular fabric of the political community in a manner proper to
human dignity. It is precisely at this point that the role of the Church
comes in as a partner in dialogue and collaboration with the civil
society. For this, we gaze at the experience of the Church of Vatican
II for insight to respond to this call of God given through the political
realities of India.
Supreme Court of India held that the Preamble is of extreme important and the
Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble
vision expressed in the Preamble. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,
Air 1973 SC 1461.These ideals of the nation as given in the Preamble have been
further elaborated in Part III of the Constitution which contains the fundamental
rights and in Part IV of the Constitution which provide the Directive Principles
of the State Policies. Commenting on the Constitution of India, Granville Austin
opined: “The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The
majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the
social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution…Yet despite the permeation
of the entire constitution by the aim of national renascence, the core of the
commitment to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV…These are the
conscience of the Constitution.” Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution:
Corner stone of a Nation, op.cit., p. 50.
52 See “Freedom Movement’s Vision of Independent India”, in Bipan Chandra,
Essays, op.cit., pp. 39-43.
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48 See above chapter 3, section 1.3.5: “The Welfare State and Religion”, pp. 211-
214.
49 Mk 2:23-28; Mt 12:1-8; Lk 6:1-5. For other sabbatical pronouncements see
Mk 3:1-6; Mt 12:9-14; Lk 6:6-11.
50 GS, article 26.
51 See the Preamble to the Constitution of India. In Kesavananda Bharati case, the
2.6.4. Human Dignity Calls for Liberating Dialogue
The Second Vatican Council opened the way of the Church’s service
to the world in terms of dialogue. The purpose of the dialogue is to
work together with all peoples of diverse faiths and ideologies to
build a world order of human solidarity worthy to the honour of
human dignity.53 Therefore, the Council exhorts Christians to
discover through dialogue what is true and good in other religions
and socio-cultural values of the nations, and learn to acknowledge,
preserve and promote the spiritual, moral and socio-cultural ethos
of the nations.54 Pope John Paul II repeatedly spoke about the
need for dialogue and cooperation among believers in a world that
is increasingly becoming interdependent. The purpose of the ministry
of dialogue is to improve societies all over the world “on the solid
ground of respect for each person’s inalienable dignity, equality,
justice for all, tolerance and solidarity in human relations.”55
This is an innovative approach that the Church of the Second
Vatican Council has assumed for its mission in the world. It is
conditioned by the contemporary world order, which has opted for
religious and cultural pluralism and for national self-governments
in various forms. Nevertheless, the Church is not a stranger to this
new world order. The Church sees in these world movements the
actions of God working in history through the Divine Spirit.56
Therefore, it has faithfully abandoned its previously held exclusive
possession of the Kingdom of God within its walls;57 but sees it
graciously spread out wherever people are, especially in those dense
situations of life, where people commit themselves to the ethics of
interhuman concerns. Accordingly, the Council defined the Church
as a communion of the people of God on the way towards the
Kingdom, led by the Spirit of Jesus.58
Vatican II realised that the Church has a great mission to
accomplish in this ever-changing world horizon. One of the primary
aspects of its mission is to become a partner among people of all
faiths and ideologies. The ecclesial purpose is to discern in the light
of the Gospel, the authentic actions of God in the happenings of
history and enter into dialogue with people and to collaborate with
them to further the cause of the Kingdom ideals.59 The world of
political realities is one of the areas where the Church is expected
to carry out this mission of dialogue in partnership with others in
the pluralistic civil society. We refer here a relevant conciliar text:
[T]here is a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper
to the human person, since he stands above all things, and
rights and duties are universal and inviolate. Therefore, these
must be made available to all men everything necessary for
leading a life truly human…
[S]ocial order requires constant improvement. It must be
founded on truth, built on justice, and animated by love; in
freedom it should grow every day towards more humane
balance…God’s Spirit, who with a marvellous providence
directs the unfolding of time and renews the face of the
earth, is not absent from this development. The ferment of
the gospel, too, has aroused and continues to arouse in man’s
heart the irresistible requirements of his dignity.”60
In the above passage Vatican II indicates God’s saving presence
in the activities of the socio-political systems to make it humane to
the requirements of human dignity. But God’s saving presence in
the world at all times and everywhere is a liberating presence from
all forms of enslavements and leading the people in freedom towards
humanisation as seen in the kingdom values that Jesus preached.61
These are also reflected in the philosophy of humanistic secularism
of the Indian Constitution as well as the Church’s teaching about
constitutional State. Consequently, both are also committed to human
dignity in the political community. These observations lead us to
discuss about a possible liberating dialogue between the Church and
53 Crf. ES, no 20; GS, articles 3, 21, 40, 91.
54 OT, article 16; AG, article 11; NA, article 2.
55 Crf. Allocutions of Pope John Paul II (1978- ), in ed., Edmund Chia, Dialogue
Resource Manual for Catholics in Asia (Bangkok, FABC-OEIA, 2001), p. 67.
56 GS, articles 2, 3, 26; NA, article 2; DH, article 1.
57 LG, article 5.
58 LG, articles 8, 9, 14, 21; GS 1, 40, 45; AG, article 2.
59 GS, articles 11, 26, 44; DH, article 1, etc.
60 GS, article 26.
61 Ex, 3: 7-12; Dt, 23:15-16; Is, 1:16-17, 61:1-3; Amos 5:14-15; Lk, 4:16-21. etc.
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the political community in defence of human dignity. For this
purpose, we take examples from Indian experience to illustrate our
point.
Looking at the Indian socio-political circumstances, the Indian
theologian Felix Wilfred, who coined the concept “liberating
dialogue,”62 suggests that in the Indian context liberating dialogue
would be an appropriate way of responding to India’s socio-political
need. He bases this process on a “humanizing and liberating ethic,”63
which leads towards a common project of humanisation in the civil
society. He situates it in the context of India’s religiosity and the
glaring fact of dehumanising forces at work in the society. However,
religions also have a great liberative potential that could be galvanized
to liberate people from poverty, caste discrimination, and communal
conflicts. The forces of dehumanisation widespread in the society
cannot be set-aside in the private realm of human existence, because
these are the issues grievously affecting the interhuman relationship
in the civil society. Therefore, such negative forces and institutions
that promote them must be addressed in the public sphere by means
of dialogue and collaboration with all people in the civil society.
As early as in the 1970s, the members of the National Integration
Council of the Government of India have suggested similar views.
In the context of emerging trends towards religious communalism
and fundamentalism in the country and the need to work towards
national integration, the National Integration Council suggested that
interreligious dialogues in the country could focus on the
constitutional values of human dignity.64 This would be compatible
with the ethics of interhuman concerns found available in most
religions. Likewise, in the early 1980s, the Catholic Church in India
came to a similar sort of understanding. In a national seminar held
in 1981, the final statement of the seminar suggested that in the
struggle for a just society in India, the Church need “to join with all
people of good will in promoting those values in society that Jesus
commissioned the Church to announce.”65
The preceding observations direct us to identify some significant
political values and institutions which are commonly held imperative
by the Indian polity as implied in the philosophy of humanistic
secularism and by the Church as enunciated in the conciliar
documents, Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. These
political values and institutions are of interhuman concerns in intent
in the civil society to promote a humane political order, which is the
goal of Indian secularism, in view of advancing the welfare of all
citizens centred on human dignity. This value commonality that
engages the concerns of the Church and the State in India is also
the call from the civil society to the Church in India for dialogue
and collaboration to protect human dignity. In the proceeding sections
we elaborate their political and theological importance in the
pluralistic context of Indian political community. These can be
approached as constructive pointers for dialogue and partnership
in action between the Indian Church and the civil society to
strengthen the values of humanistic secular ethos in the country.
2.6.4.1. The Call to Protect Dignity
The first significant value commonality that we come across
between the political doctrine of the Church, which is centred on
the theology of human dignity as expounded in Vatican II’s
documents, Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae, and the
secular provisions of the Indian Constitution is the value of respect
accorded to the dignity of the human persons in matters religious.
One can see it in the Indian Constitution from the structural
arrangement of the right to freedom of conscience and free exercise
of religion as guaranteed in article 25, and the right to corporate
freedom of religion as provided in article 26 as well as the right to
freedom from religious instructions or worship as ensured under
article 28.
According to article 25 of the Constitution of India, subject to
public order, morality and health and other provisions of Part III of
62 Felix Wilfred, From the Dusty Soil (Madras, University of Madras, 1995), pp.
261-274.
63 Ibid., pp. 270-272.
64 Crf. P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and the Constitution of India (Bombay,
University of Bombay, 1971), pp. 166-170.
65 D.S. Amalorpavadass, ed., The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society,
op.cit., p.72.
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the Constitution, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate
religion. The first juridical affirmation is that all persons are entitled
to freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion. In matters
religious, the foreigners residing in India are also protected under
article 25 of the Constitution of India. A person’s place of birth or
nationality is irrelevant for the entitlement of religious freedom,
because the right to religious freedom is founded on the inherent
worth and dignity of the human person as a moral subject.66
Secondly, by placing the right to freedom of conscience prior to
that of religion, the article places the individuals above religion.
The emphasis implied here is the affirmation of the priority accorded
to human person in his or her dignity as a moral subject and,
therefore, religion is placed by legislation in terms of human need
according to one’s choice. Thirdly, the free exercise of religion is
subject to certain necessary public need such as public order,
morality and health and the fundamental rights as provided in Part
III of the Constitution. The objective of these conditions pronounces
in clear terms that the practice of religion cannot violate human
dignity.67 All these conditional laws are protective of human dignity.
Fourthly, the corporate right of every religious denomination or any
section thereof as guaranteed in article 26 is for the furtherance of
the right guaranteed in article 25, since respect for individual person
equally applies respect in his or her social nature in the free exercise
of religion in a free society.68
Article 28 of the Constitution of India deals with the question
of attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain
educational institutions. As seen elsewhere in our study, this article
makes a distinction between educational institutions wholly
maintained out of State funds and those recognized by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds. The imparting of religious instruction
is completely prohibited in the former but there is no prohibition
against imparting religious instruction or conducting religious worship
in the latter. It further stipulates that no person attending the latter
category of educational institutions shall be required to take part in
any religious instruction that may be imparted there or to attend
any religious worship that may be conducted there, unless such
person or his or her guardian has given consent to it.
Once again the emphasis in article 28 of the Indian Constitution
is on the freedom of conscience. Therefore, respect for human
persons in their dignity as moral subjects is the reason for religious
freedom. Right to religious freedom, individual and corporate, is
respected, because the philosophy of humanistic secularism of the
Indian Constitution regards freedom of conscience and free exercise
of religion are important human needs in so far as human persons
in their dignity are moral subjects, and they are also social by
nature.69 Hence, in matters religious, the relevant provisions of the
Constitution of India attach twofold immunity from coercion to
individuals and to religious communities.
These humanistic values of the Indian secularism consistently
reverberate with Vatican II’s declaration on the right to religious
freedom and constitutional State, which is founded on the theology
of human dignity as expounded in Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis
Humanae. The relevant article of Dignitatis Humanae declares,
“[A]ll men are to be immune from coercion… in such wise that in
matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary
to his own beliefs.”70 It further means that subject to due limits, no
one is to be restrained from acting in accordance with one’s own
belief, whether privately, whether alone or in association with others.
The right to religious freedom is founded on the very dignity of the
human person, which is known through the “revealed Word of God
and by reason itself.”71 Therefore, this right “is to be recognized in
the constitutional law whereby society is governed. Thus it is to
become a civil right,”72 because it is a right inalienable to human
dignity. Therefore, the temporal power has no right to abrogate it.
66 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR, 546.
67 See above chapter 3, section 1.3.3.5: “Religious Freedom in Consonance with
Human Dignity”, pp. 189-191.
68 Upendra Baxi, op.cit., p. 67.
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69 The framers of the Constitution were emphatic on this point. See above chapter
2, section 1.2.5.2: “ The Constituent Assembly Debates on Secularism.” pp.123-
130.
70 DH, article 2, para 1.
71 Ibid., para 2.
72 Ibid.
In its declaration on the corporate right to religious freedom,
the conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae again declares, “[T]he
social nature of man itself requires that he should give external
expression to his internal acts of religion; that he should participate
with others in matters religious; that he should profess his religion
in community.”73 According to the teaching of the Church, it is the
social nature of the human person, which lays a demand on the
State to protect the corporate freedom of religion, since Dignitatis
Humanae claims that “immunity from coercion in matters religious
is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized
as their right when they act in community.”74
The Declaration Dignitatis Humanae further stresses,
“Injury…is done to the human person and the very order established
by God for human life,”75 if immunity is denied to religious
communities. Therefore, the Church emphasises, provided the just
requirements of the public order are observed,76 the State must
respect the autonomy of the religious bodies that they may govern
themselves according to their norms. The theological reason
adduced for the immunity is the inviolable dignity of the human
persons, which consists in the fact that they are created in the
image of God, redeemed by Christ and destined for communion
with God and to live in solidarity with others in the society.
As image of God, human persons are endowed with capacity
for God, which means they are moral subjects. They are free and
responsible to seek the truth and order their lives in responsible
freedom according to their judgment of conscience. As God’s image,
it is in the very nature of human persons to live in communion with
God and to form variety of communities in the civil society. This
communitarian nature is inherent in the fact of being human for the
sole reason, as the document Gaudium et Spes states, that “God
did not create man as a solitary…For by his innermost nature man
is a social being and unless he relates himself to others he can
neither live nor develop his potential.”77 Consequently, the free
exercise of religion attains a societal or corporate dimension. For
this reason, immunity from coercion in matters religious is protected
in the personal and social spheres of human existence in the civil
society under constitutional law.
This ethical doctrine of the Church on religious freedom, personal
and corporate,78 which is grounded in the theology of the human
dignity as propounded in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes,
completely agrees with the secular provisions of the Constitution
of India dealing with religious freedom.79 Just as the Church’s ethical
doctrine of religious freedom, the legal institution of religious freedom
as guaranteed by the Constitution of India also provides twofold
immunity in matters religious to individuals and corporate bodies.
Although the Church’s teaching adds a transcendent value to
religious freedom sourced by revelation,80 both the magisterial
teaching of the Church and the Constitution of India ground it on
the inherent worth and dignity of human person as moral subject.
Recall the emphasis of the Constitution of India on the “freedom of
conscience”81 in matters religious.
Hence, the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution and
the Church’s teaching maintain that respect for human dignity is
the criterion for providing immunity in matters religious. To respect
people means not to violate their dignity as moral subjects. The
violation of the right to religious freedom is a serious attack on the
people causing “injury”82 to their inherent worth and dignity, since
it prevents them to use their right to seek the truth and decide their
destiny in responsible freedom. Violence against humanity is a crime
that should be avoided. Seen theologically, it is an abuse of divine
endowment because human dignity is a gift of God by creating
human persons in God’s image.83
73 Ibid., article 3, para 5.
74 Ibid., article 4, para 1.
75 Ibid., article 3, para 5.
76 Ibid., para 5; article 4, para 2.
77 GS, article 12, para 5. See also GS, articles 24, 25.
78 DH, article 2, paras 1-3.
79 Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
80 DH, article 2, para 2.
81 Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India.
82 DH, article 3, para 5.
83 GS, articles 12, 19.
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In the context of Indian political community, which has been
constituted on the philosophical foundation of the humanistic
secularism of the Constitution, the Christian faith heritage places a
unique responsibility on the Indian Church for dialogue and
collaboration with others in defence on matters related to human
dignity in the civil society. This service of the Church to civil society
need not be limited only to matters related to religious freedom -
individual and corporate, but extends to all matters in the area of
civil liberties. The extension of Church’s pastoral responsibility to
civil society arises on account of the aim of the civil liberties. It is
to secure human dignity by protecting people’s life and property
against violence. The right to free exercise of religion is one of the
civil liberties but an essential one. It is the cornerstone of the edifice
of the civil liberties and rights; since it pertains to the order of
liberty to seek the truth, to decide one’s destiny in life and to order
one’s way of life in the civil society as a moral subject. Therefore,
the right to religious freedom is a constitutive requirement to lead a
life worthy of human dignity.
2.6.4.2. The Call to Affirm Pluralism
The second important value commonality between the teaching of
the Church on human dignity and the constitutional order of the
State in India is the value of pluralism in the political community.
We have seen in the above section that the inalienable dignity of
the people as moral subjects is the foundation of the right to religious
freedom, which is known through revelation and by reason. It is
also the invariable reason for the recognition of the plural character
of the political community, because human dignity demands that
people are to be free to seek the truth and organise their lives
according to their perception of God and the good. Pluralism,
especially religious pluralism, is one of the invaluable aspects of the
Indian way of life. The reality of the Indian people is characterised
by plural identities, namely religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic.
The pluralistic ethos of the Indian people was an essential aspect
of the freedom movement’s vision of Independent India. This was
a secular national movement that fought against the British rule as
well as the forces of the Hindu communalism and Islamic
communalism, which were also prevalent at that time.84 The vision
of the freedom struggle was for a strong and united Indian nation-
state consisting of people belonging to plurality of community
identities. Unity in diversity was its mantra. From the beginning,
this vision has incorporated diversity, especially religious diversity,
as an essential aspect of the rich national heritage.85 The philosophy
of the humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution has been
largely shaped by the vision of the freedom struggle for Indian
Independence to create a nation-state, which is pluralistic in
character. The culture of pluralism is also an essential aspect of
the ethics of interhuman concerns of the Kingdom values that Jesus
proclaimed, because it is an affirmation to care for the other person
as he or she is in his or her individuality.
The constitutional affirmation of the plural civil society is
particularly seen in articles 29, 30 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. Articles 29 and 30 confer several distinct rights to minorities.
According to article 29 (1), any section of the citizens residing in
the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language,
script or culture of its own, shall have the right to conserve the
same. According to clause (1) of article 30, all religious and linguistic
minorities have the right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their own choice. This does not prohibit the State
prescribing regulations to ensure the academic excellence of the
institutions. Clause (2) of article 30 protects minority educational
institutions whether based on religion or language from State
discrimination in granting aid.86
Similarly, clause (4) of article 15 of the Constitution of India
authorises the State to make special provisions for the advancement
of socially and educationally backward classes of the citizens or
84 See above chapter 2, sections 1.2.4.1: “Religious Nationalism”, p.104; section
1.2.4.3: “Communal Nationalism”, pp. 108-115 and section 1.2.4.4: “The
Growth of Secular Nationalism”, pp. 115-121.
85 Bipan Chandra, Indian Nationalism, op.cit., p.46.
86 Kerala Education Bill, 1957, In re The, AIR 1958 SC 956; Sidhrajbhai Sabbai,
Rev. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540. For detailed study of these cases,
see above chapter 3, section 1.3.4.4:  “State Aid and State Control”, pp. 201-
208 ff.
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for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Consequently,
clause (4) of article 15 is an exception to clause (1) of the same
article that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, caste,
sex, and place of birth or any of them. Likewise, Clause (4) of
article 16 is an enabling provision conferring a discretionary power
on the State for making any provision or reservation of appointments
or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the service
under the State.87
The matter for our consideration is that India as a secular State
is a political community of plural communities. People in their multi-
religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic identities
constitute the subject of the political community under a secular
constitution, which protects religious liberty, individual and corporate,
as required by the inalienable worth and dignity of the people. The
Indian society, under its secular political order, is a free society in
which the multifarious kinds of people’s community identities are
also protected from violence. The reason is that the humanistic
vision of the Indian secularism is grounded in the dignity of the
human persons as the Preamble of the Constitution of India assures
to each individual the value of human dignity.88 Therefore, logic of
the philosophy of humanistic secularism that Indian adopted avoids
homogenisation of people in terms of religion or culture or in any
form.89 On the contrary, it is intrinsic to the ethics of interhuman
concerns which is ingrained in humanistic vision of the Indian
secularism to recognise in the diversity of community identities the
concretisation of the people’s individuality according to their
respective beliefs and ways of life that deserve respect and
protection worthy of human dignity.
Hence, by providing differential treatment to minorities and other
marginal groups in the political community, the humanistic objectives
of the Indian secularism affirm their inherent worth and dignity as
human communities in their particular religious, cultural or linguistic
specifications. Implicit in the philosophy of the humanistic secularism
of the Constitution of India is the belief that political community is
a national community of communities with plural community
identities in a free society. Pluralism humanises the political
community and willing to offer living space to others in their
particularities.
It is not difficult to recognise the connection between the
political value of pluralism implied in the philosophy of humanistic
secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution and the teaching of
the Church on human community. One of the essential Christian
anthropological tenets is the dignity of the human persons in their
social nature. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes
consistently insists on it and states:
But God did not create man as a solitary. For from the
beginning “male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27).
Their companionship produces the primary form of
interpersonal communion. For by his innermost nature man
is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he
can neither live nor develop his potential.90
As we have seen earlier, the biblical insight about humanity
and its further theological development in the tradition of the Church
holds that human person is a relational subject. Relationality is
essential to human dignity as imago Dei. It means that people are
called to develop their unique individualities and actualise their God
given potentialities through socialisation by relating themselves with
others in responsible freedom. Their social nature is grounded in
and flows from their capacity for interpersonal communion with
God.91 God’s calling of human persons into existence to organise
87 V. D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp. 86-128.
88 The Constitution is committed to secure to all its citizens inter alia
“FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity
of the Nation.” See Preamble of the Constitution of India.
89 This is the problem with religious nationalism, which began to emerge as one of
the national movements spear headed by Hindu zealots against the secular
nationalism headed by the Indian National Congress. During the past fifteen
years or so, it has become a dominant political ideology under the auspices of
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu Nationalistic Political Party under the
ideological banner of Hindutva and Hindu Nationalism. See above chapter 2,
section 1.2.4.3: “Communal Nationalism”, pp. 108-115.
90 GS, article 12, para 5.
91 We have analysed the social nature of the human person from the Christian
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their lives in responsible freedom in a variety of community
specifications in a free society is also the sign of the Trinitarian
mystery of God, which is one of unity in plurality, in whose image
human persons are created.
The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes is emphatic on the
vestige of the Trinitarian mystery inherent in the nature of human
persons as relational subjects. It states:
God, who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that
all men should constitute one family and treat one another in
a spirit of brotherhood. For having been created in the image
of God…all men are called to one and the same goal, namely,
God Himself…
Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the father, “that
all may be one…as we are one” (Jn. 17:21-22) opened up
vistas closed to human reason. For He implied a certain
likeness between the union of the divine persons, and in the
union of God’s sons in truth and charity.92
The fact of multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-
linguistic pluralism is a substantive value heritage of the India as a
nation-state.93 Christian faith tradition is not alien to authentic values
of pluralism inherent in the philosophy of the humanistic secularism
of the Indian Constitution, which is founded on the principles of
relational anthropology. Christians are better informed by their faith
perspective about the meaning of the political community founded
on the conception of relational anthropology whose ethics is
interhuman concerns. So, they are in a better position to offer their
services for nurturing the pluralistic character of the Indian society.94
Their faith impels them with a mission to play an important role in
collaboration with others in the civil society to bring peoples, cultures
and religions into greater understanding and solidarity so as to
strengthen the values and civil structures of pluralism in the country.
This is a prerequisite for the functioning of the secular State in a
land known for pluralism.
In a pluralistic civil society, to work for the values to respect
pluralism as well as to create understanding among the diverse
communities in terms of human solidarity is the new avatar of the
praxis of the rich Christian virtue of charity. It is for the reason that
true pluralism flourishes only when people learn to respect and
appreciate the goodness of other persons and other communities,
as God loves them in what they are. The Christian virtue of charity
is the reflection of divine love for humankind, which is an act of
affirmation of people in what they are. In the context of communal
violence which is endemic in some parts of India, and especially in
the context of communal nationalism spearheaded by the ideologues
of Hindutva,95 working for unity in diversity is an important mission
of the Indian Church to the civil society.
In recent times, it has become an important national concern to
inculcate among people the values humanistic secular nationalism
as against certain emerging trends towards communal nationalism.
This ecclesial mission is to be accomplished not alone but in dialogue
and collaboration with other similar organisations in the civil society,
theological perspective. See above chapter 5, section 2.5.3: “The Theology of
Human Dignity in Gaudium et Spes”, pp. 334-344.
92 GS, article 24, paras 1, 3.
93 See above chapter 2, section 1.2.6: “Conclusion: The Legacy of the Indian
heritage.” pp. 134-136.
94 DH, articles 3 and 9.
95 Vast amount of literature is available on this matter. See Ashok Acharya, “ Civil
Society and Liberal Norms”, in Seminar, no. 456 (1997), pp. 17-20; Amir Ali,
“Case for Multiculturalism in India”, in Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
XXXV, no. 28 & 29 (2000), pp. 2503- 2505; Amaladoss Michael, “ Building
Community: The Sign of God’s Presence in India Today”, in Jeevadhara, vol.
XXIV, no141 (1994), pp. 165-175; Idem, “Religion in Civil Society”, in
Jeevadhara, vol. XXIX, no. 169 (1999), pp. 39-47; George M. Soares-Prabhu,
“Jesus Christ amid the Religions and Ideologies of India Today” in Biblical
Themes For A Contextual Theology Today, Collected Writings of George M.
Soares-Prabhu,S.j. Vol. 1, ed., Isaac Padinjarekuttu (Pune, Jnana-Deepa
Vidyapeeth, 1999), pp. 191-208; Felix Wilfred, “Inter-Religious Dialogue as a
Political Question”, in Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection, vol. LX,
No. 6 (June 1996), pp. 361-374; Idem, Christianity - Interlocutor in Civil
Society” in Jeevadhara, vol. XXXIV, no. 169 (1999), pp. 54-74; Idem, Human
Rights and the Mandal Movements: Towards a New Direction in Human Rights”,
in Jeevadhara, vol. XXI, no, 121 (January 1991), pp. 63-88; J.Mattam, P.
Arockiadoss, eds., Hindutva: an Indian Christian Response (Bangalore,
Dharmaram Publications), 2002;
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since the Constitution of India declares that it is one of the
fundamental duties of every citizen of India “to value and preserve
the rich heritage of our composite culture.”96 It is a constitutional
call arising from the philosophical vision of the humanistic secularism
of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Church’s contribution in this
nation building process is all the more important, because its
theological vision of   the human person, society and State demands
it.
2.6.4.3. The Call to Defend Equality
The third value commonality between the Church’s political doctrine
and the Constitution of India is the concept of egalitarian social
order in a democratic State. The humanistic secularism of the Indian
Constitution sourced by the ethics of human dignity would not able
to give shape to a secular political order in a free society unless the
Indian society is egalitarian in its approach towards each individual
person. It is because in a secular constitutional order of the State
like that of India, each member of the nation-state is a free and
responsible subject of the political community. Each individual
member of the political community is in immediate relationship with
the State with rights and duties, which are equally applicable to all
members for the protection of their dignity against violation. India
being predominantly a Hindu society, the age-old caste based
hierarchical social order has been a stumbling block for the creation
of an egalitarian social order. Caste system divides human
community into high and low before the law. Implicit in the system
is the concept of hierarchical anthropology according to which
human persons in their essential nature are not equal by birth.
Since nineteenth century, great attempts were made by the
reformers of the Indian Renaissance to change this nefarious
system. Influenced by the egalitarian humanism of the Western
liberal thought, the reformers infused values of egalitarian
anthropology into Indian psyche. The framers of the Constitution
of India also realised the importance of an egalitarian social order
for the development of secular State. They adopted the spirit of
the Indian Renaissance in the making of the Constitution of the
modern India. Hence, they added the law of equality in the Preamble
of the Constitution as an essential nation building value. Accordingly,
the Sovereign Republic of India resolved to secure to all its citizens
inter alia “EQUALITY of status and opportunity; and promote
among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual
and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”97
In pursuance of the above referred to the solemn resolve of
the people of India as a nation-state, the Constitution guarantees to
all its citizens equality before the law and the equal protection of
the laws within the territory of India. As we have discussed it
elsewhere, discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste,
sex or place of birth is prohibited.99 The dreadful practice of
untouchability is constitutionally outlawed.100 Consequently, the
inherent worth and dignity of every person is respected
constitutionally in the political community.101 Nevertheless, caste
rigidity does continue in various forms and ways in many parts of
India. A society is egalitarian and free only when the society treats
all members with respect in their dignity as human persons. Religions
in India have a great responsibility to cooperate with the legislative
process of the State to achieve this constitutional objective.102
In a number of cases related to the right to free exercise of
96 Article 51-A (f) of the Constitution of India.
97 Preamble to the Constitution of India.
98 Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
99 Articles 15 Cls. (1) and (2); 16 Cls. (1) and (2); 29 Cl. (2) of the Constitution of
India.
100 Article 17 of the Constitution of India.
101 Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution of India contain various provisions
regarding the right to equality. We have studied them in the light the Supreme
Court rulings. See above chapter 3, section 1.3.8.2: “Abolition of
Untouchability”, pp. 196-201 and section 1.3.9: “Egalitarian Society in Defence
of Human dignity”, pp. 201-208.
102 This has been pointed out by the Supreme Court of India while delivering its
judgement in a case challenging The Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956 (Bombay Act 31 of 1956), which permitted
to open the Hindu places of worship to all sections and classes of Hindus. See
Shastri Yagnapurshdasji v. Muldas Bhunardas Vaishya, AIR 1966 SC 1119, at
1135.
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religion, the Supreme Court of India has reiterated the
constitutional intention that the religious practices were subject to
certain humanistic values of the Constitution which were meant to
protect human dignity. We have studied some of the historic cases
of this kind in chapter three.103 Recall also the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the right to the free exercise of religion.
They are conditional rights in the sense that these are subject to
public order, morality, health and other provisions of the fundamental
rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.104 These
constitutional conditions protect human dignity in the practice of
religion. Therefore, the free exercise of religion cannot contravene
the egalitarian social order intended by the Constitution.
Egalitarian anthropology is an integral aspect of the Christian
theological approach towards society and the political order. The
conciliar document Dignitatis Humanae declares that acts of
discrimination on the part of the State, which violates human
dignity,105 is a “violation of the will of God and of the sacred rights
of the person.”106 The concept of egalitarian anthropology is the
basis for equalitarian society. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium
et Spes affirms in categorical terms:
Since all men possess a rational soul and are created in God’s
likeness, since they have the same nature and origin, have
been redeemed by Christ, and enjoy the same divine calling
and destiny, the basic equality of all must receive increasingly
greater recognition.
True, all men are not alike from the point of view of varying
physical power and the diversity of intellectual and moral
resources. Nevertheless, with respect to the fundamental
rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether
social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social
condition, language, or religion, is to be overcome and
eradicated as contrary to God’s intent.107
Gaudium et Spes further stresses that the worth of a person
does not consist in what one possesses but in what one is. The
Christian approach to egalitarian anthropology is founded on the
theology of creation and redemption. It is part of the Christian faith
perception that every person is ontologically endowed with a dignity,
which is totally unique, because every person is created in God’s
image and redeemed by Christ. Therefore, every one is associated
with the paschal mystery in a way known to God.108 The Pastoral
Constitution Gaudium et Spes exclaims, “Such is the mystery of
man, and it is a great one, as seen by believers in the light of Christian
revelation.”109 This faith perspective constitutes a solid foundation
to work for equalitarian social order in a free society.
Similar to the Church’s teaching on egalitarian political
community, we also notice a strong sense of equalitarian value
running through the pages of the Constitution of India. This needs
attention for our purpose. Imbued by the philosophy of the humanistic
secularism, which is centred on human dignity and intended for the
humanisation of Indian society, the kind of egalitarian social order
that the Constitution of India wishes to establish is not something
static. Its objectives are positive and dynamic. As given in the
Preamble of the Constitution of India,110 the State in India proclaims
to secure to all its citizens inter alia equality of status and
opportunity.
In this way, the State in India wishes to promote among all
citizens fraternity (human solidarity) assuring the dignity of the
individuals and the unity and integrity of the nation.111 Therefore,
one of the political objectives of the State in India is to see that the
103 See above chapter 3, section 1.3.1.2: “The Indian Judicial Attempt to Define
Religion”, pp. 143-145 and section 1.3.3 “The Exercise of Religion and State
Restriction,” p.178 ff.
104 See articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
105 DH, article 6.
106 Ibid, para 5.
107 GS, article 29, paras 1 and 2.
108 GS, article 22. See above chapter 4, section 2.4.2.3: “Image of God as Children
of God”, pp.260-265 and chapter 5, section 2.5.4.3: “Human Dignity and
Christ’s Universal Redemption”, pp. 362-366.
109 GS, article 22, para 7.
110 V.D. Mahajan, The Constitutional Law of India, op.cit., pp.35-45.
111See Preamble of the Constitution of India.
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application of the constitutional provisions on equality helps to
further the cause of fraternity among all citizens cutting across
caste and creed. In other words, through the instrumentality of the
egalitarian social order and its political organs, the Indian Constitution
wishes to promote a sense of human solidarity that respects the
dignity of each person. Surely, this is one of the most important
revolutionary contributions of the philosophy of humanistic
secularism, which is intended to usher in a social order based on
egalitarian anthropology for the humanisation of the Indian society.
As a result, the political community in India hopes to ensure a strong
and united India built on the values of human solidarity, which is
sourced by the value of inalienable worth and dignity of the human
person.112
From the Christian faith point of view, the recognition of
egalitarian social order based on the transcendent dignity of every
human person has biblical roots. God is concerned with the human
pain caused by the unequal treatment of the people in the society,
their alienation from the mainstream political community and the
non-recognition of the dignity of their humanity. These are the life-
threatening situations of the people in the society. The Christian
Scriptures point out that God comes in protection of the people in
such situations.113 The prophetic narratives of the Hebrews remind
us that the alienated masses of humanity, who are pushed to the
margins of society, are the locations where the voice of God is
heard.114 The focus of religion is not so much on the sacred cult
and temples but towards the sacredness of human life in situations
where human equality and dignity are denied.115
Likewise, privileging the marginalized is central to Jesus’
preaching of the kingdom of God. By his association with those
individuals and social groups, to whom equality before the law was
denied on reasons of religious taboo and social norms, Jesus
affirmed their equality founded on their dignity as God’s children.116
For the Church in India, privileging the marginalized ones in the
civil society is part of its mission. It is its “trade mark.”117 It is the
Church’s faithfulness to Christ’s commission. At the same time, it
strengthens the political structures intended for the egalitarian social
order permeated by the ethics of the humanistic secularism of the
Indian Constitution.
2.6.4.4. The Call to Nurture the Democratic Path
The fourth value commonality is the liberal democratic political
order in an egalitarian society. The contemporary institution of liberal
democracy is the logical development from the principles of modern
political liberalism, which arose in the early nineteenth century.
These may be summarised in two formulae: the extension of
individual rights to all members of the political community, and the
right of the people as an organic whole based on the idea of nation-
state to govern themselves. The first one is the negative liberty of
guarantism, given in terms of constitutional protection in that the
individual’s activity shall not be interfered within its proper
development in a political community. The second one is the positive
liberty, which is the affirmation of the free people’s effective power
to create their own State for self-government. Therefore, liberal
democracy has universalised freedom on the premises of egalitarian
anthropology and people’s right to govern themselves in their
capacity as free and responsible persons worthy of human dignity.118
From the ethical point of view, liberal democracy is grounded
on certain absolute values intrinsic to the nature of human person.
According to Paul E. Sigmund, liberal democracy assumes that
human person is a moral subject, one who is conscious, free and
responsible person to respect the equal moral rights of other people
112 P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., pp. 25-27.
113 For a thought provoking reflection on this point see Felix Wilfred, “The
Margins - The Sites of God’s Visitation,” in Third Millennium, vol. II (1999),
pp. 110-117.
114 Ex 3: 7-10; 14: 13 - 15: 21; Amos 2: 6-21; 3: 9-15; 4:1-12
115 Mariaselvam, A., “Prophetic Vision of the Ideal Hebrew Society: Pre-Exilic
Prophets”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society, op.cit., pp.
537-550.
116 George M. Soares-Prabhu, “God News to the Poor: The Social Implications of
the Message of Jesus”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society,
op.cit., pp. 609-626.
117 Felix Wilfred, “The Margins - The Site of God’s Visitation”, op.cit., p. 114.
118 Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. R.G.
Collingswood, reprint (Boston, Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 370-380.
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in the political community. It also presumes that moral and social
vision about the human person is necessary for political cooperation
in a democracy.119 Furthermore, political philosophers, Nicholas
Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, point out liberal democracy believes
that political activity is itself something valuable through which people
express themselves as relational and cooperative beings enjoying
an interdependent existence by way of political participation as
citizens in a free society. Liberal democracy advocates a political
system of participation, community and republican citizenship.120
Surely, there are significant points of value convergence
between liberal democracy and contemporary Catholic political
thought. This calls for explanation. Christian faith holds that created
in God’s image, human persons are, first and foremost, persons
before God; and for that reason they are capable of acting on God’s
behalf and responsible to God.121 Consequently, a person’s rights
and duties as a human person are inalienable and indivisible, since
each person stands before God equal in dignity and with responsible
freedom. The State has to respect this dignity, equality and
responsibility of the people because their role as human persons is
prior to the creation of the State or any human institution. Therefore,
freedom of conscience and the constitutional laws securing the
values of egalitarian anthropology are the necessary conditions for
a democratic State. They complement each other. These values
are the constitutive principles of the Indian Constitution, which is
democratic and secular in its political order with civil liberties.122
In a secular democratic State individuals and communities
flourish in their identities only through the path of democracy. The
institution of democracy offers the best possibility to people to
participate in the political process through free choice, respecting
their dignity as being human. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium
et Spes comments:
It is in full accord with human nature that juridical-political
structure should, with ever better success and without any
discrimination, afford all their citizens the chance to
participate freely and actively in establishing the constitutional
bases of a political community, governing the state,
determining the scope and purpose of various institutions,
and choosing leaders. Hence, let all citizens be mindful of
their simultaneous right and duty to vote freely in the interest
of advancing the common good.123
John Paul II, who reiterated the importance of democratic and
participatory political institutions, insisted that “free and responsible
participation of all citizens in public affairs” and “respect for the
promotion of human rights”124 are necessary conditions for authentic
development of the people as a nation-state.
As we have discussed elsewhere,125 Since Vatican II,
commitment to democracy and human rights has been added to
the social teaching of the Church. Hence, this should be another
area where the Indian Church in collaboration with the civil society
can come forward to strengthen the institution of democracy in the
country, which is both dear to the Christian approach to human
person and political order as well as to the philosophy of the
humanistic secularism of Indian Constitution.
2.6.4.5. The Call to Commit for Common Welfare
The fifth area of value commonality between the Church’s teaching
on political community and the Constitution of India is the
commitment for the common welfare of the society. From the
theological point of view, the pursuit of common good is based on
the theological anthropology sourced by the biblical insight of human
person as image of God that underpins the dignity and social nature
119 Paul E. Sigmund, “Catholicism and Liberal Democracy”, in Catholic Social
Thought and the New World Order, op.cit., pp. 66-67.
120 Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, The Blackwell Companion to
Philosophy, reprint (Oxford, Blackwell, 2001), pp. 278-279.111 See Preamble
of the Constitution of India.
121 GS, article 12, para 4; Gen 2: 26.
122 These are also the founding values of the Indian Constitution. See the Preamble
of the Constitution of India.
123 GS, article 75, para 1.
124 SRS, no.44.
125 See above chapter 5 section 2.5.7: “Human Dignity and the Concept of Secular
State,” pp. 375-377 ff.
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of the people, their personal and social needs, and their rights and
responsibilities as ordained by God.126
The Church’s teaching holds that the State is a natural institution
willed by God. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes offers
a more systematic narrative about the natural theory of the State.
It describes:
Man’s social nature makes it evident that the progress of
the human person and the advance of society itself hinge on
each other…[T]he subject and goal of all social institutions
is and must be the human person, which for its part and by
its very nature stands completely in need of social life. This
social life is not something added on to man. Hence, through
his dealings with others, through reciprocal duties, and through
fraternal dialogue he develops all his gifts and is able to rise
to his destiny.
Among the social ties which man needs for his development
some, like the family and political community, relate with
greater immediacy to his innermost nature.127
The Church’s teaching on political community is based on the
relational nature of human person as implied in the theological
anthropology. Accordingly, Church’s teaching propounds that the
institution of the political community owes its origin to the divine
design. It is known through human nature. Therefore, the State is
not only a natural institution but also a necessary one to care for
the welfare of all citizens. Hence, the consistent affirmation of the
Church’s teaching is that the purpose of the State is to care for the
common good and public order.128 Certainly, this theological
perspective is based on the ethics of interhuman concerns.
Therefore, the social teaching of the Church insists on the
responsible use of freedom to secure human dignity in the political
community, which is a universal value desired by all people.129
The Church’s political thought avoids individualism and
collectivism. It sees political community in the light of the ethics of
interhuman concerns.130 This is in keeping with the welfare of all
as demanded by the social nature of human persons, which is an
essential consequence of their creation in God’s image. It would
become clear when we see it with an example. The Church’s
position would consider that elimination of poverty ensures the dignity
of the entire political community as well as protects the dignity of
the underprivileged members of the same political community. Its
basic political mantra is that the good of the individual person is
bound up with the good of the community. What is good for the
community is also good for the individual in so far as all members
of the political community enjoy the political good, because we are
truly a political community in solidarity with all other members of
the same political community.131
We cannot but acknowledge a strong sense of value
commonality binding together the Church’s approach to welfare
State and that of the Constitution of India. Founded on the
philosophy of humanistic secularism and animated by the ethics of
interhuman concerns, the Constitution of India holds that the purpose
of the State is for the common good and public order to protect
human dignity from violation by caring for the welfare of all. This
is made clear in the Preamble of the Constitution of India that
enshrines the solemn resolve of the people of India to secure to all
its citizens “Justice, social, economic and political.”132
India is a welfare state. We have studied in chapter three that
religious beliefs and customs often contravene humane objectives
of the social welfare and reform policies of the State.133 The framers
of the Constitution have equipped the Constitution with saving
provisions for the State to intervene in the matters of social welfare
and reform with the aim of protecting as well as advancing the
cause of human dignity.134 In this regard, when cases associated
126 GS, article 26.
127 Ibid., article 25, paras 1 and 2.
128 RN, nn.28-29; QA, n.49; GS, article 74; DH, articles 5, 6.
129 DH, article 2.
130 GS, articles 25, 26; DH, article 8
131 Crf. Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, op.cit., p. 145.
132 The Preamble of the Constitution of India.
133 See above chapter 3 section 1.3.5.1: “Religious Freedom Subject to Social
Welfare and Reform,” pp. 214-217.
134 See articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
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with the clash of interest between religious concerns and social
welfare have been appealed for judicial decision, the Courts in India
have generally decided in favour of social welfare and reform
policies of the State.135
The purpose of the social welfare and reform measures of the
State can be classified in three ways: The first purpose it is to
create a social space freed from irrational forces where people
can develop themselves and flourish in various aspects in
accordance with human dignity. The second purpose is to defend
human freedom against the forces of traditionalism and
obscurantism that are contrary to authentic values of development
and scientific temper.136 The third purpose is to usher in a humane
social order based on humanistic ethics to protect human dignity
affecting the individual and community lives of the citizens. This has
been articulated under the Directive Principles of the State Policies
of the Constitution.137 For this reason, the Indian Constitution contains
many social welfare provisions.138 Most of these constitutional policies
reflect the spirit and the objectives of the nineteenth century
humanistic reform movement of India.139 It was a prophetic
movement for social and religious reform as well as for national
awakening to create modern India as a sovereign nation-state - all
centred on the value of inviolable dignity of every human person as
moral subject and people’s corporate right to political freedom.
According to the Christian understanding, the prophetic
movements are God’s saving interventions in human history, which
is led by the Holy Spirit, sent by Christ from the Father, who is at
work every where in the hearts of men and women of all ages to
renew people, to reform society and to associate all with the paschal
mystery of Christ.140 The Christian tradition is known for prophetic
movements for social, religious and political reforms. God’s saving
intervention through the prophets of the Old Testament was, at the
same time, a call to restore the denied dignity to the enslaved people
as well as a call for the restoration of a social order worthy of
human dignity and solidarity.141 Similarly, Jesus’ proclamation of
the Kingdom of God was also a proclamation to restore the dignity
of the rejects of the society and to affirm their place in the blessing
of God’s Kingdom as God’s children.142
The Church is commissioned to continue the mission of salvation
and liberation inaugurated by Jesus. It is an adventure of God in
history with people for God’s partners to renew and reform
individuals and society according to God’s rule where the Kingdom
values of freedom, fellowship and justice prevail for the flourishing
of the people’s lives in dignity as God’s children.143 This implies
that the constructive support of the Indian Church to the political
process to further the cause of social welfare and reform policies
of the State in India shall be a significant service to the nation. It
shall be also a significant witness to the Gospel values in the political
realities of India.
135 Some cases of historic importance in this matter are the following:
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v.
State of Bombay, AIR 154 SC 388; Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of
Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR
1961 SC 1402. We studied these cases in chapter three.
136 “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India - to develop the scientific temper,
humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform.” Article 51-A (h). This article
is given in Part IV-A of the Constitution, which enumerates certain Fundamental
Duties of every citizen of India.
137 For instance, one of the Directive Principles of the Constitution reads:“(1)
The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic
and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.”
‘‘(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income,
and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities,
not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in
different areas or engaged in different vocations.” Article 38 of the Constitution
of India.
138 Most of the provisions are given in Part IV of the Constitution, which contains
Directive Principles of State Policy. See articles 36-51 of the Constitution of
India.
139 R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 86-156, 256-294.
140 AG, article 4; GS, article 22; LG 16.
141 Ex 3: 7-10; 22: 21-22; Dt 23: 15-16; 24: 14-15; Is 1: 16-17; 61: 1-3; Amos 5:
14-15.
142 Mt 20: 1-15; 21: 31; Lk 4: 18-19; 15: 11-32; 18; 9-14.
143 George Soares-Prabhu, “The Kingdom of God: Jesus’ Vision of a New Society”,
in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a Just Society, op.cit., pp. 579-608.
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In this way, the Indian Church provides a relevant service to
the nation by appreciating, upholding and fostering the constitutional
values of the philosophy of humanistic secularism whose political
objectives are for the humanisation of the society and the institutions
in a way that a humane societal ambience may be created to
facilitate human life flourishing.  While upholding the autonomy
and order proper to religion and the State, the service that the Indian
Church can offer to political community consists preciously, by
means of dialogue and collaboration with the civil society. The aim
of Church’s service to civil society is none other than to promote
the values of ethics of interhuman concerns that are enshrined in
the secular Constitution of India. These are affirmative of the human
dignity in various aspects of the national life.144
2.6.5. Human Dignity: the Basis of Dialogue with the Civil
 Society
In accordance with our research question, we have studied the
centrality of the concept of human dignity in the philosophy of
humanistic Indian secularism of the Indian Constitution. Similarly,
we have researched through the Christian tradition to identify its
centrality in the Christian thought. In a special way, the theological
anthropology of Gaudium et Spes highlights human dignity and its
significance to the Church’s teaching on religious freedom and
constitutional State as given in the declaration Dignitatis Humanae.
In our research finding, we have articulated the ethical values of
interhuman concerns, which are common to the philosophy of Indian
secularism and theological anthropology, precisely because both
are based on relational anthropology. For that reason, we have
shown the possible areas of dialogue and collaboration between
the Indian Church and civil society in defence of human dignity.
From all that we have studied and elaborated, we now point out, by
way of summary, three reasons for choosing human dignity as the
subject matter of dialogue and collaboration between the Indian
Church and the political community.
2.6.5.1. Based on the Conciliar Vision of Dialogue
The first reason is based on the Second Vatican Council’s
affirmative stance towards the secular world and the path of dialogue
set forth by the Council. This has led the Catholic Church into an
era of dialogue and collaboration with the world community mainly
on three levels, namely ecumenical dialogue, interreligious dialogue
and dialogue with the secular world. With the promulgation of the
conciliar documents Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae,
the Catholic Church has come forward to offer its services to the
political community in terms of dialogue and collaboration to create
a world order worthy of human dignity.
The common ground for such dialogue of universal dimension
with peoples of all persuasions in the secular society is human dignity,
human relationality and human activity in the world. Theology sees
them as divine endowments for creating human beings in God’s
image gifted with reason and freedom as well as inalienable rights
and obligations to seek after the truth and to organise their lives in
responsible freedom. Reiterating this point, Vatican II declares
succinctly, “Everything we have said about the dignity of the human
person, and about the human community and the profound meaning
of human activity, lays the foundation for the relationship between
the Church and the world, and provides the basis for dialogue
between them.”145
The purpose of dialogue with the world of secular order, namely
the political community, education and culture, etc., is to help people
gain a deeper insight into their full destiny  ”so that they can fashion
the world more to man’s surpassing dignity, search for a brotherhood
which is universal and more deeply rooted.”146 Hence, fundamental
values such as human dignity, liberty, equality, justice, solidarity,
common good and public welfare are integral to the Christian
theology of human person, society and State. These values are
also the defining ideals of the contemporary civilizational legacy of
liberal democracy, which extols human beings as free and
responsible persons of the political community. Therefore, authentic
144 GS, article 76; DH, article 13.
145 GS, article 40, para 1.
146 Ibid., article 91, para 1.
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human values are correlated to Christian theological
anthropology because both adhere to an ethics of interhuman
concerns arising from relational anthropology.147
It is for this reason, the Second Vatican Council urges Christians
to take their secular duties seriously, since these are constitutive of
their vocation in life according to their manner of calling in the
Church, which is divine and earthly in character. The Council insists,
“concerning this task they must give a reckoning to Him who will
judge every man on the last day.”148 Those who uphold the values
of human freedom, equality, solidarity and justice, regard human
dignity with high esteem. They also work for a social order
respecting human dignity, as these are values of interhuman concerns
dealing with people’s life in the society. Therefore, the Church in
all its endeavours is called to promote human dignity in the secular
society.149
The Church in its mission to the secular society labours with all
people of good will to decipher the authentic signs of God’s presence
and purpose in the happenings, needs and desires of the
contemporary world.150 The Church on its part shares with the
world “the light of Christ, the image of the unseen God”151 so as to
recall to people the transcendent dignity of their vocation and to
show its supremely human character.152 These insights of Vatican
II substantiate our position that the concern for human dignity is an
essential way of encountering the contemporary secular world order
in so far as human dignity is a common universal value dear to
people. It is the value with which God has endowed everyone, and
longed for everyone, by creating him or her in God’s image.
2.6.5.2. Based on the Church’s Service to Political Community
The second reason is based on the Church’s pastoral responsibility
to support the political institution of democracy, religious freedom
and human rights in the pluralistic society with the objective of
protecting human dignity.153 The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium
et Spes holds that the Church has a pastoral responsibility to the
political community because it is concerned with the transcendent
dignity of the human persons as image of God. Therefore, while
speaking about the role of the Church in the political community
the Council clarifies the position of the Church and declares, “The
role and competence of the Church being what it is, she must in no
way be confused with the political community, nor bound to any
political system. For, she is at once a sign and a safeguard of the
transcendence of the human person.”154
The Church and the political community are distinct and
autonomous in their proper sphere of activity, but both serve people
in their personal and social calling in life. Therefore, human nature
requires that both institutions function harmoniously in the society
because religion and State exist for the good of the human person
who is a believer and a citizen at the same time. Regarding this the
Council further states:
In their proper spheres, the political community and the
Church are mutually independent and self-governing. Yet,
by a different title, each serves the personal and social
vocation of the same human beings. This service can be
more effectively rendered for the good of all, if each works
better for wholesome mutual cooperation, depending on the
circumstances of time and place. For man is not restricted
to the temporal sphere. While living in history he fully
maintains his eternal vocation.155
The Church carries out its pastoral responsibility to safeguard
the transcendent dignity of human person by promoting the
institutions of democracy, civil rights, especially religious freedom,
justice, human solidarity, peace and harmony in the society, and
principles of political responsibility of the citizens, etc.156147 Ibid., articles 1, 3 , 4, 11. 40.
148 Ibid., article 93, para 1. Crf. also articles 34, 42, and 43.
149 Ibid., articles 12-22.
150 Ibid., article 4.
151 Ibid., article 10, para 8.
152 Ibid., article 11.
153 GS, articles 73, 74, 75; DH, articles 2-8.
154 GS, article 76.
155 Ibid., para 3.
156 Ibid., article 41.
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It is also a demand of the Gospel of Christ laid upon the Church
to proclaim the freedom of the children of God and to repudiate all
forms of bondage that ultimately results from sin.157 The Church
values the sacredness of the conscience, and advices that the human
talents are to be employed for the service of God by serving human
persons created in God’s image.158 These are substantive values
that safeguard human dignity from violation. The Indian Church
would fulfil its religiously grounded ministry to the political community
in defence of human person not alone but in collaboration and
dialogue with the civil society, since it is also the constitutional duty
of every citizen to uphold and promote these constitutional values
in the civil society.159
2.6.5.3. Based on the Centrality of Human Dignity
The third reason arises from the manner in which human dignity is
viewed in the philosophy of the humanistic secularism of the Indian
Constitution and in the Church’s teaching on religious freedom and
the constitutional State. Human dignity is central to the Church’s
teaching, which is sourced by imago Dei doctrine. It is also central
to the Constitution of India in its secular approach to human person,
religion and society. Both institutions (the Church and the State in
India) also accord high priority not to violate human dignity or to
marginalize any sections of the people in the political community, but
remain resolved to protect the inviolable worth and dignity of all as
moral subject.160 The reason for this value commonality between
the Church and the State in India is that the philosophy of humanistic
secularism of Indian Constitution and theological anthropology are
based on relational anthropological approach towards human person.
According to relational anthropology, dignity and relationality
are fundamentally interrelated values.161 Therefore, the human
rights, which protect human dignity, are adjudicated not in an
individualistic sense - as if the political community consists of a
collection of monadic individuals, but in a relational context of human
solidarity that forms the society. In this case, Social justice balances
human rights because relational anthropology displays an ethics of
interhuman concerns. It is concerned with care for all, beginning
with the least in the society. This involves an obligation to promote
social welfare and the common good.  The ethics of interhuman
concerns is also inclusive and pluralistic in approach. It is intended
to promote a humane social order against the forces of
homogenisation, marginalization and dehumanisation.
This common perspective of the Church and the State in India
towards human dignity becomes clear when we see how the Indian
secularism understands the principle of separation between State
and religion. As we have argued out elsewhere, the State keeps a
“principled distance” from religion or from any sections of people
in the political community. It means that the State regulates the
interests of the individuals and various sections of people so that all
may live in dignity with justice. As a political value, the ethics of
interhuman concerns operates through the idea of principled distance
that the State maintains from all people. On account of the ethics
of interhuman concerns that directs the operation of the secular
provisions, the Constitution reflects the Kingdom ideals that Jesus
proclaimed.
The Constitution of India enshrines the noble longings and hopes
of the nation on its march towards a humane social order. Seen
theologically, God’s Word and the Spirit are at work in these
expectations of the nation,162 because these are the nation’s
ennobling desires towards a better human future for all informed
by the ethics of interhuman concerns. Hence, when the Indian
Church enters into dialogue and collaboration with the civil society
to protect and promote these substantive values of human dignity
as enshrined in the constitutional provisions, it is entering into a
sphere where grace is already at work, in so far as it is effectively
influenced by Christ’s saving action.163
157 Crf. Rom 8:14-17; Gal 4:4-7.
158 Crf. Mt 22: 17-22, 34-40; Acts 5: 29-32.
159 Article 50-A of the Constitution of India.
160  See the value commonality found between the articles 73-75 of Gaudium et
Spes; articles 2, 4 of Dignitatis Humanae and articles 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30 of
the Constitution of India.
161 See above section 2.6.2: “Relational Anthropological Approach in the
Constitution of India”, pp. 395-400.
162 GS, article 38, para 3 and article 45, para 2.
163 Ibid., article 22.
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These observations provide us with reason to claim that the
dialogue and collaboration, which the Church wishes to have with
the civil society, takes place between the Gospel values and the
same values embedded in the politico-ethical order and operating
through the secular constitutional provisions and institutions in the
nation’s political life to the extent that these constitutional values
and institutions reflect the ethics of interhuman concerns.
Consequently, the Church’s social ministry to civil society becomes
part of its ecclesial mission, that is, evangelisation in the secular
society in defence of human dignity.164
These essential similarities of thought inherent in the Christian
concept of human dignity and that of the Indian Constitution is the
reason for the value commonality found remarkably between both
institutions and their respective systems of thought. Some of them
are respect for human person and human rights, affirmation of
pluralism and egalitarian anthropology, institution of democracy and
constitutional order of the State, maintenance of common good
and public welfare, preservation of autonomy as well as harmony
between religion and the State.
On the one hand these are truly secular values and institutions
necessary for a secular State, which is affirmative of human dignity,
but on the other, these are also the values with deep spiritual content
because they respond to the holistic need (spiritual and temporal)
of the people in their transcendent dignity as persons. They are
truly the Gospel values and authentically human values on account
of their commitment to interhuman concerns.165 These are also the
indispensable principles of governance to promote and nurture a
humanistic secular order in the Indian political community. Therefore,
they turn out to be constructive pointers for dialogue and
collaboration between the Indian Church and the civil society to
strengthen the secular ethos of the country as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, but equally resonating with the demands
of the transcendent dignity of the people as God’s children created
in God’s image and redeemed by Christ.
164 GS, article 76, DH, article 13.
165 GS, articles 3, 11.
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Appendix
THE SECULAR PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
I. Freedom of Religion
Individual freedom of religion
Article 25 (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the
other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice
and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing
law or prevent the State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or
other secular activity which may be associated with religious
practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open
of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all
classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I. - The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be
deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II. - In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to
Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons
professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference
to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.
Collective freedom of religion
Article 26 Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right -
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and
charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
Article 30 (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language,
shall have the right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice.
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions,
discriminate against any educational institution on the ground
that it is under the management of a minority, whether based
on religion or language.
II. Citizenship
No state discrimination on grounds of religion
Article 15 (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them.
[(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall
prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.]1
Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
Article 16 (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office
under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible
for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or
office under the state.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State form making
any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in
favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion
1 Added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, sec. 2.
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of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under
the State.
[(4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any
class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in
the opinion of the States, are not adequately represented in the
services under the State.] 2
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law
which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection
with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or
any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person
professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular
religious denomination.
No discrimination in educational institutions
Article 29 (2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any
educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid
out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
language or any of them.
No communal electorates
Article 325  There shall be one general electoral roll for every
territorial constituency for election to either House of Parliament
or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State
and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or
claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such
constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or
any of them.
Article 330 (1)  Seats shall be reserved in the House of the People
for - the Scheduled Castes;
[(b) the Scheduled Tribes except the Scheduled Tribes in the
autonomous district of Assam] 3
Article 332 (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes, [except the Scheduled Tribes in the
autonomous districts of Assam],4 in the Legislative Assembly
of every state [***]5
III. Separation of State and Religion
No special taxes for promotion of religion
Article 27  No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the
proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of
expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular
religion or religious denomination.
6[Article 290A A sum of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees
shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of
the State of Kerala every year to the Travancore Devaswom
Fund; and a sum of thirteen lakhs and fifty thousand rupees
shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of
the State of [Tamil Nadu]7 every year to the Devaswom Fund
established in that state for the maintenance of Hindu temples
and shrines in the territories transferred to that state on the
first day of November, 1956, from the state of Travancore-
Cochin.]
No religious instruction in State educational institutions
Article 28 (1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any
institution wholly maintained out of state funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution
which is administered by the state but has been established
2 Inserted by the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995, sec. 2.
3 Substituted by the Constitution (Fifty-first Amendment) Act, 1984, sec.2.
4 Substituted by the Constitution (Fifty-first Amendment) Act, 1984, sec.3 for
the words “except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas of Assam, in Nagaland
and in Meghalaya”.
5 The words and letters “specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule”
omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, sec. 29 and
Schedule.
6 Inserted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, sec.19.
7 Substituted by the Madras State (Alteration of Name) Act, 1968 (53 of 1968),
sec. 4, for “Madras”.
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under any endowment or trust which requires that religious
instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized
by the state or receiving aid out of state funds shall be required
to take part in nay religious instruction that may be imparted in
such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be
conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto
unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian
has given his consent thereto.
APPENDIX 473
Summary in Dutch
Nederlandse samenvatting
Menselijke waardigheid
in het Indiase secularisme en in het
Christendom
(het Christendom in dialoog met het Indiase secularisme)
Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd in de context van India’s
politieke secularisme, dat tegenwoordig onder druk staat. De Indiase
versie van het secularisme - samengevat in de formulering
“evenveel respect voor alle godsdiensten” (sarva dharma
samabhava), is van fundamenteel belang voor de politieke filosofie
van het moderne India als een autonome natiestaat. De eenheid en
samenhang van het land vragen nu om een versterking van de
seculiere democratische fundering van zijn constitutie en zijn
politieke instellingen.
In de afgelopen drie decennia is de verzuiling van het
staatsbestel en de samenleving in India, bewerkstelligd door
voorstanders van Hindutva - een religieus-nationalistische ideologie
met fascistische trekken, een bedreiging geworden voor de hele
idee van natie en burgerschap. Dit heeft geleid tot een zeker gevoel
van nationale urgentie om een seculier nationaal platform te vormen
dat de krachten van het sektarische nationalisme kan weerstaan
en waarborgen kan bieden voor een staatsbestel in
overeenstemming met de seculiere democratische doelstellingen
van de constitutie, die de multiculturaliteit van India garandeert.
Christenen in India hebben hun solidariteit betuigd met hun
diversiteit in de burgerlijke samenleving. Bij het respecteren van
diversiteit, vooral religieuze diversiteit, hoort een staatsbestel dat
schendingen verhindert van de onvervreemdbare waarde en
waardigheid van de menselijke persoon. Deze moet als vrij en
verantwoordelijk subject kunnen zoeken naar waarheid en zo een
eigen manier van leven in kunnen richten in de burgerlijke
samenleving. Parallel hiermee hebben mensen volgens de
Christelijke theologie de capaciteit om naar waarheid te zoeken en
hun leven te leiden in verantwoordelijke vrijheid, omdat zij gemaakt
zijn als beeld van God en verlost zijn door Christus, voor gemeenschap
met God. Daarom zijn allen begiftigd met onschendbare waardigheid
en onvervreemdbare rechten. Staat en samenleving moeten deze
waarden respecteren, omdat zij betrekking hebben op mensen,
gemaakt naar het beeld van God.
Daarom heeft dit proefschrift in de context van dit
onderzoeksproject een dubbele doelstelling, namelijk (1) een
systematische studie te presenteren van de centrale plaats van
menselijke waardigheid enerzijds in de filosofie van het Indiase
secularisme en anderzijds in de Christelijke theologie van de
menselijke persoon, de constitutionele staat en de religieuze vrijheid;
en (2) de identificatie van gedeelde waarden die voortkomen uit
beide denksystemen - steeds gecentreerd op de menselijke
waardigheid. Daarom stelt het proefschrift de menselijke
waardigheid voor als een betekenisvolle basis voor dialoog en
samenwerking tussen de Indiase Kerk en de politieke gemeenschap,
ter bevordering van het seculiere ethos van de constitutie. De
onderzoeksresultaten zijn met het oog hierop gerangschikt in twee
delen met elk drie hoofdstukken. Deel een betreft de politieke
geschiedenis en de constitutie. Deel twee bestudeert de Christelijke
theologie van de menselijke persoon en de wereldlijke orde, en
identificeert gedeelde waarden die inherent zijn aan beide
denksystemen, ten behoeve van een dialoog.
Het is opmerkenswaard dat de Indiase versie van het
secularisme gevormd is door inzichten die zijn overgenomen uit
westerse en Indiase tradities. De principes met betrekking tot een
medeburgers die zich wijden aan de constitutionele waarden
en de doelstellingen van het secularisme. In deze context heeft de
hoogste instantie van de Katholieke kerk in India, de Indiase
bisschoppenconferentie (CBCI, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of
India) de historische beslissing genomen het Indiase secularisme
te steunen. De Kerk heeft deze stap genomen als onderdeel van
haar sociale dienst aan de burgerlijke samenleving, vanuit haar
pastorale verantwoordelijkheid, en is bereid haar pastorale middelen,
met name catechese, pastorale brieven, en organisaties op het gebeid
van onderwijs, gezondheid en sociale dienstverlening, in te zetten
om de ware geest en strekking van het secularisme zoals vastgelegd
in de constitutie van India, te verbreiden en ingang te doen vinden.
De context van de studie zoals hierboven beschreven stelt een
theologische vraag, die centraal staat in het onderhavige
onderzoeksproject, en de poging deze te beantwoorden vormt de
inhoud van dit proefschrift. De vraag luidt: waarom moet de Indiase
Kerk de Indiase vorm van secularisme ondersteunen die vervat
ligt in de Indiase constitutie? Bij de beantwoording van deze vraag
worden de volgende principes aangehouden. De raison d être voor
de ondersteuning door de Kerk moet belichaamd worden in de
seculiere bepalingen van de Indiase constitutie en moet tegelijkertijd
ook in overeenstemming zijn met het Christelijke geloofsperspectief
op de menselijke persoon, de politieke gemeenschap en religieuze
vrijheid.
Als antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag stelt het proefschrift voor
dat respect voor de menselijke waardigheid de uiteindelijke reden
is waarom de Indiase Kerk het Indiase secularisme zoals vervat in
de seculiere bepalingen van de constitutie moet ondersteunen. De
menselijke waardigheid staat centraal in het Indiase secularisme
en in de Christelijke theologie van de menselijke persoon, de staat
en de religieuze vrijheid, omdat beide hoge prioriteit verlenen aan
het voorkomen van schendingen van de menselijke waardigheid.
De waardigheid van de menselijke persoon als moreel subject
staat centraal in de seculiere bepalingen van de Indiase constitutie
en in de daarmee samenhangende bepalingen rond respect voor
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democratisch staatsbestel, fundamentele rechten, egalitaire
sociale orde en scheiding tussen staat en religie zijn ontleend aan
de westerse politieke traditie en vooral aan de constitutie van de
Verenigde Staten van Amerika. Het principe van gelijk respect en
gelijke bescherming voor alle religies is gefundeerd op India’s
eeuwenoude ethos van religieus pluralisme. Het principe van sociale
en religieuze hervorming ter bescherming van de menselijke
waardigheid is de constitutionele bevestiging van de humanistische
erfenis van de Indiase Renaissance (1965-1981).
Hoofdstuk een presenteert daarom een geperiodiseerde studie
van de ontwikkeling van de seculiere staat in de westerse traditie.
Het begint met de Kerk in het Romeinse Rijk en eindigt met de
constitutie van de Verenigde Staten van Amerika, die voor de eerste
keer in de politieke geschiedenis religieuze vrijheid wettelijk vastlegde
in de juridische orde van de constitutionele staat.
Hoofdstuk twee presenteert een overzicht van de Indiase
politieke geschiedenis, vanaf de oudste politieke geschiedenis tot
de totstandkoming van de constitutie van het moderne India. Dit
hoofdstuk schenkt speciale aandacht aan enkele belangrijke politieke
ontwikkelingen en ideeën die de cultuur van religieuze diversiteit
en verdraagzaamheid gevormd hebben, en de Indiase nationale
onafhankelijkheidsbeweging die zich liet leiden door de idee van
seculier nationalisme.
De resultaten van deze bevindingen, geplaatst in een historisch
perspectief, leveren drie feiten op: (1) Secularisme als politieke
doctrine ontstond in de westerse en Indiase tradities in een religieus
pluralistische samenleving ter beheersing van religieuze conflicten
en om religieuze vrijheid vast te kunnen leggen als een burgerlijk
recht. (2) Het droeg bij aan de creatie van de constitutionele staat
gebaseerd op burgerlijke vrijheiden, een egalitaire sociale orde en
het primaat van de wet (rule of law). Dit zijn essentiële politieke
waarden en instituties ter bescherming van de menselijke
waardigheid. (3) De eeuwenoude cultuur van religieus pluralisme
van India, de vele schakeringen van zijn beschavingsethos en de
afwezigheid van conflicten tussen religie en staat in de annalen
van zijn politieke geschiedenis droegen bij aan de integratie van de
westerse liberale democratische waarden en instituties in zijn oude
beschavingserfenis. Secularisme zoals aanvaard door de opstellers
van de Indiase constitutie staat in positieve zin voor religieus
pluralisme, en in een breder perspectief voor respect voor de
diversiteit in de politieke gemeenschap. Negatief bezien gaat het
om het perspectief van een niet-sektarische staat.
Hoofdstuk drie behandelt de seculiere bepalingen van de Indiase
constitutie en aanverwante wetsartikelen zoals deze geïnterpreteerd
zijn door de Indiase rechterlijke macht. Op basis van verschillende
vonnissen van het Indiase Hooggerechtshof argumenteert het
proefschrift dat de opstellers van de constitutie een seculier
staatsbestel voor ogen stond, dat alle religies gelijkelijk bescherming
biedt, maar dat de staat een “principiële distantie” in acht neemt
ten opzichte van alle religies, ter verdediging van de menselijke
waardigheid. Het proefschrift wijst er verder op dat religieuze
vrijheid onderworpen is aan een constitutioneel raamwerk van
essentiële humane waarden en instituties als een egalitaire sociale
orde. Een dergelijke sociale orde moet doordrongen van de principes
van de verzorgingsstaat, publieke orde, moraliteit en gezondheid,
omdat deze de menselijke waardigheid veiligstellen in de burgerlijke
samenleving.
In het licht van de bevindingen van het onderzoek in deel een
definieert het proefschrift de Indiase versie van secularisme als
“humanistisch secularisme”, omdat de idee van “principiële distantie”
van religie daarin in feite bepaald wordt door humanistische waarden
ter verdediging van de onvervreemdbare waarde en waardigheid
van de menselijke persoon als moreel subject. Dit komt tot uiting in
iemands persoonlijke identiteit en in de gemeenschap van mensen
in hun onderscheiden gemeenschapsidentiteiten in de pluralistische
samenleving. Daarom ziet de constitutie menselijke waardigheid
als inbegrepen in de sociale natuur van de persoon.
Deel een besluit met de stelling dat het leitmotif van de
humanistisch secularistische filosofie van de Indiase constitutie is
een waardig leven te garanderen voor alle burgers. Dit is het vaste
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voornemen van de inwoners van India, vanuit hun hoop en
verlangen om van India een seculiere democratische soevereine
republiek te maken. Dit is in de context van de Indiase politieke
gemeenschap een belangrijke bron voor theologiseren over de
menselijke waardigheid in het licht van de theologische antropologie
zoals die is ontwikkeld in de Christelijke traditie. Dit is onze taak in
deel twee van het proefschrift.
Deel twee presenteert een uitgebreide theologische studie van
het Christelijke concept van menselijke waardigheid vanaf de bijbelse
bronnen tot en met de systematische ontwikkeling in de documenten
van Vaticanum II. Het doel van dit deel van het proefschrift is om
de filosofie van het humanistisch secularisme te interpreteren in
het licht van de theologische antropologie, omdat beide gericht zijn
op menselijke waardigheid.
Hoofdstuk vier bestudeert daarom de ontwikkeling van het
concept menselijke waardigheid in de theologische antropologie op
basis van de imago Dei-doctrine, zoals die voorkomt in de bijbel,
de klassieke theologie en de sociale encyclieken van de pausen.
Het proefschrift legt de nadruk op het steeds grotere belang van
menselijke waardigheid in de Christelijke benadering van
samenleving, staat, mensenrechten enzovoort, zoals uiteengezet in
de moderne pauselijke encyclieken.
Hoofdstuk vijf verkent de theologie van menselijke waardigheid
zoals uiteengezet in de documenten van het Tweede Vaticaans
Concilie, Gaudium et Spes en de toepassing met betrekking tot
religieuze vrijheid en de constitutionele staat in Dignitatis
Humanae. Het proefschrift benadert deze documenten in de
context van de openheid van de Kerk met betrekking tot de politieke
orde en haar bereidheid tot dialoog en samenwerking met mensen
van alle overtuigingen in de burgerlijke samenleving ter verdediging
van de menselijke waardigheid.
Hoofdstuk zes besluit het onderzoeksproject. In de eerste plaats
verzamelt het proefschrift in dit hoofdstuk de belangrijkste
kenmerken van de filosofie van het humanistische secularisme en
van de theologie van de menselijke persoon, de constitutionele staat
en de religieuze vrijheid zoals weergegeven in Gaudium et Spes
en Dignitatis Humanae. Ten tweede wijst het op een onderliggende
“gemeenschappelijke antropologische benadering” in beide
denksystemen. Het proefschrift definieert deze gemeenschappelijke
antropologische benadering als “relationele antropologie”, en vraagt
aandacht voor de ethiek die verworteld is in de relationele
antropologie. Het proefschrift definieert deze als een ethiek van
“intermenselijke betrokkenheid”, omdat het een ethiek is van zorg
voor de ander.
Het proefschrift argumenteert dat de ethiek van intermenselijke
betrokkenheid de ethiek is van de koninkrijkswaarden van Jezus,
zoals verkondigd in de zaligsprekingen. Daarom brengt het
proefschrift de humanistische waarden van het Indiase secularisme
in verband met de koninkrijkswaarden en suggereert dat Gods
Woord en Geest niet afwezig zijn in de politieke aspiraties van het
Indiase volk en de Indiase staat. Daarom besluit het proefschrift
met de stelling dat menselijke waardigheid een belangrijke basis
kan zijn voor dialoog en samenwerking tussen de Indiase Kerk en
de Indiase burgerlijke samenleving, ter verdediging van
constitutionele grondwaarden en instituties ter verdediging van de
menselijke waardigheid.
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Summary in English
Human Dignity
in Indian Secularism and in Chirstianity
(Christianity in Dialogue with Indian Secularism)
The present research is carried out in the context of India’s
political secularism, which is under stress. The Indian version of
secularism - popularly known as equal respect for all religions (sarva
dharma samabhava), is fundamental to the political philosophy of
modern India as a self-governing nation-state. The very unity and
integrity of the country depends on strengthening the secular
democratic underpinnings of the nation’s Constitution and its political
institutions.
During the past three decades, the communalisation of Indian
polity and society engineered by the proponents of Hindutva - a
Hindu communal nationalist ideology of a fascist type, has assumed
menacing proportions challenging the very idea of citizenship and
nationhood. This has created a certain sense of national urgency
among people to align on secular nationalist platform to oppose the
forces of communal nationalism and ensure a polity appropriate to
the secular democratic objectives of the Constitution that secures
India’s composite culture.
Christians in India have expressed their solidarity with their
fellow citizens, who are committed to the constitutional values and
objectives of secularism. In this context, the Catholic Church in
India through its apex body, the Catholic Bishops‘ Conference of
India (CBCI), has taken a historic decision in support of Indian
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secularism. The Church has taken this step as part of its social
ministry to civil society arising from its pastoral responsibility, and
willing to extend the pastoral means, namely catechesis, pastoral
letters, educational, health and social service organizations to impart
and inculcate among people the true spirit and tenor of secularism
as enshrined in the Constitution of India.
The context of the study as described above, posits a theological
question, which is central to the present research project, and the
attempt to answer it constitutes the matter of this thesis. The
question is: why should the Indian Church support the Indian form
of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution? While responding
to this question, the thesis is attentive to the following principles.
The raison d être for Church’s support must be embodied in the
secular provisions of the Indian Constitution and, at the same time,
it must also resonate with Christian faith perspective on human
person, political community and religious freedom.
 In answer to the research question, the thesis proposes that
respect for human dignity constitutes the ultimate reason for the
Indian Church to support the Indian secularism as enshrined in the
secular provisions of the Constitution. Human dignity is central to
Indian secularism and to Christian theology of human person, State
and religious freedom, because both accord high priority to prevent
violation of human dignity.
The dignity of the human person as moral subject is central to
Indian Constitution’s secular previsions and its allied articles that
respect diversity in the civil society. To respect diversity, especially
religious diversity, is to provide with a polity that prevents the evil
of violating the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person
as free and responsible subject to seek after the truth and so to
organise one’s way of life in the civil society. Similarly, according
to Christian theology, since all persons are created in God’s image
and redeemed by Christ for blessed communion with God, they are
endowed with capacity to seek after the truth and to order their
lives in responsible freedom. Therefore, all are endowed with
inviolable dignity and inalienable rights. Society and State must
respect these values because people created in God’s image
are the subject of these institutions.
Hence, in response to the context of this research project, the
thesis has two objectives, namely (1) to present a systematic study
of the centrality of human dignity in the philosophy of Indian
secularism and in the Christian theology of human person,
constitutional State and religious freedom; and (2) to identify some
value commonality arising from both systems of thought - all centred
on human dignity. Consequently, the thesis proposes human dignity
as a significant basis for dialogue and collaboration between the
Indian Church and the political community to promote the secular
ethos of the Constitution. Keeping this in view, the research findings
are arranged in two parts, each having three chapters. Part one
deals with political history and constitutional law.  Part two studies
Christian theology of human person and temporal order, and identifies
value commonality inherent in both systems of thought for dialogue.
It is to be noted that the Indian version of secularism has been
shaped by insights assimilated from Western and Indian traditions.
The principles of democratic polity, fundamental rights, egalitarian
social order and separation between State and religion have been
drawn from the experience of Western liberal political tradition,
especially from the Constitution of United States of America. The
principle of equal respect and protection for all religions is founded
on India’s age-old ethos of religious pluralism. The principle of social
and religious reform to secure human dignity has been the
constitutional affirmation of the humanistic legacy of Indian
Renaissance.
Hence, chapter one presents a periodisized study about the
development of secular State in the Western tradition. It begins
with the Church in the Roman Empire and culminates with the
Constitution of the United States of America, which established,
for the first time in the political history, religious freedom as a legal
institution in the juridical order of the constitutional State.
Similarly, chapter two presents a survey of the Indian political
history beginning from the ancient political history and ending with
the making of the Constitution of modern India. The chapter pays
special attention to some important political developments and ideas
that shaped the culture of religious diversity and tolerance, and
Indian national movement for independence led by the idea of
secular nationalism.
The results of these findings, from a historical perspective, points
out three facts: (1) Secularism as a political doctrine arose in the
Western and Indian traditions in a religiously plural society to manage
religious conflicts and to legislate religious freedom as a civil right.
(2) It was instrumental to create the institution of constitutional
State based on civil liberties, egalitarian social order and rule of
law. These are essential political values and institutions to protect
human dignity. (3) India’s age-old culture of religious pluralism, its
composite civilisational ethos and the absence of religion-state
conflict in the annals of its political history were instrumental to
integrate the Western liberal democratic values and institutions with
its ancient civilisational legacy. Secularism adopted by the framers
of the Constitution of India positively means religious pluralism,
which, in a broader perspective, implies respect for diversity in the
political community. It is negatively construed as a non-communal
State.
 Chapter three deals with the secular provisions of the Indian
Constitution and allied articles as interpreted by the Indian judiciary.
Based on several historic decisions of the Supreme Court, the thesis
argues that the framers of the Constitution intended a form of secular
polity, which guarantees to all religions equal protection but the
State maintains a  “principled distance” from all in defence of human
dignity. The thesis further points out that religious freedom is subject
to a constitutional framework of substantive humane values and
institutions like egalitarian social order imbued by the principles of
welfare State, public order, morality and health since they secure
human dignity in the civil society.
In the light of the research findings in part one, the thesis defines
the Indian version of secularism as “Humanistic Secularism,”
because its idea of “principled distance” from religion is basically
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conditioned by certain humanistic values in defence of the
inalienable worth and dignity of the human person as a moral subject
in one’s personal identity and the community of persons in their
distinct community identities in the pluralistic society. Therefore,
the Constitution sees Human dignity inclusively together with the
social nature of the person.
Part one concludes with the proposition that the leitmotif of
the philosophy of humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution
is to secure a dignified life for all citizens. This is the solemn resolve
of the people of India, their hope and longing for constituting India
a Secular Democratic Sovereign Republic. In the context of Indian
political community, it is a significant source for theologising on
human dignity in the light of theological anthropology as developed
in the Christian tradition. This would be our task in part two of the
thesis.
Part two presents an extensive theological study of the Christian
concept of human dignity beginning with biblical sources and its
systematic development in the documents of Vatican II. The aim
of this part of the thesis is to interpret the philosophy of the
humanistic secularism in the light of theological anthropology since
both are centred on human dignity.
In pursuance of our research objective, chapter four studies
the development of the concept of human dignity in the theological
anthropology based on imago Dei doctrine as seen in the Bible,
the classical theology and the social encyclicals of the Popes. The
thesis highlights the progressive importance of human dignity in the
Christian approach to temporal order, namely society, State and
human rights, etc., as expounded in the contemporary encyclicals
of the Popes.
 Chapter five explores the theology of human dignity as
expounded in the documents of the Second Vatican Council,
Gaudium et Spes and its application to religious freedom and
constitutional State as given in Dignitatis Humanae. The thesis
approaches these documents in the context of the Church’s
openness towards political order and its readiness to enter into
dialogue and collaboration with people of all persuasions in the civil
society to secure human dignity.
Chapter six concludes the research project. First of all, in this
chapter, the thesis collates the salient features emerging from the
philosophy of humanistic secularism and from the theology of human
person, constitutional State and religious freedom as given in
Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. Secondly, it points
out a “common anthropological approach” underlying in both systems
of thought. The thesis defines this common anthropological
approach as “relational anthropology,” and draws attention to the
ethics ingrained in relational anthropology. The thesis defines it as
an ethics of “interhuman concerns,” because it is an ethics that
cares for others.
The thesis argues out that the ethics of interhuman concerns is
the ethics of the Kingdom values of Jesus. Therefore, the thesis
relates the humanistic values of the Indian secularism with the
Kingdom values and suggests that God’s Word and Spirit are not
absent in the political aspirations of the people of India as a nation-
state. Consequently, the thesis concludes by proposing that human
dignity can be a relevant basis for dialogue and collaboration
between Indian Church and civil society in defence of substantive
constitutional values and institutions that protect human dignity.
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